Cameron, D.J. v Westpac Banking Corporation

[1994] FCA 740

<.-;W.

JUDGMENT No. ...,.. 790d 2-L

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA	)
)
DUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY	) )
GENERAL DIVISION	) No. QG91 of 1994

B E T W E E N :

DONALD JAMES CAMERON

Applicant

RECEIVED	- and -
17 OCT 1994	WESTPAC BANKING
FEDERAL COURT OF	CORPORATION

AUSTRALIA	Respondent
PRINCIPAL REQISTRV

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

m:  O'Loughlin J.

~tember 1994

The respondent Westpac Banking Corporation has moved the court on motion for an order striking out the statement of claim or alternatively staying the action in this matter on grounds that include the ground that the statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action. The applicant in these proceedings, Donald James Cameron, has prepared his pleadings and has prosecuted the action against the respondent wlthout the benefit of legal representation. That, of course, is his right and it is the obligation of the court to adopt a tolerant view of any perceived deficiencies that may appear in either his pleadings or in his presentation.

respondent to his proceedings in terms such that an impartial	third party, that is the judge, may read them and understand the
nature of the complaint. In this application the applicant has claimed, as his first ground of relief, damages against the respondent for misrepresentation. I have read his statement of claim and I have searched in vain for the representation that was allegedly made to him.
The statement of claim commences with the heading entitled "Particulars of the Untruth of the Said Representations and Breach of the Trade Practices Act 1974, Commonwealth." There then follows a reference to a Mastercard application agreement and some correspondence fromthe respondent. The details of that application and correspondence are not specified but one might conjecture from the concluding language in paragraph 2 that perhaps something about them was false or reckless or in breach of some unspecified and unidentified duty of care.
But one must not be left to engage in conjecture or in speculation. The so-called statement of claim in these
and, having read it carefully, I am compelled to say that I proceedings is hopelessly inadequate. I have read it carefully
cannot understand the nature of the applicant's complaint. I cannot ascertain from reading it what it is that the bank or the bank's officers did or said which could or would amount to a misrepresentation. I need to give but one example.
Who, for example, is Fond Law Proprietary Limited? Why does its name appear in paragraph 6 ? What is its relationship to the applicant? What effect, if any, has the respondent's conduct
with respect to Fond Law had upon the applicant? One is unable to answer any of these questions from a reading of the statement of claim.
I was told from the bar table, first by counsel for the respondent and then independently by Mr Cameron, that there have been earlier proceedings in this court in action QG45 of 1994.
I permitted both counsel and Mr Cameron to address me from the
bar table on aspects of that action. I adjourned the court and
I have since read the statement of claim in that action and I
have also read the judgment of Drummond J of 28 June 1994, in which he struck out that action pursuant to order 20 rule 2 on the ground that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed. Having read the two statements of claim it would seem to me, and in this regard it would be supported by the remarks from the bar table, that this second statement of claim, even though it is less explicit and more confusing than the first statement of claim, refers to the same issues.
I would like to take time to read what it was that Drummond J had to say with respect to the earlier action. I quote from his judgment:

On the other hand, common sense dictates that an applicant,
even one who is representing himself, must set out in writing the
nature of his complaint agalnst the party whom he names as the

" I t seems t o me t h a t what Mr Cameron i s p u r s u i n g i s a

c l a i m for	damages	f rom	Westpac b e c a u s e	he	s a y s	two
of f icers o f	Wes tpac	gave	f a l s e	t e s t i m o n y	t o	the

p o l i c e , t o a c o m m i t t i n g m a g i s t r a t e and u l t i m a t e l y t o

a	j u r y which r e s u l t e d i n what	he	s a y s was h i s w r o n g f u l
conviction.	H e	s u c c e s s f u l l y appealed	t h i s conviction

a l t h o u g h	he	s e r v e d	a	s u b s t a n t i a l	p e r i o d	o f
impr i sonmen t	f o l l o w i n g	his	c o n v i c t i o n	for	a	r e l a t e d

offence . "

Mt Cameron has confirmed from the bar table that that is indeed

the core of the case he is seeking to make out against Westpac. Dnumnond J then went on to refer to some authorities, including the remarks of Dawson J in the High Court in Gianarelli v Wraith, pointing out the public interest element which protects witnesses, advocates, judges and the like from remarks made during the course of litigation. His Honour then concluded in these terms:

" M i Cameron is understandably, in the face of such

authority, unable to advance any argument to show how he may still be able to run the case he is seeking to run against Westpac. It seems to me that the only course open in these circumstances is to bring the proceedings to an end now. I will make an order in terms of paragraph 1 (b) (l) of the notice of motion to the intent that the whole proceeding will now be

brought to an end. "

Having regard to the acknowledged fact that the statement of claim in these present proceedings addresses the self same issues, albeit in a different form in some regard, as the issues addressed in the proceedings before Drummond J, common sense

by Drummond J. I will make an order that this statement of claim	dictates that I follow exactly the same course as that followed
be struck out and that these proceedings be stayed permanently.
I finally address the existence of a notice of motion filed by Mr Cameron in which he seeks from the court orders by way of interference with judgments or orders of the Supreme Court of Queensland. He seeks orders in the nature of orders for summary judgment and finally he seeks an order that I vacate the judgment

of Drummond J to which I have just referred. First, I have no jurisdiction whatsoever to interfere with judgments or orders of the Supreme Court of Queensland and I decline to do so. Secondly, it is hardly a case for summary judgment when the statement of claim has just been struck out. Finally, the decision of Drummond S , having been entered and sealed, can now only be the subject of interference by way of the appellate process. Another judge has no jurisdiction whatsoever to vacate an order that has been entered and sealed. The motion filed by M r Cameron is therefore dismissed with costs. Costs will also

follow the event in respect of the bank's notice of motion.

The costs of the proceedings in their entirety are the costs

of the bank.

I certify that this and the 4-
preceding pages are a true copy
of the Reasons for Judgment of

Justice O'Loughlin.

Associate b*'

Dated: 8 Sop- lqqf-

M r Cameron Appeared on his

own behalf.

Counsel for the Respondent	Mr Sheahan
Solicitors for the Respondent :	Feez Ruthning
Hearing Date	8 September 1994