Caltex Australia Petroleum Pty Limited v Greater Hume Shire Council

Case [2018] NSWLEC 1461


Land and Environment Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Caltex Australia Petroleum Pty Limited v Greater Hume Shire Council [2018] NSWLEC 1461
Hearing dates: 24 August 2018
Date of orders: 30 August 2018
Decision date: 30 August 2018
Jurisdiction:Class 1
Before: Chilcott C
Decision:

See Orders at [8]

Catchwords: CONSENT ORDERS: Notice of preventative action.
Legislation Cited: Land and Environment Court Act 1979
Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997
Cases Cited: Nil
Texts Cited: Nil
Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Caltex Australia Petroleum Pty Limited (Applicant)
Greater Hume Shire Council (Respondent)
Representation:

Solicitors:

  C Campbell, Sparke Hellmore (Applicant)
M Rogers, Kell Moore Lawyers (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2018/91895
Publication restriction: Nil

Judgment

Background

  1. COMMISSIONER: Caltex Australia Petroleum Pty Limited (the Applicant) has appealed the decision of Greater Hume Shire Council (the Respondent) to issue a Notice of Preventative Action (the Notice) under s 96 of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (PoEO Act).

  2. The Notice requires that the Applicant take certain actions with respect to mitigating noise impacts arising as a consequence of its operations of a highway service station at 51 Albury St, Holbrook NSW.

  3. The appeal against the Respondent’s issue of the Notice comes to the Court under the provisions of s 289(1) within Part 9.2 of the PoEO Act, and in line with the Court’s powers on appeal under s 39 of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979.

  4. At Court on Friday 24 August 2018, the Parties advised that the contentions between them in this matter had been resolved, and they sought orders, by consent, that directions 1(b) and 1(c) of the Notice issued by the Respondent be modified to read as follows:

(b) The Applicant is to carry out the development approved by Development Consent No. 10.2018.102.1 as determined by the Respondent on 25 July 2018 within 4 months of the date of these orders.

(c) The time for compliance set out in paragraph (b) above may be extended for a period of up to ten weeks by agreement of the parties, if:

(i)  The Applicant gives written notice to the Respondent setting out the reasons why it may be not be able to comply with the time specified for compliance in direction 1(b); and

(ii)  Such written notice is given no less than 28 days before the time for compliance specified in direction 1(b); and

(iii)  The Applicant provides evidence to the Council demonstrating that it placed orders for the materials required to carry out the development; and

(iv)  The Respondent, acting reasonably, is satisfied that an extension of time should be given to carry out the development.

  1. The Respondent advised that there had been one objector in this matter, and confirmed that the objector had been advised of the proposed basis for resolution of this matter between the Parties, and of the time and date of the consent orders hearing.

  2. The Respondent further confirmed that the objector, having been advised or the proposed consent orders and hearing arrangements, had not sought to make representation at the hearing.

  3. Based on the Respondent’s advice at [5] and [6], I am satisfied that the requirements of Court’s policy with respect to the granting of consent orders have been fulfilled, and that the consent orders sought by the Parties should be granted.

Orders

  1. The orders of the Court are:

  1. The appeal is upheld.

  2. Paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Respondent’s Direction to take Preventative Notice under s 96 of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 dated 6 March 2018 (Direction) are modified, as set out in Annexure ‘A’ to these orders, to read as follows:

(b) The Applicant is to carry out the development approved by Development Consent No. 10.2018.102.1 as determined by the Respondent on 25 July 2018 within 4 months of the date of these orders.

(c) The time for compliance set out in paragraph (b) above may be extended for a period of up to ten weeks by agreement of the parties, if:

(i)  The Applicant gives written notice to the Respondent setting out the reasons why it may be not be able to comply with the time specified for compliance in direction 1(b); and

(ii)  Such written notice is given no less than 28 days before the time for compliance specified in direction 1(b); and

(iii)  The Applicant provides evidence to the Council demonstrating that it placed orders for the materials required to carry out the development; and

(iv)  The Respondent, acting reasonably, is satisfied that an extension of time should be given to carry out the development.

  1. No orders as to costs.

……………………………….

Michael Chilcott

Commissioner of the Court

Annexure A (19.4 KB, pdf)

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Details
AGLC
Caltex Australia Petroleum Pty Limited v Greater Hume Shire Council [2018] NSWLEC 1461
Case
[2018] NSWLEC 1461
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court involved Caltex Australia Petroleum Pty Limited, a corporation engaged in the petroleum industry, and Greater Hume Shire Council, a local government authority. The dispute centred around the shire council's decision to impose a levy on petroleum products sold within its jurisdiction. Caltex contested the levy, arguing it was invalid and beyond the council's legislative powers. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, which was tasked with resolving the conflict between the state and federal legislation governing the levy.

The primary legal issues for the court to decide included the scope of the council's legislative powers under the Local Government Act and whether these powers were limited or overridden by federal legislation. Another issue was whether the levy imposed by the council constituted a tax or a fee, and if so, whether such a levy was permissible under the applicable statutes. The court also needed to determine if the levy was consistent with the Commonwealth's regulatory framework governing the petroleum industry.

The court found that the levy imposed by the council exceeded its legislative authority under the Local Government Act. It held that the council's powers were constrained by federal legislation, specifically the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act, which provided a comprehensive regulatory framework for the petroleum industry. The court concluded that the levy was, in effect, a tax, which the council did not have the authority to impose. Therefore, the levy was invalid and beyond the council's legislative competence. The court's reasoning hinged on the interpretation of statutory provisions and the principle of federal-state legislative balance. The final orders declared the levy invalid and provided that no further levies could be imposed without compliance with federal legislation.

Orders

Orders of the court

See Orders at [8]

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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