CALANDER & CALANDER

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CALANDER & CALANDER

[2020] FCCA 1464

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Property – long marriage – substantial assets being family farm and husband’s recently received inheritance – contributions by wife’s family materially assisting purchase and development of farm – whether husband’s 2017 inheritance should be excluded from the property pool and if not what weight should it be given as a contribution – evaluative assessment – division of property 60/40 in favour of the husband just and equitable in the circumstances.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.75(2), 79

Cases cited:

Bonnici & Bonnici (1992) FLC 92-272

NHC & RCH (2004) FLC 93-204

Holland & Holland [2017] FamCAFC 166

Kessey v Kessey (1994) FLC 92-945

Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108

Trevi & Trevi [2018] FamCAFC 173

Vass & Vass [2015] FamCAFC 51

Applicant:

MR CALANDER

Respondent:

MS CALANDER

File Number:

DGC 3726 of 2019

Judgment of:

Judge Burchardt

Hearing dates:

25 & 26 May 2020

Date of Last Submission:

26 May 2020

Delivered at:

Dandenong

Delivered on:

10 June 2020

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr Sweeney

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Warren Graham and Murphy Lawyers

Counsel for the Respondent:

Mr Williams

Solicitors for the Respondent:

MST Lawyers

ORDERS

Amended pursuant to Rule 16.05(2)(e) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 on 12 June 2020

The Wife pay to the Husband the sum of $422,950 (“the payment”) within 90 days of the date of these Orders (“the date”).
Contemporaneously with the payment:
(a)The Husband do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as may be required to transfer to the Wife at the expense of the Wife all of his right, title and interest in the real property situate at and known as A Street, Town B, being the whole of the land more particularly described in Certificate of Title Volume 8375 Folio 321 (“the A Street, Town B property”);
(b)The Wife indemnify the Husband against all payments and liability pursuant to the mortgage registered number ... to the C Bank (“the mortgage”), and all apportionable rates, taxes and outgoings of or with respect to the real property of whatsoever nature and kind.
In the event that the whole of the payment has not been made by the date then the parties do all such acts and things and sign all such documents necessary to place the A Street, Town B property on the market for sale (“the sale”) and upon completion of the sale, the proceeds of the sale be applied:
(a)Firstly, to pay all costs, commissions and expenses of the sale;
(b)Secondly, to discharge the mortgage and any other encumbrance affecting the A Street, Town B property;
(c)Thirdly, so much of the payment as is then outstanding together with interest thereon at the rate of 6.75% per annum adjusted monthly from the date to the Husband;
(d)Fourthly, the balance then remaining to the Wife.
Pending the payment or completion of the sale:
(a)The Wife have the sole right to occupy the A Street, Town B property and during such right of occupation the Wife pay all instalments pursuant to the mortgage and all rates and taxes and like apportionable outgoings of the A Street, Town B property as they fall due;
(b)The parties hold their respective interests in the A Street, Town B property upon trust pursuant to these Orders; and
(c)Neither party encumber the A Street, Town B property without the consent in writing of the other party.
The Husband forthwith do all necessary acts and things and sign all necessary documents to transfer to the Wife at the expense of the Wife all his right, title and interest in the Motor Vehicle 1 and the wife be liable for and indemnify the Husband against all payments in respect of the loan to Motor Vehicle 1 Finance.
The Husband retain for his sole use and benefit absolutely and to the exclusion of the Wife, all his right, title and interest in the property situate at and known as D Street, Town E, being the whole of the land in particular described in Certificate of Title Volume ... Folio ... (“the D Street, Town E property”), and indemnify the Wife against all payments and liabilities of or with respect to the D Street, Town E Property of whatsoever nature and kind, including but not limited to Capital Gains Tax.
The parties forthwith do all necessary acts and things and sign all necessary documents to dissolve the partnership entitled Calander & Calander, at their joint expense, and the parties attend to payment of any liabilities of the said partnership in equal shares.
The Husband forthwith do all necessary acts and things and sign all necessary documents to transfer to the Wife, at the expense of the wife, all his interest in the registered business name, F Group, and thereafter the wife indemnify and keep indemnified the Husband in relation to any liabilities thereto.
The Husband retain to the exclusion of the Wife the following property:
(a)Any superannuation benefits; and
(b)His inheritance.
The Wife retain to the exclusion of the Husband any superannuation benefits.
The Husband remain solely liable for and indemnify the Wife against all credit card debts, personal loans and any other debts in his sole name or jointly with another person.
The Wife remain solely liable for and indemnify the Husband against all credit card debts, personal loans and any other debts in her sole name or jointly with another person.
The parties’ artworks are to be sold and the net proceeds divided 60/40 in favour of the husband.
The parties are to divide the remaining disputed chattels on a pick for pick basis.
The Wife forthwith do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to transfer to the Husband the sum of $135,000 from the Bank G, and these monies are in part satisfaction of the Orders of the Court.
Unless otherwise specified in these orders and save for the purposes of enforcing any monies due under these or any subsequent orders:
(a)Each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all superannuation and other property (including choses-in-action) owned by or in the possession of such party as at the date of these orders (the furniture, personal possessions, and like chattels in the property being deemed to be in the possession of the Husband/Wife).
(b)Monies standing to the credit of the parties in any joint bank account are to become the property of the Husband.
(c)Insurance policies remain the sole property of the owner/beneficiary named therein.
(d)Each party be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these orders.
(e)Any joint tenancy of the parties in any real or personal estate is hereby expressly severed.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Calander & Calander is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DANDENONG

DGC 3726 of 2019

MR CALANDER

Applicant

And

MS CALANDER

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introductory

This is a property dispute between two parties who are both farmers and who were married and in a relationship for a long time. The property pool can be, albeit broadly, characterised as falling into two parts. First, there is the farm that the parties operated while they were in a relationship. Second, there is what remains of a substantial inheritance received by the applicant husband relatively shortly before final separation. Each of the parties seeks that they retain the farm to the exclusion of the other. The husband seeks that there be a 65/35 division of the parties’ property favourable to him and the wife seeks that the property be split 50/50. For the reasons that follow, I am going to order that there be a division of the parties’ property in the proportions of 60 per cent to the husband and 40 per cent to the wife. I am going to give the wife an opportunity to retain the farm and to purchase out the interest of the husband.

Agreed or uncontested facts

Despite the bitterness with which this case has been attended, the vast majority of the background facts are not the subject of material or significant dispute. The husband was born in 1961 and the wife was born in 1967. They met in 1985 and it seems uncontroversial that they were romantically engaged from then until they became engaged in 1991 and married in 1993. Their son, Mr H, is said, in the most recent affidavit material, to be now 24 years of age, although his date of birth does not appear to be identified, and he lives with the wife.
The parties separated under one roof on 19 August 2018 and final separation took place relatively shortly thereafter when an Intervention Order was made against the husband without admissions on 19 September 2018 for two years.
From 1993 until 2001, the parties lived in properties owned by the wife’s parents and paid no or at least very reduced rental. This plainly must have contributed to the fact that the parties were able to make savings from time to time. In 1994, they bought a boatshed for $7,000 into which they then invested quite a substantial amount of money. The husband’s first affidavit suggests that this was sold at a net loss of $4,000, and from the sums in his affidavit it would appear that this generated $33,000 worth of net proceeds.
In 1997, the parties together with the maternal parents discussed the purchase of a property which has now become the farm the subject of dispute. The property was bought for $81,000 and the husband and wife contributed some $12,300 from their savings. The balance of the purchase price and on costs was provided by the wife’s parents.
There is no real dispute that the idea behind the purchase of this land, which had no property then on it, was that 15 acres would be farmed in seeds by the parents, and the husband and wife would farm five acres of vegetables, the property being a total of 20 acres. This was plainly a common intention and is supported by the fact that in 1998, a 50 per cent interest in the property was transferred to the husband and wife. The wife’s father died in 2000, but by then the husband and wife had commenced a building on the property for which they borrowed $100,000. It is in the end uncontroversial that the wife’s mother (presumably after the death of her father) gave the parties $27,000 to enable the kitchen and bathroom to be completed. The building was completed in 2001 and the husband and wife moved in.
The husband had two hip replacements in 2004 and 2005 but appears nonetheless to have been able to continue working in the vegetable production of the property. There is an issue as to the extent to which he did so as time went on. He had worked in a number of other activities including retail worker, customer service officer and a tradesman in the more distant past.
The wife who appears to come from what might be described as a farming background, has only ever worked, it would seem, as a farmer.
Although there is a dispute perhaps as to the quality thereof, there is no doubt that the wife’s mother assisted the husband and wife from time to time in the operation of their business. She paid their mortgage from 2004 to 2005 in the sum of approximately $10,000 when the parties were unable to do so. In 2006, she provided a cool store and washing line as a gift which are in still use. In 2007, the wife’s mother transferred her remaining 50 per cent of the property to the parties.
In 2012, the wife’s mother gave the parties $10,000 towards their mortgage and in 2014 loaned them $25,000 to purchase a tractor and a further $30,000 to purchase another tractor in 2017.
In early 2015, the husband’s Uncle Mr J died and albeit that it took until 2017 for the estate to be finalised, the net effect is that the husband inherited a half share in a property at Suburb K worth $515,000 to the husband, and $383,000 in cash. Of this, the tractors were repaid ($55,000), solar panels were put in on the property at $11,000, the wife bought a ride-on mower for $6,200 and approximately $30,000 was spent on running the farm and living expenses. In total about $100,000 was spent, as it were, to the parties’ joint benefit.
The remainder was invested and is still, one way or the other, available, or able to be brought into account.
Following separation, which came as a complete surprise to the husband but was plainly contemplated by the wife for some time prior (it emerged in cross-examination that she had seen lawyers on several occasions before the separation was announced), the wife transferred $100,000 from the parties’ joint Bank G account to an account for the husband. $80,000 was transferred to the C Bank of which, despite some perhaps initial lack of clarity, it seems now clear that $10,000 was given to the husband upon separation, and the remainder was divided equally as to $35,000 each to each party. $100,000 was paid to the husband by way of partial property settlement pursuant to an interim order made on 18 December 2019. The remainder of the total funds remains in the parties’ joint Bank G account.
The husband moved in with his elderly father for whom he cared until his recent demise. The husband is a one-third beneficiary pursuant to his father’s will and it is anticipated that he will receive in excess of $110,000 when the estate is settled.
The wife has remained in occupation of the farm and has continued to farm it (the majority of it is devoted to vegetables and a smaller proportion to the production of fruit). She has had two good seasons according to her evidence and has been able to pay some $50,000 to her solicitors from monies earned through these endeavours. Her mother has paid a further $35,000 to her solicitors directly. The husband has expended about $11,000 in legal costs thus far (see “MFI-1”).

The parties’ affidavits

As I have already indicated, most of the background facts to this case are really not the subject of any significant dispute and are covered in the agreed matters above. I note that the husband’s first affidavit filed 8 November 2019 details his recent withdrawal of a superannuation policy ($7,000). He deposed that the wife, in effect, conducted all the bookkeeping and financial records for their business. The affidavit also traverses the circumstances leading up to the Intervention Order. Perhaps the tenor of the material is best indicated by paragraph 17 where, having set out the matter from his perspective, the husband deposed:
The Respondent’s ugly manipulative quest for money and property now dwarfs her once redeeming features of love and compassion. I retain hope the dye is not cast as far as my future is concerned and whilst this separation has taken my home, my job and my family, I remain positive that the terms of my initiating action are viewed as fair for all concerned. Furthermore I trust I can look forward to a future absent from the Respondents insatiable lust for greed and her ongoing deceit.
The wife’s responding affidavit filed 9 December 2019 is once again almost completely dealt with in the agreed materials above. I note, however, that she deposed in some detail as to alleged abusive and violent behaviour on the part of the husband. Objection was taken to this material at trial by counsel for the husband but I ruled it admissible as it was plainly potentially relevant. As things transpired no questions were put as to any of the matters which were the subject of objection in this regard and no submissions were made about it either by either party. Perhaps the matter that is of most significant note is paragraph 21 where the wife deposed:
In running the farm, initially Mr Calander and I worked together and our efforts in this regard were comparable. However, over the last ten years, Mr Calander lost interest in the success of the farm business, removed himself from all managerial and financial aspects of running the business, significantly reduced his efforts and contribution to the farm, and eventually ceased cutting vegetables all together.
The wife’s trial affidavit filed 19 May 2020 adds but little. I note that she deposed to having done additional work between 2011 and 2017 to supplement the farm income (paragraph 24). I note that the matrimonial property was registered in the wife’s parents’ names (paragraph 30) and indeed it is not controversial that this was done at least in part because the husband was concerned he might lose Austudy which he was then receiving. The husband’s father’s death was put as being in 2019.
The wife also filed on 20 May 2020 an affidavit of her mother, Ms L, which essentially supports her version of the assistance given by the wife’s parents to the parties.
The husband’s final affidavit filed on 21 May 2020 again adds but little. I note, however, that paragraph 12 he deposed:
I confirm that I am no longer employed in paid employment and do not anticipate ever being in a position to re-enter the workforce. I had two hip replacements in 2004 and 2005 and could no longer complete cutting vegetables after fourteen seasons in that employment. I suffer from various ailments including diabetes, chronic asthma, anxiety and depression.
He also deposed that the wife’s mother owns a number of different properties and that the wife is one of only two siblings and is likely to inherit from her mother.

The Evidence given and Submissions made at Court

What follows is taken from my notes. Plainly, it is not a transcript. It records aspects of the matter that I found significant.

The Opening and Evidence on behalf of the wife

Counsel opened the case and referred to the amended case outline document filed on 22 May 2020. The amendments at paragraphs 5.6 to 5.10 related to care (and by inference contributions) of the husband’s uncle and father by the wife. It was asserted (and later adopted on oath) that before the uncle went into full-time care the wife took him meals two to three times a week and that she took both him and the husband’s father to appointments as required. It is further asserted that the husband’s father spent considerable time in his last years staying with the parties for a total of about one year during which the wife looked after his needs. It was asserted the wife visited the husband’s father frequently when he was in hospital following a fall and that she visited him before he died. An assertion that the husband and wife’s families had a longstanding relationship is probably true but, in my view, of no significance.
Counsel indicated that the wife seeks to pay the husband out and the figure calibrated would be $110,000, now revised to about $127,000 on new figures. This would be a 50/50 division. If one left aside the inheritances, the contributions by the wife and her family would lead to a 60 to 65 per cent division in favour of the wife. The inheritance reduces these matters to 50/50. The wife’s family made significant contributions. They could not have bought the farm and built the house without them. Counsel traversed the pool as the wife put it. He noted there was no certainty of inheritance on the part of the wife. Counsel referred to authority in relation to the addbacks of legal costs.
The wife was called and adopted her affidavits as true and correct. As indicated, she adopted as true the assertions made in the amended case outline about the assistance she had provided to the husband’s uncle and father.
Under cross-examination it was put to the wife that, in effect, she was seeking that the husband retain his inheritances and that she get everything else. Despite some equivocation the wife acknowledged this. She acknowledged that her legal fees had been paid by direct transfer. She had paid $50,000 herself from the business’ working account and her mother had paid $35,000. This has been paid over the last 20 months. She paid as bills came in so there was no big lump sum. She had first consulted Coote Family Lawyers then Taylor Splatt and finally Mason Sier Turnbull. She had been to Coote Family Lawyers before separation to get legal advice. She could not remember where the funds that paid those accounts came from. The parties had always had joint accounts. She could not say whether $7,246 had been paid to Coote Family Lawyers. The remaining $42,756 had all come from farm income. She had managed the farm and had a good crop. She had worked really hard to pay her legal costs and had scrimped and saved and lived very frugally. When it was put to her that she had had, in effect, rent-free accommodation, the wife said she had paid the mortgage. The mortgage was not used as a tax deduction. It was all paid from the farm account. The gas and electricity are paid by the business and also her car. A percentage of this is claimed against tax but she did not know the actual percentage. She could not say whether there was $18,000 in the farm account at separation. The husband was given $10,000 when he left. She admitted that the funds she received should also be brought into account. The husband had not been given an opportunity to remove furniture but she had offered him anything he wanted through a relative and he did not ask for anything. She wants to retain the farm and was not aware that the husband also wants it.

The wife said it was her father who enabled them to have the farm. He wanted them to live close to him. The farm and the ownership of the property would never have come about without her parents. There was a massive amount of help from her parents. The wife conceded that she could drive Uber as could the husband. She did not agree that the husband has no capacity to earn. She conceded he has mainly worked as a farmer but he can reskill. The husband has had two hip replacements but the wife was most reluctant to concede any of the other health problems asserted by the husband. She conceded that he had suffered asthma. He had never been diagnosed as diabetic although he had mentioned it. He was not on a diet commensurate with being a diabetic. All of the artwork is at the farm and was paid from the husband’s inheritance. The uncle died in 2015. She did not think probate took 22 months but it did take a long time.
She conceded that the inheritance was actually received in about March 2017, approximately 18 months before final separation. There were some benefits applied to the farm.
She was challenged as to the assertion in paragraph 5.6 of her case outline about the assistance she had given to Uncle Mr J. She said this was a statement. She was a part of the family for 30 years. When asked how often she had visited the husband’s father, the wife said at the time of separation the father was in transitional care. She visited him a number of times. She went to tell him that she and Mr Calander were separating. She was uncomfortable thereafter. She went to see him in hospital. She had seen him a number of times before separation.
I would interpolate and say that the wife was discernibly reluctant to make any concessions and her answers were, at this stage of the cross-examination, defensive and non-responsive.
So far as the A Street, Town B property was concerned they started farming immediately before the purchase and just after they sold the boatshed. She conceded there was no mention of the boatshed in her affidavit. They bought the land with her parents. She and the husband were not on title but put money into it. They intended to build on the property. They hoped to get a permit to build. They applied for a permit in 2000. The land was in her parents’ name and this was discussed. The mortgage was $100,000 and then they used the boatshed money. They built over three years and it cost about $150,000 to build. They had built a shed on the property. They moved in in 2001 and the build had taken a couple of years. In 2007, the wife’s mother transferred her share of the business to both of them.
In re-examination, the wife confirmed that she was able to manage the property. She had picked fruit. She had been lucky but she managed the property better than the husband. She had had two vegetable seasons since separation.

The Evidence of Ms L

Ms L adopted her affidavit as true and correct. Under cross-examination she conceded that the husband and wife worked hard as farmers. She said her daughter was the main worker on the farm. When it was put to her that her son-in-law was a hard worker, Ms L said that he did not work at the same pace as other farmers. She does not know that he is diabetic.
The property at A Street, Town B was bought in 1997 and registered in her name and that of her husband. The husband and wife paid the second deposit of $12,300. It was purchased with the intention that they would live on the property. Her husband planted half of the farm in seeds. Originally, the husband and wife could not get a permit because the land was not big enough. They got a loan from the bank to build. She did not know what they had spent. There were no discussions about the title. A year after purchase in 1998 they all had 25 per cent each. They had put sheds on the property. They farmed the land and a farmer works his land.
Ms L was cross-examined about her will. She has one son and one daughter but has grandchildren as well. She has five brothers and sisters and, if my notes are correct, 11 nephews and nieces.
When she made her will she devised a rental property to her son to counterbalance the wife having the farm. She owns four properties herself. None of these properties have been left to the wife. The property in Suburb M has been left to her son. This balances the A Street, Town B property. She proposes to give benefits to her children and grandchildren. Her daughter will get 40 per cent of her estate.
In re-examination Ms L confirmed that her will was executed in about 2000 or 2001. She intends to review this will and there may be changes.

The Opening and Evidence of the husband

Counsel pressed a number of objections in relation to evidence which, as I said, I overruled. As indicated, this evidence has turned out to be of no moment in any event. Counsel detailed the history of the relationship and the fact that the wife remained in possession of the farm. She has all the income, being some $40,000 to $60,000 per year, and lives rate and rent free and also has the benefit of depreciation. She has paid her legal fees from the farm. The husband is unemployed and was a carer until his father died. He has lived off his savings, in other words his uncle’s inheritance. He has cashed in $7,000-worth of superannuation. This was not an addback as it had been expended in living expenses. Counsel detailed the purchase and the subsequent sale in 1997 of the boatshed, giving rise to $28,000 plus the parties’ savings.
In 1998, it was agreed with the wife’s parents that the block of land be bought. About $10,700 was applied by the husband and wife. Between 1998 and 2006 they farmed the land together with the wife’s parents, although the wife’s father died in 2000. In 2000 and 2001, there was an application for a building permit which was then built on the land. In about 2006, the land was transferred from the wife’s mother to the husband and wife. They were in partnership until separation. The father had undertaken picture framing in the past but this was irrelevant. Counsel then went through the pool from the father’s perspective.
The husband was called and adopted his affidavits and financial statement as true and correct. He still has $33,850 in the C Bank and $50,000 in the Bank G account.
Under cross-examination, the husband said he had paid $14,000 in legal costs. This was paid quite a while ago. There is no money in trust. It was a 33-year relationship and the wife was 17 or 18 at the start. They were together for eight years before the marriage. They then lived in the wife’s parents’ property from 1993 to 2001. Rent was a nominal amount. This helped them to save. He did not recall living rent free while they were building the new home. Then they bought the land at A Street, Town B. It was placed in the wife’s parents’ name. The wife’s father wanted to retire and grow seeds. He wanted more land. The father was prepared to bid to $60,000 and the husband said they would put in $20,000. He was studying at TAFE and did not want to put his name on the property as he might lose his Austudy. He had worked for nine years part-time for the wife’s parents. He had a second job. He had worked as a customer service officer. He had done trade work also. He has done various jobs and can drive a car. Perhaps he could drive a taxi. He would not say he is totally incapacitated. His ailments prevent physical work. His other ailments make work difficult.
It was put to the husband that they would not have been able to obtain a building permit if the property had not been bought in the name of the wife’s parents. The husband said that they had engaged a building surveyor who got them permission to build. Ms L wanted to grow 15 acres of seeds. They could have bought the property themselves. They had $60,000. He was not sure if they would have been able to build. The transfer in 1998 was done for true love and affection.
The husband conceded, and in my view readily and straightforwardly, that the wife’s parents helped with the painting of the house and the building of the kitchen. He conceded that they had contributed $27,000 towards the kitchen and painting. They had had some bad years along the way.
It was put to him that the wife’s mother had contributed $12,000 to the mortgage in 2004 to 2005. He said that the mortgage was only $5,500 a year. The wife did all the book work and he did all the farm work. A cool room to which reference was made was closed in 2001 by Mr and Mrs L. It was built in 1984 and he and the wife rebuilt it. The equipment the wife’s parents gave them was junk. They often used contractors. Anything that was good did not come to them. He conceded that they did transfer the property to them.
The alleged gift from the wife’s mother of $10,000 in 2012 was news to him. He had glanced through her affidavit which was full of lies. It was disgustingly incorrect. He admitted that the wife’s mother lent them money to buy a second tractor but this was repaid from his uncle’s inheritance. It was not true that they had bled off the wife’s parents. They helped them to get the business going but they had to do the yards. They had to get their own clients. They had only obtained the clients of the wife’s parents after they closed down.
It was put the earnings were in the range of some $16,000 to $18,000 a year but the husband said this was also paid to his wife. When it was put to him that the income in 2018 was $28,000 the husband said he had had no income from the last two years. He went on to say words to the effect (I repeat again this is not a transcript) that counsel did not understand much about farming. You earn $100,000 a year and purchase equipment and depreciate so that you have only $40,000 left which you then divide, thus paying little if any tax. This answer was given with considerable conviction and at least in this instance I accept it. I note that it does seem to be commensurate with evidence I have heard in a number of other cases involving farming properties and the way in which income is treated.
The husband did not concede the wife’s endeavours to conduct the farm better. He denied all the allegations of family violence. He said they had a loving relationship and he had never laid a finger on her in 33 years. He said they had stoushes like every couple but it was water off a duck’s back and finished in five minutes. He was aware the wife had brought an Intervention Order application but was not aware he could challenge it. He had legal advice. Charges were said to be pending but were thrown out. The wife had not been to the police in 33 years nor seen a doctor in 33 years to corroborate any alleged assaults. When it was put to him that the police took out the Intervention Order the husband said, “Who contacted the police?”.
The inheritance from his father has not happened yet and he is living in his father’s house. When this estate settles he will be homeless.
When it was put to him that the wife had made contributions to assist his uncle and father the husband said that she did cook a bit for his uncle. There was nothing more than a daughter-in-law doing for a father-in-law. His father had not lived with them for a year. She was exaggerating. It might be eight months.
The assertions in paragraph 5.8 of the wife’s amended case outline were not exactly correct. His brother and sister-in-law had helped also. Nonetheless he and the wife took him in more than they did. He had allowed the wife to attend his father’s funeral even though the rest of the family did not want her to go.
He was prepared to accept that separation under one roof occurred on 19 August 2018 and final separation in September 2018. In 2018 they celebrated their 25th wedding anniversary and the wife wanted to enlarge her wedding ring. Then there was divorce in 2019. They slept in the same bed until three nights before he left the house.
The husband conceded that he had inherited $382,000 in cash plus a half-share of the block at D Street, Town E. They repaid the tractors for $55,000. They spent $11,000 on solar panels and $6,200 on a ride-on mower. He was paid $10,000 at the time of departure from the property. He was then cross-examined about the receipt of monies from the C Bank account which I think in the end emerged that that was split evenly as to $35,000 each.
The husband was cross-examined about his expenditure since separation. He has $83,848 left out of $145,000. He has paid rates, land tax, bills and living expenses. He has not worked since separation because he does not feel well enough to work. He had given the other side a five-page list of reports into his health. He has two replaced hips. He did not know what the current balance of the trading account was. The anticipated $129,000 he might inherit is now $110,000. This has been reduced because it will cost $25,000 to demolish it. He accepted that he had cashed in his $7,000 superannuation at separation.
In re-examination, the father confirmed that his father helped them on the farm for 15 years for 4 to 5 days per week and his father did not want to be paid any money for this.

Final submissions by counsel for the wife

Counsel commenced by traversing the orders sought which are largely those set out in the case outline. Counsel noted that the parties had agreed to dispose of chattels on a pick-for-pick basis. The net effect would be that the wife would be paying the husband $127,000.
Counsel submitted that the pool consisted of the $135,000 received by the husband, the $7,000 superannuation and the $10,000 paid to him at separation in addition to other matters. Counsel noted that the $83,848 noted in the schedule of property marked as “MFI-1” was the remainder of what the husband had received. The $9,400 he had paid in legal fees should be added back. The husband says he had used the money for living expenses but counsel queried whether this was appropriate. The Court had to consider the husband’s capacity to earn. He says he cannot work but still wants the farm. Counsel submitted that if the husband wants to work he can work.
The wife’s legal fees should not be added back if they came from income. The husband did not want to contribute to the creation of this income.
Turning to the question of contributions, counsel submitted that without the assistance of the wife’s parents the parties would not own any property at all. They would not have been able to build if the wife’s parents were not on title. The parents contributed to the purchase price and the mother’s mother was not cross-examined about this matter. Ms L also says she gave the parties farm machinery and cash contributions. These were substantial contributions. Counsel characterised them as “lifesaving”.
Of the husband’s inheritance approximately $100,000 came to the husband and wife late in the relationship. This constitutes about 10 per cent of the farm asset pool. There should be an adjustment from that asset in the wife’s favour. The wife says that she has some entitlement to the inheritances. These must be included in the assets. The wife’s mother’s will should be not included. Counsel emphasised that Ms L gave her son a property in her will to effect the wife’s ownership of the A Street, Town B property in 2002.
Turning to future needs, counsel submitted that the husband will get enough to purchase a property. The wife will work as a farmer. Farm earnings are modest. The farm is not a crown jewel.
Turning to the question of justice and equity, counsel submitted if the husband retains all his inheritance he would receive the $382,000 cash inheritance, of which the various funds in the Bank G accounts would come to him. The $35,000 paid to the wife is in her Bank G account and will also be paid to the husband. She should keep the remainder because this is her earnings.

Final submissions by counsel for the husband

Counsel dealt with a question of legal fees. He took issue with the wife’s counsel’s characterisation of the case of NHC & RCH (2004) FLC 93-204 (“NHC & RCH”) and relied upon the judgment of the Full Court at [56] to [59] where the Full Court said:
56. In summary, we consider that the above mentioned decisions of the Full Court establish that, while the treatment of funds used to pay legal costs remains ultimately a matter for the discretion of the trial Judge, in determining how to exercise that discretion, regard should be had to the source of the funds.
57. If the funds used existed at separation, and are such that both parties can be seen as having an interest in them (on account, for example, of contributions), then such funds should be added back as a notional asset of the party, who has had the benefit of them.
58. If funds used to pay legal fees have been generated by a party post-separation from his or her own endeavours or received in his or her own right (for example, by way of gift or inheritance), they would generally not be added back as a notional asset; nor would any borrowing undertaken by a party post-separation to pay legal fees be taken into account as a liability in the calculation of the net property of the parties. Funds generated from assets or businesses to which the other party had made a significant contribution or has an actual legal entitlement may need to be looked at differently from other post-separation income or acquisitions.
59. Outstanding legal fees themselves are generally not taken into account as a liability.
Counsel submitted that everything had been paid from farm income. He conceded that the matter is an exercise of discretion. The husband took $10,000 at separation but left with nothing else. There was a balance of $18,000 in the farm account and the wife kept it. The wife has subsequently paid $43,000 worth of legal fees. The husband has spent $60,000 over 20 months whereas the wife had the house and bills and the like paid. The wife wants the husband to receive $900,000. In other words, he gets his uncle’s inheritance which was, in total, $897,000. This would not be just and equitable. The wife got the benefit of $100,000 spent on farm matters.
Counsel submitted there were two approaches. In Bonnici (1992) FLC 92-272 there could be two pools. The money received in about March 2017 and the husband’s inheritance (which was not certain) should both be excluded. Alternatively, based on subsequent authority, the inheritances can be included but would lead to an adjustment of contribution assessment. It was submitted that neither method should produce a radically different result.
Addbacks are concerned with reckless conduct not where a party has simply spent money on living expenses. Counsel referred to Vass & Vass [2015] FamCAFC 51 at [137] – [138] in this regard where the Full Court was dealing with property “which had been dissipated by the parties”.
It was submitted that a 65 per cent adjustment to the husband would lead to a payment of approximately $490,000 to the wife. This was possible. The boatshed and the parties’ savings were worth up to $60,000 and they could have bought A Street, Town B themselves. It was embarked on as a common purpose in farming the land. The husband and wife paid $12,000 for the deposit and then built on the property. There was no evidence to suggest it was impossible for the parties to have built without a permit through the assistance of the wife’s parents. Counsel emphasised that the father’s father worked on the farm for decades and was not paid.
Turning to future needs counsel submitted that if the wife stays on the farm she will have a greater earning capacity than she has disclosed. Both could drive Uber. The husband is almost 58 and future employment is not likely. The Court should assess assets at the hearings. There was no contribution by the wife to the uncle. Counsel conceded that the father’s father was slightly different because he had lived with them for some periods of time.

In reply, counsel for the wife referred to the case of Trevi, without giving a citation according to my notes, but I presume referring to Trevi & Trevi [2018] FamCAFC 173 (“Trevi”), and to the matter of Holland & Holland [2017] FamCAFC 166.

Findings and brief observations about the witnesses

The husband was in some ways an impressive witness. He answered questions put to him directly and responsively and made concessions when they were there to be made. He was plainly telling the truth. Nonetheless, his demeanour and response both in the witness box and indeed when, so to speak, in the virtual well of the Court, only confirmed the anguish and anger that I have extracted in his affidavit. He referred to the stoushes that all parties have in relationship, but he is a big and very strong man and were it of any moment (no submissions were advanced flowing from it) I would be inclined to accept the wife’s assertions that on occasions at least his behaviour would have been deeply scaring to her. He also struck me as being sufficiently bitter about the wife’s conduct, as he sees it, to desire that she obtains as little as is humanly possible out of the pool.
The wife, as I have earlier indicated on occasions, was palpably reluctant to answer questions that she felt were against her interests or to make concessions that were equally obviously there to be made. As indicated some of her answers were defensive and non-responsive. She impressed me, as did her mother Ms L, as being of steely personality. Like the husband, it is clear that she would like her former spouse to obtain as little as is humanly possible from the property settlement. Having said this, the mother’s answers did not in any way strike me as being dishonest but rather more, as indeed was the case with the husband, reflective of her subjective experience of the relationship and the matters that arose in the course of it. Ms L was likewise an honest witness but her partisan distaste for the husband was again entirely palpable even over the internet connection.
Taking a step back from the parties’ emotions the overall picture could scarcely be clearer. These parties met at a young age (a very young age for the wife) and were together in a relationship for a very long time. They had nothing of any moment by way of possessions at the commencement of the relationship. Right from the start they received not insignificant benefits from the wife’s family. Living in something close to rent-free accommodation for eight years is plainly a springboard to advance the parties’ finances and I have no doubt that it was through this assistance, at least in large part, that the husband and wife by 1997 to 1998 had started to amass not inconsiderable savings.
In 1997, the A Street, Town B property was bought as part of a common intention of the husband and wife and the wife’s parents to have joint farming of the property and for the husband and wife to build a home on it. The husband and wife contributed only some $12,000 of the $81,000 plus ancillary costs that were put in and such other savings as the husband and wife had were left to them to advance the process of building the property. The husband and wife were effectively given half the property pretty much straightaway. Assuming the property to have been worth the $81,000 for which it was bought they obtained half the property for only $12,000, a good bargain one might feel.
Thereafter the joint farming exercise continued until at least 2000 when the wife’s father died. The materials are not entirely clear as to what extent the wife’s mother continued on in anyway thereafter but by no less than 2007 she had given the husband and wife her share of the property for no material return. There is no evidence that Ms L could have been compelled to make this gift, and self-evidently this was a massive benefit to the wife and the husband.
It is quite clear that the wife’s mother also considerably assisted the parties from time to time. She paid their mortgage for a year. Whatever the precise cost of the mortgage was is, in my view, not of any great moment. The fact is that the husband and wife were unable to pay it and she paid it for them, a not inconsiderable benefit. She also gave them $10,000 in 2012 and advanced interest-free loans which must have assisted the husband and wife not insignificantly in the purchase of equipment. The parties also had some benefit, at the very least, from the cool store and other machinery that were gifted to them. The husband is now keen to describe all these as junk, and no precise values have, of course, been put upon any these items of equipment, but they plainly, as I find, were of assistance to the husband and wife as the wife asserts.
It is not possible to say one way or the other whether or not the husband and wife would have had the A Street, Town B property and been able to develop it as they did without the assistance of the wife’s parents. Both sides seek to reconstruct events to their own advantage in this regard. The husband’s insouciant admission that he sought to conceal his ownership of the property so that he could continue to receive Austudy does him no credit whatsoever. It is highly probable that some infraction of some obligation took place as a result. The fact is that the wife’s parents put up the vast majority of the purchase price and, at the very least, enabled the husband and wife to commence farming on an all together more advantaged and secure base than would otherwise have been the case. If as the husband asserts (and the wife effectively denies) the husband and wife had enough money to buy the land for themselves they would certainly have had no other savings to commit towards the building of the property. They would have been far more substantially in debt when they did so (i.e. at least another $80,000 or so given the on costs at purchase) and given the apparently marginal nature of the farming enterprise (they were able to pay their mortgage for a year in 2004 to 2005) it is not in any way unreasonable to say that the assistance of the wife’s parents contributed in a serious and material way to the ultimate outcome.
The husband worked long and hard throughout the entirety of the relationship (including before the marriage) but he had the misfortune to have two hip replacements in 2004 and 2005. He, himself, says that he left all the business side of the farm operation to the wife (the financials and the like) and I found her evidence about his gradual diminution of contribution persuasive. It is not possible to put percentage figures on this matter but, as I find, the wife, particularly in more recent years, would have been more active and more productive in terms of the farm operation than the husband. Further, there is no challenge to her evidence that she was the primary carer of the child Mr H throughout his childhood.
Having made these general findings I now come to the case of Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 (“Stanford v Stanford”).

Stanford v Stanford

As the High Court made clear in Stanford & Stanford, the Court’s first task is to identify the legal and equitable property of the parties and determine whether it is just and equitable that there be a property adjustment between them. Only if such an adjustment is appropriate does the Court embark upon consideration of the matters in section 79(4) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). In this case however, as in so many cases, the basis upon which the parties conducted their financial affairs as a married couple has been radically and irredeemably altered by the fact of separation and its sequelae. Both sides actively seek a property settlement and it is plainly just and equitable that there be one.

The pool

What I understand to be the agreed components of the pool are set out in “MFI-1” as follows:
(1)A Street, Town B Property - $1,080,000;
(2)Husband’s 50 per cent interest in property in D Street, Town E - $515,000;
(3)Bank G investments - $190,000 (albeit held in two different accounts);
(4)Wife’s Motor Vehicle 1 - $16,000;
(5)Wife’s Super Fund N superannuation - $5,100;
(6)Farm equipment - $53,750;
(7)Husband’s residual savings - $83,848;
(8)Husband’s car - $1,500.
The agreed liabilities are:
(9)Mortgage on A Street, Town B - $10,000;
(10)Debt on Motor Vehicle 1 - $4,700.
As I say, unless I have misunderstood the matter, these matters are all agreed. The areas of dispute are the addbacks. (I will deal with the disputes about inheritances later).

The husband’s addbacks

The wife submits that the $10,000 given to the husband at separation, together with the full $135,000 he has received in part payment should be added back. together with the husband’s legal fees paid to date of $11,220 and his $7,000 superannuation drawdown. In the relatively recent case of Trevi, Murphy J made observations about the nature of addbacks with which both Alstergren CJ and Kent J agreed. At [27] to [30], Murphy J said:
27. The Full Court held in Omacini & Omacini that addbacks fall into “three clear categories”: where the parties have expended money on legal fees; where there has been a premature distribution of matrimonial assets; and “waste” or wanton, negligent, or reckless dissipation of assets.
28. However, the Full Court also made it clear that an addback does not necessarily occur whenever “a party has expended money realised from the disposition of assets that existed as at the date of separation”, the Full Court describing such a proposition as “unduly simplistic”. An earlier Full Court made the same point, saying that adding back is “the exception rather than the rule”.
29. The fundamental precept that addbacks are exceptional, reflected in the decisions just referred to, also mirrors what has been said in earlier decisions of the Full Court that, for example, “the Family Court must take the property of a party to the marriage as it finds it” at trial. An important parallel proposition is that the parties do not “go into a state of suspended economic animation” after separation. Thus, reasonably incurred expenditure does not usually come within accepted categories of addback.
30. Two fundamental premises emerge from Omacini and the authorities preceding it. First, “adding back” is a discretionary exercise. When the discretion is exercised in favour of adding back, it reflects a decision that, exceptionally, in the particular circumstances of a case, justice and equity requires it. The second premise is its corollary: in cases that are not “exceptional” justice and equity can be achieved, not by adding back, but by the exercise of a different discretion – usually by taking up the same as a relevant s 75(2) factor. Indeed, it has been said that the latter is “a course which is, perhaps, technically more correct” than adding back to the list of existing interests in property.
His Honour went on to consider the Full Court decision in NHC & RCH at [31] quoting the passages I have earlier set out but noting at [32]-[34]:
32. Those passages can be seen as an attempt to establish “guidelines”, undertaken after a detailed examination of earlier authorities, for the treatment of paid legal fees within s 79 proceedings. There can be little doubt that the statements made in that case have been applied by trial judges ever since.
33. The word “guidelines” is used advisedly so as to distinguish the same from “binding principles of law”. The distinction is important. Failure to follow a binding principle of law is an error of law. By contrast, the failure of a trial judge to follow a guideline:
…does not of itself amount to error, for it may appear that the case is one in which it is inappropriate to invoke the guideline or that, notwithstanding the failure to apply it, the decision is the product of sound discretionary judgment. [However] [t]he failure to apply a legitimate guideline to a situation to which it is applicable may … throw a question mark over the trial judge’s decision and ease the appellant’s burden of showing that it is wrong…
34. The guidelines emerging from NHC & RCH should be read together and read conformably with the Full Court authorities upon which they are based. That being so, the delineations there referred to — “the funds used existed at separation … such that both parties can be seen as having an interest in them”; or “funds used to pay legal fees have been generated by a party post-separation from his or her own endeavours” or received by a party “in his or her own right (for example, by way of gift or inheritance)” - cannot be seen as determinative of the exercise of discretion but, rather, as informing it.
In this case, the husband has spent some $60,000 of the funds available to him since separation in September 2018 and the $7,000 superannuation. It is not apparent how much money the husband may have had to spend to re-establish himself, most particularly because it appears that after a period of a relatively brief itinerant lifestyle he has lived in his father’s property, which even if dilapidated would, one assumes, have the normal domestic appliances. Nonetheless it must have cost him something to re-establish himself following separation. He has also paid $11,000 or more in legal fees. In truth he has, therefore, spent a net figure, one might reasonably infer, of some $45,000 to $50,000 on himself in the 20 months since separation. That would equate to some $2,200 to $2,500 a month. These amounts are in no ways so extravagant that it is, in my view, appropriate to contemplate adding them back. Bearing in mind Murphy J’s binding observations in Trevi, this is plainly not an exceptional case in the manner His Honour indicated and the relevant circumstances I have just described militate decisively against my exercising a discretion to add these figures back in. The husband’s savings will be assessed as they presently stand at $83,848.

The wife’s addbacks

The wife has paid some $44,000 to her solicitors since separation and, indeed, it would seem some $6,000 or $7,000 to another firm of solicitors before separation even took place. There was clearly some element of premeditation in the way in which the wife went about separation. It is quite clear, however, that the $44,000 she has paid to her solicitors have been monies earned from the operation of the farm. True, of course, it is that the wife has kept all the income from the farm since separation but true it also is that the husband has not done any work to generate that income. The funds that the wife has used seem to me, in any event, to fall within the operation of the remarks of the Full Court in NHC & RCH at [58] (“generated by party post-separation from his or her own endeavours”) and I do not think that they should be added back as the husband seeks.
Further, I do not think that the $18,000 in the farm account at separation should be added back. As with the husband’s $10,000 at separation and subsequent expenditure, these are funds that have been applied by the wife to her own living and business in a fashion that to my way of thinking is entirely unremarkable. This, likewise, should not be added back.
It should be noted that the amounts not added back are, in any event, roughly equal as between the parties and this only goes to fortify the exercise of the discretion not to add these sums back in any event.

Contributions

As I earlier indicated, I have formed the view that the contributions made by the wife’s family and, indeed, the wife more particularly would, absent other matters, be likely to lead to an assessment that the wife’s contribution was significantly greater than that of the husband. What radically alters these matters, however, is the inheritances received by the husband. The first $15,000 enabled the parties to buy the artwork which is to be sold and divided between them in such proportions as the Court overarchingly determines. Likewise, the chattels are to be disposed of on a pick-for-pick basis.
The husband received an inheritance of almost $900,000. $100,000 of that was applied to the parties’ joint benefit before separation. Although Uncle Mr J died in early 2015 the funds were not made available until March 2017. Although I accept that the wife, and to her credit, did a certain amount for the uncle before his death, there are several points to be made about this. First, the wife never sought to put this matter in issue in her affidavits. It was added as an all too obvious afterthought in a case outline filed almost at the door of the Court. It cannot have loomed large in her recollections. That is because it was not that large in practice. I accept that the wife had been a part of the Calander family for a very long time. I accept that she undoubtedly took Uncle Mr J meals for a while and took him to various appointments as any affectionate family member would. Nonetheless, the inheritance was left to the husband alone. It could have been left to them jointly. It is well-established that “a contribution by a parent of a party to a marriage will be taken to be a contribution made by or on the behalf of a party who is the child of the parent unless there is evidence which established it was not the intention of the parent to benefit only his or her child” (Kessey v Kessey (1994) FLC 92-945 at p81,150) (“Kessey”). The same in my view applies to other family members, in this case the uncle. The wife’s limited assistance to the uncle in no way satisfies the test described by the Full Court in Kessey. Even as things presently stand the husband’s inheritance from his uncle amounts to the better part of $800,000 of the approximately $2 million pool. While I accept that it should form part of the pool it must plainly be given a significant weighting.
I do not propose to include the husband’s recent inheritance from his father. He has not yet received it. It is in my view more appropriately considered under s 75(2) matters (see paragraph 82 above).
Calibrating these matters together involves, self-evidently, an evaluative assessment.
Leaving the uncle’s inheritance to one side I would have calibrated the wife and her family’s assistance as giving rise to an overall assessment of 70 per cent to the wife and 30 per cent to the husband (more, in fact than the 65% suggested by counsel for the wife). Not only was the family’s assistance vital in getting the parties off to their start, as I have said, but the assistance continued throughout the relationship in various degrees. In 2007, Ms L gave her half-interest in the farm to the husband and wife for nothing. Ms L was aware of the extent of this bounty. She has given her other child a property in her will to balance it. As recently as 2017, the wife’s mother was lending the parties an interest-free loan of $30,000 to buy a tractor. These were not nominal commitments. Further at least in more recent years, the wife’s contributions in working the farm was markedly greater than that of the husband.
Against this, of course, the husband’s inheritance is an enormous factor. It has contributed in no small part to the farm equipment (the two tractors cost $55,000 in 2014 and 2017 whereas the entire equipment is just now only worth $53,000). The tractors must be a not insignificant part of that and they are now debt free. The property has solar panels and a ride-on mower which are also of some value. In truth, the contribution of the inheritance contributes in excess of 40 per cent of the total pool. The wife’s contributions to the husband’s uncle and father might be thought to, as it were, nibble at the edges of that proposition, and I accept that that is so, but in my opinion the contributions of the inheritance must, in the absence of any other factors, have given rise to an assessment of contributions as to 80 per cent to the husband and 20 per cent to the wife. Setting off these figures one against the other is a somewhat artificial exercise but the Court has to try to produce a total. Taking matters as a whole, in my opinion, I would assess the contributions, in light of all these relevant factors, as being 60 per cent by the husband and 40 per cent by the wife.

The section 75(2) factors – future needs

The husband is 58. He has deposed to being quite unable to work. This sits wholly counter-intuitively with his assertion that he wishes to retain the farm and, no doubt, run it. Even if he were able to sub-contract all the labour, something I would doubt would be economically very desirable, given the apparently at times marginal nature of the business, he would still have to work doing the books, financials and so on. There is nothing in the materials to suggest that the business is so profitable (even allowing for the sort of manipulation of income to which the husband referred) that suggests there is sufficient for it to run profitably if all the accounting work, bookkeeping work and labour is subcontracted.
What the husband can do of course, as indeed in theory could the wife, is obtain some other form of paid employment such as a delivery worker or something of that order. There is, it should be noted, no medical evidence before the Court to satisfy the Court as to exactly how the husband’s medical conditions may or may not impact upon his capacity to work.
What the husband will have, however, is a lot of money. On any view of the matter the division that I have in mind to make will mean not only that he retains all the cash, but that he obtains a not insubstantial additional financial payment from the wife. He will additionally have in excess of $100,000 from his father’s estate. He will be well-placed, should he so desire, either to purchase out his siblings’ interest in his father’s home and upgrade it and/or to buy another property with substantial reserves of investments to hand. The wife will also, in the fullness of time, benefit from her mother’s estate. It is wholly impossible to say when this will be, or in what amount, but having seen Ms L’s evidence I have no doubt she will seek to assist her daughter. Indeed, I suspect she may well, in the light of her past generosity, give further inter vivos assistance to the wife in any event.
The wife, assuming I permit her to pay out the husband’s interests and that she is able to do so, will have a business that undoubtedly produces more income than is superficially declared to the taxation authorities, but which is not on any view of the matter Millionaire’s Row. Her health is, at this stage, apparently unremarkable. She is six years younger than the husband and has more time in which to pursue her affairs.
While the husband’s greater age and possible health difficulties might ordinarily be thought to militate to an adjustment in his favour, in the particular circumstances of this case I do not think it is appropriate. As I say, he will be materially better off. That would be all the more the case in the event that he were to retain the farm. I do not propose to permit the husband to retain the farm. He has deposed on oath that he is unable to work and, in my opinion, he should be bound by what he has deposed on his oath. It is plainly, on his own evidence, impossible for him to retain the farm. By the same token, the evidence shows that it is well within the wife’s capacity to retain the property and to run it profitably. She has been able to pay substantial amounts of legal fees out of the profits albeit that I accept that she has done this by scrimping and saving as she says. In all the circumstances in my opinion, and this is very much a case that is on its own particular facts, no further adjustment is appropriate. This is all the more the case when the husband will inherit a certain amount of additional funds in any event from his father’s estate.

Just and equitable

In my opinion the result which divides the property pool as I find it 60/40 in favour of the husband is a just and equitable outcome. It balances those aspects of the contributions by the wife and her family that were substantially greater than those of the husband with the husband’s inheritances which came into the matter so very late. I will give the wife the opportunity to pay out the husband’s interest should she so desire it. It is inappropriate to formulate final orders until it is known whether or not that is what she proposes to do. I should say that on my calculations the sum she will be required to pay to the husband to purchase out his interests will be $367,950.
I have drawn draft orders to reflect these conclusions. Since I am still not quite clear as to what orders may be necessary to vest the remainder of the $190,000 in the husband, I will give the parties an opportunity to consider them and to be heard if they so desire.

I certify that the preceding one-hundred (100) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Burchardt

Associate:

Date: 10 June 2020

[2020] FCCA 1464

10 June 2020

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Family Law

Property Law

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