FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Calado v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 53
MATEUS CALADO V
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRSNG 457 OF 1998
TAMBERLIN J
1 FEBRUARY 1999
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NG 457 OF 1998
BETWEEN:
MATEUS CALADO
ApplicantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent
JUDGE:
TAMBERLIN J
DATE:
1 FEBRUARY 1999
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Ex-tempore Judgment
This is an application for review under the Migration Act 1958 in relation to a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”) delivered on 17 April 1998. The application for an order of review was lodged at a time when the applicant had solicitors acting for him, on 14 May 1998. I am informed that the solicitor is no longer acting as from 11 January 1999.
The application for review is classed in general terms and it states the grounds as being that the decision involved an error of law involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the RRT. Secondly, that the procedures required by s 420 of the Migration Act 1958 which the RRT was bound to observe were not observed. There were to be further particulars provided in relation to this matter but it appears that none have been so provided.
The applicant has sought in the application an order that the decision be set aside and remitted to the RRT to be reconsidered according to law, any other orders as the Court thinks fit and costs. On the matter coming on for hearing before me this morning, counsel for the Minister informed me that the Minister was prepared to consent to orders that the decision of the RRT in question be set aside and that the matter be remitted to the RRT for determination in accordance with law on the question of persecution on the ground of race.
Nothing which has been said by Mr Calado who has given me the benefit of his views in some detail, has identified any particular error of law, nor does the Minister concede that there has in fact been an error of law. In the circumstances and having regard to the agreement by the Minister for the matter to be referred back to the RRT in relation to the decision of 15 April 1998, it seems to me that the order which has been sought by the applicant is one on which he is substantially successful.
I think in the circumstances that the following are the appropriate orders to be made. Firstly, that the decision on 15 April be set aside. The second order foreshadowed is that the matter should be remitted for determination in accordance with the law on the question of persecution on the ground of race. After some consideration I think that this order is also appropriate.
In relation to the use of the words "in accordance with law" I should perhaps indicate that in the decision of the RRT there is reference to fear of persecution on page 16 at the foot of the page which reads as follows:
“With the possible exception of the attacks in January 1993, there is no evidence before the Tribunal which suggests that Mr Calado himself suffered serious harm because of his Bakongo ethnicity prior to his departure from Angola. Nor is there any credible evidence concerning his particular circumstances which suggest that he would face a greater chance of experiencing serious harm for a Convention reason than other Bakongo in Luanda. I am therefore not satisfied that his fear that there is a real chance that he will be persecuted on his return to Angola because of his Bakongo ethnicity, or because of political opinion which might be imputed to him because of his ethnicity.”
It seems to me that this passage does arguably disclose an erroneous approach, though in so suggesting I make no final determination on this question. The paragraph does indicate that the decision-maker had in mind a comparative exercise in relation to a degree of experiencing serious harm for a Convention reason rather than addressing the question whether on the ground of race Mr Calado would experience serious harm. I mention this matter not by way of binding authority but in order to indicate that I fear there may have been an erroneous approach in this respect and for the guidance of the RRT in any reconsideration of the question.
In relation to the question of costs, I think it is appropriate that because Mr Calado's application has been successful, any costs which he has incurred up to the date when the solicitor who was previously retained by him in the matter ceased to act, should be borne by the Minister. Otherwise, I make no order as to costs.
The orders of the Court then are: in relation to costs, as above; that the decision of the RRT of 15 April 1998 be set aside; and that the matter be remitted to the RRT for determination in accordance with law on the question only of persecution on the ground of race.
I should add this, I note that the matter was dealt with originally before this Court in December 1997. The decision of the RRT took place on 15 April 1998 and the matter now comes before me on 1 February 1999. It seems to me, that having regard to the fact that Mr Calado is in detention some effort ought be made to expedite the reconsideration of the matter by the RRT so that his detention is kept to the necessary minimum.
I certify that the preceding ten (10) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Tamberlin. Associate:
Dated: 1 February 1999
For the Applicant: Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R Beech-Jones Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Date of Hearing: 1 February 1999 Date of Judgment: 1 February 1999
- AGLC
- Calado v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 53
- Case
- [1999] FCA 53
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court involved whether the RRT's decision was legally flawed due to an incorrect interpretation or application of the law, and if the RRT had adhered to the procedural requirements outlined in the Migration Act 1958. Specifically, the applicant argued that the RRT did not correctly apply the law regarding persecution on the grounds of race and failed to observe the necessary procedures.
In delivering the judgment, Justice Tamberlin noted that while the applicant had not specified particular errors of law, the Minister agreed to remit the case to the RRT for reconsideration, focusing on the issue of persecution based on race. The court found that the RRT's decision might have contained an erroneous approach by comparing the applicant's situation with that of other Bakongo individuals, rather than assessing whether the applicant would face serious harm due to his race. The court set aside the RRT's decision and remitted the matter to the RRT for reconsideration in light of these observations. Additionally, the court ruled that the Minister should bear the costs incurred by the applicant up until the point when the applicant's former solicitor ceased to represent him.
The final orders included setting aside the RRT's decision of 15 April 1998, remitting the matter to the RRT for reconsideration on the issue of persecution based on race, and directing the Minister to cover the applicant's costs incurred before 11 January 1999. Justice Tamberlin also emphasized the importance of expediting the reconsideration to minimize the applicant's detention period.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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