CAINEY and CAINEY

[2017] FCWA 118

JURISDICTION : FAMILY COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

ACT: FAMILY LAW ACT 1975

LOCATION: PERTH

CITATION: CAINEY and CAINEY [2017] FCWA 118

CORAM: O'BRIEN J

HEARD: 8-9 AUGUST 2017

DELIVERED : 22 SEPTEMBER 2017

FILE NO/S: PTW 5797 of 2015

BETWEEN: MS CAINEY

Applicant

AND

MR CAINEY
Respondent

AND

BANNERMAN SOLICITORS
Intervener

Catchwords:

PARENTING - Where after highly contentious proceedings the parties reached agreement in relation to all issues other than parental responsibility - Where the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility does not apply - Where it is nevertheless in the best interests of the children for the parties to have equal shared parental responsibility.

PROPERTY - Where the evidence presented is entirely inadequate to enable a proper exercise of discretion as to what might be just and equitable in all the circumstances - Proceedings adjourned.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

Category: Not Reportable

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant: Self-Represented Litigant

Respondent: Self-Represented Litigant

Intervener: No Appearance

Independent Children's Lawyer : Mr A Mackey

Solicitors:

Applicant: Self-Represented Litigant

Respondent: Self-Represented Litigant

Intervener: Bannerman Solicitors

Independent Children's Lawyer : Legal Aid WA

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Banks v Banks (2015) FLC 93-637

WORDS IN SQUARE BRACKETS REPLACE WORDS USED IN THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT - PARTIES’ NAMES AND IDENTIFYING DETAILS HAVE BEEN CHANGED

1The proceedings between [Ms Cainey] (“the wife”) and [Mr Cainey] (“the husband”) regarding the alteration of their property interests and the parenting arrangements to be made for their children, [Child A], born [in] 2003, and [Child B], born [in] 2008 (“the children”), were listed for a trial commencing on 8 August 2017, with an estimated hearing time of four to five days.

2For reasons which follow, the trial in fact spanned two relatively short hearings on 8 and 9 August 2017 only.

Brief background

3The wife is 45 years old and works as [an] assistant. She lives in [Town A] with the children.

4The husband is 43 years old and works as a company director in [a] business, in which he also has a financial interest.

5The proceedings were commenced by the wife’s application filed on 7 October 2015 in which she sought orders for alteration of property interests which would effect a division of the property of the parties in the proportions of 70 per cent to her and 30 per cent to the husband. At that time, both parties were living in Perth.

6In his response filed on 24 November 2015, the husband sought an equal division of the property of the parties. He also sought parenting orders whereby the parties would have equal shared parental responsibility and the children would live equally with them on a week about basis.

7In her reply filed on 8 December 2015 the wife sought sole parental responsibility that the children live with her, and that she be at liberty to relocate with them to Town A. She otherwise sought leave to particularise the parenting orders sought by her following the publication of a report from a Single Expert Witness (“SEW”). She did not propose any orders at that stage for the appointment of a SEW, rather seeking an order for the appointment of an Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”).

8The parenting dispute escalated. Issues were raised by the husband in relation to Child A’s mental health, her attendance at school and the difficulties he alleged he was having in eliciting information from the wife about her well-being. The wife filed a Form 4 notice of child abuse or family violence on 10 December 2015 alleging that she had been subjected to verbal, emotional, physical and other abuse by the husband in the presence of the children, that he had exposed the children to sexually explicit material, and that Child A in particular had been harmed by him.

9The wife unilaterally relocated with the children to Town A without notifying the husband, in circumstances where the proceedings were on foot and she knew that he objected strongly to her application to be at liberty to do so.

10Since then, the relationship between the parties and the course of the parenting proceedings have been characterised by a level of acrimony and conflict described in submissions by the very experienced ICL as being among the worst he could recall of cases in which he had been involved.

11Given what has transpired more recently, it is unnecessary and would be unhelpful to set out the accusations and counter accusations made by each party over the course of the proceedings, their respective responses to the various accusations, or other detail more descriptive of the conflict they and their children have experienced. It is sufficient to observe that each made very serious allegations against the other, that the allegations have been almost universally denied in strenuous terms and that I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of the ICL’s description of that conflict.

Matters not in issue

12It is against that background that the parties, to their great credit, were able to reach an agreement in relation to most aspects of the parenting dispute, shortly prior to trial.

13That agreement was reached after the parties had the benefit of an updated report from the SEW Darin Cairns, and the assistance of a late intervention alternative dispute resolution conference arranged by the ICL and facilitated by Legal Aid, Western Australia.

14Orders were made by consent on 3 August 2017 in the terms of a minute executed by the parties and the ICL. Pursuant to those orders, the children are to continue living with the wife in Town A, and to spend time with the husband on alternate weekends, for half of school holidays, and on various specified occasions. In Child A’s case, that time is to be spent with the husband subject to her wishes. Arrangements for handover, make up time, telephone communication, overseas holidays and the like were also agreed.

15The parties also consented to orders regulating their communication with each other, their behaviour towards each other more generally, and in relation to the exchange of information regarding the children.

16The orders made by consent were consistent with and respectful of the views of the children as expressed to the SEW, who confirmed in his evidence at trial that he regarded the agreed arrangements as being appropriate.

17The parties were not, however, able to reach agreement on the issue of parental responsibility. That issue remained to be determined at trial.

The parties as self-represented litigants

18Both parties were self-represented. Against the background of the substantial agreement which had been reached in relation to the parenting case, I spent some time at the commencement of the hearing explaining various matters to them so as to ensure that they understood the process.

19I explained the principles to which the court is required to give effect in conducting child-related proceedings, and discussed with them the options in that regard given the narrow but important parameters of the remaining parenting dispute. I explained to them the importance of cross-examination if they would seek to challenge factual statements which could properly be regarded as relevant to the matter remaining in dispute. I ensured that they had both received well prior to trial the handbooks prepared by the court for the assistance of self-represented litigants. By that mechanism, the relevant law had been drawn to their attention.

20I explained the approaches required to be taken by the court both in determining what parenting orders are in the best interests of children, and in determining what orders, if any, for alteration of property interests are just and equitable in all the circumstances.

21The parties are both intelligent and articulate people. Neither had any hesitation in asking me questions when they considered it appropriate, and both indicated their understanding of the explanations I gave them.

22I am satisfied that the trial proceeded in a manner which afforded procedural fairness to both parties.

The financial case

23At the commencement of the trial, both parties confirmed that they sought to proceed with their respective applications seeking orders for the alteration of property interests.

24While the parties both sought to proceed, I did not permit them to do so as the almost complete paucity of evidence in relation to the financial case meant that on the case as presented I could not be satisfied that any order for the alteration of property interests I might be asked to make would be just and equitable in all the circumstances.

25Each party had filed a statement of financial circumstances. Apart from those documents, the sum total of the evidence in relation to the financial case was to be found in 13 brief paragraphs of the wife’s trial affidavit and nine paragraphs of the husbands trial affidavit; even then, that evidence was of minimal relevance to the process to be undertaken in determining the competing applications.

26By the schedule annexed to his financial statement the husband asserted that he and the wife are the trustees and beneficiaries of the [Trust A] (“the Investment Trust”) and that the only assets of that entity are “trade and other receivables” in the form of unsecured loans to the parties. The schedule also suggested that the Investment Trust has liabilities in an identical amount, again characterised as “trade and other payables”.

27The husband also asserts in the same schedule that he is the sole director and secretary of [Trust B] and that he and the wife jointly own, via the Investment Trust, 40 of the 120 issued shares in that entity. He asserts that the remaining shares are held by him as trustee for [[Trust C], which is associated with a [Mr B]]. Mr B is a business associate of the husband and their financial affairs are intertwined in a manner not readily apparent from the evidence.

28The husband’s schedule suggests that Trust B has assets worth approximately $3 million, with unspecified liabilities of $2.745 million.

29The schedule also refers to two further entities with the same shareholding and directorship structure – [Company A] and [Company B]. The schedule suggests that the assets of Company A are modest, and that Company B has never traded.

30The schedule refers also to [Trust D]. The husband says that he and the wife hold 50 of the 150 units issued in that trust, as trustees for [Trust E] (“the Family Trust”). There is no other reference in the schedule to the Family Trust. When I sought to confirm with the husband at the commencement of the trial that the reference to the Family Trust in the schedule was accurate, and that it was an entity separate to the Investment Trust, he said that he did not know and would have to check with his accountant.

31The schedule suggests that Trust D has assets in the form of “property plant and equipment” to the value of $2.3 million, but with unspecified current liabilities in an amount slightly exceeding that value.

32No trust deeds, company constitutions, or financial statements for any of the entities were in evidence. There was no evidence as to the nature or value of the assets of each entity, nor any evidence to support or contraindicate the accuracy of the figures attributed in the husband’s schedule.

33Similarly, the evidence of each of the parties in relation to the matters required to be considered pursuant to s 79(4) of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”), including by reference s 75(2) was entirely inadequate to enable a proper consideration of those matters, and an appropriate exercise of discretion.

34In those circumstances, I was not prepared to permit the parties to proceed with their respective applications in relation to financial matters. On the first day of the trial I made orders as to the future conduct of the financial case, and indicated to the parties my intention to retain responsibility for the case management of that aspect of the proceedings. I record that no evidence was given at trial in relation to the financial case, which is accordingly not in any sense part-heard before me.

35The trial proceeded only in relation to the issue of parental responsibility.

The parties’ competing proposals

36The wife sought sole parental responsibility for the children. In her submissions, she confirmed that the only basis upon which she sought that order was her firm view that notwithstanding the various orders made by consent on 3 August 2017 the husband would continue to communicate with her only in what she would regard as an aggressive and abusive manner. Accordingly, she sought not to be compelled by order to consult with him in relation to major long-term issues regarding the children.

37The husband sought an order for equal shared parental responsibility. He expressed his intention to comply with the orders made by consent as to the parties’ communications with each other. He otherwise relied on the submissions made by the ICL, and the oral evidence at trial of Mr Cairns detailed further below.

The evidence at trial

38The wife relied on the following affidavits:

(a)her trial affidavit filed on 8 March 2017;

(b)her Form 13 financial statement sworn on 2 March 2017;

(c)her further affidavit filed on 7 August 2017;

(d)an affidavit of [Ms M] filed on 8 March 2017; and

(e)an affidavit of [Ms C] filed on 8 March 2017.

39While notice had appropriately been given requiring the wife’s witnesses to present for cross-examination, against the background of the substantive agreements reached the husband did not seek to cross-examine them. He did not seek to cross-examine the wife.

40The husband relied on the following affidavits:

(a)his trial affidavit filed on 29 March 2017;

(b)his Form 13 financial statement filed the same day; and

(c)an affidavit of [Mrs Cainey] also filed on 29 March 2017.

41Again, notice had appropriately been given requiring the husband’s witnesses to present for cross-examination. Again, the wife did not seek to cross-examine the husband or any of his witnesses.

42The ICL relied on two affidavits sworn by the SEW annexing his reports. Helpfully, Mr Cairns also gave oral evidence at trial in relation to matters specifically relevant to the decision to be made in relation to parental responsibility. Neither party sought to cross-examine him in relation to his reports, or on that evidence.

43Memoranda provided by the Family Court Counselling and Consultancy Service and the Department for Child Protection and Family Support were also in evidence.

44A subpoena had been issued at the husband’s request to compel the wife’s mother [Mrs JB] to attend the trial and give evidence. While an objection was raised by the wife, very much at the last minute, to that subpoena, it was unnecessary for that objection to be determined; after hearing the evidence of the SEW the husband sensibly acknowledged that it was no longer necessary for the wife’s mother to give evidence.

45At the conclusion of the trial, the parties and the ICL agreed that given the narrow parameters of the dispute it would not be necessary for them to make any submissions as to the form of orders and that it would be appropriate for these reasons to be published, and orders made, in chambers without the need for further appearance.

The law

46In deciding whether to make a particular parenting order, I am required to regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.

47Section 61DA of the Act provides for a rebuttable presumption that it is in the best interests of the child for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility. The presumption does not apply if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent of the child has engaged in abuse of the child or another relevant child, or family violence.

48The parties agreed at the outset of the trial that the statutory presumption did not apply, on the basis that there were reasonable grounds to believe that a parent had engaged in family violence. The evidence supported that agreed position.

49That said, I must still be guided by the objects of Pt VII of the Act and the principles underlying it, as set out in s 60B of the Act.

50Most particularly, s 60B(1)(a) notes the object of the legislation to ensure that the best interests of children are met by ensuring that they have the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with their best interests. Section 60B(1)(d) notes the object to ensure that the best interests of children are met by ensuring that parents fulfil their duties and meet their responsibilities concerning the children’s care, welfare and development.

51The relevant underlying principles note the rights of children to know and be cared for by both their parents. They note also that parents jointly share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children, and should agree about their future parenting. Each of those principles applies except when it is or would be contrary to the relevant child’s best interests.

52The legislation expressly recognises the legal position that, subject to any order of a court, each of the parents of a child has parental responsibility for that child: s 61(c)(1).

53That in turn is consistent with the “additional object” of Pt VII to give effect to the Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted on 20 November 1989 in New York: s 60B(4).

54Article 5 of the Convention is in the following terms:

States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for by local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.

55Article 18(1) of the Convention is in the following terms:

States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of the child will be their basic concern.

56In determining what order for parental responsibility is in the children’s best interests, I am required to consider the matters set out in s 60CC of the Act. While those matters are divided in legislation into “primary” and “additional” considerations, the primary considerations do not necessarily outweigh any combination of the additional considerations.

57Where an order provides that two or more persons are to share parental responsibility, and the exercise of that parental responsibility involves making a decision about major long-term issues, the order is taken to require the decision to be made jointly. The order is also taken to require each party to consult the other in relation to the decision to be made about that major long-term issue and to make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision: s 65DAC. There is no equivalent provision requiring joint decision-making or consultation about decisions on issues that are not major long-term issues.

58The term “major long-term issues” is defined in s 4 of the Act to mean:

…issues about the care, welfare and development of the child of a long-term nature and includes (but is not limited to) issues of that nature about:

(a)the child's education (both current and future); and

(b)the child's religious and cultural upbringing; and

(c)the child's health; and

(d)the child's name; and

(e)changes to the child's living arrangements that make it significantly more difficult for the child to spend time with a parent.

To avoid doubt, a decision by a parent of a child to form a relationship with a new partner is not, of itself, a major long-term issue in relation to the child. However, the decision will involve a major long-term issue if, for example, the relationship with the new partner involves the parent moving to another area and the move will make it significantly more difficult for the child to spend time with the other parent.

The evidence and submissions relevant to a determination of the issue of parental responsibility

59It is abundantly clear from the wife’s evidence that she retains a high level of resentment towards, and distrust of, the husband. She gives evidence of him behaving in an abusive and verbally aggressive manner towards both her and the children, and alleges that he has behaved in a sexually inappropriate manner in the children’s presence. She alleges that he has been physically aggressive towards her and towards the children. As evidenced by her consent to the orders for the children to spend time with the husband, however, she does not suggest that they are at any risk in his care.

60The primary basis for the wife’s opposition to an order for equal shared parental responsibility lies in her perception as to the ability and willingness of the husband to communicate with her in an appropriate manner and to genuinely consult with her in relation to major long-term issues regarding the children. Notwithstanding the consent orders made, she is sceptical as to the prospect of the husband complying with the orders regulating the communication between the parties.

61The husband acknowledges some difficulties in his communication style, while denying many of the wife’s allegations. On his case, the wife has made a series of outrageous and false allegations against him, many of a sexual nature, and has behaved in an aggressive manner towards people associated with him. He has acknowledged being angered at times by what she has done, but maintains that his reactions have to be understood in the context of what he would say is severe provocation. He asserts his intention and willingness to comply with the consent orders regulating the communication between the parties and to focus on the children’s best interests moving forward.

62In particular, the husband contends that his continuing involvement in decisions regarding major long-term issues about the children is critical, both for the direct benefit of his input, and for the moderating effect he would say he can have on the wife’s decision-making.

63The evidence at trial of the SEW was particularly helpful. It was also unchallenged by either party.

64Mr Cairns explained the nature of functional co-parenting therapy which could be offered to the parties, and which he recommended. He indicated a willingness to facilitate that therapy, whether or not it would be provided directly by him. He told me that he would have no difficulty or discomfort with an order that compelled the parents to undertake functional co-parenting therapy with a provider nominated by him.

65To their credit, having heard that evidence, both parties indicated that they would consent to such an order regardless of my decision in relation to the question of parental responsibility. The suggested therapy can only be beneficial to the parties and more importantly the children and I propose to make orders accordingly.

66The ICL asked the SEW to comment on the wife’s capacity to solely make decisions about long-term issues in the children’s best interests. In his response, Mr Cairns said:

…the fact that she’s seeking sole decision making capacity is in itself a flag… the very fact that she’s still looking for that level of control over that decision making and not trusting him to have a say or believing he has a right, tries [sic] down to really the consistent theme within the assessment, which is a distrust or a belief about the father that doesn’t seem to hold up to any inspection in any way that doesn’t leave a lot of questions about her capacity to make sound decisions in general when it comes to him at least… the capacity to show critical thought and reflection is one of the most important things that all of us do to guard against our biases. We all do that and the biggest concern throughout both assessments is that wasn’t in evidence, that willingness and that ability to look at contradictory evidence that helps you with your decision making.

67He observed that:

…the comfort and relief in which [the children] have been re-engaged with their father tells you that the decision to pull them away from their father was not consistent with the child’s focus (sic)… So all of those things taken together as an accumulation make me concerned about, (a) whether she can have a critical – and her capacity to be critical about her own decision making, but (b) whether she can actually distance her dislike for the father in making those decisions. And in doing that, will that be child-focussed, and I would argue it wouldn’t be.

68The ICL correctly observed that one of the difficulties identified by the SEW was that when something occurs that is inconsistent with the wife’s narrative, she can react in a “certain way”. The SEW agreed, saying that in his view that was the wife’s coping style. In terms of parental responsibility in particular, he expressed the view that:

…[if] a decision came up that allowed her, or fostered the children being distanced from their father so that the previous narrative could be reinstated or enforced or, more importantly, if further evidence could be collected in accord with that strong belief she has that he is this sort of harmful man then that would be a tempting course of action for her to take because it solidifies her beliefs and removes contradictory evidence such as the children enjoying time with their father.

69Mr Cairns was then asked for his view as to whether the parties would consult with each other in relation to long-term decisions about the children if no order in relation to parental responsibility was made, leaving in place the statutory position whereby each parent has parental responsibility, but no consultation is mandated.

70His reply was clear. He said that he could not “see anything in the history that indicates that they would be able to do that…”.

71He was then asked whether, if an order for equal shared parental responsibility was made, that would likely “act as a safeguard or a protective mechanism to ensure that the types of decisions that are to be made are being made in the best interests of the children”.

72He said that he believed that it would. In his view, it would “temper judgement”. Additionally, he expressed the view that the parties would be likely to comply with such an order as:

The temptation to behave reactively or in a way that supports the biased belief systems is removed… putting conditions in place where they cannot indulge their own biases at least removes the motivator or the reinforcer that could take them down the road of poor decision making and maladaptive communications… you minimise the chance of them being able to go down those temptations (sic).

73Importantly, Mr Cairns emphasised that despite the significant dysfunction and history between the parties they both care about the welfare of their children and are motivated to see them do well. He acknowledged that they would disagree at times as to what was best for the children, but was firm in his view that neither party would be exploitative of the children for their own personal gain.

74He acknowledged that the husband can be a “very blunt speaker” and that can be off-putting for some people. That said, he also noted that the husband had “shown the capacity to have a child focused approach to his communication, even when it works against him”. During assessment, even at times when the husband spoke very bluntly, the SEW did not note him ever failing to consider the other perspective. He said that a “willingness to accept information… that works against his own best interests is present… while he has a very negative view of [the wife] he has the capacity to put the children first in his intentions”. He regarded the husband’s capacity for objective perspective taking as being greater than that of the wife.

75Mr Cairns was also firm in his view that the proposed therapy would assist the parties in making long-term decisions jointly in the best interests of their children.

The statutory considerations

76As the Full Court observed in Banks v Banks (2015) FLC 93-637 at [48] and [49]: “…in parenting proceedings, as in all civil litigation, it will be the issues that are joined that will dictate which s 60CC factors are relevant…. the requirement to “consider” each factor does not mean each must be discussed, especially where the evidence leads inexorably to a particular conclusion” (citations omitted).

77Given the parameters of the present dispute, and in particular the wife’s articulation of the basis upon which she opposes an order being made for equal shared parental responsibility, it is unnecessary to discuss each of the primary and additional considerations set out in s 60CC. It is sufficient to record that I have considered each of those matters, and that the absence of discussion of any particular factor simply reflects my assessment that it “…has no sufficient relevance in the circumstances of this case to displace the determinative significance” of those factors specifically discussed: Banks supra at [52].

78It is common ground, and reflected in the orders which have been made by consent, that the children will benefit from the continuation of their meaningful relationship with each parent. The consent orders also reflect the acceptance of the parties that those orders did not need to be crafted so as to protect the children from exposure to risk of harm.

79Importantly, both parties have taken the opportunity to participate in decision-making about the children and to spend time and communicate with them. Both seek to continue to participate in decision-making about long-term major issues about the children, and their determination to do so reflects their attitude to the children and to the responsibilities of parenthood.

80I bear in mind also the objects and principles set out in s 60B of the Act.

81In my view the children will clearly benefit from having the input of both parents into major long-term decisions regarding their welfare. More particularly, I accept the evidence of the SEW and the submissions of the ICL based on that evidence, as to the potential disadvantages to the children if the wife has sole parental responsibility as she proposes.

82While the intense level of conflict between the parties in the past must be acknowledged, so too must their mutual efforts in reaching agreement about almost all of the matters previously in dispute be recognised. The orders to which they have agreed include provisions for them to communicate in relation to general issues regarding the children by way of an email communication book, to be used exclusively for that purpose. They have each agreed to injunctions restraining them from discussing the proceedings with the children or within their hearing, and from denigrating each other in the presence or within the hearing of the children. They have each agreed to an injunction restraining them from communicating with each other in an offensive, intimidating or abusive manner.

83The parties must, in my view, be afforded the opportunity to comply with the orders to which they have agreed. It would be illogical, and contrary to the interests of the children, to determine the remaining matter in dispute based on a pessimistic view as to the likelihood of them doing so.

Orders

84I propose to make the following orders:

1.[Ms Cainey] (“the Applicant”) and [Mr Cainey] (“the Respondent”) have equal shared parental responsibility for the children, [Child A], born [in] 2003, and [Child B], born [in] 2008.

2.The parties each do all things necessary to participate in functional co-parenting therapy with a service provider (“the therapist”) recommended by the Single Expert Witness.

3.The parties each meet one half of any fees raised by the Single Expert Witness or the therapist in relation to such therapy.

4.The parties each attend all appointments recommended or requested by the therapist, and continue their participation in such therapy as recommended by the therapist from time to time.

5.The parties each authorise the therapist to inform the other party of any occasion on which they fail to attend a recommended or requested appointment, or otherwise fail to comply with the therapist’s recommendations or requests.

6.The parties are authorised to provide to the therapist a copy of these orders, copies of the reports of the Single Expert Witness, and a copy of the transcript of the evidence of the Single Expert Witness at trial.

7.All outstanding applications and responses in relation to parenting issues be and are otherwise dismissed.

8.The Independent Children’s Lawyer be discharged with effect from 30 days after the date of publication of these orders.

9.All documents produced by named persons pursuant to subpoena be returned or destroyed in accordance with the request from the named person on the expiration of 42 days from this order.

10.In relation to material tendered as an exhibit into evidence in these proceedings and absent the filing of any Notice of Appeal:

(a)all parties must collect the exhibits tendered by them (“their exhibits”), from the Chambers of Justice O’Brien at least 28 days, and no later than 42 days, from today’s date;

(b)all parties must contact the Chambers of Justice O’Brien to arrange the collection of their exhibits; and

(c)in default of compliance with subparagraph (a), all material tendered as an exhibit, save and except for material produced pursuant to subpoena, will be destroyed by the court without notice to the parties.

I certify that the preceding [84] paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for
judgment delivered by this Honourable Court

Associate
22 September 2017