CAH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CAH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1129

Appeal from: CAH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 3573
File number: NSD 33 of 2019
Judge: FLICK J
Date of judgment: 25 July 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – separate claims by mother and son – alleged failure to separately consider claims of the son – alleged wrongful imputation of adverse credibility against mother upon the son    
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 5J

Federal Court Rules2011 (Cth) rr 1.34, 9.61, 9.62, 9.63, 9.64

Cases cited: CAH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 3573
Date of hearing: 29 May 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 29
Counsel for the Appellants: Ms E Grotte
Solicitor for the Appellants: Ms M Byers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 33 of 2019
BETWEEN:

CAH17

First Appellant

CAJ17

Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FLICK J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 JULY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The First Appellant is appointed as the litigation representative of the Second Appellant pursuant to r 9.63 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

2.The appeal is dismissed.

3.The First Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent, either as assessed or agreed. 

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

FLICK J:

  1. In the present proceeding the First Appellant, identified by the pseudonym CAH17, is the mother of the Second Appellant, her son.  The son is identified by the pseudonym CAJ17.  The mother is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China.

  2. In February 2015, both the mother and her son made separate applications for a Protection visa, although the son was also included within the mother’s own application.  In making those applications, separate submissions were advanced on behalf of the son.  Reliance was placed upon claims that he would suffer harm by reason of (inter alia):

    ·the necessity for his mother to pay a “large fine” in China to secure the registration of his birth;

    ·the discrimination he would face due to his parents not being married; and

    ·the denial of access to schooling and basic government services.

    In March 2015, a delegate of the Minister refused the application of both the mother and the son.  A review of the delegate’s reasons exposes separate consideration being given by the delegate to “Applicant 1” (namely the mother) and “Applicant 2” (namely the son).  The delegate’s separate consideration of the claims made on behalf of the son directed attention to (inter alia) the submission that the son would…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1129
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of CAH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicants were a mother and her young son, both of whom had lodged separate claims for protection visas. The primary dispute concerned the handling of the son's claims, specifically whether the Tribunal had adequately considered these claims independently from those of the mother, and if there was a wrongful imputation of the mother's adverse credibility findings onto the son. The case was heard and determined by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

The legal issues before the court revolved around the adequacy of the Tribunal's assessment of the son's claims, particularly whether the Tribunal had failed to consider these claims separately as required by Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and whether the Tribunal had wrongfully imputed the adverse credibility findings of the mother onto the son. Additionally, the court examined if the Tribunal had appropriately considered the son's claims in light of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), as suggested by the applicants.

The Federal Circuit Court found that the Tribunal had indeed considered the son's claims independently, explicitly addressing the son's fear of being persecuted as a "black child" and found it unfounded. The court also concluded that the Tribunal's adverse credibility findings against the mother did not automatically translate to the son's claims. Furthermore, the court ruled that the principle in Teoh did not apply as the Tribunal was not making a discretionary decision. The court held that the Tribunal's consideration of the son's claims, including those related to religious practices, was sufficient and did not result in any prejudicial error.

The appeal was dismissed, and the First Appellant was appointed as the litigation representative of the Second Appellant. The First Appellant was also ordered to pay the costs of the First Respondent, either as assessed or agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The First Appellant is appointed as the litigation representative of the Second Appellant pursuant to r 9.63 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

2. The appeal is dismissed.

3. The First Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent, either as assessed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

After giving consideration to these issues, the Tribunal concluded with respect to the mother, in part, as follows:162.The Tribunal is not satisfied on the evidence before it that there is a real chance or real risk of the [mother] being subjected to such measures, particularly as the Tribunal would expect her to have referred to such a significant concern in her application form and when asked by the Tribunal. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real chance or real risk that the applicant faces being subjected to a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm as a result of China’s family planning laws or in the form of sterilisation or intrusive contraception.The conclusions of the Federal Circuit Court The findings of the primary Judge which Counsel contended were of principal relevance to the son’s appeal were as follows ([2018] FCCA 3573):30.The second applicant was aged 4½ at the time of the Tribunal decision. Plainly, he could not articulate his claims himself and it would almost certainly have been inappropriate for the Tribunal to question him at the Tribunal hearing. The simple fact is that the second applicant was entirely dependent upon his mother to articulate his claims. The Tribunal made comprehensive adverse credibility findings against her which necessarily impacted upon the claims of both applicants.31.It is unfortunate that at [112] the Tribunal used terminology suggestive that both applicants had engaged in religious activities in Australia solely for the purpose of enhancing their claims for protection. It is not appropriate to impute a dishonest motive to a child, especially a child of tender years. The reasoning, however, is explicable on the basis that the second applicant had no independent exercise of will in accompanying his mother to religious activities and that is was the mother’s motivation which was being impugned.…33.The applicants’ submissions claim that the Tribunal was obliged to consider the best interests of the second applicant as a primary consideration in accordance with the UNCRC, relying on Minister for Immigration v Teoh. However, this submission was misconceived. It is well established that the Tribunal was not making a discretionary decision and so Teoh does not apply.34.The applicants’ submissions also claim that the Tribunal did not consider the second applicant’s claims “separately”, relying on Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration. However the Tribunal expressly considered the claims of the second applicant to fear persecution as a “black child”, and found that he would not be a “black child” as claimed because he would be registered. There is accordingly no basis for the submission that the second applicant’s claims were not considered in accordance with Chen Shi Hai. The ability of the applicant to pay the social compensation fee was relevant to whether the second applicant would be a “black child” and so was necessarily relevant to his claims, but that does not indicate that his claims were not considered on the basis that he was an individual. The Tribunal did not reason that because the applicant’s claims failed, the second applicant’s necessarily failed too, unlike in Chen Shi Hai at [75].(footnotes omitted) A wrongful imputation of adverse credit findings of the mother upon the son

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appeal is to be dismissed with costs. The Tribunal’s consideration of the son’s claims No question is raised as to the manner in which the delegate had resolved those claims for protection previously relied upon by the son in advance of the Tribunal hearing. The submissions on behalf of the son before this Court largely focussed upon the claim for protection advanced subsequent to the delegate’s decision, being those claims founded upon his religious practice and commitment to being baptised into the Catholic Church. This aspect of the claim was before both the Tribunal and the primary Judge. It should be noted that the Appellants’ submissions also included a contention (with respect to Ground 3) that the Federal Circuit Court had erred with respect to the “black child” claim, which was a claim before the delegate. Focussed upon the religion aspect of the son’s claim, the Tribunal addressed “[t]he applicants’ religion”, noting that:101.… the Tribunal had concerns about the timing of the religious involvement of both herself and the second applicant.It then concluded with respect to both the mother’s claims and those of her son as follows:112.The Tribunal has carefully considered and weighed up her evidence about her faith, the timing of the commencement of her religious activities, and other concerns with her credibility. However, the Tribunal considers that the applicant’s evidence indicates that she (and the second applicant) has undertaken religious activities only after the rejection of their claims by the delegate, in order to remain in Australia. The Tribunal considers that this undermines that she (and the second applicant) have undertaken religious activities for genuine reasons.The Tribunal thereafter proceeded to make findings, including the following (without alteration):FINDINGS OF FACT ON THE APPLICANT’S CLAIMS118.On the basis of the adverse credibility finding, the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant is a witness of truth. The Tribunal considers that she has been prepared to change evidence depending upon the particular situation, and that she is prepared to give any evidence in order to obtain a protection visa for herself and her child to remain in Australia.Religion119.The applicant claims that she and the child have had religious involvement from the time she was in detention (December 2014-February 2015), including attending church from April 2015, and bible study from August 2015, as well as other activities. She claims that she intends to be baptised on 21 April 2017. She claims that she and the child would continue their religious involvement including studying the Bible and learning more if they return to China. The Tribunal has taken into account the support documents.120.On the basis of the adverse credibility finding, the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant’s involvement in Christianity (on her behalf or on behalf of her child) is genuine. The Tribunal finds that she decided to attend Christian activities in April 2015, the month after the claims of herself and her child were dismissed by the Department. While the Tribunal is prepared to accept that the applicants have undertaken the claimed religious activities while the proceedings have been ongoing, and that they have indicated an intention to get baptised in April 2017, the Tribunal is not prepared to accept that these actions were (or will be) undertaken for genuine reasons. 121.Having regard to this finding, the Tribunal consider that the applicants will not undertake any religious activity in China as they are not genuine Catholics, and thus the Tribunal does not accept that they face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm on the basis of religion. 122.Australian religious activities – refugee claims: At the hearing the Tribunal had put to the applicant its concerns that she did not appear to be a genuine Catholic, and that it appeared that the involvement in religious activities on behalf of herself and her son may have occurred in order to strengthen their protection visa claims. The Tribunal put to the applicant that if she and her son had been attending religious activities in order to strengthen their claims then it would have to disregard church involvement and activities in the refugee assessment, and it would find that neither she nor the second applicant would undertake religious activities in China. In response the applicant said that this might be the Tribunal’s thinking but her belief is that the Lord will give her peace and strength to raise her child as a single mother. The Tribunal finds that the religious activities undertaken by both applicants in Australia were done for the purposes of their refugee claims and it disregards all of these activities.123.Australian religious activities – complementary protection: However, the conduct in Australia is not to be disregarded when considering the claims under s. 36(2)(aa). Thus, while the Tribunal accepts that the applicants engaged in some religious activities in Australia, it was not suggested that there was a real risk that the authorities or anyone in China would find out about this. The Tribunal is not satisfied on the evidence before it that the applicants’ religious activities in Australia would lead to them facing a real risk of significant harm in China.124.The Tribunal considers there is no basis to find that the applicants have a well-founded fear of persecution or face a real risk of significant harm in China on the basis of religion.(footnote omitted)