CAF19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CAF19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 937

Appeal from: CAF19 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 186
File number: NSD 151 of 2020
Judgment of: CHEESEMAN J
Date of judgment: 15 August 2023
Catchwords:  MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where appeal ground raises a new point for the first time on appeal – where ground relies on High Court decision handed down after the primary judgment was delivered – whether leave to raise new ground should be granted – whether jurisdictional error on part of the Immigration Assessment Authority because legally unreasonably not to consider getting new information pursuant to s 473DC(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – Held: Leave granted to raise new ground. Appeal dismissed.
Legislation:  Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 473DC(3)
Cases cited:

AAZ19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 407

ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 34; 269 CLR 439

CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 50; 268 CLR 76

DMO18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 6

EMS18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 174; 280 FCR 381

FSG17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 29; 274 FCR 456

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v AWT19 [2021] FCAFC 58; 285 FCR 381

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; 264 CLR 217

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 76
Date of hearing: 14 October 2022
Solicitor for the Appellant:  Mr R Selliah of Rasan T Selliah & Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs.

ORDERS

NSD 151 of 2020
BETWEEN:

CAF19

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

CHEESEMAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 AUGUST 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the costs of the First Respondent to be fixed by way of lump sum.

3.On or before 22 August 2023, the parties file proposed agreed orders as to an appropriate lump sum for the First Respondent’s costs.

4.In default of any agreement, the matter be referred to a Registrar for determination. 

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CHEESEMAN J

INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant is a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity who arrived in Australia by boat with his sister in December…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 937
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of CAF19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs involves an appeal by the appellant against a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) regarding his application for a protection visa. The appellant, a Sri Lankan national, alleges persecution due to his suspected association with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the consequent threats from the Sri Lankan Army and Criminal Investigation Division (CID). The IAA rejected the appellant's claims, leading to the present appeal to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, which was subsequently appealed to the High Court.

The central legal issues in this case revolve around the IAA's exercise of discretion under s 473DC(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to obtain new information, specifically whether the IAA's failure to convene a second interview with the appellant constituted a legally unreasonable decision amounting to jurisdictional error. The appellant argued that a second interview would have allowed him to present his case more effectively, potentially altering the IAA's assessment of his credibility and claims of torture.

The Court found that the IAA's decision not to convene a second interview was not a jurisdictional error. Justices Nettle, Edelman, and Gordon held that the mechanism in s 473DC of the Act could not be used to reassess the appellant's demeanour, as it would not constitute the acquisition of 'new information'. They reasoned that the IAA's rejection of the appellant's claims was not based solely on credibility but also on country information and the appellant's failure to provide a free-flowing account during the initial interview. The Court concluded that the IAA's decision, while potentially harsh, did not involve a legally unreasonable exercise of discretion.

As a result, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the First Respondent. The Court mandated that by 22 August 2023, the parties should file proposed agreed orders regarding the lump sum for the First Respondent’s costs. If no agreement was reached, the matter was to be referred to a Registrar for determination. This ruling underscores the importance of the proper application of statutory discretions and the limits of judicial intervention in administrative decisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the costs of the First Respondent to be fixed by way of lump sum.

3. On or before 22 August 2023, the parties file proposed agreed orders as to an appropriate lump sum for the First Respondent’s costs.

4. In default of any agreement, the matter be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

By the new ground, the appellant contends that the Authority’s failure to exercise the discretion under s 473DC(3) of the Act to obtain new information in the particular circumstances of this case was legally unreasonable and constituted jurisdictional error. BACKGROUND The appellant claims to fear being killed by the Sri Lankan Army and the Criminal Investigation Division of the Sri Lankan Police Service (CID) because he is suspected to be a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or because he is linked to the LTTE. Because he departed Sri Lanka illegally, the appellant also fears that if he is returned he will be imprisoned and harmed on the basis that he is a failed asylum seeker. The appellant says that his village was in a former LTTE controlled area and, during the later stage of 2009, the LTTE forcibly recruited young people to join the LTTE. From 2008 to 2009, the appellant claims that he and his family “narrowly escaped death” many times before being detained at the Omanthai checkpoint, interrogated and thereafter interred with his family at Chettikulam camp. He and his family were released from the Chettikulam camp after about a year. Relevantly, for the purpose of this appeal, there are two principal themes in the appellant’s protection claims that featured in the decision making of both the Delegate and the Authority. The first relates to the appellant’s experience in and around being interred with his family at Chettikulam camp. The second relates to the appellant’s claim that he was pursued by the CID after he left the Chettikulam camp, continued to be harassed thereafter, causing him to go into hiding until he left the country. Relatedly, he claims that since he left Sri Lanka, the authorities have continued to visit his family home looking for him. The appellant’s claims were made in an arrival interview conducted on 31 January 2013, a statutory declaration dated 24 April 2016, and a SHEV interview conducted on 27 September 2018. In broad summary, the appellant’s claims are as follows. In relation to the events surrounding the Chettikulam camp he says that in the course of navigating to an area controlled by the Army, he and his family were detained at the Omanthai checkpoint for approximately two days. They were interrogated by the CID and Army. He says he was interrogated in relation to his suspected membership of the LTTE. Following this, he and his family were transferred to the Chettikulam camp. They remained there for approximately one year before being released in about April 2010. While at the Chettikulam camp, the appellant says he was interrogated three times, and that the authorities repeatedly asked him whether he was a member of the LTTE. The appellant says that he was subjected to torture during the first two interrogations at the Chettikulam camp and that he has some scarring on his body as a result. In relation to his experience post release from the Chettikulam camp, the appellant claims that the Army and the CID continued to look for him and, as a result, he hid in the jungle near his home. He says he was at home on a number of occasions when the authorities visited his home and was harmed by them. The appellant says he was asked by the authorities to report to Camp Joseph, an Army camp situated in Vavuniya. He says he did not do so because he was afraid the Army would harm him. During this time, the appellant says he hid in the jungle close to his house.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The critical point of difference between the conclusions drawn by the Authority and those drawn by the Delegate related to the appellant’s claims in connection with the events surrounding the Omanthai checkpoint and the Chettikulam camp. Whereas the Delegate accepted the appellant’s claims in his written statement about detention and interrogation for two days at the Omanthai checkpoint and the torture claims at Chettikulam camp, the Authority did not. The claims made by the appellant in relation to his detention and interrogation at the checkpoint were made in his statutory declaration. Parts of those claims were subsequently expanded upon in the appellant’s SHEV interview. The Delegate and the Authority both rejected the appellant’s enlargement of these claims in the SHEV interview, and both found that he had exaggerated his account to strengthen his claims for protection.The Delegate’s DecisionOmanthai checkpoint and Chettikulam camp The Delegate’s findings in relation to the events surrounding the appellant’s internment at Chettikulam camp were as follows (as written):Omanthai checkpoint and Chettikulam campI accept as plausible in April 2009, during the final stages of the civil war, the applicant and his family fled their home and headed towards the army controlled area. I accept the applicant was detained (for two days) and interrogated by the CID at the Omanthai check point. I accept his profile, as a young Tamil male from the North of Sri Lanka was during that time of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities. I also accept the applicant and his family were displaced and detained at the Chettikulam camp and were released in April 2010. I note the inconsistencies on the number of occasions the applicant claims he was interrogated by the Sri Lankan authorities. In his claims for protection, the applicant stated that he had been interrogated on three occasions, when detained at the Chettikulam camp. At the SHEV interview, in vast contrast, the applicant stated he was interrogated on a weekly basis. I do not accept the applicant would have been released from the camp, if he was of adverse interest to the authorities. I also do not accept the applicant was interrogated on a weekly basis. I accept that it was more likely he was interrogated and beaten on three occasions and had sustained injuries and scarring during the interrogation. The Delegate accepted that the applicant was detained for two days and interrogated by the CID at the Omanthai checkpoint, and that as a young Tamil male from the North of Sri Lanka the appellant, during this time, was of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities. The Delegate did not accept the appellant’s account that he was interrogated on a weekly basis as he had claimed in his SHEV interview. Rather, the Delegate accepted that the appellant was interrogated on three occasions, during which he was beaten and sustained injuries that caused scarring. This finding appears to be based on the appellant’s statutory declaration in which he states in paragraph 13: 13. I was interrogated on three occasions while I was detained at the Chettikulam camp. The authorities who interrogated me repeatedly asked if I was a member of the LTTE and I was tortured (they struck me with cables/wire and coconut tree branches, there is some scarring on my body to this day) during the first two occasions I was interrogated. During the third occasion I was interrogated the authorities did not torture me. On each occasion I was interrogated 1 ½ - 2 hours.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Justices Nettle, Edelman and Gordon did not think the error lay in failing to convene a second interview because they did not accept, (in Nettle J’s case, seriously doubted, but declined to decide) that the mechanism in s 473DC of the Act could be used for the purposes of reassessing the demeanour of the applicant on the basis that such an use would not constitute acquisition of ‘new information’ (at [64] to [65], [88] and [115]). CONSIDERATION The appellant relies on ABT17 as being analogous factually with his case. He seeks to have the decision of the Authority quashed on the basis that it is legally unreasonable. The appellant submits that (as written): 17.The IAA relied heavily on the interview recording of the applicant to reject the "torture claim" obviously based on credibility. The IAA's decision not solely on the country information. ….20. The appellant's complaint is that, in the circumstances of this case, where the matter is critical to the appellant's claims and where IAA was concerned about a credibility based on delegate's interview recording, the IAA should have exercised its power under s 473DC(3) where it departs from the Delegate's finding in a crucial issue of persecution. We submit that the torture claim fulfills the serious and significant harm endured by Applicant was under various international Conventions and the Migration Act.21. The opportunity to give oral evidence before a decision maker presents the possibility that the decision maker will be influenced to accept favourable features of the case, or ameliorate adverse features of the case, by reference to factors including "Demeanour" and "Presentation": BON17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 1456.22. We submit that the findings of fact of the crucial claim of the applicant's torture is very significant in this case and the [Authority] failed to use its power under s 473DC of the Migration Act1958 to invite the applicant for interview.23. As noted above, the Delegate accepted that the applicant was subjected to torture which resulted in bodily scars. However, the Delegate refused the SHEV visa on another basis of country information on the assessment of objective foundation but not solely. [AB135]. However, IAA in paragraph 27 concluded that "I do not accept the applicant was tortured, threatened and severely beaten."24. Moreover, the [Authority]'s rejection of the claims surrounding the applicant hiding after his release sufficiently lacks "an evident or intelligible justification".25. It is highly unreasonable to expect the account of an asylum-seeker, who is unfamiliar with Australian migration procedures and is not fluent in the English language, to be free flowing, especially given the interpretation and communication difficulties that are characteristic of an interview. Consequently, using the applicant's hesitancy and lack of a free flowing account as a justification for rejecting claims pivotal to his protection visa application produces a result that is "plainly unjust", in the absent of interview.