FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CAF19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 937
Appeal from: CAF19 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 186 File number: NSD 151 of 2020 Judgment of: CHEESEMAN J Date of judgment: 15 August 2023 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where appeal ground raises a new point for the first time on appeal – where ground relies on High Court decision handed down after the primary judgment was delivered – whether leave to raise new ground should be granted – whether jurisdictional error on part of the Immigration Assessment Authority because legally unreasonably not to consider getting new information pursuant to s 473DC(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – Held: Leave granted to raise new ground. Appeal dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 473DC(3) Cases cited: ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 34; 269 CLR 439
CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 50; 268 CLR 76
DMO18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 6
EMS18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 174; 280 FCR 381
FSG17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 29; 274 FCR 456
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v AWT19 [2021] FCAFC 58; 285 FCR 381
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; 264 CLR 217
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 76 Date of hearing: 14 October 2022 Solicitor for the Appellant: Mr R Selliah of Rasan T Selliah & Associates Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs. ORDERS
NSD 151 of 2020 BETWEEN: CAF19
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
CHEESEMAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 AUGUST 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the costs of the First Respondent to be fixed by way of lump sum.
3.On or before 22 August 2023, the parties file proposed agreed orders as to an appropriate lump sum for the First Respondent’s costs.
4.In default of any agreement, the matter be referred to a Registrar for determination.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CHEESEMAN J
INTRODUCTION
The appellant is a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity who arrived in Australia by boat with his sister in December…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read CAF19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultu... and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2023] FCA 937
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in this case revolve around the IAA's exercise of discretion under s 473DC(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to obtain new information, specifically whether the IAA's failure to convene a second interview with the appellant constituted a legally unreasonable decision amounting to jurisdictional error. The appellant argued that a second interview would have allowed him to present his case more effectively, potentially altering the IAA's assessment of his credibility and claims of torture.
The Court found that the IAA's decision not to convene a second interview was not a jurisdictional error. Justices Nettle, Edelman, and Gordon held that the mechanism in s 473DC of the Act could not be used to reassess the appellant's demeanour, as it would not constitute the acquisition of 'new information'. They reasoned that the IAA's rejection of the appellant's claims was not based solely on credibility but also on country information and the appellant's failure to provide a free-flowing account during the initial interview. The Court concluded that the IAA's decision, while potentially harsh, did not involve a legally unreasonable exercise of discretion.
As a result, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the First Respondent. The Court mandated that by 22 August 2023, the parties should file proposed agreed orders regarding the lump sum for the First Respondent’s costs. If no agreement was reached, the matter was to be referred to a Registrar for determination. This ruling underscores the importance of the proper application of statutory discretions and the limits of judicial intervention in administrative decisions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the First Respondent to be fixed by way of lump sum.
3. On or before 22 August 2023, the parties file proposed agreed orders as to an appropriate lump sum for the First Respondent’s costs.
4. In default of any agreement, the matter be referred to a Registrar for determination.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Justices Nettle, Edelman and Gordon did not think the error lay in failing to convene a second interview because they did not accept, (in Nettle J’s case, seriously doubted, but declined to decide) that the mechanism in s 473DC of the Act could be used for the purposes of reassessing the demeanour of the applicant on the basis that such an use would not constitute acquisition of ‘new information’ (at [64] to [65], [88] and [115]). CONSIDERATION The appellant relies on ABT17 as being analogous factually with his case. He seeks to have the decision of the Authority quashed on the basis that it is legally unreasonable. The appellant submits that (as written): 17.The IAA relied heavily on the interview recording of the applicant to reject the "torture claim" obviously based on credibility. The IAA's decision not solely on the country information. ….20. The appellant's complaint is that, in the circumstances of this case, where the matter is critical to the appellant's claims and where IAA was concerned about a credibility based on delegate's interview recording, the IAA should have exercised its power under s 473DC(3) where it departs from the Delegate's finding in a crucial issue of persecution. We submit that the torture claim fulfills the serious and significant harm endured by Applicant was under various international Conventions and the Migration Act.21. The opportunity to give oral evidence before a decision maker presents the possibility that the decision maker will be influenced to accept favourable features of the case, or ameliorate adverse features of the case, by reference to factors including "Demeanour" and "Presentation": BON17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 1456.22. We submit that the findings of fact of the crucial claim of the applicant's torture is very significant in this case and the [Authority] failed to use its power under s 473DC of the Migration Act1958 to invite the applicant for interview.23. As noted above, the Delegate accepted that the applicant was subjected to torture which resulted in bodily scars. However, the Delegate refused the SHEV visa on another basis of country information on the assessment of objective foundation but not solely. [AB135]. However, IAA in paragraph 27 concluded that "I do not accept the applicant was tortured, threatened and severely beaten."24. Moreover, the [Authority]'s rejection of the claims surrounding the applicant hiding after his release sufficiently lacks "an evident or intelligible justification".25. It is highly unreasonable to expect the account of an asylum-seeker, who is unfamiliar with Australian migration procedures and is not fluent in the English language, to be free flowing, especially given the interpretation and communication difficulties that are characteristic of an interview. Consequently, using the applicant's hesitancy and lack of a free flowing account as a justification for rejecting claims pivotal to his protection visa application produces a result that is "plainly unjust", in the absent of interview.