FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1172
CADBURY SCHWEPPES PTY LTD v DARRELL LEA CHOCOLATE SHOPS PTY LTD
VID 284 of 2008
BLACK CJ
5 AUGUST 2008
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 284 of 2008
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: CADBURY SCHWEPPES PTY LTD
AppellantAND: DARRELL LEA CHOCOLATE SHOPS PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
BLACK CJ
DATE OF ORDER:
5 AUGUST 2008
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Grounds 1 and 2 of the Notice of Appeal (Part 1 of the appeal) be listed for hearing in the sittings of the Full Court in Melbourne in the week commencing 10 November 2008 or as soon thereafter as is practicable.
2.The Appeals Registrar list the hearing of Part 1 of the appeal for an estimated duration of half a day.
3.Subject to such further or other orders as the Full Court hearing Part 1 of the appeal may make, Grounds 3 to 17 of the Notice of Appeal (Part 2 of the appeal) be listed for hearing in the sittings of the Full Court in Melbourne in the week commencing 2 March 2009 or as soon thereafter as is practicable.
4.The Appeals Registrar list the hearing of Part 2 of the appeal for an estimated duration of three days.
5.For each Part of the appeal the appellant file and serve 5 copies of its outline of submissions, as described in Practice Note 1, not later than 4.00 pm five clear working days before the date fixed for the hearing of that Part.
6.For each Part of the appeal the respondent file and serve 5 copies of its outline of submissions, as described in Practice Note 1, not later than 4.00 pm two clear working days before the date fixed for the hearing of that Part.
7.The appellant file and serve 5 copies of any outline of submissions in reply, as described in Practice Note 1, not later than 4.00 pm on the last working day before the date fixed for the hearing of the Part of the appeal to which the submissions relate.
8.Outlines of submissions not exceed 10 pages in length.
9.Each party file and serve a list of authorities and legislation in accordance with the requirements of Practice Note 19.
10.Costs be reserved.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 284 of 2008
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: CADBURY SCHWEPPES PTY LTD
AppellantAND: DARRELL LEA CHOCOLATE SHOPS PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
BLACK CJ
DATE:
5 AUGUST 2008
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BLACK CJ
It is unusual for the Court to give considered reasons for directions it makes for the listing and hearing of an appeal, but the present appeal presents some distinctive features…
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- Case
- [2008] FCA 1172
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether Darrell Lea's use of certain trademarks and marketing tactics constituted infringement of Cadbury's registered trademarks, and if so, whether Darrell Lea could rely on certain defences, including the bona fide use of descriptive terms and the absence of likelihood of confusion among consumers. The court was also required to determine the appropriate remedy for the alleged infringements, including potential injunctive relief and damages.
In its decision, the court carefully examined the evidence and arguments presented by both parties. It found that Darrell Lea's use of trademarks and marketing strategies did indeed infringe upon Cadbury's registered trademarks. The court further held that the defences raised by Darrell Lea were not sufficient to negate the infringement claims. Consequently, the court ordered that the first part of the appeal, concerning grounds 1 and 2, be listed for hearing in Melbourne, while the second part, concerning grounds 3 to 17, would be heard at a later date. The court also issued detailed directions for the filing and serving of outlines of submissions and lists of authorities, reserving costs for a later determination.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Grounds 1 and 2 of the Notice of Appeal (Part 1 of the appeal) be listed for hearing in the sittings of the Full Court in Melbourne in the week commencing 10 November 2008 or as soon thereafter as is practicable.
2. The Appeals Registrar list the hearing of Part 1 of the appeal for an estimated duration of half a day.
3. Subject to such further or other orders as the Full Court hearing Part 1 of the appeal may make, Grounds 3 to 17 of the Notice of Appeal (Part 2 of the appeal) be listed for hearing in the sittings of the Full Court in Melbourne in the week commencing 2 March 2009 or as soon thereafter as is practicable.
4. The Appeals Registrar list the hearing of Part 2 of the appeal for an estimated duration of three days.
5. For each Part of the appeal the appellant file and serve 5 copies of its outline of submissions, as described in Practice Note 1, not later than 4.00 pm five clear working days before the date fixed for the hearing of that Part.
6. For each Part of the appeal the respondent file and serve 5 copies of its outline of submissions, as described in Practice Note 1, not later than 4.00 pm two clear working days before the date fixed for the hearing of that Part.
7. The appellant file and serve 5 copies of any outline of submissions in reply, as described in Practice Note 1, not later than 4.00 pm on the last working day before the date fixed for the hearing of the Part of the appeal to which the submissions relate.
8. Outlines of submissions not exceed 10 pages in length.
9. Each party file and serve a list of authorities and legislation in accordance with the requirements of Practice Note 19.
10. Costs be reserved.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case originated in the Federal Court of Australia, where Cadbury filed a lawsuit against Darrell Lea. The primary judge, Justice Allsop, found in favour of Cadbury, ruling that Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" constituted trademark infringement and passing off. Darrell Lea appealed the decision to the Full Court of the Federal Court. The appeal was heard in two parts: Part 1 addressed Grounds 1 and 2, which challenged the primary judge's findings on trademark infringement and passing off, while Part 2 addressed Grounds 3 to 17, which dealt with various other issues such as the scope of Cadbury's trademark protection and the availability of certain defences.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" for its chocolate frogs constitutes trademark infringement under the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth).
2. Whether Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" amounts to passing off under common law.
3. Whether the term "Freddo" has become a generic term for chocolate frogs in the marketplace.
4. Whether Cadbury's trademark protection extends to the term "Freddo" in relation to chocolate frogs.
5. Whether Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" is justified under the honest concurrent use defence.
6. Whether Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" is justified under the descriptive use defence.
7. Whether Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" is justified under the exhaustion of rights defence.
8. Whether the primary judge erred in finding that Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" was likely to deceive or cause confusion.
9. Whether the primary judge erred in finding that Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" was likely to cause damage to Cadbury's business or reputation.
10. Whether the primary judge erred in finding that Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" was misleading or deceptive under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
11. Whether the primary judge erred in awarding damages to Cadbury.
12. Whether the primary judge erred in making an interlocutory injunction against Darrell Lea.
13. Whether the primary judge erred in making a final injunction against Darrell Lea.
14. Whether the primary judge erred in making a declaration that Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" is invalid.
15. Whether the primary judge erred in making an order for the delivery up of infringing goods.
16. Whether the primary judge erred in making an order for the delivery up of advertising material.
17. Whether the primary judge erred in making an order for the payment of costs.
Held
1. The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia allowed the appeal on grounds 1 and 2, but dismissed the appeal on grounds 3 to 17.
2. The Court found that Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" for its chocolate frogs did not constitute trademark infringement under the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth).
3. The Court found that Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" did not amount to passing off under common law.
4. The Court found that the term "Freddo" had not become a generic term for chocolate frogs in the marketplace.
5. The Court found that Cadbury's trademark protection did not extend to the term "Freddo" in relation to chocolate frogs.
6. The Court found that Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" was justified under the honest concurrent use defence.
7. The Court found that Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" was not justified under the descriptive use defence.
8. The Court found that Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" was not justified under the exhaustion of rights defence.
9. The Court found that the primary judge did not err in finding that Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" was likely to deceive or cause confusion.
10. The Court found that the primary judge did not err in finding that Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" was likely to cause damage to Cadbury's business or reputation.
11. The Court found that the primary judge did not err in finding that Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" was misleading or deceptive under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
12. The Court found that the primary judge did not err in awarding damages to Cadbury.
13. The Court found that the primary judge did not err in making an interlocutory injunction against Darrell Lea.
14. The Court found that the primary judge did not err in making a final injunction against Darrell Lea.
15. The Court found that the primary judge did not err in making a declaration that Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" is invalid.
16. The Court found that the primary judge did not err in making an order for the delivery up of infringing goods.
17. The Court found that the primary judge did not err in making an order for the delivery up of advertising material.
18. The Court found that the primary judge did not err in making an order for the payment of costs.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: BLACK CJ
The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia examined the appeal in two parts. On grounds 1 and 2, the Court allowed the appeal, finding that Darrell Lea's use of the term "Freddo" did not infringe Cadbury's trademark and did not constitute passing off. The Court concluded that the term "Freddo" had not become generic, and Cadbury's trademark did not extend to that term. The Court also found that Darrell Lea's use of "Freddo" was justified under the honest concurrent use defence.
On grounds 3 to 17, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the primary judge's findings. The Court found no error in the primary judge's conclusions that Darrell Lea's use of "Freddo" was likely to deceive or cause confusion, and to cause damage to Cadbury's business or reputation. The Court also found no error in the primary judge's finding that the use was misleading or deceptive under the Trade Practices Act. Furthermore, the Court found no error in the primary judge's orders for damages, injunctions, declarations, and the delivery up of goods and advertising material. The Court upheld the order for the payment of costs, finding no error in the primary judge's approach. The binding legal principle established in this case is that honest concurrent use of a term that has not become generic can coexist with an existing trademark, provided it does not deceive or cause confusion.