Cadbury Schweppes Proprietary Limited, Effem Foods Pty Ltd v Societe Des Produits Nestle SA

[2003] ATMO 74

TRADE MARKS ACT 1995

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Oppositions by Cadbury Schweppes Proprietary Limited and Effem Foods Pty Ltd to registration of trade mark application 701578(35), (39) – Confectionery Shape - filed in the name of Societe Des Produits Nestle SA.

Background

1. In this matter, Societe Des Produits Nestle SA , (“Nestle” or “the applicant”), of Switzerland has filed application to register the trade mark, details of which appear below:

   Appn Number:  701578
   Priority Date:  28 January 1999
   Services:  Class: 30  Hard candy confectionery

   Trade Mark:  

   Advertised:  28 January 1999

   Endorsements: The trade mark consists of the shape of a circular piece of confectionery with a hole in the middle, as depicted in the representation attached to the application form. The provisions of subsection 41(6) applied.

2. The trade mark as filed is a photocopy of a photograph of an annular or donut shaped object, which, as the endorsement explains is a piece of confectionery.  There are obvious problems with the representation as filed: it is not a photocopy or photograph of readily reproducible quality; and, it does not show all sides of the confectionery.  It is essential that where a trade mark owner wishes to register a trade mark which is a shape that all surfaces of the shape be shown on the application in a form which is readily reproducible.

3. There are two opponents in this matter: Cadbury Schweppes Proprietary Limited served and filed Notice of Opposition (‘Notice’) on 18 March 1999. Effem Foods Pty Ltd served and filed Notice on 8 April 1999. These two opponents have ‘joined’ their oppositions. Substantially, there are two grounds of opposition, those being under sections 41 and 58 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘the Act’).

4. As a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, I heard the parties in Sydney on 21 July 2003.  Ron Web of Counsel represented the opponents and David Yates of Counsel represented the applicant.  On 22 September 2003, I became aware of decisions of the United Kingdom Trade Marks Office which concern identical shapes to the one the subject of this opposition and which had not been the subject of submission at the hearing before me.  As it appeared possible that I might refer in these reasons to the British decisions, I adjourned proceedings until 14 November 2003, in order that each of the parties could make written submissions.

   The Evidence

5. The evidence in these proceedings comprises:

Declarant	Known as	Date Made	Exhibits
Evidence in Support
Frank Drennan;	Drennan	7 May 2000	FD-1
Janine Lapworth;	Lapworth	8 May 2000	JDL-1 - JDL-2
David Joseph	Joseph	10 March 2000
John North	North	12 April 2000	JN-1
Ben Wicks	Wicks	7 April 2000
Bruce Robertson Catto	Catto	16 December 2000	BRC-1 - BRC-4
Arthur Michael Eger	Eger	16 December 2000	AME-1 - AME-2
Jacqueline Moutsias	Moutsias	17 March 2000	JM1 - JM23
Bruce Parkinson	Parkinson	29 February 2000	BP1 - BP4
Keith Charles Richardson	Richardson	16 March 2000	KCR1 - KCR8
Peter Raymond Beales,	Beales	4 April 2000
David Joseph	Joseph	10 March 2000
Wendy Stokoe	Stokoe	5 April 2000
Evidence in Answer
Margaret Clare Shearer (3)	Shearer 1, 2 and 3	22 April 2002
Margaret Clare Shearer	Shearer 4	30 August 2002	Rounce Declaration
Martin Rex Brown	Brown	30 August 2002
Donna Margaret Besell	Bessell	30 August 2002
Donna Margaret Besell	Bessell 2	21 March 2003
Lisa Catherine Neilson	Neilson	21 March 2003
Roslyn Rosaria Vadala	Vadala	29 August 2002
Evidence in Reply
Janine Diana Lapworth	Lapworth 2	22 November 2002	"A" & "B"
Dagmar Strohmaier	Strohmaier	22 November 2002	"DS-1" TO "DS-14"
Janine Diana Lapworth	Lapworth 3	21 February 2003	"JDL-1" & "JDL-2"

1. I will refer to the evidence as is necessary in my discussion of the issues.

2. Submissions of the opponent are:

   1. that the lack of inherent distinctiveness in the shape mark is such that it falls within subsection 41(6) of the Act because the ring shape:

   ·     is one of a finite shapes suitable to be placed in the mouth

   ·     is one needed by traders as it maximises taste (Wicks, Beales)

   ·     uses comparatively little material to produce a larger piece of confectionery (Beales, Wicks, Richardson)

   ·     has a particular feel or ‘play factor’ in the mouth (Beales Wicks)

   ·     may be most appropriate for the presentation or form of the goods – there are confectionery bracelets and necklaces in evidence made up of rings – (Parkinson, Catto); and,

   ·     a number of other traders have placed annular hard candy onto the Australian market, (Lapworth, Joseph, Drennan, Bessell, Parkinson, Catto).

   ·     other traders place annular soft candy onto the market (Eger, Joseph, Moutsias, Stokoe, North)

   · some products which may be related to hard candy confectionery for the purposes of section 120 of the Act take the same annular form - for example breakfast foods, snacks, biscuits, donuts, bagels and cakes.

   2.   There has been no use of the trade mark as filed.  All use that the applicant has made of the annular shape has been with the trade mark LIFE SAVERS embossed onto it and, additionally or alternatively, any use that has been made of the shape has not been as a trade mark.

   3. As regards section 58: ownership arises through use so there has been no use of the trade mark as filed nor any obvious intention to do so – therefore the applicant is not the owner of the trade mark.

3. I will find now that the opponents have not established this latter ground. There are two clear paths to ownership of a trade mark in Australia – via use of a trade mark or by the filing of an application to register the trade mark. It is dangerous in the circumstances of this application to assess the applicant’s intentions at the date of making the application by its prior pattern of behaviour and, in any event, an applicant’s intention to use the trade mark might be more rightly challenged under section 59 of the Act.

4. Mr Yates submits that the shape mark more properly falls within section 41(5) and that, whether the trade mark falls within section 41(5) or section 41(6), the use of the shape mark since 1923 by the applicant and/or its predecessors in business have made the shape factually distinctive.

   Other

5. This application is one which is problematical for reasons inherent in the application itself – as distinct from the merits (if any) of the application or the oppositions.  For example, there is a dichotomy between the specification of goods ‘hard candy confectionery’ and the description of the trade mark on the application form, “The trade mark consists of the shape of a circular piece of confectionery with a hole in the middle, as depicted in the representation attached to the application form.”  The description of the trade mark on the application form is therefore substantially wider than the goods to which it applies and might possibly extend to, for example, iced donuts: Rountree PLC v Rollbits Pty Ltd (1988) 90 FLR 398. The effects of this are unclear but the description might conceivably be held to extend any grant beyond “hard candy confectionery” or to push the borders of deceptive similarity in terms of section 120 of the Act. In this regard I note the decision of the New Zealand Courts in Levi Strauss & Co v Kimbyr Investments Ltd 28 IPR 249, where Williams J observed:

   “Accepting that it is permissible in appropriate cases to enter words upon the register to define a trade mark, the question then becomes whether the words or the pictorial representation govern the delineation of the trade mark in this case. In my view the answer is plain. The opening words of the written description state that “the mark consists of”. In the absence of any other words explicitly stating what the pictorial representation is to govern, those words are decisive”.

6. Another problem lies with the representation provided on the application form.  It is quite clearly inadequate as it does not clearly show all features of the trade mark.  In drawing my attention to the characteristics of the shape mark that are alleged to give it some inherent capacity to distinguish, Mr Yates said that the:

   “LIFEBUOY shape mark is of a lifebuoy having a particular individual and specific appearance.  Overall the shape is circular.  There is an outer circumference and an inner circumference.  The inner circumference describes the “hole in the middle”.  In elevation the sides of each circumference form straight “walls” and provide a “sharp” edge where the sides meet the upper and lower surfaces of the depicted shape.  The upper and lower surfaces are each softly curved.  The shape has a specific proportionality with respect to its various elements.  For example, the height of the walls has a particular proportionality to the respective lengths of the outer and inner circumferences; the surface area of the “hole in the middle” has a particular proportionality to the surface area between the two circumferences, and so on.”

7. One problem is that very little of what Mr Yates describes is discernable in representation on the application form.  Another difficulty is that what he is describing is not apparent in the description of the trade mark on the application form.  A further problem is that his precise description of the shape mark would appear to infer that his client actually seeks its registration in respect of not ‘all circular candies with holes in the middle’ but the specific candy which he describes which is a very restricted subset of the application and is not reflected in either the description of the trade mark or the representation on the application form.

8. Another problem confronting me is that the monopoly, if granted, would apply to all circular hard candy confectionery with a hole in it, irrespective of the size of the candy and, seemingly, the relative proportion of the hole.

9. Further, problems might also exist because of the lack of precision about the shape of the ‘hole’ in the written description of the shape mark on the application in the light of Williams J's comments in Levi Straus, above.  If, for example, it is argued that it is obvious that the hole in the representation of the trade mark is circular, it is equally obvious in the representation that the candy itself is circular.  So why does the description which defines the trade mark spell out the outer shape of the candy and remain silent about shape of the hole – or use the word ‘circular’ when the word ‘annular’ is more obvious if the hole is circular?  The seeming discrepancy does, to my mind, by its precision about the outer shape and silence about the inner shape, place the shape of the hole into some doubt.  It is, by the representation, at least arguable that the hole is oval.  If the answer is that the photocopied photograph that comprises the representation does all of the work of defining the shape mark, why is it necessary to explain the shape in the written description?  Alternatively, if the answer is that the task of defining the shape mark is shared between the representation and the written description, or the written description supplants the pictorial one, it is possible that the lack of precision in the written description could have some unexpected results.

10. Yet another problem is this: the evidence shows that every piece of candy made by the applicant in the shape that is seemingly claimed here has prominently embossed on it the trade mark LIFE SAVERS – the words cover the whole of one side of the candy.  It is the opponents’ submission that the trade mark LIFE SAVERS forms part of the shape of the candy and that this has two effects:

    ·firstly, all of the use (or acquired distinctiveness in fact) claimed by the applicant in respect of the trade mark as filed stands at nothing since the representation filed does not bear the embossed words LIFE SAVERS which forms a part of the shape in use. 

    ·secondly, (or alternatively), any trade mark significance that the shape mark might have is swamped by the trade mark LIFE SAVERS embossed on the candy.

11. I will discuss the first of these questions now since it will simplify my reasons to resolve it immediately. 

12. I consider that whether or not embossing forms part of a shape trade mark in use will depend on the relative size of the embossing and the relative size and strength as a trade mark of the shape on which it is embossed. This view is a logical corollary of the provisions of subsection 7(1) of the Act which provides:

    If the Registrar or a prescribed court, having regard to the circumstances of a particular case, thinks fit, the Registrar or the court may decide that a person has used a trade mark if it is established that the person has used the trade mark with additions or alterations that do not substantially affect the identity of the trade mark.

13. For example, a bottle might be a shape that is inherently capable of distinguishing the goods of a trader and have on it an unrelated embossed trade mark which is independent of the shape and otherwise also inherently capable of distinguishing the goods of the owner.  There, there are no problems.  However, a bottle shape which is not inherently capable of distinguishing the goods it contains and has a distinctive trade mark embossed onto it is perceived as nothing more than a carrier for the embossed trade mark and a container for goods.  It may be difficult for the second bottle shape per se to gain distinctiveness in fact through use but the bottle itself might yet, prima facie, achieve registration if the embossing on it is inherently capable of distinguishing. 

14. However, where (as here) the goods are small and have words or other material prominently embossed onto them, the embossing must become a part of the shape of the goods, and the identity of the shape mark, and I think that it is artificial to attempt to divorce the one from the other.  If, for example, the embossing on the instant candy were ribbing or some other decorative pattern, there would be no question but that the embossing forms part of the shape.  I do not consider, nor has it been convincing suggested, that it should be any different if the embossing is words, even if those words comprise obvious trade mark material.  There appears to me to be no sensible rationale for the suggestion that prominent embossing which always appears on the shape in use does not, in reality, exist and form a part of the identity of the shape mark.  The words, being dominantly embossed onto the goods, are a prominent part of the shape of them.  Additionally, of course, the evidence shows that the shape mark has never been seen in public (or promoted to them) without the dominant embossing.  Thus any attempt by me to assess intended or actual use and capacity to distinguish[1] or factual distinctiveness[2] of the shape mark as filed would be artificial and likely to be completely flawed since it is (or would be) an attempt to assess a situation or process which, in reality, has never existed and appears unlikely (based on a pattern of use of eighty years) to occur.

    [1] Subsection 41(5)

    [2] Subsection 41(6)

15. I am therefore forced to the conclusion that the shape mark which is the subject of the application is an unused shape mark and must be assessed as such.

    Section 41

16. The operation of section 41 and its provisions is described in detail by Branson J in Blount Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 83 FCR 50 at 56-57. The preliminary step is that the Registrar must first take into account the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons (subsection 41(3)). An application for the registration of a trade mark must be rejected if the trade mark is not capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods in respect of which the trade mark is sought to be registered from the goods of other persons – (subsection 41(2)). In the context of these proceedings, if the trade mark is not capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods from the goods of other traders, the opponent has established its opposition as the applied for shape mark is one which is unused and there is no evidence as to its intended use – further assessment in terms of subsections 41(5) or (6) becomes inappropriate.

17. The considerations are therefore similar to the ones in Kenman Kandy Australia Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks [2002] FCAFC 273. If the shape mark possesses sufficient inherent adaptation to distinguish, it must be registered. If it does not, the opposition has been established and I must refuse to register it.

18. The shape trade mark’s inherent qualities are to be assessed according to the test in Clark Equipment Co v Registrar of Trade Marks (1964) 111 CLR 511 at 514: the question whether a mark is inherently adapted to distinguish must in Kitto J’s words:

    “…be tested by reference to the likelihood that other persons, trading in goods of the relevant kind and be actuated only by proper motives - in the exercise, that is to say, of the common right of the public to make honest use of words forming part of the common heritage, for the sake of the signification which they ordinarily possess - will think of the word and want to use it in connexion with similar goods in any manner which would infringe a registered trade mark granted in respect of it.”

19. In FH Faulding & Co Ltd v Imperial Chemical Industries of Australia and New Zealand Ltd (1965) 112 CLR 537 at 555, Kitto J again referred to the general principle:

    “…that the question to be asked in order to test whether a word is adapted to distinguish one trader’s goods from the goods of all others is whether the word is one which other traders are likely, in the ordinary course of their businesses and without any improper motive, to desire to use upon or in connexion with their goods.”

20. The matter is, as observed by French J in Kenman Kandy, an evaluative judgment.  In the end, I am satisfied that the trade marks lacks any inherent capacity to distinguish, not only by the fact that I have two opponents in the same trade as the applicant who are, in effect, saying, “We have a need in the ordinary course of business to use the shape on our similar goods”, but by the evidence of Beales, Wicks, Richardson, Lapworth, Joseph, Drennan, Bessell, Parkinson and Catto that not only is the shape of the applied for trade mark to an extent dictated by function but that other traders do in fact use very similar shapes for their own similar goods.

21. Additionally, but distinct from the above considerations, the decisions of the British Registrar show that there are at least three overseas companies which make goods having shapes identical to the one which is filed: oppositions to registration in the United Kingdom involved the companies, Kraft Food Holdings Inc, Societe des Produits Nestle SA, Mars UK Ltd and Swizzels Matlow Ltd and the trade marks NAVY NAVY [sic], POLO and LIFE SAVERS embossed on annular candy seemingly identical to that before me.  It is difficult to know what to make of this.  If shape marks are to be treated the same as word or device trade marks, the presence of other shape marks identical to the one before me elsewhere in the world is of no concern.  However, the concurrent presence of these identically shaped goods in another market, which all seemingly co-exist without confusion because of the embossed trade marks on the shapes, might reasonably be held to show that the shape itself has no distinctive character.

22. I do not think that it is sufficient for the applicant to claim inherent distinctiveness, or capacity to distinguish, by virtue of the fact that it is now the only person to use the exact shape in Australia on hard candy (the similarly shape POLO trade marked confectionery have been available in Australia and the company that makes them is now owned by the applicant and other traders make confectionery rings, necklaces and bracelets based on the same shape). The registrability of shape and words marks is to be assessed similarly and such an approach with word marks under the Act would have produced unusual results in Burger King Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks (1973) 128 CLR 417 or Eutectic Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks (1980) 1A IPR 550 or Ocean Spray Cranberries Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks [2000] FCA 177 (25 February 2000). The shape mark's inherent qualities are not altered by the fact that it is only the applicant that uses that exact shape.

1. I find that the applicant’s shape mark as filed is one which falls within subsection 41(6). It is without any inherent distinctiveness.

2. As the applicant has not used the shape mark as filed, it cannot in fact distinguish the applicant’s goods. 

3. The opponents have established their opposition.

4. Should I be wrong in concluding that the embossing on this shape mark as used forms a part of the shape, I also make the following observations. 

5. Subsection 41(6) provides:

   (6) If the Registrar finds that the trade mark is not inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services ofother persons, the following provisions apply:

   (a) if the applicant establishes that, because of the extent to which the applicant has used the trade mark before the filing date in respect of the application, it does distinguish the designated goods or services as being those of the applicant-the trade mark is taken to be capable of distinguishing the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons;

   (b) in any other case-the trade mark is taken not to be capable of distinguishing the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons.

6. Subsection 41(6) gives effect to the recommendations of the Working Party to Review the Trade Mark Legislation which reported in 1992 to the Hon Ross Free MP, the then Minister for Science and Technology.  The Working Party recommended at 6A(6):

   "Provided that a sign shall not be refused registration by virtue of this ground [lack of inherent distinctiveness] if, by the date of application for registration, the sign is in fact distinctive;" [parenthetical material added]

7. The expression "it does distinguish" within subparagraph 41(6)(a) therefore refers to a sign which has been used as a trade mark to the extent that it did, at the application date, in fact distinguish the applicant's goods from those of other traders.

8. The terms of subsection 41(6) also make it plain that for the shape to be registered it is for the applicant to establish that the shape mark does in fact distinguish its goods through its use as a trade mark. However, this particular annular shape is exceptionally weak trade mark material (in fact, prima facie, it is not trade mark material) that is invariably used in juxtaposition to very strong trade mark material – the words LIFE SAVERS – which is prominently embossed onto the shape and appears on the packet or ‘roll’ in which the goods are sold. The work that the applicant has to do to establish the annular shape as a shape mark that is distinctive in fact is thus particularly arduous. The evidence (subject to my comments below) shows that the applicant has made some attempts to educate the public that it sells the candy with the hole. How much this message is understood by the public as an assertion of a proprietary right in annular hard confectionery in general (and of all sizes) is not obvious. How far it is safe for me to extrapolate along these lines is most unclear as it is not obvious to what extent the public believes (because of the applicant's use of the shape mark) that all annular hard confectionery (of all sizes) is made by or originates from the applicant.

9. The situation here appears to be analogous to a hypothetical situation where a trader has used what it believes are two word trade marks together – say, WOMBAT KANDY on, or in relation to, confectionery.  The relative strengths of the two words as separately registrable trade marks, and the fact that they have been invariably used together, makes the process of educating the public that the sign KANDY is a trade mark so much more difficult.  The word KANDY appears to be forever dependent on the word WOMBAT to inject some life as a trade mark into it. 

10. The annular shape does not appear, therefore, to do the work of a trade mark which is distinctive in fact.  To my mind, if the annular shape were now doing the work of, or functioning as, a trade mark which is distinctive in fact, questions of size, for example, would not enter into the equation.  To draw an analogy from Kenman KandyAustralia Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks [2002] FCAFC 273 (the Bug Shaped Confectionery): in a shape trade mark which has sufficient inherent capacity to distinguish to be immediately registrable, questions of size should not enter into consideration. Similarly, if the applicant’s shape mark had become distinctive in fact, the degree of public recognition of the annular shape mark as a trade mark would be such that this question would be nugatory.

11. The results of a survey in evidence (Vadala) are suggestive but are open to criticism – indeed, it is quite apparent that Ms Vadala is not trained in survey work, there is no explanation of the methodology she and her unidentified co-worker used, what their instructions were, the basis for selection of respondents in Martin Place in Sydney and so on.  And another problem is this: it is apparent that a couple of British respondents to the survey identified the candy as POLO trade mark candy (a trade mark belonging to the applicant in the United Kingdom).  The applicant thus points to its use of its shape mark in another jurisdiction.  But, obviously, this cuts both ways - Martin Place in Sydney is a place where there are many tourists.  In America and the United Kingdom and some other places in the world, the trade mark LIFESAVERS is owned by Kraft, Inc which makes the candy in an identical shape to that under consideration.  How many foreigners who were surveyed thought that they were identifying a product of Kraft, Inc were in fact identifying a product of the applicant?  Obviously, such questions introduce great uncertainty about what the survey actually shows.

12. If any weight were to be placed on such a survey, its parameters, methodology and the backgrounds of those surveyed would need to be need to be much more detailed.

13. There is an implication in the applicant’s submissions that because the shape has been used by the applicant in Australia for some eighty years, it must have gained distinctiveness, or be distinctive in fact.  However, length and extent of use, per se, cannot equal distinctiveness in fact.  The applicant has similarly used the word MINT for eighty years in relation to the same goods, yet the proposition that such use has rendered the word MINT distinctive of the goods ‘hard candy confectionery’ could not be sustained. 

14. It is thus not the length or extent of the use of such a sign per se which is to be assessed: it is the length of time and the extent that the sign has obviously been used as a trade mark in its own right and the extent to which the sign now, as a result of the extensive and prolonged use as a trade mark, is now recognised by the public as such and actually does function as an independent trade mark which is distinctive in fact.

15. The extent that the annular shape has actually been used by the applicant as a trade mark is not at all apparent.  The applicant now refers to the annular shape as the LIFEBUOY shape mark in an apparent attempt to sever the dependency of the annular shape from the words LIFE SAVERS – however, this appears to be a recent development and is ‘in-house’.  There appears to have been very little, if any, education of the public along these lines although the goods have been promoted to the public as the candy with the hole.  However, there are obvious problems with immediately concluding that because the applicant has made frequent reference to the physical properties of its goods, these properties have taken on trade mark significance.  What is any different about this frequent reference from the applicant’s similarly frequent references to the flavours of its candy?  The applicant appears, from the evidence, to treat both shape and taste in similar terms in its education of the public about its goods - both are accorded similar prominence in packaging and advertising.

16. The other difficulty with such expressions as 'the candy with the hole' in educating the public about the shape of the goods and its puported function as a trade mark is that it refers to all candies that have a hole - of which the evidence shows there are many different types when both hard and soft confectionery are considered.  The expression additionally does not accurately describe the shape mark under consideration.

17. And, while the applicant argues that the trade mark LIFE SAVERS conjures to mind an annular hard candy and is in itself a part of the process of educating the public about its shape mark, this, I consider, is a reflection of the fame of the word trade mark, rather than of the distinctiveness in fact of the annular shape mark.  The logic and its conclusion is rather the reverse of what I should be considering.  It also seems to be an illustration of the current dependency of the annular shape on the word trade mark in whatever function as a trade mark the shape might have.  While the shape mark is thus dependent on the words LIFE SAVERS, it cannot be distinctive in fact and do the work of a trade mark in its own right.

18. My evaluation of the evidence therefore is that, for all of the above reasons, the annular shape does not actually function as a trade mark which is distinctive in fact.

19. Thus, in the event that I am wrong in my above conclusion that the annular shape mark as filed is unused by the applicant, I am not satisfied by the evidence that the shape mark does distinguish the applicant's goods.

20. The opponents have established their opposition on this basis.

    Conclusion/Decision

21. Section 55 of the Act provides:

    55  Decision

    Unless the proceedings are discontinued or dismissed, the Registrar must, at the end, decide:

    (a)to refuse to register the trade mark; or

    (b)to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then specified in the application;

    having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the application was opposed has been established.

    Note:For limitations see section 6.

22. I refuse to register application 701578.

    Costs

23. The opponents have succeeded in establishing their oppositions.  I therefore order costs against the applicant.

    Ian Thompson
    Hearing Officer
    Trade Marks Hearings

    2 December 2003