[2002] TASSC 29
CITATION: C v Guardianship And Administration Board [2002] TASSC 29
PARTIES:C
v
GUARDIANSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION
BOARD OF TASMANIA
POWER-CONNAN (Dr)
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION: APPELLATE
FILE NO/S: LCA 33/2002
DELIVERED ON: 10 May 2002
DELIVERED AT: Hobart
HEARING DATES: 10 May 2002
JUDGMENT OF: Blow J
[Edited version of reasons delivered orally]
CATCHWORDS:
Mental Health - Effect of mental illness or disability on civil rights and duties - Other cases - Capacity to consent to medical treatment - Understanding of effect of treatment - Schizophrenic without insight.
Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (Tas), ss36(2)(a), 45(4).
Aust Dig Mental Health [14]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant: M I Taylor
Respondent: P Turner
Solicitors:
Appellant: Butler McIntyre & Butler
Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions
Judgment Number: [2002] TASSC 29
Number of Paragraphs: 10
Serial No 29/2002
File No LCA 33/2002
C v GUARDIANSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION
BOARD OF TASMANIA and DR POWER-CONNAN
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BLOW J
(Edited Version of Reasons Delivered Orally) 10 May 2002
This is an appeal from a decision made by the Guardianship and Administration Board on 3 May 2002. The appeal has been brought on three grounds. Ground 2 asserts that the Board erred in law and/or in fact in determining for the purposes of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 ("the Act"), ss45(1)(b) and 36(2)(b)*, that the appellant was incapable of indicating whether or not he consented or did not consent to the carrying out of medical treatment. What happened, however, is that on 3 May the Board gave its consent to the carrying out of certain medical treatment of the appellant, having formed the conclusion that he was incapable of giving his consent on the basis that he did not understand the nature and effect of the proposed treatment, not on the basis that he was incapable of indicating whether or not he consented to the carrying out of the treatment.
In order for the Board to make the order that it did pursuant to the Act, s45(1), it is required by s45(1)(b) that the person who is the subject of the Board's determination be incapable of giving consent to medical or dental treatment. The question of incapability is dealt with in s36 in such a way as to give the word "incapable" a wider meaning than it would otherwise have. There are two bases provided for in s36(2) upon which it might be concluded that an individual is incapable of giving consent. Under s36(2)(b), a person is incapable of giving consent if he or she "is incapable of indicating whether or not he or she consents or does not consent to the carrying out of the treatment". This was not a case about a lack of ability to communicate, and therefore the Board was not concerned at all with s36(2)(b).
The other basis provided for in s36(2) is the subject of s36(2)(a). Under that paragraph, a person is incapable of giving consent if he or she "is incapable…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Board did not err in law in its interpretation of the Act. The court held that the provision in question was intended to refer to the person's understanding of the effect of the proposed treatment on them, rather than on patients in general. The court also found that there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision that the Board came to as to the capacity of the appellant, and therefore leave ought not be granted. The strongest argument that could be put in favour of the appellant as to there having been an error of fact was based on a single comment made by Dr Reid, however, the context of the comment showed that Dr Reid was not suggesting that the appellant was capable of understanding the effect of the proposed treatment. Therefore, the evidence was all one way, and the decision that the Board came to in relation to the question of incapacity was inevitable. The court also found that it was open to the Board to make a finding that treatment was urgent, and therefore the Board did not err in law in deciding that the treatment was urgent.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed and the injunctive orders made by the Chief Justice were discharged. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondents of and incidental to the appeal, to be taxed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The appellant's medical history included previous episodes of schizophrenia, and he had been hospitalised for approximately a month prior to the Board's decision. During this time, his condition deteriorated, and his relationship with his treating psychiatrist became strained. While he posed no immediate danger to himself, there was evidence of threatening behaviour and potential physical risk to others due to his possession of sharp objects. The appellant's refusal to accept his diagnosis and treatment played a significant role in the Board's determination of his incapacity to consent. Despite his understanding of the general nature of the proposed treatment, the Board concluded that his lack of insight rendered him incapable of comprehending the treatment's effect on him personally.
The appeal was heard on three grounds, primarily focusing on the Board's interpretation of the appellant's capacity to consent under the Guardianship and Administration Act 1995. The appellant's legal representative argued that the Board had erred in law by considering the appellant's personal understanding of the treatment's effect rather than a general understanding of the treatment's effect on patients in general. However, the Court found that the Board's interpretation aligned with the Act's purpose of facilitating medical treatment for persons with disabilities. The Court concluded that the Board did not err in law and denied the appellant's request for leave to challenge the Board's factual findings. The urgency of the treatment was also considered, with the Court upholding the Board's decision that the treatment was urgent due to the appellant's deteriorating condition and potential risk to others.
This appeal came before the Supreme Court of Tasmania on 10 May 2002. The matter originated from a decision made by the Guardianship and Administration Board on 3 May 2002, concerning the capacity of the appellant to consent to medical treatment. The appellant, represented by M I Taylor, sought leave to appeal the Board's decision that he was incapable of giving consent to the proposed treatment under the Guardianship and Administration Act 1995. The Board had concluded that the appellant, who suffered from schizophrenia without insight, was incapable of understanding the nature and effect of the proposed treatment, thereby justifying its consent to the treatment. The appeal was brought on three grounds, primarily challenging the Board's interpretation of the statutory provisions and its factual findings. The court considered the statutory language and context, ultimately finding no error in the Board's interpretation of the Act or its factual conclusions, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the Guardianship and Administration Board correctly interpret section 36(2)(a) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 when it determined the appellant's capacity to consent to medical treatment?
2. Did the Guardianship and Administration Board err in fact when it determined that the appellant was incapable of understanding the general nature and effect of the proposed treatment for his schizophrenia?
3. Did the Guardianship and Administration Board correctly determine that the proposed medical treatment was urgent within the meaning of section 45(4)(b) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1995?
Held
1. Did the Guardianship and Administration Board correctly interpret section 36(2)(a) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 when it determined the appellant's capacity to consent to medical treatment?
The court concluded that the Board's interpretation of section 36(2)(a) was correct. The court held that the provision was concerned with the individual's understanding of the effect of the proposed treatment on themselves. As a result, the appeal on this ground was dismissed.
2. Did the Guardianship and Administration Board err in fact when it determined that the appellant was incapable of understanding the general nature and effect of the proposed treatment for his schizophrenia?
The court found that there was no reason to doubt the Board's decision regarding the appellant's capacity. The court held that the Board's finding was inevitable based on the evidence presented. As a result, leave to appeal on this ground was refused.
3. Did the Guardianship and Administration Board correctly determine that the proposed medical treatment was urgent within the meaning of section 45(4)(b) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1995?
The court concluded that it was open to the Board to find that the treatment was urgent given the appellant's deteriorating condition and the risks he posed to others. The court held that the Board did not err in deciding that the treatment was urgent. Leave to appeal on this ground was not granted due to the futility of reconsidering the facts.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Supreme Court of Tasmania addressed three critical issues in the appeal concerning the appellant's capacity to consent to medical treatment for his schizophrenia. Firstly, the court examined whether the Guardianship and Administration Board correctly interpreted section 36(2)(a) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1995. The Board concluded that the appellant was incapable of understanding the general nature and effect of the proposed treatment for his schizophrenia. The court held that the Board did not err in law, as the interpretation of section 36(2)(a) should focus on the individual's understanding of the treatment's effect on themselves, rather than on patients in general. This interpretation aligns with the purpose of the Act, which is to provide medical treatment for persons with disabilities. The court emphasized that understanding the treatment's effect in general terms, but lacking insight into one's own condition, could still result in opposition to the treatment.
Secondly, the court assessed whether the Board erred in fact when it determined that the appellant was incapable of understanding the general nature and effect of the proposed treatment. The appellant's counsel argued that there was an error of fact based on a statement by Dr Reid, who suggested that the appellant understood the potential benefits of the treatment. However, the court found that this comment was made in context and did not contradict the Board's overall conclusion. The evidence overwhelmingly supported the Board's decision that the appellant did not understand the treatment's effect on him, and thus, the Board's determination was correct.
Lastly, the court considered whether the Board correctly determined that the proposed medical treatment was urgent within the meaning of section 45(4)(b) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1995. The Board's decision to grant consent for immediate treatment was based on the appellant's deteriorating condition, the risk of physical danger to others, and the short timeframe within which the treatment needed to be administered. The court concluded that the Board's finding of urgency was reasonable, considering the circumstances. Therefore, the Board did not err in law when it decided that the treatment was urgent.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Guardianship and Administration Board correctly interpreted section 36(2)(a) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1995, did not err in fact in determining that the appellant was incapable of understanding the general nature and effect of the proposed treatment, and correctly determined that the proposed medical treatment was urgent. The court followed the principle that the purpose of the Act should guide the interpretation of its provisions and upheld the Board's decision in this case.