C Tanner v Emma Harris - [2019] ACTMC 12

MAGISTRATES COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:	C Tanner v Emma Harris
Citation:	[2019] ACTMC 12
Hearing Date(s):	17 July 2018, 10 October 2018
DecisionDate:	24 April 2019
Before:	Special Magistrate Hunter OAM
Decision:	See [179] – [196]
Catchwords:	CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Reasons for Judgment – neglect - child neglect - injury – failure to seek medical treatment - recklessness – witness credibility - consciousness of guilt
Legislation Cited:	Children and Young People Act 2008 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) Criminal Code 2002
Cases Cited:	Alvin Gerald (1988) 9 Cr App (S) 425 Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193 R v Baden-Clay [2014] QSC 154 R v CM [2005] ACTSC 21 R v JM [2010] ACTSC 35 R v JM (No 2) [2011] ACT SC 60 R v Senior [1899] 1QB 283 R v Shepherd [1981] AC 398
Texts Cited:	Butchart, Alexander and Alison Harvey, Preventing Child Maltreatment: A Guide to Taking action and Generating Evidence (World Health Organization 2006) Child Family Community Australia, ‘What is Child Abuse and Neglect?’ Australian Institute of Family Studies (CFCA Resource Sheet September 2018) Scott, Debbie, ‘Understanding Child Neglect’, Child Family Community Australia, (CFCA Paper no. 20, April 2014)
Parties:	C Tanner (Informant) Emma Harris (Defendant)
Representation:	Mr B Ngugi (Informant) Ms M Ellis (Defendant)
Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Informant) Daryl Perkins Solicitors (Defendant)
File Number(s):	CC 2665 of 2016

SPECIAL MAGISTRATE HUNTER OAM

Matter of Emma Harris

The defendant has been charged with one count of neglecting a child (CC 2016/02665), pursuant to section 39 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).

Prosecution opening address

The Prosecutor opened his case stating that on the 25 February 2015 the defendant was at her home address in McGregor with her six-month-old child HN. Also in the house was KM with his two-year-old child IM.
All people in the house were asleep. Between 10.00am and 11.00am, HN is piteously beaten and left with significant bruising to her face. It is unknown who beat her.
The allegation is that the defendant failed to provide proper medical attention for her daughter and therefore neglected her.
The defendant made certain admissions that she was the mother of the child and knew that the child had been injured. Evidence was led that it was KM’s child IM who had attacked HN.
The prosecution asserted that KM would give evidence that he observed the child HN to have significant bruising and scratches on her face. It would appear that she was also bleeding from her nose and that she had a blood vessel which had burst on her nose. The prosecutor described this as a haematoma. As far as KM was aware he did not call a doctor and no one else did either.

Evidence

Natalie Andrews

Natalie Andrews gave evidence that the defendant called her on 25 February 2015 telling her the child HN was sick. Ms Andrews attended the address later that evening and made observations of HN’s face.
Ms Andrews upon seeing the child begged the defendant to take the child to the hospital but the defendant refused to do so. The defendant asked Ms Andrews to get some medication from the chemist for HN.
Ms Andrews ultimately contacted police because of her concern for HN. Ultimately HN was taken to hospital and admitted for medical examination.

Statement of DT

I received a statement from DT, exhibited as ‘P1’. DT said that she went to see the defendant on 19 February 2015. She described the defendant as being a good mother to HN. On that day and before she left, she made observations that HN had no injuries observable at that time and she had never seen any injuries on her at any time.
DT said that at no time when she called her that week did the defendant tell her HN had been hurt.

KM gave evidence before me. KM said that he had been staying with the defendant for about three weeks because she had given him a place to stay. KM said that HN was there and she was approximately six months old. On 25 February 2015 his son IM was with KM and sleeping in the same room as him. IM was two years of age at the time but was very big for his age.
KM said that the defendant came into his room, very upset and said that she thought that his son had been playing rough with HN. KM was asked what observations he made of any injuries to HN. He seemed reluctant in my view to give evidence about what he observed, stating that it had been a long time and he couldn’t remember, but he thought she may have had a tiny scratch on her face.
KM agreed that the incident had been some time ago and at the time of the incident he was consuming illicit substances. KM stated that he did make a statement to police and he was referred to that statement. In his statement KM had told police that he saw bruising on the right side of her face and scratches down the middle of her face. KM went on to say that “it was pretty dark, yeah just dark and you know like her whole face had been black and blacked out pretty much. That’s how dark it was.”[1]
[1] Transcript of proceedings 17 July 2018, page 22, line 3.
KM also told police that HN had deep scratches that looked thick and she was bleeding, that there was blood on her nose and he said he actually couldn’t look at it. KM said that in terms of HN’s demeanour he said “man, all I can say is the poor baby was just, yeah, just bruised and just looked battered.”[2]
[2] Transcript of proceedings 17 July 2018, page 23, line 45.
It was KM’s view after having reflected on what was said, that baby HN appeared to have been hit by something.
In cross-examination KM agreed that it was possible that he had seen the bruising on the Friday when he spoke with police and that he saw the scratches on the Wednesday.
Several matters were put to KM in relation to what he recalled and he really didn’t have very much recall at all in relation to that event. That was put down to his illicit drug consumption.

Natalie Andrews

Natalie Andrews gave evidence before me. Ms Andrews, not unexpectedly, could not recall back to 2015 although she did accept that she had given police some information which was recorded.
Ms Andrews could not recall telling police that she was concerned about HN. She could not recall the texts and messages from the defendant to her in relation to the child being unwell. It was suggested to Ms Andrews that the reason she did not go immediately over to the home was because there had been no expression by the defendant that there was a need.
It was suggested to Ms Andrews that about 6.00pm that day on 25 February 2015 she went to the house and saw that HN had severe bruising to her face, she immediately expressed to Ms Harris that she should take HN to the hospital. It was suggested that the defendant told her no, they could not do that because she did not have a child car seat and that she did not have a Medicare card for HN.
It was suggested to Ms Andrews that KM had sent her a copy of a photograph in a text message showing injuries HN sustained and she then sent an SMS to the defendant as proof that the injuries were severe. Ms Andrews did not have any recollection of that event.
It was further suggested to Ms Andrews that she had told police that there wasn’t a spot on HN’s face which wasn’t purple red or blue and that her nose was bleeding and that she trickled a handful of water onto her face and HN screamed in pain. Ms Andrews did not recall any of that happening.
It was suggested to Ms Andrews that she again tried to convince the defendant to take HN to hospital. Ms Andrew replied “if the baby was in that state then I would have obviously tried to do that, but I don’t recall it.”[3]
[3] Transcript of proceedings 17 July 2018, page 36, line 38.
It was further suggested to Ms Andrews that the defendant refused to take HN to hospital and begged Ms Andrews to go to the shops to buy Nurofen and Panadol. Ms Andrews again did not recall that fact.
It was further suggested that Ms Andrews went to the Kippax pharmacy to purchase Child Panadol and Nurofen. Ms Andrews does not recall attending the Kippax pharmacy.
It was further suggested that Ms Andrews had some trepidation in returning the items to Ms Harris’s home and placed them in the garden. Ms Andrews had no recollection of that taking place.
It was suggested further that the defendant contacted Ms Andrews in relation to using her ATM card to pick up some nasal spray to clear HN’s nostrils. Ms Andrew had no recollection of being asked to pick up nasal spray but does have a recollection in relation to the card.
The whole of the question-and-answer starting at question 22 of the interview with the police was read out to the witness and Ms Andrews said she did not recall the conversation with police.
In that interview at question 22 Ms Andrews said the following:
“But I did see Emma was in extreme distress. She was clearly, clearly upset. And I went over to her and saw HN and the injuries to HN’s face, and I can’t really – to words – of the effect essentially, I asked her what happened, you know, what’s- what’s going on what – what happened here? And she, from memory, she didn’t make much sense the first time she tried to explain it, and was quite hysterical. I had to calm her down. I sort of stopped and said, right, get a towel, you know, we’ll will take her to hospital. And she said, no, no, we can’t, there is no baby car seat. And I said, that’s fine. You hold her in the back seat in your lap, that’s fine. We’ll take her to the hospital. Yeah, and it was – no, no, we can’t – I don’t have a Medicare card for her, it’s in the car no-one cares about the Medicare card, we’re taking her, put her we’re going.”[4]
[4] Transcript of proceedings 17 July 2018, page 39, line 30.
Ms Andrews explained to police further:
“I had a look – had a look at HN and she – she was bruised everywhere from her – from her entire face, and then on the beginning of her hairline as well, going back about halfway back to her head, from memory. And there wasn’t a spot on her that wasn’t purple or blue or red. There was like scratches on the side of her face as well and her nose, it wasn’t bleeding profusely but there was- you know it was like a runny nose but there was – it was a runny nose with blood and it just you know you’d you try to and wash it away and then still little clots would still keep coming”.[5]
[5] Transcript of proceedings 17 July 2018, page 40, line 6.
Ms Andrews had told police in that conversation that the defendant actually took a photo of her daughter and sent it to a friend of Ms Andrews the next night and she said that “she looked a ‘helluva lot better than when she saw her in person”.[6]
[6] Transcript of proceedings 17 July 2018, page 43, line 5.
There was some further questioning in relation to what was told by the defendant to Ms Andrews and what she heard being said, and there was clearly some lies told about how the injuries to HN occurred. The lies being that it was another child who had injured HN and it had happened on another occasion. The prosecutor submitted that those lies showed consciousness of guilt.
In cross examination it was suggested that Ms Andrews had been kicked out of the premises. She did not recall being asked to leave and she did not accept that she been kicked out. It was also suggested that it was because of that that she went to the police about HN and it was because she wanted to get the defendant into trouble. Ms Andrew said she highly doubted that she would have done that.
It was suggested to her that she was angry about being kicked out and she said if I had been kicked out I would not have gone back with medicine. It was suggested to Ms Andrews that what the defendant said was not that she refused to take the child to the hospital but that she did not need to do so. Ms Andrew said that was possible.
I accept Ms Andrews’s version given to police much of which was read out in Court as credible. Much of her evidence is corroborated by other independent evidence such as the medical evidence, photographs, SMS messages sent and received by the defendant as well as the evidence of KM and Ms Diha.

Dr Catherine Sansum

Dr Sansum gave evidence before me stating that she provided a medicolegal report in relation to HN, exhibited as ‘P6’.
Dr Sansum is a medical practitioner specialising in forensic medicine and is the Medical Director of the Child Protection Unit at Canberra hospital.
Dr Sansum produced some photographs which were taken of the injuries to the child. There was an objection in relation to the fact that the photographs looked worse some three days after the event than they did on the day. The objection was because they were not taken on the day of the incident, therefore they were inadmissible. I ruled that the photographs were admissible.
Clinically Dr Sansum observed scabbing on the face in keeping with abrasions or scratches, and discolouration appearing as bruises. The bruises were on the cheek, the chin, the forehead and also the right side of her head.
There were also clinically 2 linear parallel scratch abrasions behind her left ear. There was also bruising to the bridge of the nose and a small abrasion on the top of her left eye, there was some slight swelling under the bruising on the cheek.
Dr Sansum was shown the photographs taken of HN. Dr Sansum commented upon those photographs and gave her opinion in relation to them, particularly number 22 which she said depicts a full frontal image of the injuries being the first thing that would confront you when looking at the child.
Dr Sansum stated that the child appeared not to be distressed and in fact was quite bubbly when she saw her.
Dr Sansum stated that the child was admitted to hospital because of the facial injuries she had sustained. Medical tests were performed including a skeletal survey, scans to detect whether there was any underlying brain injury because of the significant bruising to her head. Blood tests to exclude any other cause for the bruising. Those tests results were normal.
Dr Sansum opined referring to her report:
“Any small child that essentially is non-mobile and presents with unexplained bruising, there is a significant risk of underlying injury. So as I said, we x-rayed her arms and legs and ribs amongst other things and also imaged her brain because the bruising on her face and her head was concerning and so we needed to exclude an underlying brain injury”.[7]
[7] Transcript of proceedings 17 July 2018, page 60 line 12.
Dr Sansum opined that contrary to what she was told as to the history of the injuries, there had been multiple applications of blunt force of some sort. HN was discharged because she recovered quickly and she was quite well.
Dr Sansum answered the question I posed in relation to concern as to the extent of the bruising to the head and face and opined that it is true that there could be fractures underlying even if there is no outside signs of injury. Dr Sansum agreed with me that in that situation it is recognised by medical practitioners that x-rays and perhaps MRIs or CT scans are required to determine whether there are any significant underlying injuries.
Dr Sansum also opined that one would not know, without those types of examinations, whether there was any underlying injuries such as fractures and the medical staff were also concerned because the chance of a six-month-old sustaining those injuries accidentally were extremely remote.
Dr Sansum opined that in these types of injuries one must exclude other causes such as blood disorder or clotting disorder as a cause of the bruising and therefore it would be extremely important to get a medical examination to exclude them.
Dr Sansum said that when any child that presents with unexplained bruising, doctors look at medical causes and also other physical accidental or non-accidental causes.[8]
[8] Transcript of proceedings 17 July 2018, page 62 line 2.
In cross-examination Dr Sansum agreed that there is a standard process when a child is admitted to hospital, but it depends on the situation. Dr Sansum explained this and gave as an example, if a five year old presented after falling off a bicycle with a bruise that would be treated very differently to a six-month-old presenting with multiple bruises with no explaining history. It was posited that if a six-month-old had been tipped out of a pusher and had bruising would that require the same scans as those done on HN by the hospital. Dr Sansum stated if they had that amount of extensive bruising to the head it is indicative of blunt force to the head and therefore scans would be required.
It was suggested that Dr Samsun’s concern was there was no explanation for the bruising. Dr Sansum stated that staff had been given two explanations over period of time and neither of those explanations matched the pattern of injury that they saw.[9]
[9] Transcript of proceedings 17 July 2018, page 62 line 35.
Dr Sansum was asked questions in relation to the bruising whether it would be immediately evident or whether it would likely to have come out later. Dr Samsun said it was highly unlikely that it wasn’t immediately evident because of the number of bruises but agreed that some may have taken a bit longer to come out. Dr Samsun further opined that bruises normally develop at different times but within minutes or hours of the injury rather than days.
Dr Samsun was asked whether she would expect the bruising to be worse the next day and indicated that it was possible although she said it might have looked better than the day before.[10]
[10] Transcript of proceedings 17 July 2018, page 72, line 24.
In re-examination Dr Samsun said multiple applications of blunt force to a head is particularly significant in children because the head guards the brain and injuries to the head or the skull can cause underlying brain injuries.[11]
[11] Transcript of proceedings 17 July 2018, page 74, line 20.
I also received some medical records dated 27 February 2015 at 5:30 pm which included a history which stated that the mother has taken the child to a GP. Dr Sansum had seen that for the first time in court when shown. There was a further document exhibit P9 which indicated that on the history given, a version of how HN received the injuries was not consistent with the history given to Dr Sansum in relation to the injuries. It also indicated that the defendant took HN to the Kippax walk in clinic .Dr Sansum was also not aware of that history either.

Amanda Harris

Ms Harris is the mother of the defendant. Ms Harris was asked about a conversation she had with police where she told them that the defendant had said she was worried about taking HN (for medical treatment) because she thought that they would take the child from her.
Ms Harris said that there were a number of different versions given by the defendant about what happened to HN and she was not sure what happened.
In cross examination Ms Harris said that aside from being treated for conjunctivitis or something of that nature that was the only treatment that HN was given by the hospital in February 2015.

Christopher Tanner

Detective Senior Constable Tanner arrived at the address in Macgregor on 27 February 2015 in response to a welfare check on a six-month-old girl. That report was made after a photograph was sent to the police.
Detective Senior Constable Tanner stated that when the defendant gave an interview with police she spoke of a walker or bouncer and that a two-year-old, the son of an associate, picked up HN from the walker and dropped her on the cement. There were photographs taken of that incident. That was clearly a lie and it was accepted by defence counsel that it was a lie in relation to how HN was injured.
Detective Senior Constable Tanner said that he recorded a conversation with Ms Natalie Andrews and at the time he did not form the view that she was affected by any intoxicants.
Detective Senior Constable Tanner also attended the Kippax pharmacy and received a receipt for the Nurofen baby and Panadol dropper from 25 February 2015.

As a result of his investigations it was clear that the defendant lied about several things; firstly the injury occurring as a result of the child been taken from the walker and dropped onto the cement, secondly that she did not go to the walk-in clinic with the child and thirdly a lie about getting medicine from the pharmacy.
There was confirmation in relation to the pharmacy because there was CCTV footage of Ms Andrews attending the pharmacy and the relevant receipt which identifies what was purchased and the time of the purchase was produced.
Detective Senior Constable Tanner also attended the Kippax walk-in centre and establish that the defendant did not take HN to the walk-in centre at the relevant time. Medicare records also establish that she did not see any medical practitioner during that time.
Detective Senior Constable Tanner then spoke with the defendant, offering her the opportunity to explain herself after his investigation showed that she had not taken HN to the walk-in centre. Detective Senior Constable Tanner also received a telecommunications search warrant for Emma Harris in respect to her sending SMS messages to various people at the relevant time.
The SMS trail revealed that there was some material in relation to HN being sick and not having a car seat to take her to the doctors which was consistent with what Ms Andrew said Ms Harris had told her.

Myra Diha

Ms Diha works for Child and Youth Protection Services and was involved in a care plan as to where HN should live upon discharge from hospital. Ms Diha said that she arrived on 27 February 2015 at the home of HN and Emma Harris. Upon arrival she observed substantial bruising to the child’s face as well as scratches, and asked the defendant what had happened. The defendant told her that she and a friend were in the backyard of the home along with a friend’s son and HN was in her walker. The friend’s son tried to pull HN out of the walker and dropped HN as she slid along the grass. Ms Diha said she was also advised by police about another version given by the defendant. Ms Diha was told by police that a friend’s two-year-old son had climbed into the cot with HN and caused the injuries.
The defendant had told Ms Diha that she had attended the Kippax walk-in clinic and was attended to by a nurse and the nurse had told her to give Panadol and Nurofen and use Betadine for the injuries to HN. The defendant was asked whether the nurse had suggested she take HN to the hospital; the defendant said no she was not told that.
Ms Diha said that it was the worst injury she had seen on a child, that it was horrific and that she had to force herself to look at HN’s face. Ms Diha said she has had about 12 years’ experience as a child protection officer working with children in both New Zealand and Australia, and much longer than that as a social worker.
In cross examination Ms Diha said that ACT Child and Youth Protection Services became involved with the defendant as a result of several reports prior to 27 February 2015 in relation to domestic violence and illicit drug use. The report indicated that the drug use was by the defendant.
Ms Diha said that she had conducted a home environmental check and there was nothing of concern at the home and that HN was well. There were also no concerns about her development. There were also no concerns in the home as it was well looked after, beautifully furnished and there was no drug paraphernalia found.
In response to a question from counsel, Ms Diha stated that in her experience she has received on occasions reports which were false and had been made to cause mischief to the parents.

Emma Harris

The defendant Emma Harris spoke with police in a recorded interview exhibited before me as ‘P12’.
In that interview conducted on 27 February 2015 at the address in Macgregor. The defendant stated that HN was injured when she and her friend were in the backyard having a cigarette and HN was in her walker. She stated her friend’s two-year-old, G, came over and tried to pick up HN, and before either of them could get over to stop him he had picked her up and HN had her legs caught in the walker, fell out and then slid across the grass on the side of her face.
The defendant stated that it was her friend Courtney. The defendant said that occurred on Wednesday, 25 February 2015.
The defendant stated that her friend’s child G was a big boy, being part Islander and part Aboriginal. The defendant then gave a long explanation about the children and the whingeing and the child picking up her daughter HN.
The defendant then stated that she ran over, grabbed HN and picked her up and that she was crying at the time. She noted that she had a cut on her face but none of the bruising had come out at that time. The defendant stated that HN had a cut under her eye which was the worst injury sustained. The defendant said she grabbed a washer and dabbed it to have a look at it. The defendant then stated to police that she thought she would take HN up to the walk-in clinic at Kippax where the nurses are.
The defendant then told police that she took HN to the walk-in clinic and spoke with a nurse who looked at HN and said that HN hadn’t been knocked out, seemed happy enough, was alert, hadn’t got a fever and was not unwell, to just get some Panadol, Nurofen and Betadine and fix her up that way,[12] which is what she did.
[12] ‘P12’, Record of Conversation between Police and Emma Harris on 27 February 2015, page 5.
The defendant then told police that it would not have been more than an hour after the event that she took her to the walk-in clinic, around 2.00pm or 3.00pm in the afternoon.
The defendant then explained what the nurses did, which was taking HN’s temperature, looking at her eyes and taking a history of what happened. The defendant then said that the nurses told her to monitor her and if any changes occurred then to take her to the hospital.
The defendant then told police that she was told to give the child Panadol, Nurofen and use Betadine for the cuts and she said she then went to the pharmacy to purchase those items.
The defendant stated to police that when she took her to the clinic there were just basically scratches, there was no bruising, although there was a little bit of swelling.
The defendant said that she owned the home that they lived in but she was renting out a room to someone whom she had kicked out because she was bringing people to her house and trashing it.
The defendant was asked whether she let anyone else know about the accident with HN. The defendant said she didn’t speak with her mother about HN’s accident.
The defendant then demonstrated to the police how HN was taken out of the walker. The defendant went into intricate detail about how the accident happened showing police with the walker in the place where it she said it happened.
The defendant also gave evidence before me on 10 October 2018.
The defendant stated that she had gone down for a nap and had a baby monitor with her. HN was in her own room in the cot. KM and his son were in the spare room. The defendant said she was asleep and heard her daughter crying and went to check on her.
The defendant stated that when she arrived in the room she saw KM’s son inside the cot and saw that HN had scratches and red marks on her face. The defendant said she pulled the boy out of the cot and saw a metal jack-in-the-Box tin in the cot. There was a small amount of blood on the tin and she realised that the boy had hit HN with it.
The defendant stated that she picked HN up and she was calm within minutes. The defendant said she gave HN a bath and assessed her injuries as being fine because she was not crying, so she gave her a bottle and some food.
The defendant stated that when she first saw HN she saw that she had redness on her cheeks some scratches on her nose and behind her ear they were small scratches. The defendant stated she did not know what the child belonging to KM did, although she did go and see KM and told him to get his son out of the house. The defendant stated that KM rang the mother of the child and told her to take him out of the house. That happened within minutes.
The defendant stated that HN was acting normally, was smiling and took her bottle. The defendant stated that prior to the incident she had been teething and also had a cold and was a bit miserable prior to the incident.
The defendant stated that apart from some crying she did not notice anything about HN that alarmed her and said she stayed with her and that she was acting normally. When she was asked about whether she should have taken her to the doctor, the defendant said she did not need to do that because there was no vomiting she did not have a fever therefore there was no need.
The defendant stated that when the bruising came out she did not think she needed to take her to a doctor because she was her playful happy self. The defendant stated that Natalie did come over and she asked her to do so because she had stolen her car. The defendant stated that she did ask her to get some Panadol but only because she had some left but needed some more and that was for HN’s cold not for her face.
The defendant stated that if she had thought HN needed to be seen by someone she would have taken her immediately to see someone, but in her view there was no need to go to see anyone.
It was suggested to her that she had given the police two different versions of what happened on the day. The defendant stated that when the police came she did not understand the seriousness of the situation and she lied to them because KM was not supposed to have his child with him at the time.
The defendant stated that she was asked to clarify the different version she had given and she said she lost herself and did not know what to do.
In cross examination the defendant agreed that it was the worst day of her life because she had woken up and her six-month-old was crying and she went to her room and saw her the way she was. The defendant agreed that she was upset and that she had approached KM who was asleep. She agreed that she had woken him up. The defendant agreed that she was upset she had been crying but was not concerned about the welfare of the child because she had assessed her as being fine.
This was despite the fact that she had injuries to her face, red marks and scratches which were in the head area. It was suggested that injury to a head is serious and she said it depended whether the person becomes unconscious or not. The defendant said that if she had been unconscious she would have taken to her to the hospital.
It was pointed out to her that she was not on aware of whether the child had been unconscious. The defendant said that she heard the cry and then she assumed that’s when it had happened.
The defendant agreed that she had lied to police and she has admitted that lie. That included the lie she told to the CYPS about HN being pulled out of the walker and sliding on the grass.
The defendant agreed that she had lied twice about how HN was injured. The defendant agreed that Natalie had asked her to take HN to the doctors. The defendant said she told Natalie that she had assessed her and there was no need for her to go.
The defendant agreed that Ms Diha had said in evidence she was horrified when she had seen HN’s face. The defendant said that the bruising had come out by then, it was not horrific, they were not serious bruises and in her opinion they did not require medical treatment.
The defendant agreed that she had never attended parenting classes and she had no medical background or training. It was suggested to her that the injuries on HN’s face plus the blood on her face did worry her. The defendant replied that from the scratches she was worried but she assessed her and she was eating she was not crying, she was not acting differently, she was playing, and was fine. If that had changed she said she would have assessed her. She said that no treatment was given at the hospital in any event.
The defendant said that once she had realised the seriousness of the situation she had told the truth. It was suggested to her that she had told five lies. The first lie consisted of IM being in the cot when first discovered, the defendant said that was not a lie, the second lie was about HN being in the child walker and the other child G pulling her out of it, she agreed that was a lie, The third lie was the story about HN the child walker the being slid on the grass, The defendant agreed that was a lie. The next lie was that she was slid on the concrete, she agreed that was a lie but it was the same lie just different details.
The fourth lie was that she said she had taken HN to the walk-in centre and spoken to the nurse and that was a lie. The final lie was that the defendant then said that the nurse had told her that she did not need to take HN to the hospital. The defendant agreed that was a lie – the defendant said it was part of same story and same lie.
The defendant stated that she emailed Myra and told her the truth and that she forwarded the email to her lawyer. It was suggested to her that Ms Diha never mentioned that an email had been sent from her about this. In relation to the SMS to Natalie for help, the defendant denied that and said that was prior to the incident and it was because she needed Panadol and Nurofen for HN’s cold.
In relation to Ms Andrews attending at 5 o’clock the defendant said it was 3- 4pm when HN was hurt and she came around at 5 pm and she had asked her to come prior to that because of HN’s cold.
The defendant insisted that in her view the baby did not need to go to the hospital because no treatment had been required anyway. The defendant agreed that HN had been teething and had had a cold.
The defendant said that Natalie Andrews had exaggerated what she had seen of HN’s face being that there was not anywhere on the face other than blue red and purple areas. The defendant suggested that was wrong because Natalie was a drug addict. The defendant also agreed that she had asked Natalie to get a nasal spray but said that was because of her cold and her snotty nose.
It was suggested to her that she had provided a new version of what happened to various people including the police, her friends and CYPS as well as her lawyer. The defendant denied that and said it was not a new version.
The defendant agreed that when the doctor examined HN she found she had redness and scratches and some swelling. The defendant said that she had red and swollen areas on the day but the bruising came out a couple of days later, however she accepted that her eye was swollen but called it puffy.
It was suggested to the defendant that KM had given evidence that the baby did not look too good. The defendant said yes, that was because HN looked like a baby that had been hurt.
It was suggested that she knew HN was injured but chose not to seek medical help. The defendant again denied that and said she did not need to go for medical treatment.
[I found the defendant less than honest. It was clear by her own admissions and the evidence from the witnesses, particularly Ms Andrews, KM and Ms Diha that the defendant had told several lies. I found that she was not a witness of truth and she was not a credible witness.]

Prosecution submissions

The prosecutor submitted that section 39 (1) (b) of the Crimes Act 1900 is the relevant provision. The Criminal Code 2002 does not apply to this provision.
The Prosecutor referred to the legislation and a number of authorities which I have set out below
Essentially the prosecutor submitted that neglect involves a conscious failure to act. The prosecutor further submitted that it does not require actual harm referring to JM and it can be intentional or reckless. The prosecutor submitted that recklessness is what is required at common law.
Turning to the evidence of the defendant, the prosecutor submitted that I should disregard her evidence because she was not a witness of truth. The prosecutor reminded me that there is no obligation on the defendant to give evidence but she did do so and that I should treat her evidence like I would any other witness. The prosecutor further submitted that I should scrutinise her evidence and having done so I would be satisfied that her version was not truthful.
The prosecutor submitted that the issue of the timing of the offence, that is to say that it occurred between 10.00am and 11.00am, is important because the evidence of Natalie Andrews states that it was earlier in the day that she was contacted and that is corroborated to some extent. KM gave evidence which was not challenged that the incident occurred when he was woken at between 10.00am and 11.00am.
The prosecutor submitted that there were only three people who saw HN on that day, KM, Ms Andrews and the defendant. Ms Andrews gave evidence of her impression of what HN looked like when she saw her that afternoon. The prosecutor submitted that she had no motive to lie or exaggerate her evidence. To her evidence is corroborated.
The defendant agreed that she did contact Ms Andrews and the SMS she sent clearly shows that she was upset and thought that the child desperately needed to go to the hospital. The further evidence is that Ms Andrews bought the medicine with the defendant begging her to do so.
Ms Andrews said that she begged the defendant to take her to the hospital but the defendant refused begging her to get the medications, there was an issue about not having the child seat or the Medicare card for HN. That was corroborated by some of the SMS messages.
Ultimately Ms Andrews goes to the police because of her concerns. Ms Andrews had seen the baby in the bath and said that the injuries were horrific, that she poured water on her face and HN screamed. Dr Sansum stated that action would have caused discomfort to the child.
The defendant stated that Ms Andrews was at drug addict, however the police formed the view that she was not affected by drugs the day they spoke with her.
KM stated to police at the time when questioned that HN looked like someone had hit her with something. He also provided a description of her injuries which was not challenged. It was his view HN did not look good.
The prosecutor submitted that evidence shows that the appearance was of a child who needed help. The defendant suggested that KM should not have had his child with him and that’s one of the reasons why she did not seek help. It was never put to KM that he was not allowed to have his child with him at the time this incident occurred.
Ms Diha gave evidence that in her 11 years of practice as a child protection worker and many years as a social worker in that field, that this is one of the worst cases she had seen. Her comments were that it was horrific to see.
Dr Sansum stated that bruises can appear at any time but certainly on Friday, 27 February the child had bruises on her face.
All of this evidence bolsters the corroborative effect of the evidence of Ms Andrews. Those that observed HN’s injuries consider them to be not insignificant. Clearly upon their evidence they believed that the child should have been taken for medical assessment. The prosecutor submitted that was reasonable and one could infer that a reasonable person would see that from looking at the child. The prosecutor submitted that I would infer that a reasonable person would also have taken that view and the child should have been taken for medical attention.
The prosecutor submitted that the lies told by the defendant which to some extent she has accepted are those as described in Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193. The defendant said that she had taken HN to the walk-in clinic that was a lie. The defendant had said that the nurse told her that she did not need to go to the hospital unless her condition changed, that also was a lie.
The prosecutor submitted that those lies show a consciousness of guilt. See Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193 as per Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ:
“In other words, in telling the lie the accused must be acting as if he were guilty. It must be a lie which an innocent person would not tell. That is why the lie must be deliberate. Telling an untruth inadvertently cannot be indicative of guilt. And the lie must relate to a material issue because the telling of it must be explicable only on the basis that the truth would implicate the accused in the offence with which he is charged. It must be for that reason that he tells the lie. To say that the lie must spring from a realization or consciousness of guilt is really another way of saying the same thing. It is to say that the accused must be lying because he is conscious that "if he tells the truth, the truth will convict him"

And further:
“Although guilt must ultimately be proved beyond all reasonable doubt, an alleged admission constituted by the telling of a lie may be considered together with the other evidence and for that purpose does not have to be proved to any particular standard of proof. It may be considered together with the other evidence which as a whole must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt if the accused is to be convicted ((30) See Shepherd v. The Queen [1990] HCA 56. If the lie said to constitute the admission is the only evidence against the accused or is an indispensable link in a chain of evidence necessary to prove guilt, then the lie and its character as an admission against interest must be proved beyond reasonable doubt before the jury may conclude that the accused is guilty. But ordinarily a lie will form part of the body of evidence to be considered by the jury in reaching their conclusion according to the required standard of proof. The jury do not have to conclude that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt in order to accept that a lie told by him exhibits a consciousness of guilt. They may accept that evidence without applying any particular standard of proof and conclude that, when they consider it together with the other evidence, the accused is or is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt”.
The prosecutor submitted that there was a consciousness of guilt by the defendant because she knew the baby had been injured and she knew that she should have sought medical help. The defendant had to explain why she did not take the child to have her medically assessed by stating that the nurse told she did not need to.
The prosecutor submitted that, firstly, I have to be satisfied that the lie was made and secondly, I need to consider the purpose of the lie and how it ties into the evidence. The prosecutor submitted that I would find that the defendant’s reason to lie was because she feared the truth but implicate her in the commission of an offence.
The lie was to protect herself because she knew she was obliged to seek medical help. Clearly people lie for various reasons, however the prosecutor submitted that the only inference available upon the evidence of those lies, referring to R v Baden-Clay [2014] QSC 154, was that she lied to conceal that the injuries did require medical attention and she knew it.
The prosecutor submitted that the other lies such as the lie that HN was pulled out of the Walker by another child, G, onto the concrete and the lie that HN was pulled out of the Walker onto the grass and slid goes to her credibility and taints her credibility.
The prosecutor submitted that it was never put to KM the defendant’s explanation that she did not tell anyone because he was not allowed to have his child at the home. The prosecutor submitted I should not accept her version in that regard. That story was merely an explanation of her motive to lie.
The prosecutor submitted that I would find that on 25 February 2015 HN suffered injuries identified and seen by the witnesses. I must be satisfied as to the extent of those injuries and I can be because two independent witnesses painted a picture that the child had significant injuries. Given that fact a reasonable person in the defendant position should have been sufficiently concerned to seek medical help.

Defence submissions

The defence also referred to R v JM (No 1) [2010] ACTSC 35 as well as R v CM [2005] ACTSC 21 [2005] ACTSC 21.
The defence counsel submitted that the defence case is that the defendant did not think the baby required help. She had considered it and if it was needed she would have sought help.
Defence counsel submitted that the timing of the phone calls substantiates the defendant’s view that the incident happened at 3:30 pm. The defendant said SMS messages were about HN having a cold not about her being injured. They were also about the car because she wanted it back from Ms Andrews.
Defence counsel submitted that when the child was seen by Dr Samsun, she was bright and alert, interactive and was discharged home. It was the view of the medical staff that the injuries were possibly non-accidental.
Defence counsel stated that KM’s evidence was varied and he admitted taking ice and that I should give little weight to his evidence.
Counsel submitted that likewise Ms Andrews was on drugs at the time and that her evidence about the injury was not supported by medical evidence and that I should not give it much weight. [I must say I find that submission difficult to accept, given there was evidence by Ms Diha about her impression of the injuries which supports that of Ms Andrews and KM.]
Defence counsel submitted that some of Ms Andrews’s evidence is acceptable but much is not. Defence counsel submitted that if Ms Andrews was so concerned on 25 February 2015 she should have gone to the police. Neither she nor KM contacted police.
In relation to Ms Diha, on her visit prior to the incident she said that HN looked well and was well cared for and she had no concerns. Ms Diha also said that there had not been any concerns raised about how HN was looked after.
Constable Tanner said he was satisfied that the defendant did not cause the injuries to HN.
Defence counsel submitted that there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that treatment was actually given to HN at the hospital and no medical practitioner saw what the defendant saw on the day.
The defence counsel referred to R v CM [2005] ACTSC 21 at paragraph 28 – conscious failure where parent overlooks but attempts to care for child.
Defence counsel submitted that clearly the defendant cared for her child, she was upset about the injuries but observed that HN had calmed down and she continue to observe her over the next few days. The defendant was satisfied that HN did not need medical treatment.
Defence counsel submitted that in hindsight we have 20/20 vision, but the defendant knew her child, and that there had never been an instance of her ever failing her child. The defendant gave evidence of what she looked for in her child and what observations he made of her child and those observations did not raise over concern with her.

Prosecution in reply

The prosecutor in his submissions in reply stated that symptomology is not the issue that goes to recklessness. That I should, using my life experience and examining the injuries that occurred together with the fact that the defendant did not tell anyone about the injuries would be satisfied that the defendant was reckless as to seeking medical help.

The legislation

Section 39 (1) Crimes Act 1900 - Neglect etc of children:
(1) A person must not;
(a) ill-treat or abuse a child who is in the person’s care; or
(b) neglect a child for whom he or she is caring or has parental responsibility.
Maximum penalty: 200 penalty units, imprisonment for 2 years or both.
(2) A person is not guilty of an offence referred to in subsection (1)(b) by reason only of failing to provide a thing for a child if the person did not provide the thing because he or she could not afford to do so.
(3) A person must not, knowingly or recklessly, leave a child unattended in such circumstances and for such a time that the child could suffer injury or sickness or otherwise be in danger.
Maximum penalty: 100 penalty units, imprisonment for 1 year or both.
(4)A police officer, medical practitioner or director-general responsible for the Children and Young People Act 2008 may act (including by entering any building, place or vehicle, with such force that is necessary and reasonable) if the police officer, medical practitioner or director-general reasonably believes—
(a) that a child is being or has been ill-treated, abused or neglected as mentioned in subsection (1) or left unattended as mentioned in subsection (3); and
(b) that it is necessary to act immediately to safeguard the child.
(5) An action does not lie against a person by reason of the person having acted under subsection (4) in good faith, without negligence and with reasonable care in the circumstances.
(6) In this section: parental responsibility, for a child, means all the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority parents ordinarily have by law in relation to their children.

Definition

Child Abuse

I note that the World Health Organisation defines child abuse and neglect as:
All forms of physical and/or emotional ill-treatment, sexual abuse, neglect or negligent treatment or commercial or other exploitation, resulting in actual or potential harm to the child’s health, survival, development or dignity in the context of a relationship of responsibility, trust or power.[13]
[13] Alexander Butchart and Alison Harvey, Preventing Child Maltreatment: A Guide to Taking action and Generating Evidence (World Health Organization 2006) 9.
Definition according to Child Family Community Australia:
Definitions of child abuse and neglect can include adults, young people and older children as the perpetrators of the abuse. It is commonly stated in legislation that the term ‘child abuse and neglect’ refers to behaviours and treatment that result in the actual and/or likelihood of harm to the child or young person. Furthermore, such behaviours may be intentional or unintentional and can include acts of omission (i.e. neglect) and commission (i.e. abuse) Bromfield, 2005; Child Family Community Australia [CFCA], 2016).[14]

Neglect

[14] Child Family Community Australia, ‘What is Child Abuse and Neglect?’ Australian Institute of Family Studies (CFCA Resource Sheet, September 2018) < type="1">

According to the World Health Organisation:

Neglect includes both isolated incidents, as well as a pattern of failure over time on the part of a parent or other family member to provide for the development and wellbeing of the child – where the parent is in a position to do so – in one or more of the following areas:

a)health
b)education
c)emotional development
d)nutrition
e)shelter and safe living conditions.[15]
[15]Alexander Butchart and Alison Harvey, Preventing Child Maltreatment: A Guide to Taking action and Generating Evidence (World Health Organization 2006).

According to Debbie Scott, a Child Family Community Australia paper:

Neglect is often considered to be a failure, on the part of a caretaker, to provide adequate supervision, emotional nurturance, appropriate medical care, food, clothing, and shelter for a child. This definition also aligns with a definition of poverty, where poverty is considered to be inadequate food, shelter, and clothing. Not all children who are neglected are from impoverished families and not all children from impoverished families are neglected. For example, families may be perceived as being neglectful where in fact their cultural context or economic situation may be more important considerations. Rather than a statutory child protection response, the family may be better served by providing support to educate them or provide access to other resources, like financial assistance….

With these issues in mind, the definition of neglect that has been used for the purposes of this paper is a commonly accepted definition proposed by Straus and Kantor (2005):

Neglectful behaviour is behaviour by a caregiver that constitutes a failure to act in ways that are presumed by the culture of a society to be necessary to meet the developmental needs of a child and which are the responsibility of a caregiver to provide. (p. 20)

Medical neglect: a failure to provide appropriate medical care. This could occur through a failure to acknowledge the seriousness of an illness or condition when a reasonable parental response would be to seek care, or the deliberate withholding of appropriate care. The concept of medical neglect is further complicated by the consideration of some religious beliefs where certain medical interventions are contrary to the belief systems of that religious group (e.g., withholding blood transfusions). [16]

Authorities

R v CM [2005] ACTSC 21, Crispin J

[16] Debbie Scott, ‘Understanding Child Neglect’, Child Family Community Australia, (CFCA Paper no. 20, April 2014) < type="1">

This is a decision where his Honour discharged the defendant in what was an offence under section 39 of the Crimes Act 1900.

His Honour sets out the critical questions for determination, specifically what does neglect mean in the context of the section. His Honour also considers what mental element is required for the commission of the offence.

His Honour referred to Lord Diplock, in R v Shepard who referred to an earlier decision of Lord Russell in R v Senior [1899] 1QB 283, where his Lordship said:

Neglect is the want of reasonable care – that is, the omission of such steps as a reasonable parent would take, such as are usually taken in the ordinary experience of mankind.

His Honour Justice Crispin then went on to consider further what Lord Diplock had said in relation to the word neglect, that it was generally qualified only by the requirement that it must be in such a manner as to be likely to cause the child unnecessary suffering or injury to health. He said neglect was the want of reasonable care if all that meant was that a reasonable parent who was mindful of the physical welfare of his child and possess knowledge of all the relevant facts would have taken steps that the accused omitted to take to avoid the risk of unnecessary suffering by the child or injury to his help.

His Honour also referred to a confusion that may arise in relation to neglect on the one hand and negligence on the other, considering that it should be what steps would have been appropriate in the light of the facts that the parent knew at the time of the omission.

His Honour Justice Crispin went on to consider that the word neglect in the Act has no clarity of meaning as there is no definition in the Crimes Act 1900 for it. His Honour having considered section 139 of the Children and Young People Act 2008 said there is no similar interpretation of what neglect means is in that Act. The crimes act did not import such a definition.

His Honour then went on to say that the word neglect must be taken to mean neglect by failing to provide adequate and proper lodging, food or clothing or nursing, medical or dental care and attention for the child in question.

He gave an example of the English case of Alvin Gerald (1988) 9 Cr App (S) 425 where the parent had failed to seek the provision of medical treatment for a week after the child was scolded.

His Honour then went on to refer to a decision of Justice Higgins as he then was in relation to an animal neglect case where his Honour said the concept of neglect involves a conscious failure.

R v JM [2010] ACTSC 35 at 61, His Honour Justice Refshauge sets out the meaning of neglect, referring to Lord Diplock at 406 in R v Shepherd [1981] AC 398 and said:

The word ‘neglects’ was quite general, qualified only by the requirement that it must be in such a manner as to be likely to cause the child unnecessary suffering or injury to health. One cannot quarrel with Lord Russell statement that neglect is the want of reasonable care if all that means is that a reasonable parent who was mindful of the physical welfare of the child and possess the knowledge of all the relevant facts would have taken steps that the accused omitted to take, to avoid the risk of unnecessary suffering by child or injury to his help.

His Lordship noted there that there is a danger that this invites confusion with negligence and this was an important matter for care must be taken not to confuse the two concepts.

Lord Keith of Kinkel in R v Shepherd also made the important point (417 – 418) that subsequent injury or impairment did not prove neglect for a person with parental responsibility who may take all reasonable care, but nevertheless, the child might suffer further injury to his or her self. His Lordship considered that neglect could occur where the person with parental responsibility perceive the need and deliberately did nothing, was negligent or was blameless because he or she did not perceive the need which ought to have been perceived by a reasonable parent. The qualification wilfully meant, however, that only deliberate or reckless neglect was punishable.

His honour went on to say the only consideration of the provision under which JM was being prosecuted is in R v CM. As cited above it seems that his Honour held in that case the terms of the section could be a guide to the meaning of neglect.

Ultimately His Honour was satisfied that neglect under section 39 (1) (b) of the Crimes Act 1900 does not require actual harm or injury to be caused so long as there is a failure to provide adequate proper lodging food or clothing or nursing, medical or dental care.

His Honour reflected that the notion of mental elements in relation to omissions or failures can be obscure and problematic. His Honour after considering various decisions and the differences between the ACT and UK acts and authorities opined that there must be some intention of recklessness about the conduct in what is alleged to be the neglect before it can be said to make it criminal under the statute.

His Honour then went on to talk about the inferences in relation to the mental element of what is required given that there are rarely admissions of this nature.

His Honour then heard and made a decision in relation of the substantive matter R v JM (No 2) [2011] ACT SC 60

After having referred to the evidence in the matter his Honour then referred to a number of authorities which he considered and had applied to this matter.

His Honour cited Lord Russell CJ in relation to the meaning of neglect in R v Senior [1899] 1QB283 (at 291):

Neglect is the want of reasonable care – that is, the omission of such steps as a reasonable parent would take, such as are usually taken in the ordinary experience of mankind – that is, in such a case as the present, provided the parent had such means as would enable him to take the necessary steps. I agree with the statement in the summing up, that the standard of neglect varies as time went on and that many things might be legitimately looked upon as an evidence of neglecting one generation, which would not have been thought so in a proceeding generation, in that regard must be had to the habits and thoughts of the time.

The offence does not require actual injury or harm to the child a proof that the care was less than proper or adequate in the circumstances.

The prosecution must prove that the failure to provide less than reasonable care was intentional or reckless. His honour justice Refshauge went on to say that the concept of recklessness about neglect is somewhat more difficult and that it would be an inference one draws from the behaviour.

Decision

I now turn to my findings of fact.
I am satisfied that the defendant is the mother of HN. I am further satisfied that HN on 25 February 2015 was six months old. I am also satisfied that the defendant, between 24 and 27 February 2015, had parental responsibility for HN. I am also satisfied that between 24 and 27 February 2015 the defendant did not seek professional medical attention for HN. I rely on the admissions made by the defendant in that regard.
I am also satisfied that on 25 February 2015 HN was injured and she sustained significant bruising, abrasions and scratches to her face and head.
I am also satisfied that the injuries HN sustained were caused by a person or persons unknown. I am satisfied that those injuries were sustained at the home of the defendant in McGregor on 25 February 2015.
I have considered the evidence of KM Ms Andrews, Ms Diha and Dr Sansum. I have relied on the evidence given to police at the time of the incident rather than the paucity of evidence given by KM and Ms Andrews in evidence before me. Both indicated they have very little recall of events which took place some three years before.

I note that the evidence given in court by both KM and Ms Andrews was that they were affected by intoxicants, however I also note that the police officers who spoke with both at the time of the incident or shortly thereafter concluded that neither of them were affected by intoxicating substances when they spoke to them. I prefer the version they gave to police which is corroborated by other evidence.
Both of these witnesses described the injuries to HN’s face as horrific and KM said he couldn’t look at them, they were so bad. I have no doubt that that was their opinion after seeing the child.
I have also examined the photographs taken by Dr Sansum at the hospital which clearly depict significant bruising to HN’s face head and neck area. Those bruises in themselves were alarming as well as the scratches to her face which appeared to be healing.
I am satisfied that the evidence given by Dr Samsun in her report and before me, together with the photographs clearly identifying these injuries as significant. The danger of course was that there may have been an underlying cause for the significant bruising other than the injury, or there may have been significant brain injury which underlay those injuries.
I am satisfied that HN required medical attention to treat her condition and also to exclude any serious injury which may have occurred as a result of the beating to which she had been subjected to.
I am also satisfied that the defendant lied about taking HN to the walk-in centre. I am satisfied that the lie was told out of a consciousness of guilt. I am satisfied that the defendant knew that she ought to have taken the child for medical attention and she did not do so.
I am satisfied that the defendant did not seek medical attention because she did not wish the child youth protection workers to know of the injuries, particularly given they had been to her home some days prior acting on a report from someone.
Both their Honours Justice Refshauge and Justice Crispin referred to the decision of Lord Russell in R v Senior [1899] 1QB 283 in considering the critical factors for determining the meaning of neglect and what mental element is required for the commission of the offence. Lord Russell said neglect is the want of reasonable care – that is, the omission of such steps as a reasonable parent would take, such as are usually taken in the ordinary experience of mankind.
Lord Keith of Kinkel considered that neglect could occur where the person with parental responsibility perceived the need to do something and deliberately did nothing. Thus qualifying the deliberate or reckless neglect as opposed to being blameless because there was no perception of the need.
I note that the defendant stated that HN was not unconscious, however, the defendant did not see how HN was injured and was only alerted by the fact that she cried. The defendant could not know whether indeed she had been unconscious at any time prior to her attending to her. The defendant could also not have known whether there were any underlying injuries without proper medical attention.
I note Justice Refshauge opined that there was no requirement for actual injury or harm to the child but proof that the care was less than proper or adequate in the circumstances.
Having considered the authorities and the definitions I have set out above, as well as the evidence before me, much of which was corroborated, I am satisfied that the defendant has neglected HN at a time when she had parental responsibility for her. I find that she should have taken HN to a medical practitioner to be examined given the significant bruising and scratches inflicted upon her.
I find the offence proven.

I certify that the preceding 196 numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgement of her Honour Special Magistrate Hunter OAM.

Associate: Elinor Knaggs

Date: 24 April 2019

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Citations

C Tanner v Emma Harris [2019] ACTMC 12

Cases Citing This Decision

Cases Cited

Statutory Material Cited

Steinberg v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1975] HCA 63

Shepherd v The Queen [1990] HCA 56

R v Baden-Clay [2014] QSC 154