C, Mg v Police; C, Mg v Police

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)

C, MG v POLICE; C, MG v POLICE & ANOR

[2010] SASC 268

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Kelly

27 August 2010

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - POWER TO BRING APPEAL - FROM INTERLOCUTORY OR ANTECEDENT JUDGMENT OR ORDER

Appeal from decision of Magistrate - prosecution made application to withdraw information alleging indecent assault - where intention of prosecution to lay fresh information including other similar charges - Magistrate allowed application - whether order of Magistrate interlocutory or final - whether application was an abuse of process - whether Magistrate failed to exercise discretion and made an error of law.

Held: Appeal incompetent - order made by Magistrate was interlocutory - even if the appeal was competent the Magistrate implicitly recognised power to refuse application for abuse of process - no abuse of process demonstrated.

MAGISTRATES - APPEALS AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - JUDICIAL REVIEW

CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - PROSECUTION - FILING OF INFORMATION, PRESENTMENT OR INDICTMENT - SOUTH AUSTRALIA

Judicial review - whether Magistrate failed to exercise discretion and made a jurisdictional error - whether s 69 of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) should have governed the determination of the application - whether application was an abuse of process.

Held: Application for judicial review dismissed - Magistrate implicitly recognised power to refuse application for abuse of process - no abuse of process demonstrated - unnecessary to decide whether s 69 of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) governed the application - no impact on outcome.

Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 69; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 56; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 9 and s 42; District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 9; Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (SA) s 7, referred to.
Collis v Magistrates Court of South Australia (2008) 101 SASR 332, distinguished.
Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423; Licul v Corney (1975) 180 CLR 213; Rona v District Court of South Australia (1995) 63 SASR 223; R v Brentford Justices ex parte Wong [1981] QB 445, discussed.
Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 246; Heinrich v Curtis [2006] SASC 264; Brereton v Sinclair (2000) 2 VR 424; Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531; Dalton v South Australia (in right of the Department for Families & Communities) (No 3) [2010] SASC 179; Gray v Police (2003) 85 SASR 1; Wunsch v Police (1995) 64 SASR 203; Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 3 of 1995) (1995) 66 SASR 450; Willing v Hollobone (1972) 2 SASR 434, considered.

WORDS AND PHRASES CONSIDERED/DEFINED

"interlocutory or final order", "abuse of process"

C, MG v POLICE; C, MG v POLICE & ANOR
[2010] SASC 268

Magistrates Appeal:   Criminal

KELLY J:

Introduction

  1. By a notice of appeal filed on 28 April 2010 the appellant,…

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Details
Case
[2010] SASC 268
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Mr C, appealed against a decision of a Magistrate to allow the prosecution to withdraw an information alleging indecent assault. The prosecution intended to lay fresh information with additional similar charges. The key issues were whether the Magistrate's order was interlocutory or final, if the Magistrate implicitly recognised the power to refuse the application for abuse of process, and whether there was any abuse of process demonstrated. Additionally, the court considered whether section 69 of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) should have governed the determination of the application.

The court found that the appeal was incompetent because the order made by the Magistrate was interlocutory. Even if the appeal was competent, the court noted that the Magistrate implicitly recognised the power to refuse the application for abuse of process. No abuse of process was demonstrated in this case. The court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether section 69 of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) governed the application, as it had no impact on the outcome.

The court dismissed the application for judicial review. The Magistrate implicitly recognised the power to refuse the application for abuse of process, and no abuse of process was demonstrated. Consequently, the appeal was incompetent, and the decision of the Magistrate stood.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the order of the Magistrate allowing the prosecution to withdraw the information was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

To avoid unnecessary confusion I shall refer to Mr C as the appellant and to South Australia Police as the respondent throughout.Background The appellant was charged with one offence of indecent assault contrary to s 56 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) in an information on 20 May 2009. The offence allegedly occurred on 11 March 2008. The appellant first appeared in court in answer to that information on 3 September 2009. On 27 October 2009 the matter was mentioned in court in the context of a subpoena application issued by the appellant’s solicitors to a third party. There followed a number of other mention dates; 25 November 2009, 1 December 2009, and 12 December 2009, when the matter was listed for a pre‑trial conference to take place on 16 February 2010. On 16 February 2010 both parties indicated that they were ready for trial and the matter was accordingly listed for trial to commence on 7 April 2010. A number of affidavits were filed in the hearing in this Court. Although there were some preliminary objections made by the respondent’s counsel eventually these were resolved and all affidavits were ultimately filed by consent. They were the affidavits of Shane Spence signed on 30 March 2010 and 20 May 2010 respectively and an affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent by Sergeant Simon Keane on 4 June 2010. Sergeant Keane was the prosecutor allocated to conduct the trial of the matter on behalf of the police. He first became aware of a number of other matters pending for adjudication either by South Australia Police or the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) involving the appellant shortly after 15 March 2010 when he was allocated the file. Some of these matters had either already been transferred to the DPP or had been referred to that office for advice in accordance with protocols set up between the DPP and the police. One file had been referred on 8 December 2009 and further files on 10 March 2010. Another matter already in the office of the DPP was in respect of a matter in which the appellant had been arrested on 20 November 2009. Sergeant Keane examined each of the apprehension reports in relation to those matters and formed the view there was some similarity and underlying unity in each of the allegations. He therefore made a decision himself to contact the DPP and telephoned the appellant’s solicitor to advise that it was his intention to apply to the Court to withdraw the information of 20 May 2009. That application was made before the Magistrate on 22 March 2010. The affidavits of Sergeant Keane and Shane Spence set out the history of what transpired on that date and again on 31 March 2010 when submissions were continued. There is no dispute about what was said and done at those hearings. Sergeant Keane informed the Court that he wished to withdraw the information. In consequence the Magistrate asked him if it was the intention of the DPP to commence a joint prosecution. On 31 March 2010 he informed the Court that the file would be transferred to the DPP with the view to laying an information jointly charging the appellant with all outstanding matters.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It can be seen from subsection (1a) of s 42 that no appeal lies from an interlocutory judgment given in summary proceedings unless the circumstances set out in subparagraphs (a), (b) or (c) of s 42(1a) are established. As the appellant did not seek to rely on the provisions of s 42(1a)(c) the only live question is whether the order of the Magistrate should be properly characterised as interlocutory or final.Was the judgment of the Magistrate a final or interlocutory order The starting point for consideration of this question is the decision of Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423. In an often quoted passage Windeyer J stated the test for determining whether a judgment is final or interlocutory in the following way at 443:In most cases the test that seems to be most satisfactory, and the one that accords most nearly with what has been said on the subject in this Court, is it seems to me to look at the consequences of the order itself and to ask does it finally determine the rights of the parties in a principal cause pending between them. It is never enough to ask simply does the order finally determine the actual application or matter out of which it arises; because, subject to the possibility of an appeal, every order does that, unless it be an order that is expressly declared to be subject to variation… Later at 444 - 445 he said:The position when there is an existing dispute between defined parties does not, I think, provide an analogy. There, as I have said, the cases shew that the determining factor is the effect of the order in establishing finally or otherwise the rights of the disputant parties - does it put an end to an existing dispute or existing action?... In Licul v Corney (1975) 180 CLR 213 at 219 the Court again clarified the nature of the test. In that case the Court was considering whether an order made by the Supreme Court in Victoria setting aside orders made in the County Court were interlocutory or final. Barwick CJ at 219 – 220 said:The first question arising from the objection to the competency of the appeal to this Court is whether the order of the Supreme Court was a final order within the meaning and operation of s 35(1)(a) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (as amended). To be final for this purpose, the order, in my opinion, must of its own force put an end to the action or proceeding between the parties. It is not enough, in my opinion, that by reason of circumstances unconnected with and uncontrolled by the order itself, it may be or become impossible or impracticable to proceed with this action. Later in the judgment Gibbs J said at 225:…The distinction between final and interlocutory judgments is not always easy to draw and there has been disagreement as to the test by which the question whether a judgment is final or interlocutory is to be determined. One view - which was preferred by the Court of Appeal in Salter Rex & Co v Ghosh - is that the test depends on the nature of the application made to the Court. The other view which, since Hall v Nominal Defendant, should, I think, be regarded as established in Australia, depends on the nature of the order made; the test is: Does the judgment or order, as made, finally dispose of the rights of the parties? Within either of those tests the judgment of the Full Court in the present case is not a final judgment. It does not have the effect of finally disposing of the rights of the parties. It leaves it open - at least in theory - to the applicants to make a further application, upon prior notice served on the respondent himself, for an extension of time for service of each summons, and if that extension is granted, and the summonses are served, to proceed with the actions. The order is therefore not final in nature whatever its practical effect may be…[Footnotes omitted]

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established