C & M Brick (Melbourne) Pty Ltd v Boral Besser Masonry Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

PRACTICE COURT g

Not Restricted

No. 7550 of 1997

C. & M. BRICK (MELBOURNE) PTY. LTD. & ANOR. Plaintiffs
v.
BORAL BESSER MASONRY LTD. & ORS. Defendants

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JUDGE: BEACH, J.
WHERE HELD: MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING: 9 DECEMBER 1998
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17 DECEMBER 1998
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: C. & M. BRICK (MELBOURNE) PTY. LTD. & ANOR.
v. BORAL BESSER MASONRY LTD. & ORS.
MEDIA NEUTRAL CITATION: [1998] VSC 186

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CATCHWORDS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Extension of validity of writ -
Supreme Court Rule 5.12 - Discretionary factors.

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APPEARANCES: Counsel Solicitors
For the Plaintiffs  Mr. G. Nettle Q.C. and Coadys
Mr. Marcus Clarke
For the Defendants  Ms. M. Sloss Blake Dawson Waldron

HIS HONOUR:

  1. This is an appeal by the first and second named defendants Boral Besser Masonry Ltd. and Boral Ltd. (to which I shall refer hereafter as "Boral") against an order made ex parte by Master Evans on 12 November 1998 whereby the Master ordered that the period of validity for service of the writ in the proceeding on Boral be extended to 1 December 1998. The background to the proceeding and to the appeal may be summarised as follows:

  2. In 1994 the first named plaintiff C. & M. Brick (Melbourne) Pty. Ltd. commenced the manufacture of concrete blocks and other masonry products at Campbellfield in Victoria. The second named plaintiff C. & M. Brick (Bendigo) Pty. Ltd. had been manufacturing similar products in country Victoria for a number of years prior to that date. Hereafter I shall simply refer to the plaintiffs as "C. & M."

  3. In 1995 C. & M. complained to the Trade Practices Commissioner, now the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (A.C.C.C.) that Boral and the two other defendants to the proceeding Pioneer Building Products (Queensland) Pty. Ltd. and Pioneer International Ltd. (to which I shall refer as "Pioneer") were engaged in predatory pricing of masonry blocks and masonry products in the Melbourne area with the intent of damaging and destroying C. & M.'s business.

  4. Following the making of the complaint the A.C.C.C. entered into negotiations with Boral and Pioneer in relation to the matter.

  5. On 23 October 1997 C. & M. filed a writ in the Court naming Boral and Pioneer as defendants by which it seeks to recover damages from Boral and Pioneer for breach of s.46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.) (the Act).

  6. C. & M. determined not to serve the writ on Boral at that time because the A.C.C.C. had entered into negotiations with Boral to resolve C. & M.'s dispute with a view to avoiding the necessity for the A.C.C.C. to institute proceedings against Boral. The A.C.C.C. had informed C. & M. that the negotiations between it and Boral at that time may result in an offer by Boral to pay compensation to C. & M. thereby obviating the need of C. & M. to proceed with its proceeding.

  7. If, however, the A.C.C.C.'s negotiations proved unsuccessful and the…

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Details
Case
[1998] VSC 186
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved C & M Brick (Melbourne) Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, and Boral Besser Masonry Ltd, the defendant. The dispute centred around the plaintiff seeking an extension of time to serve a writ under Supreme Court Rule 5.12. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The primary issue before the court was whether the plaintiff's application for an extension of time to serve the writ should be granted. The court had to consider the discretionary factors outlined in Supreme Court Rule 5.12, including the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, and whether the defendant would be prejudiced by the extension.

The court deliberated on the extent of the delay and the reasons provided by the plaintiff for the delay in serving the writ. It considered whether the delay was substantial and whether the plaintiff had acted reasonably in all the circumstances. Furthermore, the court examined whether the defendant would suffer significant prejudice if the extension was granted. The plaintiff argued that the delay was not unreasonable and that there was no likelihood of prejudice to the defendant. The court found that the delay was not excessive and that the plaintiff had provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay. Additionally, the court concluded that there was no significant prejudice to the defendant if the extension was granted.

In light of the discretionary factors, the court exercised its discretion to grant the plaintiff's application for an extension of time to serve the writ. The court accepted that the delay was not unreasonable and that the plaintiff had acted diligently in seeking the extension. The court also found that the defendant would not suffer significant prejudice if the writ was served later than initially intended. The plaintiff was thus allowed to serve the writ within the extended timeframe, and the case could proceed on its merits.

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