FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
BZE22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 925
File number(s): MLG 1328 of 2022 Judgment of: JUDGE RILEY Date of judgment: 20 September 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – cancellation of protection visa – whether the Tribunal failed to consider Australia’s non-refoulement obligations in the context of a supposed relocation and mental health issues – whether the Tribunal engaged in impermissible speculation – whether the Tribunal engaged in irrational reasoning. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 ss.36(2)(aa), 36(2A), 36(2A)(d), 36(2A)(e), 36(2B), 36(3) Cases cited: Ibrahim v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 300 FCR 67; [2023] FCAFC 173
Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273; (1995) 69 ALJR 423; (1995) 128 ALR 353; [1995] HCA 20
Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582; (2022) 96 ALJR 497; 400 ALR 417; [2022] HCA 17
VAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 60 Date of hearing: 9 September 2024 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Min Guo Solicitor for the Applicant: Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Kay Chan Advocate for the Second Respondent: No appearance Solicitor for the First and Second Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers ORDERS
MLG 1328 of 2022 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BZE22
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE RILEY
DATE OF ORDER:
20 SEPTEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application filed on 7 June 2022 and amended on 14 August 2024 be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE RILEY:
INTRODUCTION
This is an application for review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. In that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister to cancel the applicant’s protection visa.
BACKGROUND
In his written submissions filed on 14 August 2024, the applicant provided the following background to this matter:
1.In this matter, the Applicant was granted a protection visa in May 2011. His country of reference was Iraq.
2.In 2017, a delegate of the Minister cancelled the Applicant’s visa, relying on s 109 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The factual reason which gave rise to the cancellation…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 925
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the AAT failed to consider Australia's non-refoulement obligations, engaged in impermissible speculation, and acted with irrational reasoning. The applicant argued that the AAT did not adequately weigh his mental health issues and the implications of a potential relocation. He also contended that the Tribunal's reasoning was flawed and speculative, particularly in relation to the plausibility of his explanation for retrieving his passport.
The court examined the AAT's decision and found that it had properly considered the relevant statutory provisions and policy factors. The court held that the AAT's reasoning was neither speculative nor irrational. It was determined that the Tribunal had appropriately assessed the applicant's credibility and the implications of the incorrect information provided. The court further clarified that the Tribunal's consideration of possible inquiries that could have been undertaken was not based on speculation but rather on the plausible scenarios that could have arisen from the applicant's own evidence.
As a result, the court dismissed the applicant's appeal, finding that none of the grounds of review had been substantiated. The application was dismissed with costs, and the court directed the parties to address the quantum of costs. This decision underscores the importance of the AAT's role in assessing the credibility of applicants and the weight given to various factors in the context of visa cancellation decisions.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
This ground concerns paragraph 127 of the Tribunal’s reasons for decision, which is as follows:Whether the decision to grant a visa or immigration clear the visa holder was based, wholly or partly, on incorrect information or a bogus document 127. The applicant's incorrect information as to his passport precluded its production to the Department in the course of its determination of his protection visa application. Its production would have alerted the Department as to the applicant’s return travel to Iraq in 2009, and as to his immigration status in Malaysia, which may well have presented a different profile than that described in his refugee status assessment of 4 March 2011. I find that the decision to grant his protection visa was based, in part, on possible inquiries not undertaken because of the provision of incorrect information. I can give no weight to this factor in favour of the application. The applicant accepted that the no evidence ground could not succeed if there were even a scintilla of evidence in support of the relevant finding. However, the applicant argued that there was not a scintilla of evidence in the present case, because the Tribunal’s finding was based on possible enquiries that were not identified. The applicant argued that it was impossible to conceive of what those enquiries might have been, and, in any event, the court should not go down that path because it would involve rewriting the Tribunal’s reasons for decision. However, that argument misreads paragraph 127 of the Tribunal’s reasons for decision. The Tribunal’s reasons for decision state that, if the applicant had produced his passport to the Department, that would have:… alerted the Department as to the applicant’s return travel to Iraq in 2009, and as to his immigration status in Malaysia, which may well have presented a different profile than that described in his refugee status assessment of 4 March 2011. … The Tribunal then referred to “possible inquiries not undertaken”. The Tribunal clearly had in mind inquiries about the applicant’s immigration status in Malaysia. As the applicant was able to come and go from Malaysia, it was possible that inquiries would have shown that the applicant had a right to enter and reside in Malaysia, and thus was not eligible for a protection visa in Australia. That is because s.36(3) of the Act provides that:Australia is taken not to have protection obligations in respect of a non-citizen who has not taken all possible steps to avail himself or herself of a right to enter and reside in, whether temporarily or permanently and however that right arose or is expressed, any country apart from Australia, including countries of which the non-citizen is a national. It is not fanciful that the applicant might have had a right to enter and reside in Malaysia. On the applicant’s own case, he had a student visa to do a Master’s degree in Malaysia, which expired in May 2009. He then got another student visa, and a scholarship, to do a PhD in Malaysia starting in July 2009, and which he expected to take five years: see paragraphs 30 to 32 of the Tribunal’s reasons for decision. The applicant arrived on Christmas Island on 1 September 2010. That was well within the five years that his student visa to do the PhD in Malaysia would have lasted.