BZAL of 2004 v Minister for Immigration
[2005] FMCA 454
•8 March 2005
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BZAL OF 2004 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION | [2005] FMCA 454 |
| MIGRATION – Review of RRT decision – dismissal of application – principle of res judicata – Anshun estoppel principle. |
| Judiciary Act of 1903 Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 76 ALJR 996 Lie v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] HCA 30 |
| Applicant: | BZAL OF 2004 |
| Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
| File Number: | BRG 715 of 2004 |
| Judgment of: | Rimmer FM |
| Hearing date: | 8 March 2005 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 8 March 2005 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicant appearing in person |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
That the application, which was filed on 10 December 2004 in the Federal Magistrates Court, out of the Brisbane Registry of its Court, be dismissed by way of a summary dismissal.
That the applicant, Mr Roy, is not permitted to file any further application with respect to the decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal on 3 January 2003.
That the applicant is to pay the respondent's costs fixed in the sum of $3500, such costs are to be paid within two calendar months of today's date.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
BRG 715 of 2004
| BZAL OF 2004 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Application
This is an application brought by the Minister for Immigration of Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, who will be referred to as "the Minister", by way of a notice of motion filed in this Court on
11 January 2005. The notice of motion seeks that the application filed by Mr Roy in the Federal Magistrates Court, out of the Brisbane Registry, on 10 December 2004 be dismissed, and that that dismissal be by way of a summary dismissal pursuant to the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001. The application is opposed by Mr Roy, who appears in person with the assistance of a Bangladeshi interpreter.
The matter came before the Court on 8 February 2005. At that time Mr Roy indicated that he had not received, by way of service, the notice of motion and supporting affidavit, and the application was adjourned to today's date. Since that time, Mr Roy has had the opportunity to file in the Court on 28 February 2005 a summary of his argument.
Background
Mr Roy is a citizen of Bangladesh and he arrived in Australia on
20 February 1996. On 18 March 1996, he applied to the Minister for a protection visa. On 1 September 1998, a Delegate of the Minister refused that application, and on 1 September 1998, the Refugee Review Tribunal, who I will refer to as "the RRT", affirmed the Delegate's decision. On 10 December that decision was set aside by consent and remitted to the Tribunal to be determined according to law. On 14 January 2003, a differently constituted Tribunal handed down a decision made on 3 January, affirming the Delegate's decision.
Mr Roy had, before the Tribunal, given oral evidence on four separate occasions. In affirming the Delegate's decision, the Tribunal found that Mr Roy had often made claims which were either contradicting of those that he had provided in writing, or which had not made at any time previously. Essentially, the Tribunal determined that there were serious credibility problems identified and that Mr Roy's credibility was so damaged that his claims were rejected outright, and that he did not leave Bangladesh as a result of a well-founded fear of prosecution but for other reasons. The Tribunal accepted that he was Bangladeshee and that he was Hindu, but found that he did not have a set of genuine claims to have suffered past harm, or that he could suffer harm because of his religion or his political opinion on the future.
On 6 February 2003, Mr Roy applied to the Federal Magistrates Court, out of the Sydney Registry, seeking a review of the RRT's decision. On 11 June 2003, Federal Magistrate Driver dismissed that application. His Honour set out on paragraph 2 of his reason for judgment the grounds of review as follows: He said that Mr Roy was seeking to establish that he was genuine refugee; that he was deprived of an opportunity to fully present his case to the RRT; that the RRT had failed to act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case; and, that he was not satisfied with the RRT'S Members' comments regarding his real chance of prosecution should he return to Bangladesh.
It is clear from those reasons that his Honour, Federal Magistrate Driver, explained to Mr Roy that the Court was not able to review the merits of the RRT's decision, only its legality. Mr Roy also raised as a concern that his interpreter was a Muslim, and requested an adjournment for the purpose of obtaining the services of a non-Muslim interpreter. His Honour found that he was satisfied that the interpreter was qualified and competent, and the adjournment was refused and the hearing continued. His Honour considered all matters raised by Mr Roy, and found that Mr Roy was not able to demonstrate a reviewable legal error based on procedural fairness in terms of the manner in which the RRT conducted its hearing, and he dismissed the application.
On 1 July 2003, Mr Roy appealed that decision of Federal Magistrate Driver to the Full Court of the Federal Court. This Court was constituted by Stone J sitting as the Full Court of the Federal Court as a single Justice and, on 3 November 2003, the appeal was heard. In his appeal, Mr Roy again raised that he was a genuine refugee and that the Tribunal was wrong in not believing his claims. He raised that the Tribunal was biased against him; that the conduct of the Tribunal Member was irritable, dismissive of his account, and that his mother and brother had made substantially the same claims as he, and had been granted protection visas by different Tribunal Members; that he suspected the Tribunal Member was a Muslim and alleged that the Tribunal Member appeared to be hostile to non-Muslims. He produced in Court a number of tapes which he said would support his allegations, and it is clear that these were the same tapes that he had asked Federal Magistrate Driver to review in the hearing, and had been refused such leave.
Stone J found that the learned Federal Magistrate was correct in his conclusions that, in substance, what the applicant was seeking from the Court was a merits review of the Tribunal's decision, and that neither the Federal Magistrates Court, nor the Federal Court of Australia, had jurisdiction to engage in a merits review of the RRT's decisions. The appeal was dismissed by Her Honour on 3 November 2003.
On 24 November 2003, Mr Roy applied for special leave to the High Court of Australia, seeking special leave of the High Court to file an appeal against the decision of Stone J. In his grounds relied upon for special leave to be granted, he raised the following: that the Federal Court had failed to find an error of law, and relief under section 39B of the Judiciary Act; they failed to find that the RRT had not found any evidence in relation to the claims, and that its decision was influenced by sufficient doubt; that the RRT's decision was affected by the decisions in the High Court in relation to Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 76 ALJR 996 T and Lie v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] HCA 30; that the RRT did not follow the proper procedure as required by the Act in arriving at its decision dated 3 January 2003. Attached to that application for special leave was a draft notice of appeal, which I have considered carefully. Mr Roy also filed a written summary of argument, which was lengthy and expanded on his argument on all of the above grounds.
On 19 November 2004, a decision was handed down by Gleeson CJ and Callinan J, who refused to grant special leave to appeal to the High Court. The High Court found that special leave ought not to be granted because there was no error on the part of Stone J sitting as the Full Court of the Federal Court. The only ground raised in the applicant's summary was identified by their Honours as one based on their decisions of Muin v RRT (2002) 76 ALJR 996, and they found that the applicant in fact had sought nothing more than a merits review of the Tribunal's decision, there was no factual basis for bringing the present special leave application, that the appeal could not succeed and that leave should be refused.
The applicant filed in this Court, on 10 December 2004, an application under the Judiciary Act 1903 and the Migration Act of 1958. Again, that application is under s.39B of the Judiciary Act and that is of course the same basis of the cause of action which he bought in the original application before Federal Magistrate Driver in the Federal Magistrates Court of Sydney.
The applicant's claim is set out on the face of that application as follows:
“An order or declaration, to redirect the applicant's claims to the RRT for consideration, and to advise the Tribunal to make a further consideration and order that no action be taken to remove the applicant from Australia while the decision is pending, and an order for costs and any other further order that the Court deems appropriate.”
The grounds of the application are required to be set out on the face of the application, and Mr Roy has done that. He has identified the grounds as the following:
“That the Tribunal has made its decision in bad faith.
That the Tribunal deprived me of natural justice.
That the Tribunal did not observe the Migration Act 1958 properly.
That the Tribunal's decision was actual bias.
The Tribunal's decision did not reflect the material facts of my claim.
The Tribunal has given a decision which was pre-set in the back of its mind.
The Tribunal mixed up many facts with this decision which affected the decision.
The Tribunal concentrated on particular facts while ignored many other facts in this condition.
The Tribunal make up his mind without any inquiry regarding my claim, and he did not believe my genuine Convention-based refugee claim.
My Judicial review application before the Federal Magistrates Court is late.”
And he then relies on the High Court's case of Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2 in relation to the lateness of filing the application.
As I have said, the decision which is before me today is a decision which is brought by the Minister for summary dismissal of the application on the basis that it does not establish any cause of action which is materially different to that which was raised already, and determined by the Federal Magistrates Court, appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court, and on an application for special leave to the High Court and that, therefore, the decision is subject to the over-riding principle of res judicata, a principle which the Court does not have any discretion in relation to, and given that it applies as a complete bar to the new claim, the application should be summarily dismissed.
Under rule 13.10 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules of 2001:
“The Court may order that a proceeding be stayed or dismissed generally, or in relation to any claim, for relief in the proceedings, if it appears to the Court that:
(a) No reasonable cause of action is disclosed in relation to the proceedings or claim for relief; or
(b) The proceeding or claim for relief is frivolous or vexatious; or
(c) The proceedings or claim for relief is an abuse of process of the Court.”
Clearly, that is the rule which is relied upon by the Minister in relation to this notice of motion.
The applicant opposes the application. As I say, the applicant was afforded the opportunity to provide a written summary of argument and also, today, through and with the assistance of an interpreter, to put any further matters before this Court. In that process, I explained very carefully to the applicant that this was not an argument today in relation to the determination of his application filed on 10 December 2004 for a review, but was in fact a preliminary application on a notice of motion to determine whether that application itself should go ahead or simply be summarily dismissed on the basis that it was not an application that could be successful in respect to the cause of action raised.
The applicant, in his written submissions, or summary of argument, raises to the Court that he wishes to bring an application which is now based upon the findings of the Full Court in the decisions to which I have referred of Muin and Lie and, essentially, the argument is that the law has changed since those decisions, and given that those decisions were not available to him at the time that the RRT's decision was determined that, effectively, he should be able to start the process again.
The Minister has also provided written submissions to the Court, and sets out in those written submissions the basis of the application for summary dismissal, which he says should be determined, firstly, on the principle of res judicata but, if that principle is not accepted by the Court as being applicable to this case, then clearly it falls within an Anshun estoppel principle and, if not within that principle, it is clearly an abuse of process to bring, yet again, an application to the Court once that application has already been determined to the fullest extent of the legal process afforded to a resident in Australia, or a person who has a right to bring a claim in Australia, and that is the full way to the High Court of Australia.
It is a well-established principle that for res judicata to operate, there must have been a final judgment by a Judicial tribunal acting within its jurisdiction, and that judgment must be based on the establishment or failure to establish a cause of action; that the latter proceeding must raise the same cause of action and, except where the prior judgment was in rem, the parties to the two proceedings must be the same.
Where res judicata applies it is a complete bar to the new claim, because the cause of action is extinguished by the first judgment. This Court does not have a discretion to ameliorate the application of the doctrine, and if the doctrine applies, then the Court does not have jurisdiction to, again, hear and determine the same claim.
In this matter, it is submitted on behalf of the respondent that res judicata does not operate unless the order that disposed of the first proceedings was a final order. The Federal Magistrates Court has dismissed an application for judicial review made pursuant to section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903. As I have already outlined, this was done by Federal Magistrate Driver in his decision on 11 June 2003. Clearly, that is a final order in relation to this cause of action.
That decision, of course, was subject to an appeal and an application for special leave. Both were dismissed and, therefore, the final order which was made by his Honour, Federal Magistrate Driver, stands as a final order which is not set aside or challenged by the later appeals process, and I am satisfied that, clearly, a final order has been made. What I need to determine is, is this application, which is now sought to be brought by Mr Roy, going to the same cause of action, as has already been completely and totally extinguished by the final order made by Federal Magistrate Driver on 11 June 2003.
In Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v FM Foods Pty Ltd (1992) 36 FCR 406, Gummow J said:
“It is said that for the estoppel to operate, the cause of action in each proceedings must be the same.”
But as Brennan J pointed out in Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589 at 610 to 613:
“The phrase "cause of action" is used imprecisely and in several senses. These include:
(1) The series of facts which the plaintiff must allege and prove to substantiate a right to the judgment;
(2) The legal right which has been infringed; and
(3) The substance of the action as distinct from its form.”
Clearly, what is sought now to be agitated by the applicant is set out, as I said, in the grounds of his application. He wishes to agitate that the Tribunal made the decision in bad faith and deprived him of natural justice, and did not observe the Migration Act of 1958 properly, and the Tribunal decision was actual bias. He says the Tribunal decision did not reflect the material facts of his claim, and that the Tribunal's decision was pre-set in the back of its mind, and that the Tribunal mixed up many facts with this decision which affected the decision, and concentrated on particular facts while ignoring many other facts in the condition, and that the Tribunal made up his claim without any inquiry regarding his claim and "didn't believe my genuine Convention-based refugee claim".
All of those matters are a merits-based claim, and each and every one of those matters in their various form, have been agitated by the applicant before Federal Magistrate Driver, before Stone J and, again, sought to be agitated before the High Court by way of a special leave application. Clearly, those matters have all been determined by the final order made by Federal Magistrate Driver on 11 June 2003, and I am satisfied are clearly caught by the principle of res judicata.
The new ground which he raises only in his summary of argument, and not on the face of this application, goes to the decisions of Muin and Lie, to which I have already referred. However, it is very clearly the case that in relation to those decisions, the Full Court of the Federal Court and the High Court have determined that what must be different must be the substantive basis of the cause of action, because migration law, particularly, over the last two decades in Australia, has been subject to great change, both by way of legislative amendment and by way of decisions of the Court. What must be different is not that there might be some slight change in relation to the way that someone might construct their cause of action, but the entire basis of the cause of action must be substantially different.
It is very clear from the submissions which Mr Roy made to the Court today that the basis of his discontent with the decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal has not changed. He says, in essence, that he cannot accept a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal because he is a genuine refugee. That has been determined by the Court, at first instance before Federal Magistrate Driver, and before the Court of Appeals.
He says that his mother and brother have had substantially the same grounds on which to apply for a protection visa, and before different Refugee Review Tribunal Members, they have been successful but he has not, and he simply cannot understand how that can be. That, of course, again, has been agitated before the decision-makers and on appeal, and has been found to be a merit argument which the law of Australia does not allow him to make a merits argument against a decision of the RRT. It only allows him to make a legal argument as to the legality of the decision of the RRT and, clearly, he has been found by both Federal Magistrate Driver and the Full Court of the Federal Court constituted by Stone J, and the High Court of Australia constituted by Gleeson CJ and Callinan J, to be making his application on a merits-based claim, which is not available nor open for him to make on a review or appeal.
With respect to the decisions which he now seeks to rely upon, and only in his summary of argument, I am not persuaded that they raise for him a new cause of action. Clearly, the same arguments are being raised by him and agitated by him in relation to this application, as have been long agitated before the Courts, both the Federal Magistrates Court, the Full Court of the Federal Court and the High Court of Australia, and there is nothing new of substance which is raised in relation to this application.
Therefore, I am satisfied that this application, which was filed on
10 December 2004 in the Federal Magistrates Court, out of the Brisbane Registry of its Court, by the applicant, must be dismissed by way of a summary dismissal, as it does not properly demonstrate a cause of action which is not caught by the principle of res judicata. Principles of res judicata are clearly raised so that there is a finality to the decision of a Court. If a person is dissatisfied with the outcome of proceedings, they are not permitted to simply file applications without end, seeking to raise, agitate and argue precisely the same matters upon which they have been unsuccessful in prior decisions.
If I am incorrect in relation to the principles of res judicata, I am satisfied that this clearly is a matter which falls within the Anshun estoppel principle. In the decision of Lindgren J in the Federal Court in Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 204 ALR 722, his Honour, in a detailed examination of the question, concluded by saying:
“In my opinion, I am constrained by the decision in Taylor v Ansett, in which Hackney LBC was, rightly or wrongly, considered and distinguished by a majority of the Full Court of this Court to accept that in the circumstances mentioned, Mr Wong is barred by an issue estoppel from pursuing the overlapping grounds, and to hold that for this reason it would be an abuse of process for him to do so. It is for a Full Court to consider whether to over-rule the holding of Fisher J and Ryan J in Taylor and Ansett. Moreover, I would follow Merkel J in Somander v Fiandanin and Heerey J in Elex, unless I thought their Honours were clearly wrong in holding that res judicata can operate as a bar, where the earlier proceedings was in the nature of a Judicial review of an administrative decision. In my opinion, treating the reference to res judicata as including a reference to the estoppel which arises from the earlier dismissal, I do not think that they were clearly wrong.”
In relation to this matter, I must consider, in determining whether the Anshun principle applies, firstly, whether it was unreasonable for the applicant not to have advanced any claim sought to be advanced in a second proceeding during the first proceeding and, secondly, whether there are special circumstances which would warrant the Court declining to apply the Anshun principle.
The Minister, in submissions to the Court, clearly raised it, even in circumstances where there has been a further expounding of legal principles in the migration area by a later Court. After a decision has been made by the RRT, the Court must look to whether the substance of the claim is different and, therefore, whether or not, in the special circumstances of the case, it is one which would warrant the Court declining to apply the Anshun principle, and allowing the applicant to proceed further with his application.
I am satisfied in this matter that, as found in Daniel v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 21, there is no special circumstances which applies in this matter. As Goldberg J said in the decision of Yusef, where he rejected the argument made by the applicant in that case:
I accept that the outcome of this application will have serious consequences for the applicant if it is determined against him. However, I do not consider that those consequences constitute a special circumstance warranting a disregard of the Anshun principle. I make the same observation in relation to the other special circumstances relied upon. They are all circumstances that apply in one form or another in many cases which come before the Court.
I clearly find that this is the circumstances in this case. There is no doubt that, for Mr Roy, the outcome of these proceedings is important. It is highly important to him, he says, a person who has been living in Australia for some 15 years while these reviews have been determined by the Court, for him to be able, in his mind, to fully and completely agitate every single factual and legal basis upon which he might seek to stay in Australia. That is not what the review process is about, and I am satisfied that the special circumstances which would warrant a disregard for the Anshun principle must be far wider than to the particular circumstances that he outlines to the Court today.
I am satisfied that if this matter were to proceed then the same case, in essence, would be argued by Mr Roy, as was previously argued - that is, that the decision of the Review Tribunal, on its merits, cannot be sustained. That is not an avenue of legal redress that is available for Mr Roy to pursue in the Federal Magistrates Court or the Federal Court of Australia. The only basis upon which he can review anything is on the basis of some legal principle. He has failed to establish that he would fall under the legal principles which are outlined in both Muin and Lie because, in those cases, there was an agreed set of facts which the parties agreed as to the Tribunal's decision.
In this particular matter, there is no such agreed set of facts, and in fact what Mr Roy has to overcome is a credibility finding of the strongest type, which has been made against him by the Tribunal. Those circumstances are so substantially different from the two cases upon which he seeks to rely, but I am satisfied that all they would do is put him back in the identical position that he was in before Federal Magistrate Driver and Stone J, and that is the position of arguing the merits of whether or not the Refugee Review Tribunal should have made the decision that it did as to his credibility. Clearly, that, in my view, is not a special circumstance which would see the Court standing aside from the principle of Anshun estoppel, and clearly Anshun estoppel applies in this matter.
I am satisfied that, in any event, to permit Mr Roy to simply agitate, re-agitate, to appeal through the totality of the processes of appeal, and then, within a month of the decision being handed down by the High Court declining him special leave, to allow him to start the process all over again in the lowest Court, the Federal Magistrates Court, is clearly an abuse of process. There must be an end to litigation. A person who is not successful must ultimately accept the determination of the Courts who apply the laws that operate within Australia. That a person simply is unable to do so, and seeks to revisit the issue time and time again by different proceedings, is clearly an abuse of process, and I am satisfied that the original application should be summarily dismissed on all those bases, and the application by the Minister should be successful.
The Minister seeks a further order in the application, and that is an application that, in effect, Mr Roy be declared as a vexatious litigant and denied an opportunity from bringing any further proceedings in the Court in relation to the review decision of the RRT. That, of course, is an application brought pursuant to rule 13.11 of the Federal Magistrate Court Rules, where the Court says that:
“The Court can make an order if a person habitually and persistently, and without reasonable grounds, institutes vexatious proceedings in the Court against another person, the Court may, on application of the person aggrieved, order that any proceedings instituted by the vexatious litigant against the person aggrieved may not be continued without leave of the Court, or that the vexatious litigant may not institute any proceedings against the person aggrieve without the leave of the Court.”
This rule was considered in a decision of Jacobson J, SZDCJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1284, which was an unreported decision of the Federal Court of
16 November 2004. In that decision his Honour reviewed the rules of the Federal Magistrates Court and concluded that the Federal Magistrate did have power to make an order of the kind sought now by the Minister, and that that power was contained in rules of the Federal Magistrates Court, both by the Registrar being able to refuse to accept a document for filing, and also in relation to the rules for vexatious litigants.
I am satisfied that, clearly, there is power within the Federal Magistrates Court Rules, both in rule 2.06 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules, and an additional source of power in section 15 of the Federal Magistrates Act, which provides that:
“The Federal Magistrates Court has power in relation to matters, in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such a kind, including interlocutory orders, as the Federal Magistrates Court thinks appropriate, and issue or direct the issue of writs of such kind as the Federal Magistrates Court thinks appropriate.”
Section 15 of the Federal Magistrates Court Act is in identical terms as section 23 of the Federal Court Act, and that clearly empowers courts to order its own business in relation to the acceptance, and how it deals with applications before it. It therefore follows, in my view, that this Court does have power to make an order in terms of rule 2.06 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules and in terms of rule 13.11 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules.
The question is whether or not this is a case in which it is appropriate for the Court to exercise that jurisdiction. I am satisfied that, when one reviews the facts and circumstances that I have already set out in my reasons, that this is a matter in which it is appropriate for the Court to make an order. If a litigant, such as Mr Roy, is unable to accept the decisions of the Court and understand the principles of law which must apply to the decision-makers, when he has been informed very clearly of the basis of the decisions, both by the Review Tribunal, but also by the Federal Magistrate in Sydney, Federal Magistrate Driver in his reasons for decision, by Stone J in her reasons for decision, and by the High Court in their reasons for decision and, yet again, three weeks later, comes to another State of Australia - not the Sydney Registry where he had previously filed all his applications - and bring substantially the same application, dealing with the same set of facts and the same causes of action, that this Court should find that the prejudice and cost, both to the Court itself in terms of dealing with these applications, and putting valuable and scant judicial resources to the determination of the matter, and the resources of the respondent, who is the same responding party to all of these proceedings, must be managed by the Court making an order that the applicant, Mr Roy, is not permitted to file any further application with respect to the decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal on 3 January 2003.
The respondent to the claim and the applicant in relation to the notice of motion, the Minister, has made an application for a fixed costs order to be made in the sum of $3500 under schedule 1 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules. The application is made on the basis that they have been wholly successful in the application and that the applicant has been wholly unsuccessful.
Costs in relation to the application of course are always discretionary. However, I have clearly found in my reasons for judgment that there was no cause of action which could be properly agitated at law by Mr Roy and as an applicant who comes before a Court in relation to which the respondent then has to pay costs must satisfy themselves as to the proper basis of their claim before bringing an application. If they do not, then they suffer the risk that the Court will address the position of the respondent at the conclusion of the proceedings by making an order for costs.
I accept that Mr Roy has today, through his oral submissions, advised the Court that he has no income and has to look after his mother and has no ability to pay. However, I am also satisfied that these are not the first proceedings in relation to this matter. They are the end of a series of proceedings in which Mr Roy has brought the Minister before a Court, being this Court, the Federal Magistrates Court, or before the Federal Court of the High Court in order to argue applications that have been unsuccessful.
In those circumstances I am satisfied that this is a matter where costs should follow the cause, and I propose to order that the applicant is to pay the respondent's costs fixed in the sum of $3500, such costs are to be paid within two calendar months of today's date.
I certify that the preceding fifty paragraphs (50) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Rimmer FM
Associate: Alexandra Adsett
Date: 13 April 2005
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