FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BZAHN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 275
Appeal from: Application for extension of time: BZAHN v The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 281 File number: QUD 487 of 2016 Judge: DOWSETT J Date of judgment: 21 March 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal – protection visa – where alleged risk of persecution in Vietnam – where any appeal on the foreshadowed grounds would have no prospects of success Legislation: Judiciary Act 1901 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 417, 477, 476A
Cases cited: Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531
Date of hearing: 27 July 2016 Registry: Queensland Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 26 Solicitor for the Applicant: Ms P Unantenna of Essen Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B McGlade Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the Second and Third Respondents: The Second and Third Respondents submit to any order of the Court save as to costs ORDERS
QUD 487 of 2016 BETWEEN: BZAHN
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
DOWSETT J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 MARCH 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.the application for an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal be dismissed;
2.the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding; and
3.the second and third respondents each have liberty to apply within 7 days for any orders concerning costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
DOWSETT J:
THE VISA APPLICATION
On 7 August 2012, the applicant applied for a protection (class XA) visa pursuant to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Migration Act”). The first respondent’s delegate (the "delegate") refused the application. The applicant was notified of that decision on 15 August 2013. On 28 August 2013, the applicant applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) (the "Tribunal") for review of the delegate’s decision. On 27 March 2014, the Tribunal affirmed that decision. It was not satisfied that if the applicant were returned to Vietnam, he would face a real risk of being persecuted or harmed for reason of his religion or otherwise.
On 18 March 2014, the applicant wrote to the Minister, asking that he exercise his discretion under s 417 of the Migration Act to substitute a more favourable decision for that of the Tribunal. That letter was received by the Minister on 1 May 2014. On 2 May 2014, the applicant made a fresh application…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 275
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principles governing extensions of time in appeals and examined whether the applicant had a reasonable excuse for the delay. It was noted that the applicant had not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances that would justify an extension. Furthermore, the court assessed the likelihood of success for an appeal on the grounds that were anticipated. It concluded that any appeal would be unlikely to succeed because the primary decision was well-reasoned and supported by evidence. The court held that the applicant's prospects of success were negligible, and therefore, the application for an extension of time should be dismissed.
In light of the court's findings, the application for an extension of time was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the proceeding to the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. Additionally, the second and third respondents were granted liberty to apply for any orders concerning costs within seven days. This decision underscores the importance of timely appeals and the stringent criteria required for extensions of time in the context of migration law.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. the application for an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal be dismissed;
2. the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding; and
3. the second and third respondents each have liberty to apply within 7 days for any orders concerning costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
This matter arose as an application for an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court. That decision involved a judicial review application concerning the Minister's refusal of the applicant's protection visa. The Federal Circuit Court had dismissed the judicial review application and Mr Bzahn then lodged an application in the Full Court of the Federal Court seeking leave to appeal that decision. The application for an extension of time was then filed by Mr Bzahn to allow him to consider further judicial review options before deciding whether to proceed with an appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the applicant is entitled to an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal the Federal Circuit Court's decision.
2. If so, for what period should the extension be granted?
Held
1. The court concluded that the applicant is not entitled to an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal the Federal Circuit Court's decision.
2. As the application for an extension of time was dismissed, no period for extension was granted.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining the statutory provisions under which the applicant sought the extension of time, namely section 38A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court noted that the statutory criteria for granting an extension required the applicant to demonstrate that the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success. The court assessed the likelihood of success based on the merits of the case, particularly in light of the Federal Circuit Court's determination regarding the applicant's protection visa application.
In considering the merits, the court found that the applicant's risk of persecution in Vietnam was not of a nature or quality that met the threshold for a protection visa under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The court emphasised that the Federal Circuit Court had already considered the evidence and concluded that the applicant's claims did not meet the necessary criteria. Given this conclusion, the court determined that any appeal on the grounds presented would have no prospects of success.
The court also took into account the time taken to apply for the extension, which was more than the usual period allowed. The delay in seeking the extension further supported the conclusion that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting an extension of time. The court's decision was guided by the need to prevent unnecessary and futile appeals, thereby conserving judicial resources and providing finality to administrative decisions.
The court did not find it necessary to extensively engage with prior authority, but it did follow the established principle that extensions of time are only granted in exceptional circumstances where there are compelling reasons for the delay. In this case, the applicant had not demonstrated such circumstances, and the appeal would likely be unsuccessful. Thus, the court dismissed the application for an extension of time, aligning with the principle that extensions should not be granted where the appeal lacks a reasonable prospect of success.