FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BZAGL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 214
Appeal from: BZAGL v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1235 File number: QUD 425 of 2016 Judge: MOSHINSKY J Date of judgment: 7 March 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection (Class XA) visa – refusal of visa application by delegate of Minister – decision of delegate upheld by Tribunal – dismissal of application for judicial review of Tribunal decision by Federal Circuit Court of Australia – no jurisdictional error established – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(aa), 91R Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Respondents S152/2003 (2004) 222 CLR 1 Date of hearing: 2 December 2016 Registry: Queensland Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 33 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms J Lucas Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
QUD 425 of 2016 BETWEEN: BZAGL
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MOSHINSKY J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 MARCH 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MOSHINSKY J:
Background
The appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, arrived in Australia on 29 May 2012. On 21 September 2012, he applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa.
On 16 January 2013, a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) decided to refuse the application for a protection visa.
The appellant applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) for review of the delegate’s decision.
On 20 May 2013, a hearing took place before the Tribunal. The appellant gave evidence at the hearing. The appellant’s representative had provided an extensive written submission to the Tribunal before the hearing. Following the hearing, the appellant’s representative provided a further written submission.
On 31 January 2014, the Tribunal decided to affirm the decision of the delegate not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa.
The appellant applied to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the Federal Circuit Court) for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.
On 5 November 2014, a hearing took place before the Federal Circuit Court. Both the appellant and the Minister were represented by counsel at that hearing.
On 20 May 2016, the Federal Circuit Court decided that the application should be dismissed.
The appellant appeals to this Court from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court. The appellant appeared for himself with the assistance of an interpreter.
The Tribunal decision
The Tribunal’s findings are set out in a detailed decision record…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 214
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Tribunal went on to consider whether the appellant’s claims could be said to give rise to a real risk of significant harm under the complementary protection criteria. It did not accept that any of the incidents the appellant had described as having occurred in the course of his employment, either individually or cumulatively, gave rise to significant harm (Tribunal decision, [137]). The Tribunal took the same view in relation to: the claims relating to the appellant’s brother; the alleged incidents following the appellant’s departure (which the Tribunal had previously rejected); and the claims about problems with the Singhalese, the stigma associated with mental illness, and general discrimination against Tamils in Sri Lanka. It was not satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk that the appellant would suffer significant harm in relation to these matters (Tribunal decision, [139]-[147]). The Tribunal considered whether the appellant’s status as a failed asylum seeker gave rise to a real risk of significant harm, but was not satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk of the appellant suffering significant harm on this basis (Tribunal decision, [148]-[152]). The Tribunal considered all of the appellant’s circumstances on an individual and cumulative basis but was not satisfied that the appellant was a person in respect of whom Australia owed protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) (Tribunal decision, [155][161]).The Federal Circuit Court decision In the Federal Circuit Court, the appellant relied on three grounds in support of his application for judicial review. These were set out in an amended application filed on 23 September 2014. The grounds were: (a)that the Tribunal had taken into account irrelevant considerations; (b)that the Tribunal had reached a number of mistaken conclusions amounting to jurisdictional error; and (c)that the Tribunal had not taken into account relevant considerations. The first ground alleged that the Tribunal had taken into account an irrelevant matter when considering claims concerning the appellant’s brother, insofar as it relied on the ending of the civil war in Sri Lanka (see the reasons of the primary judge (the Reasons) at [31]). The primary judge noted that the fact the Tribunal thought that the cessation of the civil war might be of significance was an entirely permissible conclusion (Reasons, [32]). The primary judge also found that the appellant’s complaint that the Tribunal had wrongfully taken into account the fact that he was promoted in 2010, and accordingly would not have been a suspect on the LTTE list, was misconceived (Reasons, [33]). The primary judge considered the other matters raised by the appellant with respect to this ground to constitute merits review (Reasons, [34]). The primary judge likewise considered the second ground, concerning the Tribunal having reached a number of mistaken conclusions, to be merits review (Reasons, [35]).