Bzagl v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BZAGL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 214

Appeal from: BZAGL v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1235
File number: QUD 425 of 2016
Judge: MOSHINSKY J
Date of judgment: 7 March 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection (Class XA) visa – refusal of visa application by delegate of Minister – decision of delegate upheld by Tribunal – dismissal of application for judicial review of Tribunal decision by Federal Circuit Court of Australia – no jurisdictional error established – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(aa), 91R
Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Respondents S152/2003 (2004) 222 CLR 1
Date of hearing: 2 December 2016
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 33
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms J Lucas
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

QUD 425 of 2016
BETWEEN:

BZAGL

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MOSHINSKY J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 MARCH 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MOSHINSKY J:

Background

  1. The appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, arrived in Australia on 29 May 2012.  On 21 September 2012, he applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa. 

  2. On 16 January 2013, a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) decided to refuse the application for a protection visa.

  3. The appellant applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) for review of the delegate’s decision.

  4. On 20 May 2013, a hearing took place before the Tribunal.  The appellant gave evidence at the hearing.  The appellant’s representative had provided an extensive written submission to the Tribunal before the hearing.  Following the hearing, the appellant’s representative provided a further written submission.

  5. On 31 January 2014, the Tribunal decided to affirm the decision of the delegate not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa.

  6. The appellant applied to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the Federal Circuit Court) for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.

  7. On 5 November 2014, a hearing took place before the Federal Circuit Court.  Both the appellant and the Minister were represented by counsel at that hearing.

  8. On 20 May 2016, the Federal Circuit Court decided that the application should be dismissed.

  9. The appellant appeals to this Court from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court.  The appellant appeared for himself with the assistance of an interpreter.

    The Tribunal decision

  10. The Tribunal’s findings are set out in a detailed decision record…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 214
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Bzagl brought an application for judicial review against the Tribunal's decision to uphold the Minister's refusal to grant him a protection (Class XA) visa. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had erred in considering the cessation of the civil war in Sri Lanka and his promotion in 2010, and that it had failed to consider relevant matters. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review. The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in considering the cessation of the civil war and the appellant's promotion, and that the appellant's other complaints amounted to merits review. The appellant appealed the Federal Circuit Court's decision. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had taken into account irrelevant considerations, reached a number of mistaken conclusions amounting to jurisdictional error, and failed to take into account relevant considerations. The High Court dismissed the appeal. The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in considering the cessation of the civil war and the appellant's promotion, and that the appellant's other complaints amounted to merits review. The court also found that the Tribunal had not erred in finding that the appellant's claims did not give rise to a real risk of significant harm. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal’s findings are set out in a detailed decision record (the Tribunal decision). In broad terms, the appellant claimed to fear harm: on account of his imputed political opinion in support of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), arising from his Tamil ethnicity; on the basis that he was considered a suspect in criminal or terrorist activities; and as a failed asylum seeker (Tribunal decision, [7]-[8]). He claimed to fear being arrested, detained, interrogated, tortured and subjected to lengthy imprisonment or killed. He claimed to fear the police, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the Sri Lankan Army (SLA), the President’s Security Forces (PSD), and paramilitary groups and that the authorities would not protect him (Tribunal decision, [8]). As recorded in the Tribunal decision, the appellant referred to a number of incidents which he claimed had occurred in the course of his employment. The first incident occurred in 2006-2007 when the appellant was travelling on a bus from Colombo to Sapugaskanda and was stopped at a checkpoint within the high security zone. He claimed that the authorities suspected him of being involved with the LTTE because he did not have a pass. They took him back to the police station until they could confirm his identity with his employer and only let him go on the condition that he report back to them (Tribunal decision, [43]). The Tribunal ultimately accepted that there was an incident in 2006 in which the appellant was stopped at a checkpoint in a high security zone while travelling to Supugaskanda for work and other aspects of his evidence (Tribunal decision, [56]). The Tribunal stated that it may be that the authorities took the appellant’s details and warned that he would have to go back to the police station for questioning if a suspicious incident were to occur, but stated that there was no suggestion in the evidence that any such incident occurred or that the appellant was recalled for questioning at the police station (Tribunal decision, [56]). The Tribunal found that the incident occurred in the context of security checking in a high security zone during the Sri Lankan civil war; and that the appellant’s release indicated that he was able to satisfy authorities of the reason for his presence in the area. The Tribunal did not accept that the authorities would have released the appellant if they considered him to be an LTTE member or sympathiser (Tribunal decision, [57]). The appellant also described an incident at Colombo International Airport in 2009, where he claimed that: army officials checked his ID card and found that he was born in Jaffna; they took him to a place near the checkpoint; they performed a security check on him; they asked him why he came there and whether he was involved in the LTTE; they were about to hit him with their gun; he told them that he came to the airport to work; his boss noticed this and she came immediately and rescued him; she told the authorities that he was not involved in the LTTE and that she knew him personally (Tribunal decision, [46]). The Tribunal ultimately accepted that this incident had occurred (Tribunal decision, [59]). However, the Tribunal did not accept that the appellant would have been released if the authorities considered that he was in fact affiliated with the LTTE (Tribunal decision, [60]). Further, the Tribunal did not accept that the incident involved serious harm or persecution of the appellant (Tribunal decision, [60]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal went on to consider whether the appellant’s claims could be said to give rise to a real risk of significant harm under the complementary protection criteria. It did not accept that any of the incidents the appellant had described as having occurred in the course of his employment, either individually or cumulatively, gave rise to significant harm (Tribunal decision, [137]). The Tribunal took the same view in relation to: the claims relating to the appellant’s brother; the alleged incidents following the appellant’s departure (which the Tribunal had previously rejected); and the claims about problems with the Singhalese, the stigma associated with mental illness, and general discrimination against Tamils in Sri Lanka. It was not satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk that the appellant would suffer significant harm in relation to these matters (Tribunal decision, [139]-[147]). The Tribunal considered whether the appellant’s status as a failed asylum seeker gave rise to a real risk of significant harm, but was not satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk of the appellant suffering significant harm on this basis (Tribunal decision, [148]-[152]). The Tribunal considered all of the appellant’s circumstances on an individual and cumulative basis but was not satisfied that the appellant was a person in respect of whom Australia owed protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) (Tribunal decision, [155]­[161]).The Federal Circuit Court decision In the Federal Circuit Court, the appellant relied on three grounds in support of his application for judicial review. These were set out in an amended application filed on 23 September 2014. The grounds were: (a)that the Tribunal had taken into account irrelevant considerations; (b)that the Tribunal had reached a number of mistaken conclusions amounting to jurisdictional error; and (c)that the Tribunal had not taken into account relevant considerations. The first ground alleged that the Tribunal had taken into account an irrelevant matter when considering claims concerning the appellant’s brother, insofar as it relied on the ending of the civil war in Sri Lanka (see the reasons of the primary judge (the Reasons) at [31]). The primary judge noted that the fact the Tribunal thought that the cessation of the civil war might be of significance was an entirely permissible conclusion (Reasons, [32]). The primary judge also found that the appellant’s complaint that the Tribunal had wrongfully taken into account the fact that he was promoted in 2010, and accordingly would not have been a suspect on the LTTE list, was misconceived (Reasons, [33]). The primary judge considered the other matters raised by the appellant with respect to this ground to constitute merits review (Reasons, [34]). The primary judge likewise considered the second ground, concerning the Tribunal having reached a number of mistaken conclusions, to be merits review (Reasons, [35]).