BZACZ v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BZACZ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2013] FCCA 1264
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for protection visa – Refugee Review Tribunal – whether the tribunal properly communicated with the applicant – whether the applicant was made aware of proceedings – whether there was unfairness in the tribunal’s failure to send further communication – whether the tribunal acted within its jurisdiction – application dismissed – costs awarded.

Legislation:

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, r.16.05(2)(a)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.65(1)(b ),s.424A

Applicant: BZACZ
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: BRG 871 of 2012
Judgment of: Judge Burnett
Hearing date: 23 May 2013
Date of Last Submission: 23 May 2013
Delivered at: Brisbane
Delivered on: 23 May 2013

REPRESENTATION

BZACZ appeared on their own behalf
Solicitors for the Respondent: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

  1. That the application filed on 5 April 2013 be dismissed.

  2. That the Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $2,658 pursuant to the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AT BRISBANE

BRG 871 of 2012

BZACZ

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Revised from Ex Tempore Reasons)

  1. On 8 March 2012, orders were made dismissing the applicant’s application filed 2 October 2012.Those orders were made because the applicant failed to appear on that date for the hearing of the application. On that date, although BZACZ did not attend at court, he had attempted to attend but was delayed by approximately 20 minutes in his arrival at court.

  2. He now makes application, pursuant to r.16.05(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, to set the order aside as an order that was made in his absence.

  3. That application came on for hearing yesterday, but was adjourned to today to enable the applicant an opportunity to review the principal application which he wishes to pursue. The exercise of the power under r.16.05(2)(a) is to be exercised judicially. In the current context, the relevant considerations for the exercise of that discretion are, particularly, the circumstances occasioning the non‑appearance and the strength of the application in respect of which he seeks to have the right to now agitate.

  4. The Minister does not take issue with the applicant’s explanation for his non‑appearance, and I too am satisfied with his explanation.  However, the application must be refused, in my view, for more fundamental reasons. In essence, that reason is that the applicant’s principal application has no real prospects of success and accordingly, to set aside the orders made on 8 March 2013 and relist the principal application for hearing would simply serve to delay the inevitable.

  5. It is important to understand some of the background and the basis for the applicant’s principal application.  The applicant is a young man, having been born in 1994 in Punjab, India.  He completed year 11 at high school and subsequently applied for, and was issued with, an…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCCA 1264
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by BZACZ for judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration to refuse to grant him a protection visa. The applicant sought to challenge the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which had affirmed the original decision maker's refusal.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the AAT had erred in law when affirming the refusal of the protection visa. Specifically, the court considered whether the AAT had exercised its powers beyond those authorised by the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) or had failed to properly consider the applicant's evidence and arguments.

Judge Burnett reasoned that the AAT's decision was within its powers under section 65(1)(b) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). The court found that the onus was on the applicant to persuade the AAT that he met the criteria for a protection visa, and that the AAT was not obliged to uncritically accept all of the applicant's claims. The court concluded that the applicant had failed to persuade the AAT and that the tribunal's decision was not subject to review based on later material. Consequently, the court found that the principal application had no real prospects of success.

The court ordered that the discretion to set aside the original order ought not be exercised in favour of the applicant. The applicant was unsuccessful and was ordered to pay the respondent's costs in the sum of $2658.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

This would require an interpretation of the Act contrary to the clear meaning of s.65(1)(b), which provides,Decision to grant or refuse to grant visa(1) After considering a valid application for a visa, the Minister:(a)…(b) if not so satisfied, is to refuse to grant the visa. The tribunal, in reviewing a decision of the decision maker, exercises all the powers of the original decision maker, but cannot make a decision beyond that authorised by the Act. In saying that, the tribunal does not have to, and did not in this case, uncritically accept everything the applicant claimed, as the onus is upon him to present his evidence and make arguments so the tribunal can make such a decision. Simply put, the applicant did not persuade the tribunal, in this case, that he met the criteria for a protection visa. It would seem, by reference to some of the comments made by the applicant in the course of submissions this morning, that all he seeks to do is to re-agitate the factual issues relevant to his application. The tribunal made a decision that was within its power, and it is not open to be reviewed by reference to later material. This ground, too, has no, or remote, prospects of success. It follows, in my view, that the principal application has no real prospects of success and, accordingly, on that basis, the discretion to set aside the original order ought not be exercised in favour of the applicant. The applicant has been unsuccessful. There is no reason why the usual order, which is costs follow the event, ought not be applied in this instance. I understand the applicant claims he is impecunious, but that fact alone should not disqualify the successful respondent from entitlement to a costs order. Costs on the scale are assessed at $2658. I will allow the respondent costs in that sum.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established