Byrt v Deputy Commissioner for Taxation
[2015] FCCA 1762
•26 June 2015
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BYRT v DEPUTY COMMISSIONER FOR TAXATION | [2015] FCCA 1762 |
| Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal – questions of law – whether Tribunal properly applied s.42A(10) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – no error demonstrated. |
| Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, ss.5(1), 5(2) Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 2001, s.15 |
| Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 |
| Applicant: | TERENCE JOHN DALEEN BYRT |
| Respondent: | DEPUTY COMMISSIONER FOR TAXATION |
| File Number: | BRG 491 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Jarrett |
| Hearing date: | 11 February 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 11 February 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 26 June 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant appeared in person |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Brennan |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | McInnes Wilson |
ORDERS
The application for an extension of time filed on 16 April, 2014 is dismissed.
The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application to be assessed according to the Federal Court Rules2011 up to and including 16 May, 2013 and thereafter according to schedule 1 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRG 491 of 2014
| TERENCE JOHN DALEEN BYRT |
Applicant
And
| DEPUTY COMMISSIONER FOR TAXATION |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 21 June, 2013 the applicant filed two applications for review of certain decisions of the respondent in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The respondent’s decisions related to assessments of income tax and administrative penalties imposed upon the applicant for the years ended 30 June, 2007 and 30 June, 2008.
On 27 November, 2013 a Deputy President of the AAT dismissed those two applications (numbered 2013/2998 and 2013/2999) pursuant to s.42A(5) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) (AAT Act). He did so on the basis that Mr Byrt failed within a reasonable time to comply with a direction by the Tribunal in relation to his application.
On 20 December, 2013 Mr Byrt applied to the AAT to reinstate the two proceedings that had been dismissed by the Deputy President pursuant to s.42A(10) of the AAT Act. On 23 January, 2014 a Senior Member of the AAT refused that application.
By this application, Mr Byrt seeks to extend the time to commence proceedings pursuant to the Administrative Decision (Judicial Review) Act 1975 so as to challenge the Senior Member’s decision. He initially commenced these proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia in February, 2014. Not only did he seek relief pursuant to the ADJR Act, he also sought relief pursuant to s.39B of the Judiciary Act1903 and s.23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act1976.
On 16 May, 2014 the Federal Court of Australia ordered that:
Upon the applicant by his solicitor abandoning so much of the originating application as claims relief under s39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 and s23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application be remitted for hearing to the Federal Circuit Court, to the end, subject to any contrary direction of that Court that the application be heard together with an existing appeal being QUD69/2014 under s44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 previously remitted to that Court and on the footing that submissions in respect of whether an extension of time should be granted under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 stand as submissions in respect of the application for substantive relief under that Act.
There are related proceedings that were also commenced in the Federal Court and transferred to this Court that seek to challenge the decision of the Senior Member: BRG444 of 2014. In those proceedings, the applicant prosecutes an appeal pursuant to s.44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975. Those proceedings were heard together with this application. I have delivered separate reason for decision and orders in respect of that application: Byrt v Deputy Commissioner For Taxation [2015] FCCA 1761.
When these proceedings were commenced in the Federal Court, Mr Byrt was legally represented. His representatives drew all of the relevant documents, including the draft Originating Application that he wishes to file if time to do so is extended. They have filed and served written submissions on Mr Byrt’s behalf in support of the application. However, by the time the application came on for hearing, Mr Byrt no longer had the assistance of his lawyers. He represented himself.
The Originating Application that Mr Byrt wishes to pursue should an extension of time be granted is annexed to an affidavit of Joshua Santhosh filed on 26 June, 2014 (annexure JS-3). That document expresses the grounds upon which Mr Byrt wishes to challenge the Senior Member’s refusal to reinstate his applications should he be granted the necessary extension of time.
Background
Mr Byrt filed an Application for Review of Decision in the AAT on 21 June, 2013 in relation to assessments of income tax and administrative penalties for the years ended 30 June, 2007 and 30 June, 2008.
In a telephone directions hearing on 7 August, 2013 a Deputy President of the Tribunal made directions for the conduct of Mr Byrt’s application for review. Mr Byrt was required by those directions to lodge and serve a statement of facts, issues and contentions by 4 September, 2013. Mr Byrt was represented by his solicitors at that hearing.
On 22 August, 2013 Mr Byrt was granted an extension to 18 September, 2013 to lodge and serve his statement of facts, issues and contentions.
On 3 September, 2013 Mr Byrt’s solicitors notified the Tribunal that they were no longer acting for him and he was thereafter acting in person.
At a telephone conference with a conference registrar on 27 September, 2013 Mr Byrt was granted a further extension until 16 October, 2013 to lodge and serve his statement of facts, issues and contentions.
Mr Byrt did not lodge and serve his statement of facts, issues and contentions by 16 October, 2013.
At a telephone directions’ hearing before a Senior Member of the Tribunal on 28 October, 2013 a direction was made requiring Mr Byrt to lodge and serve his statement of facts, issues and contentions by 18 November, 2013.
Mr Byrt did not lodge and serve his statement of facts, issues and contentions by 18 November, 2013.
Mr Byrt asserts that at a telephone directions hearing before a Deputy President of the Tribunal on 27 November, 2013 he was asked to show cause why his applications should not be dismissed for his continuing failure to comply with the directions of the Tribunal. According to the Deputy President’s reasons, however, it seems that the respondent made an application for that purpose. The Deputy President’s reasons state: “Mr Byrt essentially sought to have these proceedings adjourned for several months to enable him to conclude other proceedings in which he is involved with the Commissioner. He provided no detail of what those proceedings were and how they were related to the present proceedings other than the suggestion that his lawyers needed to concentrate on those other proceedings” (Byrt and Commissioner of Taxation [2013] AATA 862).
The Deputy President dismissed both of Mr Byrt’s applications for review pursuant to s.42A(5) of the AAT Act.
On 20 December, 2013 Mr Byrt’s solicitors lodged with the AAT an application under s.42A(10) of the AAT Act to reinstate the applications dismissed by the Deputy President.
On 21 January, 2014 the respondent’s solicitors lodged and served a letter opposing the reinstatement applications.
The reinstatement applications were heard before a Senior Member of the Tribunal on 21 January, 2014. Mr Byrt was represented by his solicitors at that hearing. However, on 23 January, 2014 the Senior Member refused the reinstatement applications.
The power the Senior Member was asked to exercise is found in s.42A(10) of the AAT Act. It is in the following terms:
(10) If it appears to the Tribunal that an application has been dismissed in error, the Tribunal may, on the application of a party to the proceeding or on its own initiative, reinstate the application and give such directions as appear to it to be appropriate in the circumstances.
In determining to refuse the application, the Senior Member said:
5. I am not satisfied Deputy President Hack’s decision was attended by error. He set out the procedural history and drew an inference from those facts. There is no suggestion he has misstated or misunderstood that history. He was aware Mr Byrt was unrepresented and that Mr Byrt had other proceedings on foot. The deputy president drew a conclusion that was plainly open to him.
6. Mr Byrt relied on The Taxpayer and Commissioner of Taxation [2002] AATA 523. In that case, the Tribunal concluded its earlier decision to dismiss an application was attended by error because it was possible to have adopted an alternative course - namely, offering the applicant an opportunity to proceed with a hearing on the papers. In effect, the Tribunal was using the power under s 42A(10) to remedy what may have been a failure to afford procedural fairness. I am unsure the power under s 42A(10) can be used in that way, but I do not need to express a concluded view on the point as I am not persuaded the applicant in this case was denied an opportunity to present his case. He had ample opportunity to be heard, but he failed to seize that opportunity (or at least offer a convincing explanation for his failure to do so). I have not heard anything in the course of the reinstatement application that would suggest a different view of the facts is appropriate.
The decision to dismiss the proceedings was not attended by error within the meaning of s 42A(10). The discretion to reinstate has not been enlivened. The application for reinstatement must be refused.
Extension of Time
The parties agree that the relevant principles that inform this Courts’ exercise of the discretion to extend the time within which to commence the foreshadowed proceedings are laid out in Hunter Valley Development Pty Ltd v Cohen, Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348. Without intending to be exhaustive, Wilcox J suggested that a court should not grant an application to extend time unless satisfied that it is appropriate to do so. In determining that matter, the following are relevant:
a)The applicant must show “an acceptable explanation of the delay” and also that it is “fair and equitable in the circumstances” to grant the extension;
b)Whether any action to challenge the decision sought to be the subject of the proposed review has been taken by the applicant, apart from the application to extend time;
c)Whether extending time would cause any prejudice to the respondent. In that respect, the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension;
d)The merits of the substantive case; and
e)Considerations of fairness as between the applicant and other persons in a likewise position.
The delay in commencing the relevant proceedings is about 12 weeks. As to the matter of an acceptable explanation for his delay, Mr Byrt submits that he had limited funds to pursue the Originating Application that he now wishes to pursue and the Notice of Appeal (the subject of BRG444/2014). In those circumstances, he argues that there is “an acceptable explanation for the delay” and that it is “fair and equitable in the circumstances” to extend the time limit.
However, there are two answers to Mr Byrt’s proposition. First, impecuniosity is generally not seen as providing an acceptable explanation for a delay in commencing proceedings: QAAH v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 9 at [7]; BRGAO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 126 at [16]-[17] and SZMNO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 797 at [25]. Without more, the mere fact of impecuniosity is insufficient to satisfy me that his explanation for the relevant delay is acceptable.
This brings me to the second answer to Mr Byrt’s submission that his explanation is acceptable. I am not at all satisfied that impecuniosity was the reason that Mr Byrt failed to institute his proceedings in time. Mr Byrt swears in his affidavit filed on 15 May, 2014 at paragraphs 4 and 7 that:
As I had limited monies to pursue both an Originating Application for judicial review under subsection 5(1) of the ADJR Act and a Notice of Appeal in respect of the same Decision, I instructed my Lawyers to withdraw the Originating Application for judicial review of the Decision.
…
A consent order made on 28 March 2014 in finalising proceedings in another matter QUD759 of 2013 in the Federal Court of Australia in which I was the applicant enabled me to direct my financial resources towards pursuing the Originating Application for judicial review of the Decision.
However, as the respondent points out, Mr Byrt has provided no evidence that the cost of pursuing both the ADJR Act application and the AAT appeal would have been any greater (or significantly greater) than pursuing the appeal alone. That is said to be especially so where:
a)Mr Byrt seeks to have his appeal in respect of the same decision heard with this application; and
b)the background facts in the appeal and the application are the same.
The respondent points out that Mr Byrt has failed to provide any corroborative evidence at all which:
a)sets out the independent costs of pursuing the ADJR Act application; and
b)would satisfy the Court that Mr Byrt was unable to fund those costs.
Moreover, the respondent argues that Mr Byrt’s explanation should also be rejected on the basis that it is not, in truth, the reason for his delay.
It is apparent that Mr Byrt instructed his lawyers to file an Originating application for judicial review under section 5 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act1977. They did so by eLodging such an application on 19 February, 2014. The application was within the time limited for making it.
However, on 20 February, 2014 Mr Byrt’s solicitor’s asked the Registry of the Federal Court not to file the application. They wished to withdraw it from filing. It was not filed at their request.
On the same day Mr Byrt, by his lawyers, commenced an appeal pursuant to s.44(1) of the AAT Act (BRG444/2014). No explanation is given by Mr Byrt’s solicitor in his affidavit filed on 16 April, 2014 about why that occurred. But, he does swear:
On 28 March, 2014, the filing of an application for judicial review under the ADJR Act was raised at a directions hearing of the Notice of Appeal in the Federal Court of Australia. Following the directions hearing, having further considered the matter and having obtained further advice from Counsel, Mr Byrt’s lawyers are now filing a new Originating Application for judicial review…
The affidavit annexes the draft originating application. In substance, it is in the same form as that sought to be filed on 19 February, 2014 although the latter seeks to include relief pursuant to s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 and s.23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. There is no mention of a want of funds as the reason the first originating application was withdrawn from filing.
I am not persuaded that Mr Byrt’s explanation for the delay in commencing his proceedings is acceptable. I am not satisfied that he did not commence these proceedings for want of funds. It seems that proceedings were to be filed, but they were withdrawn before they were properly filed in the registry. The reason for that, according to Mr Byrt’s lawyer seemingly had nothing to do with access to funds. It seems that a subsequent decision was made to attempt to file the Originating Application again after the directions hearing on 28 March, 2014 and taking advice from Counsel.
Nonetheless, the respondent concedes that an acceptable reason for delay is not an essential prerequisite for an application for an extension of time. It is but one factor to be taken into account.
Mr Byrt has taken other action to challenge the decision of the Senior Member. He instituted an appeal pursuant to s.44(1) of the AAT Act for that purpose. I take that into account.
The respondent concedes that he would suffer no detriment if the extension of time was permitted. However, the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension.
Perhaps the most important consideration is the merits of the proposed application. The draft Originating Application that Mr Byrt now wishes to pursue specifies claims under both the ADJR Act and s.15 of the Federal Circuit Court Act 2001.
The following parts of s.5(1) of the ADJR Act are specified as those upon which he intends to rely:
1. Under subsection 5(1) of the ADJR Act Senior Member Bernard J McCabe’s decision:
(i) was not authorised by the enactment in pursuance to which it was purported to be made (namely, section 42A(10) of the AAT Act);
(ii) involved an error of law, whether or not the error appears on the record of the decision;
(iii) involved a breach of the rules of natural justice in connection with the making of the decision; and
(iv) involved an improper exercise of the power conferred by the enactment in pursuance of which the decision was purportedly made (namely, section 42A(10) of the AAT Act).
The grounds specified by Mr Byrt in the draft originating application are in substance the same as those specified by him in his Notice of Appeal in BRG 444/2014. In my view, those grounds have no substance.
For the reasons I have expressed in Byrt v Deputy Commissioner For Taxation [2015] FCCA 1761 at [34] the decision made by the Senior Member to dismiss Mr Byrt’s application for reinstatement was authorised by s.42A(10) of the AAT Act.
The Senior Member’ decision was informed by three separate findings, namely:
a)that the Deputy President’s decision on 27 November, 2013 to dismiss the proceedings without offering Mr Byrt an opportunity to proceed with a hearing on the T-documents was not attended by “error” within the meaning of s.42A(10) of the AAT Act;
b)that the discretion to reinstate the proceedings under s.42A(10) of the AAT Act had not been enlivened; and
c)that the applicant was not denied an opportunity to present his case and there had not been a failure to afford procedural fairness in the decision to dismiss the proceedings without offering the applicant an opportunity to proceed with a hearing on the T-documents.
To the extent that Mr Byrt wishes to argue, pursuant to s.5(1)(d) of the ADJR Act, that each of the decisions were not authorised by s.42A(10) of the Act, his claim has no merit. The Senior Member was required to make a finding about the existence of error for the purposes of s.42A(10) of the AAT Act in the Deputy President’s decision before he could exercise the relevant discretion. In that sense, a decision that there was no error, even if that decision was erroneous, was authorised by the section.
Next, as to the second finding that the discretion to reinstate the proceedings had not been enlivened, the Senior Member’s determination that the decision to dismiss the proceedings was not attended by error within the meaning of s.42A(10) of the AAT Act was a finding which meant that he had no discretion to reinstate Mr Byrt’s applications. A finding of error was a jurisdictional prerequisite to the exercise of the discretion set out in s.42A(10) of the AAT Act. Having made a determination of no error, not only was the refusal of Mr Byrt’s application for reinstatement “authorised” by the section, it was inevitable.
Finally, as to the third finding by the Senior Member, that the applicant was not denied an opportunity to present his case and that there had not been a failure to afford procedural fairness in the decision to dismiss the proceedings without offering the applicant an opportunity to proceed with a hearing on the T-documents, that finding was a finding that led to the conclusion that there was no error on the part of the Deputy President. The finding was authorised by the section in the sense that it was part of the reasoning process by which the Senior Member arrived at his decision about the jurisdictional fact – the existence of error.
Mr Byrt’s written submissions draw my attention to Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 378 where in respect of the ADJR Act, Toohey and Gaudron JJ said:
The expression “not authorized” in s. 5(1)(d) of the A.D.(J.R.) Act, when considered in the context of the exercise of administrative powers conferred by an enactment, signifies a decision that is expressly or impliedly forbidden. The expression does not refer to findings or conclusions which, although not required, bear upon or may bear upon some issue for determination under an enactment.
He submits that the Senior Member’s:
“decision to dismiss the proceedings was not attended by error within the meaning of s 42A(10)” is a decision which is impliedly forbidden by section 42A(10) of the AAT Act or was beyond the power of (or ultra vires) the Senior Member…
But, the finding about error was one expressly authorised by s.42A(10). The Tribunal was obliged to determine if there had been an error for the purposes of the section. In the event that it found that there had been an error, it could go on to consider exercising the power to reinstate. If not, it had no choice but to dismiss the application.
Insofar as Mr Byrt asserts that the Senior Member’s decision was not authorised by s.42A(10) of the AAT Act, his claim has no merit.
As to next ground relied upon by Mr Byrt – that the Senior Member’s decision involved an error of law (s.5(1)(f) of the ADJR Act), for the reason I have already expressed in Byrt v Deputy Commissioner For Taxation [2015] FCCA 1761 that ground too must fail. As I have attempted to explain:
35. That leaves Mr Byrt’s contention that each of the Senior Member’s findings was, or was affected by, an error of law. He contends that the error was that the Senior Member did not recognise that in circumstances where the Deputy President could have offered Mr Byrt a hearing on the T-documents instead of dismissing his applications, his determination to dismiss the proceedings without first offering him that opportunity was in error. Put another way, and framed as a question of law: Whenever the Tribunal is considering exercising the power conferred upon it by s.42A(5) of the AAT Act, must the Tribunal offer the applicant a hearing on the T-documents alone before dismissing the proceedings? Having stated the question of law in that way, one might expect to see in the Notice of Appeal the grounds of appeal connect that question to the facts and circumstance of the case at hand and the relief sought by the applicant.
36. Dealing with the question of law, in my view, the answer to that question must be “No”. Section s.42A(5) of the AAT Act is in the following terms:
42A Discontinuance, dismissal, reinstatement etc. of application
(5) If an applicant for a review of a decision fails within a reasonable time:
(a) to proceed with the application; or
(b) to comply with a direction by the Tribunal in relation to the application;
the Tribunal may dismiss the application without proceeding to review the decision.
37. In my view, before it can be said that Mr Byrt’s proceedings were dismissed in error by the Deputy President, Mr Byrt must show that either, as a matter of law the Deputy President was obliged to offer Mr Byrt the opportunity of a hearing on the T-documents alone, or on the facts of the case it was necessary for him to offer that opportunity.
38. Plainly, the section requires one of two alternative preconditions to exist before an exercise of the power conferred by it can take place. Neither of those preconditions includes a requirement that the Tribunal offer to an applicant a hearing on the T-documents alone before it moves to dismiss the application. Further, the power conferred by the section is unfettered once it is engaged. No doubt the discretion conferred by the section must be exercised according to the circumstances of the case at hand and cannot be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily. But otherwise, it is unfettered. As a matter of law the Tribunal is not obliged to offer an applicant a hearing on the T-documents alone before it moves to dismiss an application pursuant to s.42A(10) of the AAT Act.
39. Nor was it necessary on the facts of this case for the Deputy President to offer Mr Byrt the T-document alone hearing. Mr Byrt relies upon The Taxpayer and Commissioner of Taxation (above) to demonstrate that the Tribunal must offer an applicant the opportunity for a hearing on the T-documents alone before it moves to dismiss the application. However that case is distinguishable on its facts. In that case there was “an indication that the applicant might have been prepared to rely on the documents then before me, being the T documents”. There was no such indication before the Deputy President in this case.
40. Accordingly, the Senior Member’s decisions that:
(a) that the Deputy President’s decision on 27 November 2013 to dismiss the proceedings without offering Mr Byrt an opportunity to proceed with a hearing on the T-documents was not made in “error” within the meaning of s.42A(10) of the AAT Act;
(b) that the discretion to reinstate the proceedings under s.42A(10) of the AAT Act had not been enlivened; and
(c) that the applicant was not denied an opportunity to present his case and there had not been a failure to afford procedural fairness in the decision to dismiss the proceedings without offering the applicant an opportunity to proceed with a hearing on the T-documents.
were not, or were not affected by, an error of law.
The next ground upon which Mr Byrt relies under s.5(1) of the ADJR Act is ground 5(1)(a), namely that that a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the decision. In this respect, it is the decision of the Senior Member which is relevant, not that of the Deputy President. Mr Byrt does not contend that there was a breach of the rules of natural justice in the making of the decision by the Senior Member. No complaint is made about the way in which the Senior Member conducted the hearing of the reinstatement application.
The written submissions delivered by Mr Byrt’s then solicitors focus upon the decision of the Deputy President and what they claim to be a failure by the Deputy President to afford Mr Byrt procedural fairness. That was a matter specifically considered by the Senior Member in his determination.
Nothing identified before me by Mr Byrt, or in his solicitors’ written submissions, would lead to the conclusion that there was a want of procedural fairness in the proceedings conducted before the Senior Member.
The final ground relied upon by Mr Byrt arises under s.5(1)(e) of the ADJR Act, namely that the Senior Member’s decision that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the enactment in pursuance of which it was purported to be made. To support this ground, Mr Byrt relied upon s.5(2) of the ADJR Act so as to demonstrate that the Senior Member improperly exercised the power pursuant to s.42A(10) of the AAT Act. In particular, he contends that the Senior Member:
a)took an irrelevant consideration into account in the exercise of the power;
b)failed to take certain relevant considerations into account in the exercise of the power; and
c)exercised the power so unreasonably that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power.
However, Mr Byrt’s arguments do not grapple with the difficulty that the Senior Member did not exercise the power conferred on the Tribunal by s.42A(10) of the AAT Act. The Senior Member determined that the necessary precondition to the power to reinstate being available to him was missing. Accordingly an occasion to consider exercising the power did not arise.
In those circumstances, any argument based upon the Senior Member’s failure to consider relevant matters or the consideration of irrelevant matters and an argument that the Senior Member had unreasonably exercised the power must fail. He did not exercise the power at all.
The written submission delivered by Mr Byrt’s solicitors confuse the exercise of the relevant power with the findings of fact that the Senior Member needed to make before he could exercise the discretion to reinstate Mr Byrt’s applications. Those determinations, and particularly the determination that no error was present in the Deputy President’s decision was not the exercise of a power that would attract the operation of ss.5(1)(e) and 5(2) of the ADJR Act.
Conclusions
Mr Byrt’s application to extend time within which to bring proceedings under the ADJR Act in respect of the Senior Member’s decision to dismiss his application to reinstate the proceedings dismissed by the Deputy President, must itself be dismissed.
I am not satisfied that Mr Byrt has demonstrated an acceptable reason for his delay in attempting to institute the proceedings. More importantly, however, I am not persuaded that the proposed proceedings are sufficiently meritorious to warrant the claimed extension of time.
The application to extend time must be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Jarrett
Associate:
Date: 26 June 2015
8
3