BXY15 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BXY15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2018] FCCA 2896
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application to review decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the Tribunal misconstrued or misapplied s.36(2)(aa) or s.36(2B)(c) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2)(aa), 36(2B)(c)

Cases cited:

BBK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 680; (2016) 241 FCR 150
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; (2018) 92 ALJR 780
Jankovic v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 56 FCR 474
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; (2013) 210 FCR 505
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu ShanLiang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259
Shrestha v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 69; (2017) 251 FCR 143
Shrestha v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 35; (2018) 92 ALJR 798
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26; (2007) 235 ALR 609
SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 46; (2009) 174 FCR 415
SZSGA v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCA 774
SZSHK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 125; (2013) 138 ALD 26
SZSPT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1245
SZTQP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 121; (2015) 232 FCR 452
VCAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 1

Applicant: BXY15
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 2589 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Barnes
Hearing date: 22 August 2017
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 16 October 2018

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Mostafa
Solicitors for the Applicant: Fragomen
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Riley
Solicitors for the Respondents: Mills Oakley Lawyers

ORDERS

  1. A writ in the nature of certiorari issue directed to the Second Respondent quashing the decision made on 19 August 2015.

  2. A writ in the nature of mandamus issue directed to the Second Respondent, requiring the Second Respondent to determine according to law the application for review of the decision of the delegate of the First Respondent made on 20 March 2014.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2589 of 2015

BXY15

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background

  1. This is an application for review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) dated 19 August 2015 affirming a decision of a delegate of the First Respondent not to grant the Applicant a protection visa.

  2. The Applicant, a citizen of Pakistan, arrived in Australia on 22 July 2012.  On 17 August 2012 he participated in an entry interview.  He applied for protection in November 2012.  His application was accompanied by a written statement of claims.  He claimed to fear harm from the…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 2896
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter came before Judge Barnes of the Federal Court of Australia concerning an application for judicial review by BXY15, a Pakistani citizen, against the Minister for Immigration. The dispute centred on the Tribunal's decision regarding BXY15's claim for protection, specifically whether the applicant faced a real risk of significant harm in his home region.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Tribunal had erred in its application of section 36(2B)(c) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant contended that the Tribunal incorrectly interpreted this provision by confining its consideration to the population of his "home region" rather than the population of Pakistan generally, and by finding that the applicant was not singled out for harm. The applicant argued that the Tribunal's reference to section 36(2B)(c) implied an initial finding that a real risk of significant harm existed, which was then improperly dismissed.

Judge Barnes considered the Tribunal's reasoning, which stated that there was nothing to suggest the applicant would be singled out for harm and that the risk faced was one faced by the population generally in his home region. The Court noted the applicant's submission that section 36(2B)(c) applies only when a risk is faced by the "population of the country generally," citing relevant case law. The Court also acknowledged the applicant's argument that the Tribunal's reference to the exception in section 36(2B)(c) indicated an underlying assessment that a real risk of significant harm might otherwise exist.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal discussed this provision at paragraphs 100 to 101 of its reasons as follows:100. The Tribunal has considered the issue of risk to the population in the home region generally. The applicant has provided a warning to Australians not to travel to certain locations in Pakistan. The applicant is not an Australian citizen or permanent resident. The applicant is a Pakistani citizen. There is nothing that would lead to the applicant being singled out by any party seeking to cause harm or violence in the applicant’s home region. Under s.36(2B)(c) of the Act there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm if the tribunal is satisfied that the real risk is one faced by the population generally and is not faced by the applicant personally.101. This consideration of generalised risk further demonstrates that the applicant does not face a level of risk personally in his home region than (sic) the population generally in his area. As determined above, the Tribunal considers that the risk of harm in the applicant’s home region is significantly diminished, to the point that the Tribunal dos not consider that there is a real risk of significant harm for the applicant or the population generally. (emphasis added in Applicant’s submissions) As the parties accepted, the exception in s.36(2B)(c) applies only where a real risk that is faced by a non-citizen is a risk that is faced by “the population of the country generally”. The Applicant submitted that the Tribunal erred in considering that s.36(2B)(c) applied on the basis that there was nothing to lead to him being “singled out” by any party seeking to cause harm or violence in his “home region” (in paragraph 100) and in confining its application of this provision to the population in the Applicant’s home region, rather than considering the population in Pakistan generally. The Applicant referred to SZSPT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1245 at [11] per Rares J referring to a risk faced “by the population of the country generally” and to BBK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 680; (2016) 241 FCR 150 at [30] and [32] in which Buchanan J confirmed that s.36(2B)(c) applied only where the risk in question affected the “general population” of the country in question. Buchanan J also suggested that s.36(2B)(c) should only be discussed in circumstances where otherwise the requirements of s.36(2)(aa) would be met (see BBK15 at [29]). The Applicant submitted that while the first sentence in paragraph 101 of the Tribunal decision was somewhat opaque, it nonetheless reflected the Tribunal’s conclusion in relation to s.36(2B)(c) in referring to a level of risk in the Applicant’s “home region” and the population generally “in his area”. It was suggested that the Tribunal had addressed risks of harm to the Applicant or the population generally “in the applicant’s home region” and then reached a conclusion in terms which reflected its incorrect application of s.36(2B)(c) of the Act. It was pointed out that if the Tribunal had considered that there was no real risk of significant harm to the Applicant, there would have been no cause for it to refer to s.36(2B)(c) of the Act.