Bxi16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BXI16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 760

Appeal from: BXI16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 3017
File number: NSD 2113 of 2016
Judge: O'CALLAGHAN J
Date of judgment: 7 July 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where appellant claims procedures required by Migration Act 1958 (Cth) not followed – where appellant seeks to rely on grounds not relied upon before primary judge – leave required – appeal dismissed.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36(2)(a) and (aa)
Cases cited:

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507

O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588

Date of hearing: 16 May 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 16
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Palte
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs
Table of Corrections
10 July 2017 On cover page, citation for judgment appealed from amended

ORDERS

NSD 2113 of 2016
BETWEEN:

BXI16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

O'CALLAGHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 JULY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’CALLAGHAN J:

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) dismissing the appellant’s judicial review application.

    BACKGROUND

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who first arrived in Australia on 6 December 2012.  He was issued with a bridging visa on 28 February 2013 before applying for a protection visa on 12 April 2013.   The delegate refused that application on 30 September 2014, a decision of which the appellant sough review on 7 October 2014.  On 22 June 2016 that application was dismissed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) and a judicial review application in respect of that decision was dismissed by the FCCA on 23 November 2016.

    The Tribunal proceeding

  3. The Tribunal considered whether the appellant met the criteria in s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act), on the basis of being a refugee, or the criteria in s 36(2)(aa), on the basis of there being substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the appellant being removed from Australia, there is a real risk that he would suffer significant harm.

  4. In summary, the appellant claimed to meet both sets…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 760
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Bxi16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the Federal Court of Australia considered an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The appellant, Bxi16, sought to challenge the decision made by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, asserting that certain procedures required by the Migration Act 1958 were not followed. The appellant further sought to rely on grounds that were not previously presented to the primary judge. The court was tasked with determining whether the appellant was entitled to rely on these new grounds and, if so, whether they had merit.

The legal issues before the court included whether the appellant required leave to raise new grounds in the appeal and, if leave was granted, whether those grounds had merit. The court had to examine the particulars of the grounds presented, assess whether they were indeed new, and determine if they were expedient in the interests of justice. The court also needed to evaluate the substantive claims of procedural errors and credibility findings made by the Tribunal.

The court found that the appellant's grounds were not particularised sufficiently to warrant leave. Even if considered, the grounds were without merit as they did not point to any error in the Tribunal's reasoning or procedures. The Tribunal's credibility findings were detailed and supported by cogent reasons, and there was no indication that the procedures required by the Migration Act were not followed. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

To the extent that the appellant seeks to reagitate the procedural fairness claims that he made before the FCCA, no error is disclosed by the primary judge’s reasons at [35]-[36], [37] and [39].CONCLUSION For the reasons given above, the appeal will be dismissed. The appellant should pay the first respondent’s costs, to be agreed or assessed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The first respondent submitted that the three grounds relied upon by the appellant in this appeal were not raised before the primary judge. Consequently, the first respondent submitted, the appellant requires leave to rely on them in this Court. Without the appellant’s grounds in this Court being particularised, it is difficult properly to assess whether this is so. To the extent that ground 3 adverts to procedural irregularity, it can be characterised as broadly similar to ground 2 of the appellant’s grounds before the primary judge. In any event, leave would only be granted if it were expedient in the interests of justice to do so: O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310. That is, leave could be granted if a new ground “clearly has merit…and there is no real prejudice to the respondent in permitting it to be agitated”: VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588 at [48]. For the reasons that follow, the new grounds in this appeal (if indeed they are all new grounds) are entirely without merit.CONSIDERATION The first ground claims, in essence, that the primary judge erred in failing to identify that the Tribunal’s decision lacked any “basis or evidence”. I accept the Minister’s submission that the Tribunal’s rejection of the appellant’s claims turned on its adverse credibility findings and that the appellant has failed to identify any respect in which those findings were not open or were flawed on one or more of the bases discussed by the Court in CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146 at [38]. Even putting the appellant’s case at its highest, the Tribunal’s findings on credit were supported by detailed and cogent reasons and reveal no error of the kind that would be appellable to this Court. The appellant’s general claims that the Tribunal’s decision was “conventional”, “based on hypothetical assumption” and/or failed to focus on the factual issues take the appellant’s case no further; a close reading of the Tribunal’s decision reveals no defect in its credibility reasoning. The second ground adverts to a “recent High Court reported decision” without identifying that decision. I accept the first respondent’s submission that this ground is meaningless in the absence of such a fundamental particular. The third ground is similarly unparticularised and claims that the Tribunal failed to follow the “appropriate procedures as required by the Migration Act… and Regulations”. The relevant procedures are not stated. Nevertheless, neither the notice of appeal nor the Tribunal’s reasons point to appellable error in respect of the procedures adopted by the Tribunal. Relevantly, as the first respondent submitted:(1)the appellant was on notice that his credit would be in issue and he was invited to attend the hearing, which he did, and to comment on the dispositive issues under review;(2)the appellant was invited to comment on the authenticity of the documents that he provided in support of his application; and(3)there was no information before the Tribunal that might have enlivened its obligations under s 424A of the Act.