BWC15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 13 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BWC15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 199

Appeal from: BWC15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2436
File number: NSD 1591 of 2016
Judge: BROMBERG  J
Date of judgment: 1 March 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection (Class XA) visa – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCC”) – whether the FCC erred by failing to find that the Tribunal treated the appellant unfairly – where the Tribunal had relied on its own observations of the appellant’s country of origin –the Tribunal may rely on its own experience and observations so long as a visa applicant is provided an opportunity to respond to the observations – where the appellant sought to tender new evidence that Tribunal spoke to the appellant roughly – where tender of new evidence would have necessitated an adjournment from which prejudice would flow and where tender of new evidence would serve no utility – leave to tender new evidence refused – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474
Cases cited:

BWC15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2436

NAEH v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 927

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

SLMB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 129

Date of hearing: 1 March 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 27
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person assisted by an interpreter
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr T Liu of Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

NSD 1591 of 2016

BETWEEN:

BWC15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BROMBERG  J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 MARCH 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or as taxed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BROMBERG J:

  1. The appellant is a citizen of Lebanon who arrived in Australia on 10 September 2013.  On 21 October 2013 the appellant lodged an application for a Protection (Class XA) visa (“visa”).  On 12 August 2014 a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) refused the appellant's application.  On 20 August 2015 the second respondent (“Tribunal”) affirmed the delegate’s decision.  The appellant sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision in the Federal Circuit Court.  The subject of this appeal is the primary judge's dismissal of that application on 31 August 2016.  The primary judge's judgment is published as BWC15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2436.

  2. The task of the primary judge was to determine whether the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error: s 474 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Migration…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read BWC15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] FCA 199
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BWC15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appeal by the appellant against the Federal Circuit Court of Australia's decision. The appellant contested the Federal Circuit Court's decision to dismiss his appeal against the delegate's refusal to grant him a protection (Class XA) visa. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had treated him unfairly and relied on its own observations of his country of origin without providing him an opportunity to respond. The appellant also sought to tender new evidence that the Tribunal had spoken to him roughly, which he claimed necessitated an adjournment and would have served no utility.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Federal Circuit Court erred in failing to find that the Tribunal treated the appellant unfairly and whether the appellant was entitled to tender new evidence. The court examined whether the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error and whether the primary judge's judgment was affected by appellable error. The court considered the appellant's claims, including his assertions of being a Shi'a Muslim facing harassment and abuse in Lebanon, and the Tribunal's findings that the appellant's evidence lacked credibility and that he had fabricated his claims.

The court held that the Tribunal was entitled to rely on its own experience and observations, provided that the appellant was given an opportunity to respond. The court found that the Tribunal had set out the appellant's claims and provided him with an opportunity to respond. The court also held that the appellant was not entitled to tender new evidence as it would have necessitated an adjournment and would have served no utility. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or as taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or as taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, a Shi’a Muslim from Lebanon, applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa in Australia. He claimed that he faced harassment, criticism, and abuse in Christian and Sunni areas in Beirut due to his religious affiliation. He also alleged that he experienced discrimination and abuse at work and feared being caught in a bombing or kidnapped if he returned to Lebanon. The appellant claimed to support groups fighting Islamic State and believed that he would be targeted if he returned to Lebanon. The Tribunal assessed the appellant's claims and found his evidence lacking in credibility and that he had fabricated his claims to secure a protection visa.

The appellant's application for a Protection (Class XA) visa was initially heard by the Tribunal, which rejected his claims and denied his visa application. The appellant appealed this decision to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC), arguing that the Tribunal had treated him unfairly by relying on its own observations of Lebanon without providing him an opportunity to respond. The appellant also sought to tender new evidence that the Tribunal had spoken to him roughly, which would have necessitated an adjournment. The FCC dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal had not erred in its handling of the case and that the tender of new evidence would serve no utility. The appellant then appealed to the Federal Court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the FCC erred by failing to find that the Tribunal treated the appellant unfairly.
2. Whether the Tribunal was justified in relying on its own observations of the appellant’s country of origin.
3. Whether the appellant was entitled to tender new evidence that the Tribunal spoke to him roughly.

Held
1. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) did not err by failing to find that the Tribunal treated the appellant unfairly.
2. The Tribunal was justified in relying on its own observations of the appellant’s country of origin.
3. The appellant was not entitled to tender new evidence that the Tribunal spoke to him roughly.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The task of the primary judge was to determine whether the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error: s 474 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Migration Act”); and Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476. The task of this Court is to determine whether the primary judge's judgment is affected by appellable error: SLMB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 129 at [11] (Branson, Finn and Finkelstein JJ). As the Tribunal set out at [5]–[11] of its reasons, the appellant made various claims in support of his application for a visa. He claimed that he was a Shi’a Muslim whose employment as a painter and cleaner required him to work in different suburbs of Beirut, and that he faced harassment, criticism and abuse in the Christian and Sunni areas because he was Shi’a. He claimed he had experienced discrimination and abuse at work, and that the political situation in Lebanon is explosive and that violent acts can happen at any moment. The appellant also claimed that if he returned to Lebanon he would be caught up in a bombing. He claimed that there had been six or seven explosions in recent times, and that he had avoided being caught in an explosion by five minutes on one occasion shortly before he left Lebanon. He also claimed he would be kidnapped because he supported groups fighting Islamic State (“IS”). He said that he supported all groups that fought IS, such as the Lebanese and Syrian armies, Hizbullah and the US and Western governments. The manner in which the Tribunal dealt with each of those claims is, with respect, ably summarised in the reasons of the primary judge at [8]–[15] which I will here recount. The Tribunal found that the appellant’s evidence regarding his claims lacked credibility and that he had fabricated his claims in order to be granted a protection visa. The Tribunal dealt with the appellant’s claim to have been caught in a bombing. The Tribunal did not accept that the appellant was nearly caught in a bomb blast before he came to Australia, or that there was a real chance that he could be caught in a bomb blast on return to Lebanon. The Tribunal rejected the claim because of an inconsistency between the appellant's evidence about the timing of the blast and media reports about that bomb blast. In respect of the risk of the appellant being caught in a bomb blast in the future, the Tribunal considered that, while there had been a number of bombings in Shi'a areas of Beirut, there was “a very small number of bombings and an equally small number of casualties out of a population in the southern suburbs of Beirut of 900,000 people”. The Tribunal went on to find that, even though it was satisfied that the appellant would not be targeted, or be the incidental victim of a bomb attack because of where he lived, the fact that the appellant had financial resources to relocate if he chose, but was unwilling to do so, indicated that he had no fear of returning to the area in which he lived.