Buzalek and Buzalek

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BUZALEK & BUZALEK

[2012] FamCA 62

FAMILY LAW - CHILDREN – parental responsibility – allegations of abuse – unacceptable risk - the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility – meaningful relationships with mother and father and paternal family – allegations of physical abuse of child by father and paternal grandparents – father poses no risk of physical harm to child – father engaged in conduct towards mother falling within the definition of family violence - presumption of equal shared parental responsibility

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60B(1), 60B(2), 60B(3), 60CC, 60CC(4), 61DA, 65DAA(1), 65DAA(3),(4) and (5), Subsections (1)(b), (2) and (2)(d) of s 65DAA,

MRR v GR (2010) 263 ALR 368
Cowley v Mendoza [2010] Fam CA 597
Goode and Goode (2006) FLC 93-286; M and M (1988) 166 CLR 69
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
W and W (Abuse allegations: unacceptable risk) (2005) FLC 93-235

APPLICANT:

Mr Buzalek

RESPONDENT:

Ms Buzalek

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

Mr Robert Winter

FILE NUMBER:

ADC

173

2008

DATE DELIVERED:

February 2012

PLACE DELIVERED:

Sydney

PLACE HEARD:

Adelaide

JUDGMENT OF:

Stevenson J

HEARING DATE:

3,4,5,6,7 and 10 May 2010, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9 and 10 August 2010 and 26, 27 & 28 October 2011

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT:

Ms O'Connor

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT:

Denise M Rieniets & Associates P/L

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Ms Lee

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Norman Waterhouse Lawyers

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

Mr Childs

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

Legal Services Commission

Orders

That all existing orders in relation to the children M born on … September 2005 and N born on … June 2006 (“the children”) are discharged.
That the parties have equal shared parental responsibility for the children.
That the children live with the mother at all times other than the periods specified in order 4, during which they will live with the father.
That the children live with the father during the following periods:
4.1during school term time, from the conclusion of school on Thursday until the commencement of school on Monday in each alternate week, beginning in the first week of each term;
4.2for one half of all school holidays as agreed between the parties from time to time or being the first half in default of agreement and subject to all provisions for special occasions in these orders.
4.3from 5.00pm on 24 December until 3.00pm on 25 December in 2012 and each alternate year thereafter; and
4.4from 5.00pm on the Saturday preceding Father’s Day until 5.00pm on the following day in the event that the children are not otherwise in the care of the father pursuant to these orders.
That in the event that the children are not otherwise in the care of the father pursuant to these orders, they will spend time with him as follows:
5.1on each child’s birthday, from 10.00am until 2.00pm on a non-school day or otherwise from the conclusion of school until 7.30pm; and
5.2on the father’s birthday from 10.00am until 2.00pm on a non-school day or otherwise from the conclusion of school until 7.30pm.
That, in the event that the children are not otherwise in the care of the mother pursuant to these orders, they will spend time with her as follows:
4.1on each child’s birthday, from 10.00am until 2.00pm on a non-school day or otherwise from the conclusion of school until 7.30pm; and
4.2on the mother’s birthday from 10.00am until 2.00pm on a non-school day or otherwise from the conclusion of school until 7.30pm.
That the parties exchange information concerning the children by way of text messages and a communication book.
That each party inform the other as soon as is practicable of any serious injury or illness suffered by either child while in the care of that party.
That each party give all necessary consents and authorities to enable the other party to obtain information concerning the children’s education, health care and extracurricular activities.
That each of the parties is at liberty to attend all events at the children’s school to which parents are invited in the ordinary course.
That each of the parties is restrained from denigrating the other in the presence of the children or permitting any other person to do so.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Buzalek and Buzalek has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY

FILE NUMBER: ADC 173 of 2008

Mr Buzalek

Applicant

And

Ms Buzalek

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE PROCEEDINGS

Ms Buzalek and Mr Buzalek are the parents of two children:
M born in September 2005 (6) and
N born in June 2006 (5).
The applicant father and the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) sought orders that the children live with him and spend time with the mother on two out of every three weekends; for half of all school holidays and on special occasions. They proposed that the father have sole parental responsibility, provided that he solicit and consider the mother’s views on any major long term decision relating to the children.
The respondent mother sought orders that the children live with the father from Thursday afternoon until Monday morning in each alternate week and for half of all school holidays. They would live with the mother at all other times and see each parent on special occasions. This proposal assumed that the parents would continue to live one and a half to two hours travel time distant from each other. If both parents and the children live in the Town F area, the girls would divide their time between households on a week-about basis. In either event, the mother proposed that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility.
Unfortunately, the proceedings were protracted for two principal reasons. Firstly the parties consented to interim orders, after several days of evidence, in the hope that they could eventually negotiate a final settlement. No such agreement was forthcoming, however, and the trial resumed after several months. Secondly, the mother was unable to continue with the proceedings on two occasions because of ill health.
The positions of the parties shifted dramatically over the seventeen month span of the trial. Initially, the father sought orders to the effect that he have sole parental responsibility and primary residence of the children. They would see the mother only under supervision, initially at a contact centre and then in the presence of her sister or other appropriate people. By the conclusion of the trial the father’s position was that the children live with him and spend time with the mother on weekends and during school holidays on an unsupervised basis. At all times the father sought an order that he have sole parental responsibility.
At the start of the trial the mother sought orders to the effect that the children live with her and spend time with the father only at a contact centre. By the end of the proceedings the mother’s position had shifted to a week-about arrangement, in the event that the parties live in the same area, or otherwise that the children spend ten and four nights per fortnight with her and the father respectively. Initially the mother sought an order that she have sole parental responsibility. By the conclusion of the trial she proposed that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility.

Background

The father was born in 1974 and is 37 years old. He works in the healthcare field who is currently employed from 10:00am until 4:00pm on Sunday, from 7:30am until 2:30pm on Tuesday and from 9:00am until 9:00pm on each alternate Thursday.
The mother was born in 1975 and is 36 years of age. She is training to work in the education field. At present she has chosen to remain out of the paid workforce in order to care for the children.
The parties began to live together in 1999 and married in August 2004. The relationship broke down finally on 23 December 2007, following an earlier separation of approximately three months between March and June 2007.
N was born fifteen weeks prematurely in June 2006, when M was about nine months of age. N spent the first four months of her life in a neonatal intensive care unit. There is no doubt that the parents experienced a great deal of stress after the births of the children.
While N was in hospital the father drove at a speed in excess of the legal limit with the mother and M in his car. The mother alleged that she asked him to slow down and he replied “I don’t care if we all die”. The father admitted that he drove at 100 kilometres per hour in a 60 kilometre zone. He maintained that the mother said “slow down or you will kill us all” and he replied “why I should follow the rules?”
On 9 October 2006 N was released from hospital. That evening the parties had an argument which resulted in police officers attending their home. The mother alleged that the father “threatened to kill” either “me”, “somebody” or “me, himself and someone” according to her affidavit and oral evidence respectively.
In his oral evidence the father said that he made no threat to harm either the mother or children on this occasion. He claimed that the parties had the following conversation:
“Father. When you continue to put me in this position I feel like I could kill someone.
Mother. Do you mean me or the children?
Father. No, more likely me.”
The father conceded that he yelled at the mother during this confrontation and on other occasions.
In January or February 2007 the parties commenced counselling with Relationships Australia. In the course of this counselling they each underwent a psychiatric assessment. The father consulted Dr V and the mother saw Dr CJ in 2007.
Between April and October 2007 the father attended six individual counselling sessions at a community health service. He also attended seven sessions with the “Facing Up To Violence And Abuse Group For Men” between April and June 2007. He attended twelve meetings of “A Group For Men Who Want to Stop Hurting Those they Care About” between 20 June 2007 and 5 September 2007, as well as one follow-up session on 21 November 2007. Further he attended four sessions dealing with anger and stress management early in 2009.
On 26 September 2007 Dr V referred the parties for “marital therapy”. They attended five sessions between 30 October 2007 and 11 January 2008 but were unable to salvage their relationship.
The mother alleged that the father directed violence at her from the time when M was approximately four months old. The father admitted that he shouted and swore at the mother during arguments. He conceded that he could well have frightened her and the children on occasion. He admitted to “using the full extent of [his] voice” and “yelling very loudly” during confrontations between the parties.
In about September 2008 the father commenced counselling with Mr RM. In May 2010 he gave evidence that he continued to see Mr RM and had benefited from this therapy.
The mother commenced counselling with Ms R in April 2007, following a referral from a domestic violence support service. Her contact with Ms R was sporadic between March 2008 and 2009.
In the earlier tranches of the proceedings the mother relied heavily on an alleged threat by the father to drown the children in a dam on his parents’ property. In her primary affidavit she deposed:
“In February 2007 the father told me that if I obtained orders in relation to the children that on the first occasion that he had an ‘access visit’ he would take the children to a dam at his parents’ property and that I would never see the children again.”
The father strongly denied that he ever made such a threat. I will consider the evidence relevant to this issue later in these reasons.
After the separation on 23 December 2007 the father spent short periods of time with the children only in the presence of the mother. The paternal grandparents were unable to see the children at all for nine months after the breakdown of the marriage.
On 16 January 2008 the father commenced parenting proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court. His initial application sought orders that the children live with each parent on a week-about basis. M was then two and a half and N eighteen months of age.
On 9 May 2008 the proceedings were transferred to the Family Court of Australia and placed in the Magellan list. On 3 June 2008 interim orders were made which provided that the children spend time with the father at a contact centre. They spent time together at the O Contact Centre on six occasions between 16 August 2008 and 25 October 2008.
On 21 January 2008 the mother applied for a domestic violence order against the father. He defended the application but, during that trial, the parties agreed to discontinue the proceedings upon the giving of undertakings to this court. The application was subsequently withdrawn by the prosecution.
The children continued to spend time with the father in contact centres until July 2009, when interim orders were made which allowed the paternal grandparents to act as supervisors. The mother had previously objected to the continuing use of the O Contact Centre on the basis that the operator was affiliated with the father’s employer. Supervised visits occurred in the P Contact Centre until July 2009.
On 15 November 2009 the mother alleged that the paternal grandfather sexually abused N. She then filed an application seeking to suspend all existing orders for the children to spend time with the father.
Interim orders made on 23 November 2009 provided that the children’s time with the father be supervised by his sister or the paternal grandmother. The paternal grandfather was restrained from being present on any occasion when the children spent time with the father. I will consider in detail the allegation of sexual abuse of N by the paternal grandfather later in these reasons.
The trial commenced on 3 May 2010 and proceeded on 4,5,6,7 and 10 May 2010. At approximately 3:00pm on 10 May 2010, during cross-examination, the mother claimed to be ill and unable to continue with her evidence. She attended a medical centre and obtained a certificate dated 10 May 2010 (exhibit 12) which stated: “[The mother] has a viral illness and will be unfit to give evidence in court from 10 May 2010 to 11 May 2010 inclusive.”
Obviously, there were serious ramifications if the trial were to be abandoned at that point. Counsel therefore prepared an agreed written request for a more comprehensive medical certificate as to the condition of the mother (exhibit 11).
The proceedings were adjourned to 10:00am on 11 May 2010, when a further medical certificate was produced in response to the written request (exhibit 13). Dr Y stated unequivocally that the mother was unable to give evidence or otherwise participate in the proceedings for the remainder of that week. The proceedings were then adjourned part heard for ten days to commence on 2 August 2010.
The trial recommenced on 2 August 2010 and continued on 3, 4, 5, 6, 9 & 10 August 2010. The parties then consented to interim orders which provided that the children live with the mother and spend time with the father from 3:00pm on Thursday until 8:45am on the following Monday in each alternate week, commencing on 12 August 2010.
As noted, it was hoped that these interim orders would lead to a final resolution of the proceedings. Regrettably, the parties reached no agreement and it was necessary for the trial to resume on 16 May 2011. The proceedings continued on 17, 18 & 19 May 2011, until the mother indicated at approximately 12:15pm that she was unwell. She again attended a medical centre and obtained a certificate dated 19 May 2011 (exhibit 26) which stated: “this is to certify that [the mother] has a medical condition and will be unfit to attend court on 19 May 2011”. Another adjournment was thus necessary but it was impossible to arrange mutually convenient dates for the court and counsel until October 2011. The proceedings were finally completed on 28 October 2011.
During the week prior to the re-commencement of the trial on 26 October 2011, the mother attended two medical centres and obtained certificates stating that she was suffering from a viral illness. Nonetheless, the trial was concluded during the allocated time.

Approach To These Proceedings

In making a parenting order, the court is governed by a determination of what arrangements are in the best interests of the children who are the subject of the proceedings. Part VII of the Family Law Act sets out a number of mandatory considerations which prescribe the pathway to that decision.
Section 60CC sets out two “primary” and thirteen “additional” considerations, to which the court must have regard in determining what orders are in a child’s best interests. Section 60CC(4) requires the court to consider also the extent to which each of the child’s parents have fulfilled, or failed to fulfil his or her responsibilities as a parent.
The court must have regard to the objects of Part VII, as set out in section 60B(1) and the principles underlying those objects, as set out in section 60B(2). Section 60B(3) makes particular provision for the right of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child’s right to enjoy his or her culture.
Section 61DA requires the court to apply a presumption that it is in a child’s best interests for his or her parents to have equal shared parental responsibility. This presumption does not apply if there are reasonable grounds for the court to believe that a parent (or a person who lives with a parent) has engaged in abuse of the child (or another child who was a member of the parent’s household) or family violence. The presumption may be rebutted by evidence which satisfies the court that it would not be in a child’s best interests for his or her parents to have equal shared parental responsibility.
If a parenting order provides for equal shared parental responsibility the court must consider whether it is in the child’s best interests, and reasonably practicable, for him or her to spend equal time with each parent (section 65DAA(1)). If there is no order for equal time, the court must consider whether it is in the child’s best interests, and reasonably practicable, for him or her to spend “substantial and significant” time with each parent. The concepts of “substantial and significant time” and “reasonable practicability” are defined in sections 65DAA(3),(4) and (5). There is no temporal definition of “substantial and significant time”.
In MRR v GR (2010) 263 ALR 368 the High Court of Australia said:
“[8] Subsection (1) of s 65DAA is headed “Equal time” and provides:
If a parenting order provides (or is to provide) that a child’s parents are to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child, the court must:
(a) consider whether the child spending equal time with each of the parents would be in the best interests of the child; and
(b) consider whether the child spending equal time with each of the parents is reasonably practicable; and
(c) if it is, consider making an order to provide (or including a provision in the order) for the child to spend equal time with each of the parents.
Subsection (2) makes provision for where a parenting order provides that a child’s parents are to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child (para (a)) but the court does not make an order for the child to spend equal time with each of the parents (para (b)). In such a circumstance the court is obliged to:
(c) consider whether the child spending substantial and significant time with each of the parents would be in the best interests of the child; and
(d) consider whether the child spending substantial and significant time with each of the parents is reasonably practicable; and
(e) if it is, consider making an order to provide (or including a provision in the order) for the child to spend substantial and significant time with each of the parents.
Subsection (3) explains what is meant by the phrase “substantial and significant time”.
[9] Each of subss (1)(b) and (2)(d) of s 65DAA require the court to consider whether it is reasonably practicable for the child to spend equal time or substantial and significant time with each of the parents. It is clearly intended that the court determine that question. Subsection (5) provides in that respect that the court “must have regard” to certain matters, such as how far apart the parents live from each other and their capacity to implement the arrangement in question, and “such other matters as the court considers relevant”, “[i]n determining for the purposes of subss (1) and (2) whether it is reasonably practicable for a child to spend equal time, or substantial and significant time, with each of the child’s parents”…
[13] Section 65DAA(1) is expressed in imperative terms. It obliges the court to consider both the question whether it is in the best interests of the child to spend equal time with each of the parents (para (a)) and the question whether it is reasonably practicable that the child spend equal time with each of them (para (b)). It is only where both questions are answered in the affirmative that consideration may be given, under para (c), to the making of an order. The words with which para (c) commences (if it is) refer back to the two preceding questions and make plain that the making of an order can only be considered if the findings mentioned are made. A determination as a question of fact that it is reasonably practicable that equal time be spent with each parent is a statutory condition which must be fulfilled before the court has power to make a parenting order of that kind. It is a matter upon which power is conditioned much as it is where a jurisdictional fact must be proved to exist. If such a finding cannot be made, subss (2)(a) and (b) require that the prospect of the child spending substantial and significant time with each parent then be considered. That subsection follows the same structure as subs (1) and requires the same questions concerning the child’s best interests and reasonable practicability to be answered in the context of the child spending substantial and significant time with each parent.”…
[15] Section 65DAA(1) is concerned with the reality of the situation of the parents and the child, not whether it is desirable that there be equal time spent by the child with each parent. The presumption in s 61DA(1) is not determinative of the questions arising under s 65DAA(1). Section 65DAA(1)(b) requires a practical assessment of whether equal time parenting is feasible.”…

In Cowley v Mendoza [2010] Fam CA 597 Murphy J set out a “summary of principles”, drawing together the relevant legislation, the decision of the Full Court in Goode and Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 and the judgment of the High Court in MRR v GR. I extend my gratitude to my learned colleague for this analysis, which has figured heavily in the approach which I now set out to my determination of these proceedings.
When a court makes or contemplates making a parenting order, it must:
·apply the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility
·determine whether there is abuse of a child or family violence, which means that the presumption does not apply
·determine whether the presumption is rebutted by evidence that it is not in the child’s best interests for there to be equal shared parental responsibility
·if the presumption applies:
¨   determine whether it is in the child’s best interests for there to be an order for equal time with each parent
¨   make findings as to the matters set out in section 65DAA(5) which are:
Reasonable practicality: In determining for the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) whether it is reasonably practicable for a child to spend equal time, or substantial and significant time, with each of the child’s parents, the court must have regard to:
(a)how far apart the parents live from each other; and
(b)the parents’ current and future capacity to implement an arrangement for the child spending equal time, or substantial and significant time, with each of the parents; and
(c)the parents’ current and future capacity to communicate with each other and resolve difficulties that might arise in implementing an arrangement of that kind; and
(d)the impact that an arrangement of that kind would have on the child; and
(e)such other matters as the court considers relevant.
¨   as a result of this enquiry, make findings as to whether an equal time order is reasonably practicable
¨   if an equal time order is not reasonably practicable, carry out the same process in respect of a “substantial and significant time” order
·if there is no equal time or substantial and significant time order, proceed to determine what orders are in a child’s best interests
A leading decision on the approach to allegations of sexual abuse of children is that of the High Court of Australia in M and M (1988) 166 CLR 69. Their Honours said (at page 76):
“…the resolution of an allegation of sexual abuse against a parent is subservient and ancillary to the Court’s determination of what is in the best interests of the child. The Family Court’s consideration of the paramount issue which it is enjoined to decide cannot be diverted by the supposed need to arrive at a definitive conclusion on the allegation of sexual abuse.”
and at page 75:
“…the ultimate and paramount issue to be decided in proceedings for custody of, or access to, a child is whether the making of the order sought is in the interests of the welfare of the child. The fact that the proceedings involve an allegation that the child has been sexually abused by the parent who seeks custody or access does not alter the paramount and ultimate issue which the Court has to determine, though the Court’s findings on the disputed allegation of sexual abuse will naturally have an important, perhaps a decisive, impact on the resolution of that issue.”
In M and M the High Court identified the relevant standard of proof as (at pp76-77):
“In considering an allegation of sexual abuse, the Court should not make a positive finding that the allegation is true unless the Court is so satisfied according to the civil standard of proof, with due regard to the factors mentioned in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at p.362. There Dixon J said:
‘The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent likelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters ‘reasonable satisfaction’ should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences.’”
The “Briginshaw test” is now encapsulated in section 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which provides:
“140(1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.
(3) Without limiting the matters which a court M take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:
(a)the nature of the cause of action or defence; and
(b)the nature of the subject matter of the proceeding; and
(c)the gravity of the matters alleged.”
The High Court in M and M addressed the issue of “unacceptable risk” of sexual abuse and said (at page 77):
“In resolving the wider issue the court must determine whether on the evidence there is a risk of sexual abuse occurring if custody or access be granted and assess the magnitude of that risk. After all, in deciding what is in the best interests of a child, the Family Court is frequently called upon to assess and evaluate the likelihood or possibility of events or occurrences which, if they come about, will have a detrimental impact on the child’s welfare. The existence and magnitude of the risk of sexual abuse, as with other risks of harm to the welfare of a child, is a fundamental matter to be taken into account in deciding issues of custody and access. In access cases, the magnitude of the risk may be less if the order in contemplation is supervised access.
In W and W (Abuse allegations: unacceptable risk) (2005) FLC 93-235 the Full Court (Warnick, May and Boland JJ) discussed the “the unacceptable risk test”, and said:
“In summary, the law is well settled as to the standard of proof required to make a positive finding of sexual abuse, and that such a finding should not be made unless a trial Judge is satisfied to the highest standard, on the balance of probabilities abuse has occurred. We accept, as a matter of practice, a trial Judge will almost inevitably be required in a case where sexual abuse allegations are raised to consider whether abuse has been proven on the balance of probabilities as well as considering whether or not an unacceptable risk of abuse exists. The High Court in M and M recognised the difficulty in defining with any degree of precision what constitutes an ‘unacceptable risk’ and the cases determined after that decision testify to the difficulty. However, the questions posed by Fogarty J in N and S, and referred to by us in paragraph 105, do provide a structure or framework which may assist a trial Judge to assess future risks to a child.”
The Full Court in W and W cited with approval the following passage from the judgment of Fogarty J in N and S:
“In asking whether the facts of the case do establish an unacceptable risk the Court will often be required to ask such questions as: What is the nature of the events alleged to have taken place? Who has made the allegations? To whom have the allegations been made? What level of detail do they involve? Over what period of time have the allegations been made? Over what period of time are the events alleged to have occurred? What are the effects exhibited by the child? What is the basis of the allegations? Are the allegations reasonably based? Are the allegations genuinely believed by the person making them? What expert evidence has been provided? Are there satisfactory explanations of the allegations apart from sexual abuse? What are the likely future effects on the child?
I would respectfully observe that this series of questions is a useful, practical tool in the determination of the issue of “unacceptable risk”.

The Father’s Alleged Threat To Kill The Children

I have referred above to the mother’s allegation in her primary affidavit that the father threatened to drown the children in a dam on his parents’ property. It is notable that her affidavit set out no evidence in direct speech of any specific threat.
In oral evidence given in May 2010 the mother made the following statements:
·“I did not agree to [the father’s] application for equal time because I believed he would kill them. I don’t know now whether he will kill them.
·I pray because of his threat to kill them. I think it is a possibility that he will kill them. I do want my children to have a relationship with their father and extended family. I say I believe he will kill them – that there is a chance of that. I believe he thinks we will get back together after he kills the children.
·He mentioned the dam only once but he alluded to it. He said “there are consequences of your actions [the mother’s first name]”.
·He did not say “I will be able to take the children anywhere I like”. He did not say “I will be able to take them to my parents’ place”.
·He never actually said he would take the children and drown them in his parents’ dam.
·Yes I think the court should take with a grain of salt how [the father] presented in court and in assessments of him because he wants to get the children alone and kill them.
·I would not say his warm and loving attitude to them is inconsistent with a plan to kill them.
·Yes he could have killed the children before now if he had wanted to. I think he meant that he would kill them after final orders.
·I do believe he will kill them. I can’t say if on the first contact. Yes, that is the truth I think he is denying that he could say “that is what I intended but not now”.
In August 2010 the mother said in oral evidence:
“I expect that [Ms R] should be able to give evidence that I told her about [the father’s] threat to kill the children.”
Ms R gave evidence on 5 August 2010 pursuant to a subpoena issued by the mother.
Ms R prepared a report dated 19 March 2008 (exhibit 16). She wrote that the mother told her of “threats in the past year that [the father] has made to harm her and the children”. In her oral evidence Ms R said “she was worried that he would allow his parents to have them at their dam”.
Ms R said nothing in her report or oral evidence about a specific threat by the father to drown the children in his parents’ dam.
The mother discussed the father’s alleged threat to kill the children and her fears that he would harm them with the Family Consultant, Dr A. By the time of the fourth Family Report dated 5 November 2010 the mother had resiled from her allegation that the children were at risk of harm at the hands of the father.
In the first Family Report dated 8 July 2008 Dr A wrote:
“26. [The mother] reported her attitude towards [the father] is now such that she cannot believe a word he says. This is because, she related, she heard them threaten their daughters’ lives in such a way that left her extremely convinced of the danger she sees he presents to the girls. This threat allegedly alluded to [the father] threatening to drown the children in the dam on the parents’ property. [The mother] described now being unable to commence negotiations with him regarding the girls spending time with him because she believes that danger to be valid.”
Dr A reported further:
“28. [The mother] said her fearful attitude is further coloured by [the father’s] alleged comments to her that, following what he perceives will be a potentially favourable decision from the court that unsupervised visits would be in order, that ‘we can be like we were years ago without children’. Prior to having children they had apparently planned to go to Japan and teach. [The mother] said that she considered those comments suggestive of [the father’s] alleged intent to harm the children.”
In her report dated 3 March 2009 Dr A wrote:
“9. The central issue in dispute in this matter is the one of alleged death threats or threats of violence against [the mother] and the children by [the father]. [The mother] continues to believe and report that [the father] poses a lethal threat to [M] and [N] as [the father] continues to argue that he does not.
10. This assessment has identified an apparent impasse between the parties regarding the above issue. It was also of concern how the children might interpret allusions to their father when, as [the mother] noted, she, together with the girls, prays to God to keep them safe from [the father].”
The mother denied that she prayed with the girls to keep them safe from their father.
Dr A reported further in March 2009:
“16. [The mother] referred to being very religious in how she and the girls prayed to God to help them during these most fearful and difficult times. [The mother] reported that she does not want her girls dead – she noted that following supervised visits the children always come back to her alive.”
The mother kept her hand on the Bible throughout her oral evidence in May 2010. She said that she continually recited the Lord’s Prayer to herself while in the witness box. The intensity of her focus on religion seemed to diminish as the trial progressed to conclusion.
Dr A wrote also in March 2009:
“18. [The mother] reported that she has the girls on prayer lists all over the world; she said ‘it’s all I can do’. She reflected that [the father] will not take the girls to the dam now (to drown them) but that ‘he will have his [other] plan and he will do that’. [The mother] reported that her solicitor has advised her ‘to tell everyone [that the father will kill the children]’ and that this Family Assessment Report ‘is the last chance’.
The mother said that ‘prayer lists’ was Dr A’s term and not a phrase which she used during her interview. She said that she told Dr A that she did not know whether the father would take the children to a dam and that her words were “he may have another plan, I don’t know”.
Dr A further reported in March 2009:
“20. [The mother] continued saying that ‘you just don’t know what might happen in the future; in Victoria [the child over the bridge] the wife kept saying he would kill the kids, the court transcripts were lost – I have told them over and over that he will kill the kids. The worst thing that can happen [to the father’s interest] is that, if the court believes me, then he will get supervised contact only’. [The mother] noted that she is not trying to exclude [the father] from the children’s lives, but that if she is right in her fears for their safety ‘then he will kill them and it will be too late’.”
Dr A continued:
“28. [The mother] enquired as to whether the court might take into account evidence from the mother of the recently murdered child in Victoria if, she said, she could get that woman to come to South Australia for that purpose. She earnestly enquired whether, if the court determines that unsupervised visits are appropriate for [M] and [N] – and [the father] subsequently murders them – that she could sue the court for being an accessory to murder.”
The mother said in oral evidence “I don’t think I said anything about accessory to murder”. She asserted that Dr A was incorrect in reporting that she made any enquiry about the prospect of her taking legal proceedings against the court. She maintained that her comment was “can I change the law?”
In the third Family Report dated 19 April 2010 Dr A wrote:
“26. [The mother] was again asked to explain her specific fears regarding [the father]. She said they remain as they have always been in that [the father] said:
· ‘we will be like we were 10 years ago –
[The mother] explained that if she and [the father] were as they were 10 years ago that they would not have the children and she perceives [the father] meant to get rid of the children.
· ‘[The father] said he would take the children to the dam and she would never see them again’ –
She explained her view that meant [the father] would drown the children.”
The father at all times strongly denied that he ever threatened to kill the children or harboured any intention to harm them. In oral evidence he said that the parties had only one conversation in which the dam featured, which took place in February/March 2007. He said that, following this conversation, he told the mother that he would be “free to do what I want if I have unsupervised time”.
It was common ground that the conversation concerning the dam took place prior to the parties’ first separation. It seems somewhat extraordinary that the mother would choose to reconcile with the father if he actually made this threat and/or that the mother believed that he harboured an intention to kill or harm the children.
I found unconvincing the mother’s evidence that the father threatened to drown the children in his parents’ dam or otherwise harm them. She gave no verbatim account of any alleged threat. Her non-specific evidence was that the father made a threat in one conversation, following which she elected to reconcile with him.
In any event, the children have spent unsupervised time with the father for the past eighteen months and have come to no harm at his hands. In October 2011 the mother said in oral evidence:
“I don’t have any criticisms of [the father]. I think he is doing very well and so am I. I stopped having concerns about him a long time ago.”
I am satisfied, and I find, that the father made no threat to drown the children in a dam on his parents’ property. I am satisfied, and I find, that the father at no time intended to harm the children in any way. I should add that the paternal grandparents have installed portable fencing around the dam on their property.

The Allegation of Sexual Abuse of N By The Paternal Grandfather

In her primary affidavit the mother deposed:
“133. On Saturday 14 November 2009 when the children returned to my care when we were driving home [N] told me that she was experiencing pain in her genital area. When we arrived home [N] was grabbing her clothing and pulling around her genital area. On Saturday night when I placed a nappy on [N] for the night I did not see any redness around her genital area.
134. On Sunday 15 November 2009 [N] again complained to me that she had a sore genital area. [N] refers to her genital area as ‘gina’. On the Sunday night I asked [N] ‘why is your vagina sore?’ [N] said ‘[The paternal grandfather] hurt me’. [N] was anxious and upset when she told me. [N] then said ‘I don’t want to be taken away’. I was shocked and distressed at what [N] had said. I did not ask [N] any further questions. I rang my sister and asked her to come to my home and told my sister that I was worried as the result of a statement that [N] had made.”
On 16 November 2009 the mother took N to see Dr CC, who made a referral to a medical centre. On the same day a paediatrician in the Child Protection Unit carried out a genital examination of N. It seems that no person interviewed N in relation to the allegation of sexual abuse. She was then a little over three years of age.
In her affidavit sworn on 26 February 2010 the mother’s sister stated that she went to the mother’s home on the afternoon of 15 November 2009, in response to a telephone call. She deposed:
“24. In order to talk with [N] away from [the mother] and [M] I asked [N] to come with me to [the mother’s] bedroom. When I was in [the mother’s] bedroom with [N], [N] said to me ‘my vagina hurts’. [N] refers to her genital area as her ‘vagina’. I asked [N] ‘why does your vagina hurt?’ [N] then said to me ‘[The paternal grandfather] put chocolate in my vagina, a triangle bit’ or words to that effect. I asked [N] where she was at the time. [N] told me that it was in ‘Daddy’s home’. I asked who was there at the time and was there anyone else in the room. [N] told me ‘no, they were in the other room’. [N] did not give me any further details.
25. [M] came into [the mother’s] bedroom and said to me ‘[N’s] vagina hurts’. [M] then said ‘[The paternal grandfather] put chocolate in her bottom’. I said to [M] ‘how do you know that?’ [M] said ‘[N] told me’. [N] then came back into [the mother’s] bedroom and both children were jumping on the bed and playing. [The mother] then came back into the bedroom and [the mother] spoke to [N] and said ‘show [the mother’s sister] where it hurts’. I had a superficial look at [N’s] genital area. I noted that her genital area was slightly red, however I only had a cursory look as a result of the situation with [N].”

In her oral evidence the mother said that staff at the medical centre told her “it was vaginitis and would go away on its own”. Nonetheless, in evidence which she gave in August 2010 she agreed that she sought a final order for the children to have no contact with the paternal grandfather.
The paternal grandfather strongly denied that he touched N inappropriately in any way on Saturday 14 November 2009 or on any other occasion. He denied that he was ever alone with N that day and the paternal grandmother corroborated this evidence.
In May 2010 the mother said:

“I did not make [the sexual abuse] allegation. [N] did.”

The consent interim orders of 10 August 2010 contained the following notations:
“a)      The father does not pose an unacceptable risk to the children [M] born [in] September 2005 and [N] born [in] June 2006; and
b)        [The paternal grandfather] does not pose an unacceptable risk to the children [M] and [N]; and
c)         [The paternal grandmother] does not pose an unacceptable risk to the children [M] and [N].”

On 9 October 2010 the father took N to a hospital after she complained of soreness in her genital area. He telephoned the mother before he left for the hospital and later sent a text message to inform her that the diagnosis was vulvo-vaginitis. In response to this message, the mother telephoned the father in the early hours of the morning.
There was conflicting evidence as to what the parties said to each other during these two conversations. The father maintained that the mother either stated directly or implied that the paternal grandfather had previously perpetrated sexual abuse upon N and she denied that she made any such statement. Unsurprisingly, there was no independent evidence and I have no basis upon which to prefer one version over the other.
The notation to the consent interim orders of 10 August 2010 meant that the allegation of sexual abuse of N could thereafter form no part of the mother’s case. She did not raise this allegation at any subsequent stage of the proceedings but, quite properly, she was cross-examined about the issue.
In May 2011 the mother gave this evidence in cross-examination concerning the sexual abuse allegation:
“I don’t know what really happened. I am not even thinking about it. If you look at it purely scientifically, [N] said [the paternal grandfather’s first name] did something and there are hundreds of [people with that first name] and he denied it. I have no problem with [the paternal grandfather]. I did not when I signed the consent orders.”
She said also:
“I can’t say I am sorry that I alleged that [the paternal grandfather] sexually abused [N] but I am a mandatory notifier.”
Independently of the mother’s retraction I am comfortably satisfied, and I find, that the paternal grandfather at no time sexually abused N. This most regrettable aspect to the litigation can only have enhanced the suspicion and mistrust between the two families.

The Mental Health of the Parties

Each of the parties has alleged that the other suffers from a mental illness or personality disorder. As noted, they each underwent psychiatric assessments in the early stages of the proceedings.
On 15 May 2007 the father consulted Dr Hans V, a psychiatrist, who produced a report dated 1 June 2007. Dr V offered these observations and opinions:
“On mental state examination, [the father] presented as a 32 year old man, of average height, well built. He appeared cooperative in his behaviour and was eager to provide the requested information. His conversation was normal in flow and appeared to be coherent in form. His affect was within the euthymic range. There was no evidence of perceptual disturbances. Although formal cognitive function was not performed during the interview, [the father] appeared appropriately oriented. He appreciated the predicament of his marriage and his judgment was fully intact…
On assessment, based on the histories obtained and [the father’s] mental state examination, I was unable to formulate a diagnosis of mood disturbance. From the history it would appear that the couple experienced significant problems adjusting to a situation in which their youngest child may be physically disabled. This situation appears to have contributed to significant strains in their relationship. I consider the marital therapy provided via Relationships Australia to be most appropriate.”
Dr V reviewed the father on 23 May 2007 and noted that there was no change to his mental state. He observed that the father appeared to be “coping better” and had some level of confidence about a reconciliation between the parties.
On 1 May 2008 the father consulted Dr B, psychiatrist. He provided reports dated 1 May 2008 and 20 August 2009 and gave oral evidence on 6 May 2010. In his first report Dr B offered these observations and opinions:
“The history and accompanying documentation does not suggest any significant mental illness. I would point out to the court that mental illness generally implies that the range of emotional experiences, or thoughts and behaviours is abnormal. Whilst he has demonstrated through his history a range of emotional responses, including some verbally violent outbursts these would not be considered mental illness, as they are brief, understandable to the context, are due to a relationship problem and not due to mental illness.
I do not believe he has a personality disorder, as there is not a pattern of repeated abnormal reactions to life’s stressors.
I believe he has a personality style that is generally sensitive to the needs of other people, which he attempts to meet so that he can be accepted and not rejected. He has some clear values and has found it difficult when his wife has apparently (from his perspective) had variable viewpoints. Unsure how to respond, arguments have occurred. My impression is that in these arguments it escalates to a point at which his wife withdraws. It is not appropriate for me to comment on her response at that time, as I have not assessed her. The salient point is that he experiences her withdrawal as a rejection. This is the very thing that he fears and it is a driving force for his accommodating manner. At this point, fearful of rejection, it is likely that he escalates the argument to get a response. It is likely that he is verbally abusive at that point. This appears to have had the desired response to get [the mother] to respond, which alleviates his intense fear, but unfortunately at the cost of inducing an intense fear in [the mother] (based on her affidavits).”
In his second report Dr B opined:
“As a result of undertaking anger management courses, he is now able to identify the triggers to such angry outbursts and recognises that they occur when he feels frustrated and trapped, and so now he is careful to ensure that when such feelings arise he attempts to be patient and wait, rather than expressing his distress immediately. Another trigger he has identified is when he is blamed for an action which, in his opinion, he did not do.”
The mother began to see Dr CJ, a psychiatrist, in July 2007. There were eight consultations prior to March 2009 and seven appointments between March and June 2009. Dr CJ saw the mother on one further occasion before she gave evidence on 8 August 2010, to assess whether she needed to amend her reports.
The mother took the children to some of her appointments with Dr CJ, which is of concern because the father was a topic of discussion. Dr CJ eventually suggested that she refrain from bringing the children to her consultations.
The father attended an appointment with Dr CJ together with the mother in August 2007. In her report dated 27 April 2009 Dr CJ recorded her concerns as to his mental state on that occasion. She noted:
“…I also informed him that on the basis of our interview, I was concerned about his mental state, and that I urged him to make an appointment with [Dr V] and consider recommencing treatment. I recall that his manner of communication was erratic and disjointed at times, approaching thought disorder. Similarly, I recall his florid complexion and intense interpersonal manner. I have recorded in my notes that I was concerned that [the father’s] behaviour was the manifestation of an extreme anxiety disorder, or that he may be in the prodromal period of a psychiatric illness.”
In the same report Dr CJ noted that both parties were “under considerable pressure”. She urged them to seek independent professional support and assistance. As noted, they attended counselling with Relationships Australia but were unable to salvage their relationship.
Dr CJ prepared a report dated 10 May 2009 after having seen the mother on twelve or thirteen occasions. Dr CJ offered these observations and opinions:
“On mental state examination [the mother] presented as a petite young woman of medium build. She was well groomed in neat, casual attire, and carried a handbag. [The mother] was pleasant and cooperative, answering all questions in a calm and rational manner. [The mother’s] spoken English is clear, accent-less and articulate. There was no evidence of delusions of grandeur, persecution, nihilism nor a religious nature. There were no suicidal, homicidal, or infanticidal thoughts or plans.
[The mother’s] mood was reported subjectively as normal. Objectively, she appeared euthymic and reactive. [The mother] has not experienced any perceptual distortions or perturbations. She was oriented to time, place and persona and is tertiary educated.
Apart from her well documented concerns, [the mother’s] judgment and insight are preserved.
Diagnostically, [the mother] does not meed the criteria for any psychiatric disorder.”
Accordingly, there was no diagnosis that either party suffers from a psychiatric disorder. I found Dr B’s evidence as to the dynamics of the parties’ relationship of considerable assistance, in terms of understanding the mother’s attitude to the father and his involvement with the children following the separation. I was left with the impression that the parties were both under great stress after the birth of N and, unfortunately, interacted with each other in a way which could well have caused the mother to develop a genuine fear of the father. It seems likely to me that the mother has achieved a degree of control over her fears as time progressed and the children came to no harm in the unsupervised care of the father.

The Presumption of Equal Shared Parental Responsibility

As noted, the father and the ICL sought an order that he have sole parental responsibility provided that he consult with the mother in relation to any major long term decision. The mother proposed that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility. This presumption applies unless there are reasonable grounds for the court to believe there has been abuse of the children or family violence or that there is evidence that equal shared parental responsibility is not in their best interests.
There was no suggestion that the mother has subjected the children to physical abuse. On the father’s own admission, he screamed and shouted at the mother in the presence of the children prior to the parties’ final separation. He conceded that his behaviour could well have caused the mother to fear him. In my view, therefore, the father engaged in a form of family violence prior to the parties’ separation.
Early in the proceedings the mother maintained that the children suffered various injuries in the care of the father, even while under the supervision of the paternal grandparents and aunt. For example, in her primary affidavit the mother alleged that N returned from time with the father in late October or early November 2009 with a large bruise on her shoulder. She alleged that the child complained that the father kicked her, which he denied firmly. It seemed most unlikely to me that he would kick N in the midst of an unfinished trial. The mother alleged further that the children returned from time in their father’s care with bruises on their legs. She annexed to her primary affidavit one photo of N with a bruise on her shoulder.
In oral evidence the mother produced additional photos which she clamed to show injuries sustained by the children during their time with the father. Two of these additional photos were of the bruise on N’s shoulder and a third showed some apparently faint bruises on her legs.
The mother reported none of these alleged injuries to the child protection authority. She claimed that she feared that the children would be removed from her care if she did so. I was unconvinced by this explanation, which seemed to me to carry an air of convenience.
The mother has made no allegations that the father caused injuries to the children since August 2010. I am satisfied, and I find, that any injuries which they incurred while in his care prior to that time were accidental in nature and probably due to normal childhood activities.
The mother alleged that the children have complained of verbal and physical altercations between him and the paternal grandmother in their presence. There was no independent evidence of any such conflicts. The paternal grandfather said that he has observed “only normal parental things between [the father] and [the paternal grandmother]”. The father’s sister gave evidence in May 2010 that she had “not heard raised voices between [the father] and my mother” for the previous nine months. In any event, the mother has made no such allegation since August 2010.
In terms of allocation of parental responsibility, one significant issue is whether the mother has subjected the children to psychological abuse. It seemed to me that she could well have inflicted such abuse on the children prior to the interim orders of 10 August 2010. Obviously, this behaviour is not to be excused or minimised but it appears to me that the critical issue is whether the mother has subjected the children to this form of abuse since August 2010.
It is convenient at this point to consider the evidence of Dr A, the Family Consultant. Dr A holds the degrees of Bachelor of Social Work and Doctor of Philosophy in Health and Social Sciences.
It seemed that Dr A formed a firm view that the mother presents a psychological risk to the children. In her report of 3 March 2009 she wrote:
“54. [The mother] presented as a person who possibly has been experiencing extreme fear and distress following what she certainly believes to have been [the father’s] clear and unequivocal threats to kill the children. Her consistent demeanour and attitude towards [the father] did not appear to auger well for either the children’s emotional or psychological wellbeing or any potential for a satisfactory relationship between the children and their father. It did not appear to auger well for the children’s ongoing nurturing relationship with her insofar as her attitude towards [the father] might well present the children with distress, distrust and fear of their father.”
In her report dated 19 April 2010 Dr A wrote:
“51. The quality of the children’s relationships with their parents does not appear to be resistant to what could be described as a parental power struggle and a chronic loyalty problem for the children. There are likely to be multiple reasons and determining factors that are influencing [M] and [N’s] relationships with their mother and with their father; an important one being their emotional vulnerabilities. Further important factors not the least evidenced by the children’s poor relationships with their father and paternal extended family following allegations emanating from their mother; some of which allegations and nuances [the father] may be powerless to defend or withstand. It appears likely, when [the mother’s] continuing rendition of her views about [the father] are taken into account, and her repeated comments, in the children’s presence, to the children’s contact service staff about the children being dead before the next court date are also given weight, that her behaviour appears likely to be an effective strategy designed to sabotage the father/child relationship and, indeed, distort her and the children’s emotional and psychological wellbeing and relationship.”
In evidence were notes made by workers at the P Children’s Contact Service, AB Children’s Contact Service and Relationships Australia. These supervised visits occurred in 2008 and 2009, so these notes are now of some antiquity. Later notes referred to handovers which took place at contact centres.
Notes for the period 16 August 2008 to 31 January 2009 contained no reference to conduct on the part of the mother such as described by Dr A. Subsequent notes, however, describe concerning statements and behaviour by her in the presence of contact centre workers. These notes are voluminous and the material which follows is intended to be illustratory rather than an exhaustive account.
The mother disputed the accuracy of these notes. Further, she maintained that she was given confusing instructions as to how she should conduct herself at the contact centres on some occasions.
Ms SS, the author of some of these notes, gave evidence in August 2010. She conceded “possibly I don’t get things 100 per cent right.” The notes for 25 April 2009 recorded a concession by a worker that the service agreement which the mother signed “could be confusing”. The coordinator saw fit to clarify in writing to the mother her requirements for ongoing use of the centre. There may thus be substance to the mother’s contentions of confusing instructions and inaccurate notes.
Nonetheless, there can be little doubt that the mother conducted herself in a concerning manner at contact centres in 2009. Dr A had access to all of these notes and appeared to place considerable reliance on this material in formulating her opinions.
The notes of Relationships Australia for 22 February 2009 referred to the mother holding N’s arm and saying “you have to stay here and show the courts how scared of [the father] you are”. The mother denied that she made any such statement. The notes for this date quoted the mother as saying to a worker “the girls will be dead before the next court appearance”. The mother allegedly referred to a tragic incident in Melbourne when a little girl was thrown off a bridge by her father and expressed the view that a similar fate would befall M and N.
In her last report dated 3 November 2010 Dr A wrote:
“66. If [the father] and his mother’s accounts of events since the trial are given credence or considered on the balance of probabilities to be substantiated, by the court, then both [N] and [M] are likely to have experienced their internal subjective lives with significant emotional turmoil. It was reported that their mother has refused to speak with them, refused to warmly and affectionately hand them over to their father in a child-focussed way, and that they were distressed when they possibly heard their mother reportedly speaking by telephone to [the paternal grandmother] by [the paternal grandfather] if he touches [N]. If those alleged situations are given credence by the court, then it could be very likely that [M] and [N’s] cognitive, emotional and psychological wellbeing and subsequent abilities would be significantly detrimentally affected.
67. Further, if the court gives credence to those allegations by [the father] and [the paternal grandmother], then it also appears likely that [the mother’s] capacity for child-focussed, empathic, attuned communication and her capacity for intuitive insight into what might significantly damage her children’s wellbeing, is lacking.”
It is significant to note that Dr A offered these opinions contingently upon the court accepting the evidence of the father and the paternal grandmother as to comments made by the children since the interim orders of 10 August 2010. She offered no alternate recommendations and said only “I am not clear” when pressed on that issue in cross-examination.

With great respect to Dr A, I am reluctant to attach substantial weight to her evidence. It seemed to me that some of her predictions did not eventuate but she was unprepared to acknowledge that she could have been mistaken in her opinions.
On 8 August 2010 Dr A said:
“Any sort of graduated shared care would be fraught for the children because I think she would be unable to support it.”
“I do not see living with one parent and weekends with the other as workable because she will not accept that and allow them to enjoy their life if they live with her.”
“Residence with the mother and unsupervised time with the father is unlikely to work at this stage.”
“My perception is that she would need lengthy and ongoing assistance to strategise supporting the children going to their father.”
“I think she would struggle.”
“Maybe in years to come, with a lot of assistance, she may be able to achieve that position.”
Despite these firm predictions on the part of Dr A, the parents agreed to interim orders whereby the children spend four nights per fortnight in the unsupervised care of the father only two days after she gave this evidence. In my opinion it is important to note that Dr A prepared her last report no more than approximately eleven weeks after the commencement of the interim orders, in circumstances where the children had spent a maximum of six periods of four days and nights in the unsupervised care of the father. By the conclusion of the trial in October 2011, these interim arrangements had operated for approximately fourteen months. The orders required the preparation and release of an updated Family Report no later than 5 November 2010.
Dr A gave evidence on 27 October 2011 and recommended against a continuation of the arrangements put in place by the interim orders of 10 August 2010. She said:
“Very sadly I would speak against a continuation of the current arrangements.”
Dr A said also in October 2011:
“My underlying impression is that there was no change in her position, that she did not agree with the orders anyway.”
She added:
“There is a distinct possibility that there may have been some improvement, I would have to concede that, yes, I think because she has been forced to.”
When Dr A gave this evidence, she had not interviewed or assessed the parents and children for over twelve months. With respect to her, I consider that she was brave to offer these opinions in such circumstances.
It concerned me that Dr A gave evidence that she “did not recall” putting to the mother all of the matters raised by the father and the paternal grandmother in their last interview. Notably, she stated in her last report that the mother “denied each and every one of [the father] and his parents’ reports”. Dr A set out these complaints as follows:
“[The mother] refusing to allow the children to take toys with them when they are with their father
[The mother] refusing to speak to the girls when the children were allowed to speak with her to say goodnight
His concerns that during the trial [the mother] had apparently reported that the children injure themselves
[The mother] cancelling an appointment [the father] had made for [Mr PP] to therapeutically intervene with the children
[The mother] cancelling (and then cancelling and reinstating several times ending in cancellation) an appointment [the father] had made with [Ms TT] with a view to the children receiving therapeutic counselling
[The mother] insisting that [CA Counsellors] with counsellor [Mr LL] is an appropriate self referral and that she would prefer to take the children there for counselling
[The mother] refuting [the father’s] information after his direct enquiry to [CA Counsellors] reportedly revealed that: [CA Counsellors] focus on relationship counselling and family therapy, will not provide reports to Court, do not specialise on children’s issues and do not usually liaise with family court personnel
The children continue to say their grandmother does not love them. And to their father they say ‘do you have a photo of us so you won’t forget us?
The children fearfully refusing wheelbarrow rides given by their father with which they had previously been delighted
[The mother] walking away from the children at handover leaving them in great distress
Refusing to discuss any future school arrangements with [the father] via any style of communication
Sending text message (sighted) ‘Please don’t fight with your mother in front of the children’
[The mother] asserting [N] was allergic to sunscreen that a dermatologist had recommended for young children with allergies
[The father] and [the paternal grandmother] had taken [N] to hospital after contacting the parent helpline after the child had complained of pain during urination. The [hospital] staff had advised the child had vaginitis, due probably to bubble bath and or wiping her bottom incorrectly. [The father] had conveyed the information to [the mother] and advised her of the outcome of the hospital visit
That same night, 10/10/2010 [the mother] had allegedly telephoned at 3.28am in the morning and said during her conversation to [the father] after she had received his message, something close to – it must be sexual abuse by [the paternal grandfather] (the writer sighted the recorded source telephone number, date and time)
On 11/10/2010 at 7:35pm, [the paternal grandmother] had allegedly received a telephone call from [the mother] saying and immediately hanging up, ‘Tell [the paternal grandfather]; touch my daughter again and I will have it cut off’. According to [the paternal grandmother] she could hear the very distressed children in the background
[The father’s] concerns that the school requires formal instruction from the Court that he might volunteer and or attend sports day – [the father] was unclear about what information might have precipitated the school’s position towards him.”
These allegations were not put to the mother in detail in cross-examination but she responded to very similar material in an affidavit sworn by the father on 18 February 2011. In this affidavit the father made complaints or comments in relation to every period which the children spent in his care between 10 August 2010 and 10 February 2011. The mother responded to these complaints in her affidavits sworn on 4 May 2011.
The mother deposed that she has sent the children’s comfort toys with them on every overnight stay with the father since August 2010. She conceded that she may have told the father on the first occasion that she needed to speak to her lawyer about whether she should send their teddy bears.
The father told Dr A that the mother refused to speak to the children on the telephone to say goodnight on 12 August 2010. He maintained that she said that she would not offer assistance if he were unable to cope with the children.
The mother’s version of these events was that she felt unwell during this conversation. She maintained that she hesitated about the father’s proposal that each party say goodnight to the children on the telephone without the benefit of legal advice, because there was no provision for this arrangement in the interim orders. The mother was correct and, in fact, order 6 stated:
“NOTING THAT the parties will contact only each other in relation to children’s issues.”
The mother denied that the father suggested on 12 August 2010 that she speak to the children. She said that she heard the children crying on the telephone and offered to collect them.
The father complained to Dr A that the mother unilaterally cancelled an appointment for the children for therapeutic counselling with Mr PP and then vacillated about the engagement of Ms TT. Correspondence annexed to the mother’s affidavit indicated that the father made appointments with both Mr PP and Ms TT and then invited the mother to indicate whether she had a preference or a proposal for an alternative therapist. The mother’s solicitor’s letter in reply indicated clearly that she did not consent to the engagement of Ms TT purely for financial reasons. It appears that the father did not tell Dr A that the mother raised concerns about the cost of therapy with Ms TT. The mother conceded that she did not consent to the children attending upon Mr PP but did not proffer an explanation.
The father complained to Dr A that the mother insisted that the children’s therapy be undertaken with Mr LL at CA Counsellors. The mother’s version of this dispute was is that she made enquiries of CA Counsellors after she became aware of the cost of therapy with a private psychologist.
The father complained further to Dr A that the mother refuted his information that counselling by Mr LL would be unsuitable for the children. In cross-examination he conceded that he attended one meeting with Mr LL but failed to provide the mother with any reason for his opposition to the children attending therapy at CA Counsellors.
It seems to me that the mother did no more than make appropriate enquiries about affordable counselling for the children. The father chose to paint a somewhat more sinister picture. Dr A conceded in cross-examination that “he may have been a bit manipulative”.
The father next complained to Dr A that the children continued to tell the paternal grandmother that they do not love her. In October 2011 the paternal grandmother gave evidence to the effect that the children no longer make negative comments about her, the paternal grandfather or the father. A part of this same complaint by the father was that the children ask him whether he has a photo of them “so you won’t forget us”. I was not sure why this statement should be construed by the father and the Family Consultant adversely against the mother.
The father’s next complaint to Dr A was that the children fearfully refused “wheelbarrow rides” with him, an activity which they previously enjoyed. In her affidavit the mother said that she has no objection to “wheelbarrow rides” and in her oral evidence she said that the children never discussed this activity with her.
The father alleged to Dr A that the mother walks away from the children, leaving them in a very distressed state at handovers. As noted, there could have been a maximum of six periods of unsupervised time with the father before he made this complaint. In October 2011 both the father and the paternal grandmother gave evidence that the children are now very comfortable with him and settled into the current routine.
The next issue which the father raised with Dr A was that the mother refused any discussion with him about future educational arrangements for the children. If the mother held such a view at that stage of the proceedings, she clearly had a different opinion by October 2011. She then gave evidence “I think both parents should have a say in major decisions”.
The father’s apparent insistence on a discussion about a school for the children in late 2010 sits uncomfortably with evidence which he gave in M 2011. He said:
“I plan to move to [Town F] as soon as possible.”
He said that he believed that the children would benefit from remaining in their community and that he had formed friendships with other parents at Town F School. Apparently the father ceased to have concerns about the children’s enrolment at this school within a few months of this complaint.
The father alleged to Dr A that the mother sent him a text message “please don’t fight with your mother in front of the children”. As noted, the mother made no complaint of confrontations between the father and the paternal grandmother after August 2010.
The father complained to Dr A that the mother asserted that the children are allergic to a sunscreen recommended by a dermatologist. It appears that the father took the children to a dermatologist without the mother’s knowledge.
The next matter which the father raised with Dr A was the hospital attendance in October 2010 when N complained of vaginal soreness. I have referred above to the evidence in relation to these events.
The next issue which the father raised with Dr A was a telephone call allegedly made by the mother to the paternal grandmother on 11 October 2010. The caller allegedly threatened physical harm to the paternal grandfather in the context of supposed sexual abuse of N. As noted, the mother categorically denied that she made any such call.
In cross-examination Dr A denied that she rang the father and advised him to obtain telephone records to establish that the mother made this call. She conceded that she may have made this suggestion if the father had telephoned her. I have reservations as to the appropriateness of a Family Consultant giving advice on evidentiary matters to a litigant.
Lastly, the father informed Dr A that staff at the children’s school require “formal instruction from the court” before he could attend various events. He intimated that the mother had painted an unfavourable picture of him at the school. In his affidavit the father alleged that the school principal told him that he could not attend a sports day without amendments to the orders, because the mother had stated that there was no provision for him to go to the school. The chronological structure of the father’s affidavit would suggest that this alleged incident occurred in October 2010.
The mother said that the principal discussed with her the terms of the interim orders and raised an issue as to whether the father was permitted to attend the school sports day. The mother denied that she told the principal that the orders prevented the father from attending the school on that day.
It thus seems to me that the mother was able to offer a feasible explanation for all of these matters which so concerned Dr A. With due respect to Dr A, that fact gives me caution in placing substantial weight on her opinions. It would be reasonable to expect some initial difficulties in the implementation of a shared care arrangement but Dr A did not seem to allow for that contingency. She had previously offered firm opinions that any shared care regime was doomed to failure due to the mother’s unreasonableness and intransigence. It seems to me to be entirely possible that Dr A was inclined to regard the complaints of the father and the paternal grandmother as support for her view that shared care was an unviable option. As noted I also harbour disquiet about the weight to be afforded to Dr A’s evidence in circumstances where she confidently predicted a failure of any shared care arrangement, yet the regime created by the interim orders has operated for eighteen months.
In his affidavit sworn on 18 February 2011 the father raised numerous complaints about the quality of communication between the parties. The mother responded to these complaints in her affidavit sworn on 4 May 2011. In general terms the mother alleged that the father insisted that various arrangements be put in place and demanded that she answer his questions immediately. The mother alleged further that she was afraid that the father would use everything which she said to him as evidence to support his case. Certainly it is true that the father and the paternal grandmother took copious notes throughout the proceedings and that this material was incorporated into detailed affidavits.
Similarly, the father set out a number of complaints in his affidavit sworn on 7 October 2011. Again, he referred to every period which the children spent in his care between 20 May 2011 and 6 October 2011. Regrettably, it appears that the father has reached a point of searching for reasons to criticise the mother.
Despite all of the father’s complaints, however, there was no suggestion that the children have missed spending with him any period of time prescribed by the interim orders of 10 August 2010. The fact is that these arrangements have operated without interruption and the result can only have been a strengthening of the children’s relationships with the father and extended paternal family.
There is no doubt that the quality of communication between the parents could improve substantially. Regrettably, there exists a high level of suspicion and mistrust between them which they need to address in the interests of their children. As noted, the father effectively admitted that he subjected the mother to a form of family violence prior to the separation. In oral evidence he conceded that the mother “was probably fearful that I would hurt her”. I have no doubt that the mother’s mistrust of the father and paternal family has been exacerbated by their practice of maintaining copious notes which they use to prepare affidavits in which they level criticisms at her. I am inclined to accept the mother’s evidence to the effect that she feels that she is under close scrutiny and that her words and behaviour will inevitably be drawn to the attention of the court.
On the other hand, the mother has given the father and his family abundant reason to be suspicious of her motives and intentions towards them, in terms of their relationship with the children. As I have indicated, however, this behaviour seems to have abated and the interim arrangements have been implemented relatively successfully.
The father placed emphasis on an incident which took place at a handover on 3 January 2011, when he attempted to hand a communication book to the mother. In my view it is not now useful to try to determine who was to blame for this altercation. I would note that the interim orders of 10 August 2010 made no provision for the use of a communication book and there was no agreement to do so prior to 3 January 2011. The father appears to have made a unilateral decision to implement this form of communication.
The mother annexed to her affidavit of 8 October 2011 a copy of a communication book used by the parties between 23 May 2011 and 10 September 2011. It seemed to me that they exchanged necessary information, for example, about medical treatment and refrained from acrimonious commentary.
In these circumstances I am satisfied that the parties should have equal shared parental responsibility for the children. I have found that the father engaged in a form of family violence prior to the separation but that behaviour ceased over four years ago. It is greatly to his credit that he voluntarily undertook the counselling and therapy which has been outlined above in these reasons. I am persuaded that the children should not now be deprived of the benefit of the father’s input into major decisions which will affect the course of their lives.
The mother most probably subjected the children to psychological abuse in the period between the parties’ separation and late 2010. I am satisfied, and I find, that she has since desisted from this behaviour. Similarly, I see no reason now to deprive the children of her input into major decisions about the course of their lives.
There will thus be an order for equal shared parental responsibility. Consequently, I am obliged to consider whether the children should spend equal or substantial and significant time with each of their parents. I will do so, inter alia, by reference to the considerations set out in s60CC of the Family Law Act.

The Primary Considerations

The proposals of all parties would see the children spending unsupervised time with each parent for periods of up to half of the school holidays. Logically, it must therefore be the case that the mother, the father and the ICL all acknowledge that the children will benefit from having a meaningful relationship with each parent.

The Additional Considerations

At the ages of six and five years respectively, M’s and N’s views on parenting arrangements carry very little weight. As noted, they currently move comfortably between their parents and it seemed to be common ground that they are settled into the present arrangements.
Each of the parties readily conceded that the children love and enjoy being with the other parent. In May 2011 the father said “the girls speak positively of their mother and look forward to going back to see her. They enjoyed making a card for her last mother’s day – I wrote on the card and they wrote their names. I perceive that they love their mother. Of course she has been a large figure in their lives and they enjoy spending time with her.”

In May 2011 the mother said “they tell me that they love their father” and “they say they love Nana and that could be [the paternal grandmother]”. In October 2011 she said “they enjoy their time with their father, they love their father”.
Dr A’s opinion as to the nature of the relationship of the children with each of their parents shifted substantially during the course of the proceedings. In her report dated 9 July 2008 Dr A observed:
“[The mother] interacted with [the children] easily and they would seem to be very comfortable in her presence. [N] refused to leave her mother and began to cry when the Family Consultant suggested that she spend a little time with her father. [M] smiled at her father and accepted a kiss from him.”
In her report dated 3 March 2009 Dr A wrote:
“45. Observed interactions between the subject children and their mother were marked by warmth, gentle communications, and demonstrations of capable parenting. There were no further remarkable observations”.
The Family Consultant then invited the children to accompany her to a different room to see their father. She observed that they smiled happily and sat close to him. She assessed that:
“All interactions between the children and their father were marked by warmth, reciprocal affection and gentle behaviours. There were no further remarkable interactions.”
In her report dated 19 April 2010 the Family Consultant noted that the children appeared to be comfortable with the mother and maternal grandmother and that “there were no further remarkable interactions”. She noted that M refused to hold her father’s hand or kiss him and initially played separately from him and N. She then joined in the games and became “excited and exuberant”. She observed that N was delighted to see her father and that she held out her arms to him.
At the conclusion of the observation session the father reminded the children that they would see him on the following Saturday. M said “It’s my choice, yes or no, if I see you” and “I will be sick on Saturday”. The Family Consultant expressed concern at M’s apparent sense of empowerment at the age of four and a half years.
In her last report dated 3 November 2010 the Family Consultant observed warm, happy and loving interactions between the children and the father. She observed that they were “happy and comfortable” in the company of the mother and that “they appeared considerably more relaxed, verbal and active” than had been the case on any previous assessment.
When the Family Consultant interviewed the children together in late 2010 M said “we tell you, we don’t like Dad” and quickly repeated that statement. The Family Consultant noted that these comments were inconsistent with the nature of the interactions between the children and the father.
In oral evidence in August 2010 the Family Consultant said inter alia:
·“It seems that [M] is starting to align with the mother and feels she has to choose;
·The quality and nature of the children’s attachment to the mother is suspect;
·I think there is little doubt that the children have internalised some of her fears about the father;
·Children who experience ongoing denigration of the other parent may experience a distortion of that man and they can believe it and go with it or become extremely distressed. They may internalise it and think “I am half of this dreadful person”.
In October 2011 Dr A said “It certainly appears that she is trying everything to try and erode the father/daughter relationship”. She said also “I think the children’s attachment to her is likely to be insecure and getting toward being disorganised.”
With due respect to Dr A, it seemed to me that she was quite unprepared to entertain the possibility of a genuine change in the mother’s perception of the father and paternal family. In my view she was brave to speculate that the children’s attachment to the mother is likely to be insecure and approaching a state of disorganisation in October 2011, despite the fact that her last interviews and observations were undertaken twelve months previously. I am not persuaded, on the strength of Dr A’s evidence, that a problematic relationship currently exists between the children and the mother.
There was an abundance of evidence which indicated that the mother was unwilling or unable to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the children and the father at earlier stages of the proceedings. In my view, however, the fundamental issue in terms of this consideration is whether her capacity properly to parent the children continues to be impaired in this way. I am satisfied, and I find, that the mother no longer attempts to undermine the children’s relationship with their father and paternal family and has not done so since the arrangements put in place by the interim consent orders have settled into a familiar routine.
As noted, it was common ground that the children now move comfortably between the parents’ households and there was no suggestion they have missed any time which they should have spent with the father pursuant to the August 2010 orders. It was agreed that they love their father and are happy in the company of the paternal family. It seems to me that one or both of the children would be reluctant or actually refuse to leave the mother and move into the care of the father, if she has maintained her efforts to undermine the paternal family relationships.
There was evidence that the mother has endeavoured to facilitate time for the children with the father in addition to the framework of the interim orders. For example, the orders contained no provision for the children to spend time with the father over Christmas 2010. Nonetheless, they spent several hours with him by agreement between the parties. The communication book (exhibit 23) indicated that handovers occurred on Christmas Day at 10am and 3pm. In oral evidence in May 2011 the mother said “I wanted the girls to spend Christmas time with him”.
In September 2011 the mother offered for the children to spend time with the father from 10am until 3pm on Father’s Day, when they would be in her care pursuant to the interim orders. The mother’s offer extended to delivering the children to and collecting them from a restaurant of the father’s choice if he was required to work on Father’s Day.
The father conceded that the mother contacted him and made this offer in relation to Father’s Day some considerable time prior to the event. He also agreed that the children gave him a card and a present for Father’s Day.
The father responded to the mother’s offer with a proposal that the children stay overnight with him on Father’s Day. In a text message he informed her that he had a dinner engagement but he did not advise her that he planned to spend the evening with his parents. The mother maintained that she thought the children would be cared for by a baby sitter while the father was on a dinner date. She said that she would have agreed to the children having dinner with the father and the grandparents if she had known of his plan.
The mother attempted to arrange for the father to speak to N by telephone on her first day of school on 17 October 2011. For some reason the father elected not to take up this offer. The mother sent him a photo of N in her uniform on her first day at school.
These matters, together with the success of the interim arrangements, persuade me that the mother has substantially improved her attitude toward the father and the paternal family. In October 2011 she said “I think we have both come a long way” and, at least with respect to herself, I am persuaded that she is correct in this view.
A change in primary residence would undoubtedly require a significant adjustment on the part of the children. In October 2011 the Family Consultant said “the change I recommend will be difficult for the girls” and “they probably will experience the father differently because he will be providing care.” Dr A said also “there is no easy way of affecting the transition”.
I have no doubt that the father and his family would do their very best to ease the children’s path into his primary care. I retain considerable concerns that they could effectively shield the children from the traumatic effects of such a significant change. It is, however, encouraging that the paternal grandmother said she would support whatever outcome is the result of the proceedings.
If the application of the father and the ICL is successful, it will be necessary for the children to change schools for practical reasons. In October 2011 the father said that he had made no firm enquiries about a suitable school, in the event that there is a change in primary residence. It is somewhat surprising that the father failed at least to investigate the availability of places for the children at appropriate schools.
The parents’ homes are distant by approximately one and a half to two hours travel time. They have managed to implement the current arrangements despite difficulties of distance and I have no reason to suppose that any geographical problems would arise in a similar arrangement in the future. The proposals of each party and the ICL allow for both parents to be involved in the children’s school life.
The father and the ICL placed considerable reliance on alleged deficiencies in the mother’s parenting capacity. As noted, historically she has failed to foster the children’s relationship with the father and paternal family. As already indicated, however, I am satisfied that she now has much more positive attitude to their role and significance in the children’s lives.
I have identified above my reasons for concern with the Family Consultant’s evidence that the mother’s parenting capacity continues to be impaired as was previously the case. In the last report and in oral evidence in October 2011, Dr A maintained that the mother’s presentation was “incongruent” and that her statements did not reflect her real views. In the report dated 3 November 2010 Dr A opined:
“21. Overall, [the mother] presented incongruously. On the one hand, [the mother] argued that [the father] is not capable with regard to the care of the children. She argued that he is seeking medical opinions to influence the court to his view. She argued that she could not agree with point (b) of the order 10/8/2010 that [the paternal grandfather] is not sexually abusing, or has not sexually abused [N]. On the other hand, [the mother] said she is very happy for the current court orders to continue and that she wants to settle the matter as soon as possible by consent orders.”
The Family Consultant’s notes of her interview with the mother in late 2010 (exhibit 32) read in part:
“…but overall MO wants final orders, says it should have happened years ago but we can’t change the past.”
In oral evidence in October 2011 Dr A asserted:
“Up to now she had never indicated that she was prepared to settle this matter in any way.”
I have difficulty in reconciling this statement with the mother’s consent to the interim orders and desire to attend mediation with a view to resolution of the proceedings on a final basis.
Dr A also maintained that the mother’s contention that the father’s attempts to obtain “medical opinions to influence the court’s view” is inconsistent with a genuine desire to resolve the dispute. I did not understand why the father’s seeking of medical opinions should be construed as an indication that the mother was unwilling to negotiate a settlement of the dispute.
Dr A further asserted that the mother’s particularity about the wording of a notation in relation to the paternal grandfather and the sexual abuse allegation in the interim orders was an indication of “incongruousness”. The mother maintained in October 2011 that Dr A “misinterpreted hugely” and that she merely insisted that the sealed orders be worded exactly in accordance with the document signed by her. I do not regard this position as unreasonable or “incongruent” with a genuine desire on the mother’s part to resolve the dispute.
In October 2011 the mother conceded that she continues to feel intimidated by the father “when in close physical proximity to him”. She said “it is not an overriding fear” and, with regard to the prospect of their attending school events at the same time, “I am going to have to suck it up”. She said further “he does intimidate me but I need to get over it and I will.
It seems to me that the father may have unintentionally intimidated the mother in the early stages of the current regime. He had been effectively excluded from a significant role in decision making and the daily care of the children for some time and was suddenly presented with an opportunity for much greater input into their lives. It would be entirely understandable that he should seize this opportunity and the mother could well have been somewhat overwhelmed by his requests for information about the children and insistence that decisions be made immediately on issues such as education. In making this observation, I am mindful of the father’s admissions as to his verbal abuse and violence towards the mother prior to separation.
In my view the father has fulfilled his duties as a parent to the extent to which circumstances permitted from time to time. As noted, the mother curtailed his parental role for a considerable period but has not done so since August 2010.

Conclusion as to Equal Time

By the conclusion of the trial, no party sought orders that the children spend equal time with each parent. The mother had previously proposed that the children live with each parent on a week about basis but, at that time, the father indicated that he intended to move to the Town F area. He changed his mind in the final phase of the trial, thus the distance between the parties’ homes made this arrangement impracticable. The children would need to attend two schools or undertake substantial travel in these circumstances. An equal time arrangement for the children is thus virtually impossible to implement for these practical reasons.
An equal time arrangement would be contrary to the wishes of both parents. I am persuaded that the mother would have supported a week-about regime if the parties lived in the same area. The father at no time looked favourably on the prospect of such an arrangement.
In all of the circumstances, I cannot be satisfied that it would be in the children’s best interests, and reasonably practicable, for the children to spend equal time with each of their parents. I will not make such an order, thus it is necessary that I consider whether it is in the children’s best interests, and reasonably practicable, that they spend substantial and significant time with each parent.

Conclusion as to Substantial and Significant Time

The legislation contains no temporal definition of “substantial and significant time” but does detail requirements for an arrangement to fall within these parameters. It is necessary for:
·A child to spend with a parent days which fall on weekends and holidays and also at other times.
·A parent is able to be involved in a child’s daily routine and events which are of particular significance to the child.
·A child is able to be involved in events which are of particular significance to a parent.
It seems to me that the present arrangements fall within this definition. I am persuaded that a continuation of these arrangements would be in the children’s best interests. Recent history indicates that this regime is reasonably practicable.
This arrangement has operated in a fundamentally successful manner for approximately eighteen months. The children have established a routine in which they are comfortable and happy. The communication difficulties between the parents have not destabilised these arrangements. I have very real concerns that a separation from their primary carer would be traumatic for the children.
For reasons indicated above, I do not share the concerns of the Family Consultant that the mother currently labours under an impaired capacity to properly parent the children. The children move happily between their parents’ households and have established loving and secure relationships with the father and their extended paternal family. I see benefit to the children in allowing them to continue in their established routine.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and seventy eight (178) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Stevenson delivered on 23 February 2012

Associate:

Date: 23 February 2012

[2012] FamCA 62

1 February 2012

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Family Law

Legal Concepts

Consent