Buttigieg v the Police No. Scciv-03-1244

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BUTTIGIEG  v  THE POLICE

[2003] SASC 363

Magistrates Appeal (Criminal)

  1. BLEBY J: This is an appeal against sentence. On 8 August 2003 the appellant pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court to one count of driving a motor vehicle whilst disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence contrary to s 91 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959. The appellant was sentenced to 14 days imprisonment, which sentence was suspended upon the appellant entering into a 12 month good behaviour bond.

  2. On 8 January 2003 the appellant was disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for a period of six months.  That disqualification period was due to end on 8 July 2003.

  3. The offence the subject of this appeal occurred on Wednesday, 25 June 2003 at about 2.40 am at Bedford Park, fourteen days prior to the end of the disqualification period.  Police were conducting random breath tests on drivers of vehicles travelling south on South Road, Bedford Park, when a red Commodore sedan driven by the appellant was directed to turn into the breath testing station. Instead, the vehicle slowed and turned into Gum Terrace, Clovelly Park where it stopped at a car yard.  Police approached the appellant and it was revealed that he was disqualified from holding a driver’s licence.  He tested negative to an alcotest.  The appellant, when questioned by police, said that he was aware that he was disqualified from driving but that someone had called him and asked him to check his parents’ car yard as it may have been broken into.  It appears from the sentencing remarks of the Magistrate that the person who had asked the appellant to go to the car yard was the appellant’s father.  The appellant was 19 years of age at the time of the offence and was employed at his parents’ car yard.

  4. The police prosecutor asserted in his affidavit tendered before me that the Magistrate was informed that the appellant had previously been convicted of driving whilst disqualified on 22 August 2002 and had received a fine of $500 in respect of that offence.  This was not referred to in the Magistrate’s reasons and the appellant denies that any prior like offences were alleged before the Magistrate.  Rather, he says, only one prior matter of driving at a speed dangerous was alleged, being the offence which led to the licence disqualification.  The prosecutor, in a subsequ­ent affidavit, defers to the recollection of the appellant’s counsel that no reference was made to that earlier conviction of driving whilst disqualified.  The respondent’s further affidavit was tendered without objection before me and deposes to the fact that the appellant was in fact convicted of driving whilst disqualified on 22 August 2002.

  5. The Magistrate imposed a sentence of imprisonment for a period of 14 days and suspended that sentence upon the appellant entering into a bond to be of good behaviour for 12 months.  In sentencing the appellant, the Magistrate commented that she had been told that the appellant did not…

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Details
Case
[2003] SASC 363
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Buttigieg v the Police, the appellant, Buttigieg, appealed against his sentence for driving a motor vehicle while disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence. The appeal was heard in the Supreme Court of South Australia. Buttigieg had pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 14 days imprisonment, which was suspended upon him entering into a 12-month good behaviour bond. The offence occurred while Buttigieg was still under a six-month disqualification period that was set to end shortly after the offence. The key legal issue was whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and if the Magistrate had considered all appropriate sentencing alternatives before deciding on imprisonment.

The court considered whether the offence was contumacious, meaning it was committed with total disregard of the disqualification. The Magistrate found that the circumstances were not particularly unusual and that Buttigieg must have realised that he should not drive. The court agreed that Buttigieg’s driving indicated an attitude of defiance, especially considering he was nearing the end of his disqualification period and had been previously convicted of a similar offence within 12 months. The court held that the penalty imposed was within the normal range for a first offence and that the order for suspension was appropriate. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

The court concluded that the sentence was neither excessive nor inappropriate given the circumstances of the offence and the offender. The Magistrate had properly exercised her discretion in imposing the sentence and considering the appropriate alternatives. The court found no basis to interfere with the sentence imposed by the Magistrate.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 8 January 2003, the appellant in this case, Buttigieg, was disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period of six months, a disqualification period set to end on 8 July 2003. Fourteen days prior to the end of this disqualification period, on 25 June 2003 at approximately 2:40 am, Buttigieg was caught driving a red Commodore sedan in Bedford Park by police who were conducting random breath tests. Instead of complying with the police directive to turn into the breath testing station, Buttigieg turned into Gum Terrace, Clovelly Park, and stopped at a car yard. The police approached him, and it was revealed that he was disqualified from driving. Despite testing negative for alcohol, Buttigieg admitted to the police that he was aware of his disqualification but had been called by someone—later identified as his father—to check his parents’ car yard as it may have been broken into. At the time of the offence, Buttigieg was 19 years old and employed at his parents' car yard.

The appellant had a prior conviction for driving while disqualified, having been convicted on 22 August 2002 and fined $500. This prior conviction was not explicitly referred to in the Magistrate's sentencing remarks, though the police prosecutor asserted that it was brought to the court's attention. Buttigieg denies that any prior offences were alleged before the Magistrate, claiming only one prior matter of driving at a dangerous speed was mentioned. The Magistrate sentenced Buttigieg to 14 days imprisonment, which was suspended upon him entering into a 12-month good behaviour bond. The Magistrate considered the offence serious, justifying a custodial sentence to deter Buttigieg and others from driving while disqualified. She deemed a community service order impractical due to Buttigieg's employment, without considering alternatives such as a fine or a simple bond.

The appeal in Buttigieg v the Police No. Scciv-03-1244 before Bleby J in the South Australian Supreme Court arises from a conviction and sentence imposed by the Magistrates Court. The appellant, Buttigieg, pleaded guilty to driving a motor vehicle whilst disqualified from holding a driver’s licence, an offence under section 91 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959. This incident occurred on 25 June 2003, just fourteen days before the end of a six-month disqualification period imposed on 8 January 2003. Buttigieg was sentenced to 14 days imprisonment, which was suspended upon the appellant entering into a 12-month good behaviour bond. The appeal against the sentence contests its severity, arguing it was manifestly excessive, and that alternatives such as a fine or simple bond should have been considered instead of imprisonment. The matter is an appeal against sentence and Bleby J's task is to assess whether the sentence was appropriate given the circumstances and the nature of the offence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Was the sentence imposed by the Magistrate manifestly excessive in all the circumstances?
2. Did the Magistrate adequately consider alternative forms of punishment such as a fine or a simple bond before imposing a suspended sentence of imprisonment?
3. Does the appellant's claim that he drove without thinking about the issues of disqualification negate the contumacious nature of the offence?
4. Did the Magistrate err in not finding the offence to be contumacious, and if so, does this impact the appropriateness of the penalty imposed?
5. Does the appellant's previous conviction for a similar offence within 12 months negate any suggestion of lack of contumacy and affect the penalty imposed?

Held
1. The court concluded that the sentence imposed by the Magistrate was not manifestly excessive in all the circumstances. The appeal against the sentence was dismissed.
2. The court concluded that the Magistrate did not adequately consider alternative forms of punishment such as a fine or a simple bond before imposing a suspended sentence of imprisonment.
3. The court concluded that the appellant's claim that he drove without thinking about the issues of disqualification does not negate the contumacious nature of the offence.
4. The court concluded that the Magistrate erred in not finding the offence to be contumacious, but this does not impact the appropriateness of the penalty imposed.
5. The court concluded that the appellant's previous conviction for a similar offence within 12 months negates any suggestion of lack of contumacy and does not affect the penalty imposed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the Magistrates Appeal case of Buttigieg v the Police, Bleby J considered the appellant's appeal against a sentence imposed for driving while disqualified. The Magistrate sentenced the appellant to 14 days imprisonment, suspended upon the appellant entering into a 12-month good behavior bond. The appellant argued that the sentence was manifestly excessive and that the Magistrate failed to adequately consider alternative forms of punishment. The appellant also argued that his claim of driving without considering the issues of disqualification negated the contumacious nature of the offence. Bleby J examined these issues, applying legal principles and authorities to determine the appropriateness of the penalty imposed.

First, Bleby J considered whether the sentence was manifestly excessive. The maximum penalty for a first offence of driving while disqualified is six months imprisonment, and for a subsequent offence, two years imprisonment. Bleby J noted that the Magistrate imposed a sentence within the normal range for a first offence and found that the order for suspension was appropriate. Bleby J also observed that the appellant had previously been convicted of a similar offence within 12 months, which negated any suggestion of lack of contumacy.

Second, Bleby J considered whether the Magistrate adequately considered alternative forms of punishment, such as a fine or a simple bond, before imposing a suspended sentence of imprisonment. The Magistrate did not specifically refer to these alternatives but found that a community service order was not practicable due to the appellant's employment. Bleby J held that the Magistrate's decision to impose a suspended sentence of imprisonment was appropriate, given the circumstances of the case.

Third, Bleby J examined the appellant's claim that he drove without thinking about the issues of disqualification. Bleby J disagreed with this claim, stating that the appellant must have realized that he should not drive, as he was nearing the end of his period of disqualification and had been unable to lawfully drive a motor vehicle for nearly six months. Bleby J concluded that the appellant's actions indicated an attitude of defiance, which is characteristic of contumacious offending.

Fourth, Bleby J considered whether the Magistrate erred in not finding the offence to be contumacious. Although the Magistrate did not make an express finding on this issue, Bleby J inferred from the circumstances disclosed that the offence was contumacious. Bleby J held that the Magistrate's failure to make an explicit finding did not impact the appropriateness of the penalty imposed.

Lastly, Bleby J considered whether the appellant's previous conviction for a similar offence within 12 months negated any suggestion of lack of contumacy and affected the penalty imposed. Bleby J found that this prior conviction did negate any suggestion of lack of contumacy and held that the penalty imposed was appropriate given the circumstances of the case.

In conclusion, Bleby J dismissed the appellant's appeal against sentence, finding that the penalty imposed was well within the normal range for a first offence and that the order for suspension was appropriate. The ratio decidendi of this case is that in cases of driving while disqualified, where the offence is found to be contumacious, the court may impose a penalty within the normal range for a first offence, even if the Magistrate does not explicitly find the offence to be contumacious. Furthermore, a previous conviction for a similar offence within 12 months may negate any suggestion of lack of contumacy and affect the penalty imposed.