[2010] QDC 191
DISTRICT COURT
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
JUDGE RICHARDS
| COMMISSIONER OF POLICE | Respondent(Plaintiff) |
| v. BRUCE ANTHONY BUTTIGIEG TOOWOOMBA ..DATE 21/04/2010 | Appellant(Defendant) |
| JUDGMENT |
1-1
HER HONOUR: On the 3rd of November 2009 the appellant, Bruce
| whilst disqualified with a blood alcohol reading of .083 on | 10 |
| the 6th of May 2007, driving whilst disqualified on the 8th of May 2007, and a failure to appear on the 20th of July 2007. | |
| The sentence that was imposed was 12 months' imprisonment for | |
| each of the disqualified driving offences, and one month's | 20 |
| imprisonment for the breach of bail undertaking which was cumulative on the 12 months' imprisonment. He was also sentenced to three months concurrent for the driving under the influence of alcohol. | |
| 30 | |
| The appellant had a bad traffic history, including 15 previous | |
| convictions for driving whilst disqualified, although those convictions dated back to 1986. And he was last before the Court on a disqualified driving on the 28th of June 2005. He | |
| had a history of drink driving as well, and it was | 40 |
| acknowledged at sentence that he had at the time a significant | |
| drinking problem. The appellant pleaded guilty to the | |
| charges. He had given up alcohol and had not re-offended for | |
| two and a-half years, aside from failure to appear. The basis | |
| of the appeal is that the Magistrate, in imposing a sentence | 50 |
| end of that sentence, did not comply with the Court of |
1
Anthony Buttigieg, was sentenced in the Toowoomba Magistrates
Court to an effective sentence of 13 months' imprisonment with
a Court-ordered parole release date fixed at the end of that
sentence. The offences for which he was sentenced were drive
| of 13 months' imprisonment with parole release date set at the that case the Court said at paragraph 17, "First, in a case | 1-2 | JUDGMENT | 60 |
1
such as this where the applicant has a claim upon the
discretion for an order that he be released after serving less
than half of the head sentence in view of his plea of guilty
and personal circumstances, a parole date, which is
| significantly beyond the mid point of the head sentence, is | 10 |
| very unusual (see R v Norton [2007] QCA 320 per Douglas J)." | |
| So much was not in contention in this application. If such an | |
| unusual order is to be made, in my opinion the duty to give | |
| reasons requires that the sentencing remarks explain the | 20 |
| process of reasoning underlying it. As was said in the joint | |
| judgment of Markarian v Queen [2005] 228 CLR 357, [2005] HCA | |
| 25 at paragraph 39, "Accessible reasoning is necessary in the | |
| interest of victims, of the parties, appeal Courts and the | |
| public." Such an explanation might be quite brief in many | 30 |
| cases, but here the reasons do not explain at all why the | |
| parole release date was postponed until after the midpoint of | |
| the sentence. There are decisions of this Court to the effect | |
| that a failure to give reasons that ought… |
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- Case
- [2010] QDC 191
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court needed to determine whether the Magistrate complied with the principles set forth in R v Norton and whether the failure to provide reasons for setting the parole release date beyond the midpoint of the sentence constituted an error. The court noted that the appellant had a history of drink driving and disqualified driving, but had also made efforts to address his alcohol problem by abstaining from alcohol entirely. The appellant was employed and had positive references attesting to his character and efforts to rehabilitate.
The court found that the Magistrate did not appropriately consider the principles in R v Norton and that the reasons for setting the parole release date beyond the midpoint of the sentence were insufficient. The Crown conceded that the Magistrate should have made some allowance for the appellant’s plea of guilty and his efforts at rehabilitation. The court emphasised the importance of accessible reasoning in sentencing, noting that the Magistrate should have provided an explanation for setting the parole release date beyond the midpoint. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the parole release date was altered to a point earlier than the midpoint of the sentence.
The final orders included setting aside the original sentence to the extent that the parole release date was altered. The court ordered that the appellant be released on parole in relation to the matters in question on the 21st of April 2001, and no order was made as to costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The court found that the Magistrate should have made some allowance for Buttigieg’s plea of guilty and his attempts at rehabilitation. The Crown conceded that the Magistrate did not heed the principles in Queen v Kitson, and that Buttigieg should have been given notice and the opportunity to be heard if a term of imprisonment without parole or with late parole was to be imposed. The appeal was allowed, and the original sentence was set aside to the extent that the parole release date was altered. Given the circumstances of Buttigieg's rehabilitation efforts and the fact that he had been alcohol-free since 2007, the court ordered his release on parole on 21 April 2010.
Bruce Anthony Buttigieg was sentenced in the Toowoomba Magistrates Court to an effective term of 13 months’ imprisonment with parole release set at the end of that term for various driving offences. This included driving while disqualified on multiple occasions, driving under the influence of alcohol, and failing to appear in court. The case came before the District Court in appellate jurisdiction on the grounds that the sentencing Magistrate did not comply with the principles set out in relevant case law when imposing the sentence. The appeal was based on the Magistrate's failure to adequately consider the principles in Queen v Kitson and provide sufficient reasoning for setting a parole release date significantly beyond the midpoint of the head sentence. The Crown conceded that the Magistrate should have called for submissions or given reasons for setting such a late parole release date. The District Court allowed the appeal, set aside the original sentence in part, and ordered that Buttigieg be released on parole on 21 April 2010. No order as to costs was made.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the Magistrate err in not setting a parole release date earlier than the midpoint of the sentence, in view of the appellant's plea of guilty, attempts at rehabilitation, and period of time between the offence and the sentence?
2. Was the failure to give reasons for the parole release date set beyond the midpoint of the sentence an appellable error?
3. Did the Magistrate breach the principles of natural justice by not giving the appellant adequate notice and opportunity to be heard before pronouncing the judicial order?
Held
1. The court concluded that the Magistrate erred in not setting a parole release date earlier than the midpoint of the sentence, considering the appellant's plea of guilty, attempts at rehabilitation, and period of time between the offence and the sentence. The result was that the appeal was allowed in part.
2. The court determined that the failure to give reasons for the parole release date set beyond the midpoint of the sentence was an appellable error. The appeal was allowed on this ground as well.
3. The court found that the Magistrate breached the principles of natural justice by not giving the appellant adequate notice and opportunity to be heard before pronouncing the judicial order. The result was that the appeal was allowed in part.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The District Court in Buttigieg v Commissioner of Police considered whether the Magistrate erred in setting the parole release date beyond the midpoint of the appellant's sentence. The court found that the Magistrate's decision to set the parole release date at the end of the sentence was indeed erroneous. The court relied on the principle that, in cases where the defendant has a claim for release after serving less than half of the head sentence due to their plea of guilty and personal circumstances, a parole date significantly beyond the midpoint is unusual. This principle was reinforced by the decision in R v Norton [2007] QCA 320, where Douglas J highlighted the unusualness of such an order.
The court noted that the appellant had a substantial history of offending, but had not re-offended for two and a half years before his sentencing. The Crown conceded that the Magistrate did not adequately consider the principles set out in Queen v Kitson and should have made some allowance for the appellant's plea of guilty, attempts at rehabilitation, and the period between the offence and the sentence. The court agreed that the Magistrate should have called for submissions if he intended to impose a term of imprisonment without parole or with late parole, as noted in paragraph 22 of Kitson. The court concluded that, given the appellant's efforts to address his alcohol problem and his employment status, a parole release date earlier than the midpoint of the sentence was appropriate.
The court also addressed whether the failure to give reasons for setting the parole release date beyond the midpoint constituted an appellable error. The court referenced the decision in Markarian v Queen [2005] 228 CLR 357, which emphasized the necessity of accessible reasoning in sentencing. The court found that the sentencing remarks did not explain the reasoning behind setting the parole release date beyond the midpoint, and that this failure to give reasons amounted to an appellable error. The court cited previous decisions affirming that a failure to give reasons that ought to have been given amounts to such an error.
Additionally, the court examined whether the Magistrate breached the principles of natural justice by not giving the appellant adequate notice and opportunity to be heard before pronouncing the judicial order. The court reiterated the principle from In re Hamilton; In re Forest [1981] AC 1038 that a person is entitled to adequate notice and opportunity to be heard before any judicial order is pronounced against them. This principle, known as audi alteram partem, applies to all judicial proceedings unless expressly excluded by Parliament. The court found that the appellant was not given adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, thus breaching the principles of natural justice.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of this decision is that a parole release date significantly beyond the midpoint of the sentence is unusual in cases where the defendant has a claim for early release due to their plea of guilty and personal circumstances. The court also established that a failure to provide adequate reasons for setting such a date constitutes an appellable error and that not giving the defendant notice and opportunity to be heard before pronouncing the judicial order breaches the principles of natural justice.