BUTIN & SONNER
[2011] FamCA 96
•25 JANUARY 2011
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BUTIN & SONNER | [2011] FamCA 96 |
| CHILDREN - Best interests CHILDREN - Equal time CHILDREN - Substantial and significant time CHILDREN - Parental responsibility - Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility CHILDREN - With whom a child lives - Best interests of child |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) |
| M & M (1988) FLC 91-979 |
| APPLICANT: | Ms Butin |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Sonner |
| INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Westminster Lawyers |
| FILE NUMBER: | MLC | 1546 | of | 2007 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 25 JANUARY 2011 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Melbourne |
| PLACE HEARD: | Melbourne |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Dessau J |
| HEARING DATE: | 29 & 30 November 2010, 1-3 December 2010, & 9 December 2010 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | MR Hall |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Perry Weston |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Ms Wheeler |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Ballards |
| COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Ms Carter |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Westminster Lawyers |
Orders
The child S born … November 2006 shall live with the mother.
Parental Responsibility
The mother shall have sole parental responsibility for S.
The mother shall keep the father informed, in writing, of her proposals regarding S’s education, and non-urgent serious medical treatment. The father shall be at liberty to provide his written response to the mother’s proposals within seven days, and the mother shall use her best endeavors to take the father’s response into account regarding the child’s health and education.
The mother shall advise the father, in writing, as to the day-care/kindergarten/school in which she has enrolled the child within seven days of doing so, and she shall advise him forthwith of any serious urgent medical treatment received or required by S.
The mother be and is hereby restrained by herself, her servants or agents from taking or allowing any other person to take S for any medical examination or any therapeutic intervention by any medical practitioner, psychologist, social worker, counselor or like professional which relates in any way to an allegation S has been abused (sexually, physically or emotionally) by the father or by any other person when in his care, save pursuant to a request from a protective worker employed by the Department of Human Services in Victoria or a member of a State or Territory police force or by order of the Court.
Time with the Father
S shall spend time with the father as follows:
6.1.Each Wednesday and Sunday for a period of four hours, from 1pm to 5pm for a period of four weeks starting 30 January 2011;
6.2.For a period of a further eight weeks:
6.2.1Each Wednesday from 9.30am until 5pm commencing 2 March 2011; and
6.2.2On either Saturday or Sunday in each week, from 9.30am until 5pm as directed by GordonCare commencing on either 5 or 6 March 2011.
6.3.Each alternate week-end, from 9am Saturday to 5pm Sunday for a period of eight weeks;
6.4.Thereafter, each alternate week-end from 5pm Friday to 5pm Sunday;
6.5.For the first five nights of the September 2011 term holiday period, commencing from 5pm until 5pm on the day after the fifth night;
6.6.Subject to paragraphs 11 and 12, for one five-night period in the first half and one five-night period in the second half of the 2011/2012 long summer holidays, specified by the mother to the father by the end of the first week of the 2011 Term 4, to commence at 5pm on the first night and conclude at 5pm on the day after the fifth night.
6.7.Upon S commencing school in 2012:
6.7.1During term time, from the conclusion of school each alternate Friday to the commencement of school on Monday starting on the first week-end after school commences;
6.7.2For the first week in each of the term holiday periods commencing at the conclusion of school on the last day of term, and concluding at 5pm on the day after the seventh night;
6.7.3Subject to paragraphs 11 and 12, for one half of the 2012/2013 long summer holidays and thereafter, for the first half starting from the conclusion of school in even numbered years and the second half in odd numbered years.
During all school holiday periods from the September 2011 term holiday and thereafter, the father’s alternate week-end time with S shall be suspended, and resume on the first week-end after school commences.
For the first four occasions that S spends with the father, he shall ensure that the paternal grandmother shall be in substantial attendance.
Unless otherwise agreed between the parents in writing, all changeovers not at S’s day-care, kindergarten or school shall take place at a children’s contact service (with changeovers currently occurring at GordonCare Children’s Contact Service, M) with the parents to share equally the costs associated with same, and the parents shall forthwith do all acts and things as may be necessary to arrange GordonCare Children’s Contact Service, at W as the venue for changeovers as soon as a place becomes available there.
The father shall advise the mother forthwith in the event that S requires any urgent medical treatment whilst in his care.
Special Occasions
S shall spend time with the father for Christmas:
11.1 From 2pm to 6pm on 25 December 2011;
11.2Commencing 2012 and in each alternate year thereafter, from 4pm Christmas Day to 4pm Boxing Day;
11.3Commencing 2013 and in each alternate year thereafter, from 4pm on 24 December to 4pm Christmas Day.
S shall spend time with the mother for Christmas:
12.1 On 25 December 2011, subject to paragraph 10.1 above:
12.2Commencing 2012, and in each alternate year thereafter, from 4pm on 24 December to 4pm Christmas Day;
12.3Commencing 2013 and in each alternate year thereafter, from 4pm Christmas Day until 4pm Boxing Day.
In the event S is not otherwise with her father on Father’s Day, she shall spend time with him from 5pm on the evening prior to Father’s Day to 5pm Father’s Day.
In the event S is not otherwise with her mother on Mother’s Day, her week-end time with the father shall conclude at 5pm on the evening prior to Mother’s Day.
S shall spend time with the parent who is not caring for her on her birthday for not less than two hours, at times agreed, and failing agreement, from 3.30pm to 5.30pm.
Communication between the parents
The parents shall communicate via a communications book, with only child-focused communications to be contained in the book.
Counselling and Courses
The parents shall forthwith do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as requested by the ICL to enquire about enrolment in a program with Family Transitions or if such course is unavailable or either parent cannot afford the fees charged, then with the Australian Childhood Foundation.
School
As soon as practicable the mother shall authorise the principal/director of the day-care/kindergarten/school attended by S to provide to the father at his request and his expense, if any, by ordinary mail, copies of :
18.1.each order form for school photos of the child;
18.2.each newsletter and notice; and
18.3.each school report for the child.
The father shall be at liberty to attend S’s day-care/kindergarten/school to attend functions to which parents are routinely invited when S is in his care, to the exclusion of the mother, and to arrange his own parent-teacher interviews at a time different from the mother’s interview. Otherwise he shall not attend such functions.
That pursuant to s 65DA(2) and s 62B, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders and details of who can assist parties adjust to and comply with an order are set out in the Fact Sheet attached hereto and these particulars are included in these orders.
The ICL
That the ICL shall be discharged at the expiration of three months from the date of these orders.
That the ICL shall arrange for a copy of these Reasons for Judgment to be forwarded to the Department of Human Services, Ms C, Mr M , and either or both of Family Transitions and the Australian Childhood Foundation, if the parents or either of them is enrolled in a program in the organization.
All applications shall otherwise be dismissed and removed from the list of cases awaiting finalization.
That pursuant to the Family Law Rules this matter reasonably required the attendance of counsel.
That the copies of the file of Mr M, counsellor, be returned to the mother’s solicitors as soon as practicable to be destroyed, and pending their return each party shall be restrained from copying or distributing same.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Butin & Sonner is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
FILE NUMBER: MLC 1546 of 2007
| Ms Butin |
Applicant
And
| Mr Sonner |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
S is just four. Her parents have litigated over her throughout most of her life, and even before she was born. The first round of litigation ended with final orders in the Federal Magistrates’ Court on 21 May 2008, providing for S to continue living with her mother, and to spend gradually increasing time with her father.
By August 2009 things had gone off the rails. After a period of several months again in the Federal Magistrates Court, the case was sent to this Court as part of the Magellan case management program, because of the serious allegations the mother made of sexual abuse of S in her father’s care.
Mr Sonner has always denied the allegations. He seeks an order for S to live with him, for her to be spared what he says are the mother’s deliberately false allegations, and for her to be permitted to have a meaningful relationship with him, something he says will never be possible if she continues to live in the mothers’ household.
The mother wants S to continue living with her, her step-father, and her little half-siblings, in a home where she is happy, settled and secure. She says that, as some experts have recently proposed alternative theses as to why S has acted in a sexualised way and disclosed sexual abuse, she is prepared to accept that the father should see his daughter on a regular unsupervised basis.
The Independent Children’s Lawyer supports S staying with her mother, her primary attachment figure, but spending time with her father on an unsupervised basis. The ICL also supports the mother having the sole parental responsibility for decisions about S’s education and health, given the degree of conflict and the lack of communication between the parents.
What that brief summary fails to portray is an unenviably difficult start to the parties’ parenting relationship, the mutual distrust between them, some shabby behaviour on both sides, heartache for both, and the entrenched negativity between them. These are some of the things that need to be explored in detail in an effort to determine the arrangements that will now serve S’s best interests.
BACKGROUND
The father is Mr Sonner. He was born in 1965 and is aged 45. He lives in F, and works part-time as a handyman. He has a son, L, who is nearly 16. The father has raised him alone since he separated from L’s mother when L was a baby. She has not been involved in his life since then.
S’s mother is Ms Butin. She was born in 1974 and is aged 36. She lives in V and is engaged in home duties. Since July 2007, she has been married to Mr B. They have two children, J who is three, and K who is almost one.
The parents’ evidence differs markedly as to how their relationship started. The mother’s account is that she and the father knew each other as neighbours but never had a relationship as a couple. She says they had sex only once, after she had consumed alcohol, and that she only realised what had occurred when she woke up the following morning. The father’s account is that they were in a relationship for about four months, during which the mother became pregnant.
I have no doubt that the father’s version is the more accurate one. It was well supported by other evidence, including a letter written to him by the mother which denoted a fledgling, albeit unsuccessful relationship. It was supported by text messages sent by her to him, quoted by him in his affidavit. It was supported by the fact that they sought counselling together. It was supported by evidence of several social outings between them, and by the fact that the father took the mother to hospital after a motor bike accident, when she was already pregnant. It was also supported by the fact that the mother had every motive to down-play the relationship with the father, as it overlapped with the start of her relationship with Mr Butin.
She denied that she had ever claimed to have been raped by the father. The notes of her maternal health care nurse record that she had said so. She said the notes were wrong. The nurse was not called, so I cannot make a definitive finding about that. I do note however that, even in this Court, the mother at the very least gave the impression that she did not intend to participate in sexual intercourse with the father. Her version was of the father coming to her home with alcohol for her, and of her waking up after the event. It was telling that her husband said he believed that the alcohol could have been “spiked”.
The false impression that the mother has given of this sexual encounter with the father must have caused him enormous frustration, as did the fact that their relationship did not progress as he hoped, and in the early months of the first round of litigation, she did not even accept that he was S’s father.
On the other hand, the mother has had her own frustrations. She found herself in the terrible predicament of an unplanned pregnancy, to a man with whom she had little in common, after a very short-term relationship, and at a time when she was beginning to develop a serious affection for the man she would ultimately marry.
I am conscious that relationships do not always start or finish according to the neat timelines preferred in affidavits and evidence. Real life is often more complicated. The circumstances surrounding S’s conception are not important to me in terms of judging the parents’ morality. They are important in that they highlight the anguish for the mother of falling pregnant to a man with whom she felt she had little in common, the anguish for the father of his failure to persuade her to develop the relationship with him that he wanted, and the enormous difficulties for them in thereafter parenting a child together, and being bound together in that task when, on any view, they came off the low base of only the briefest relationship.
S was born in November 2006. At birth, she was registered as taking her mother’s maiden name. On 27 May 2007, her mother changed S’s surname to Butin. That was just prior to marrying Mr Butin in July 2007. On 21 May 2008 McGuire FM ordered that the child’s name be changed to Sonner-Butin. Since 28 August 2008, S’s name has been registered as S Sonner-Butin. Whether she has used that surname, rather than just Butin, is part of the evidence I shall consider below.
A brief summary of the litigation, the limited time the father has been able to spend with S, his criticisms of the mother, and her complaints about his care, provide essential context in this case. I shall return to the detail of allegations below. I note at the outset there are aspects that reflect poorly on both parents. The father pursued insensitive applications and unreasonable criticisms of the mother’s parenting, which contributed to her loss of confidence in him. The mother in return thought only the worst of the father, which led to persistent obstacles in the way of his time with S.
In the midst of all that, the mother got married and gave birth to two children, (one is still just an infant), there were on-going arguments about paternity testing, fights over S’s surname, various intervention order proceedings, and a couple of admissions to hospital for S for unrelated health issues.
MATERIAL RELIED UPON AND ORDERS SOUGHT
The mother relied upon the following documents:
·Her Amended Initiating Application filed 27 September 2010
·Her affidavit sworn 23 September 2010 filed 27 September 2010
·Affidavit of Mr Butin sworn 4 November 2010 filed 5 November 2010
·Affidavit of Mr M sworn and filed 5 November 2010
The father relied upon the following documents:
·His Further Amended Response to Initiating Application filed 17 Nov 2010
·His affidavit sworn 9 November 2010 filed 10 November 2010
·His affidavit sworn and filed 22 October 2010
·His affidavit sworn 11 December 2009 filed 15 December 2009
·His affidavit sworn 12 August 2009 filed 14 August 2009
·His affidavit sworn 8 April 2009 filed 9 April 2009
·His affidavit sworn 20 September 2007 field 21 September 2007
·Affidavit of the paternal grandmother sworn 13 August 2010 filed 18 August 2010
·Affidavit of the paternal grandmother sworn 13 July 2010 filed 14 July 2010
·Affidavit of the paternal grandmother sworn 9 December 2009 filed 15 December 2009
·Affidavit of Mr G sworn 7 November 2010 filed 10 November 2010
·Affidavit of Mr H sworn 8 November 2010 filed 10 November 2010
·Affidavit of Mr N sworn 16 November 2010 filed 18 November 2010
·Family Report Mr E dated 15 April 2008
The witnesses; the maternal grandmother, Mr G, Mr H and Mr N were not required for cross-examination.
The ICL relied upon:
·Family Report of Ms D dated 31 May 2010
·Psychiatric assessment of the mother and the father prepared by Dr O dated 8 October 2010
RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Section 60B(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 sets out the objects of Part VII of the Act, to ensure the best interests of children are met by:
(a)ensuring that children have the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child; and
(b)protecting children from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence; and
(c)ensuring that children receive adequate and proper parenting to help them achieve their full potential; and
(d)ensuring that parents fulfil their duties, and meet their responsibilities, concerning the care, welfare and development of their children.
Section 60B(2) sets out the principles underlying those objects. They are that (except when it is or would be contrary to a child’s best interests):
(a)children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents, regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together; and
(b)children have a right to spend time on a regular basis with, and communicate on a regular basis with, both their parents and other people significant to their care, welfare and development (such as grandparents and other relatives); and
(c)parents jointly share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children; and
(d)parents should agree about the future parenting of their children; and
(e)children have a right to enjoy their culture (including the right to enjoy that culture with other people who share that culture).
In deciding a particular parenting order the best interests of the child is the paramount consideration (s 60CA). Section 60CC(2) and (3) set out the primary and additional considerations for the Court in determining what is in the child’s best interests. I will return to the detail below.
Section 60CC(4) provides that the Court must consider the extent to which each of the child’s parents has fulfilled or failed to fulfil his or her responsibilities as a parent, and the Court must have regard in particular to events that have happened and circumstances that have existed since separation (see s 60CC(4A)).
There is a presumption that it is in the child’s best interests for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility (s 61DA). The presumption relates to the allocation of parental responsibility. It does not relate to the time the child spends with each parent. The presumption does not apply if there are reasonable grounds to believe a parent has abused the child or engaged in family violence, and if it does apply, it can be rebutted if the Court is satisfied it is not in the child’s best interests.
If there is an order for equal shared parental responsibility, the Court is then obliged to consider whether the child should spend equal time with each parent (see s65DAA) or substantial and significant time (see s 65DAA (2)).
The “reasonable practicability” of the orders must be considered, including the parents’ capacity to communicate with each other (see 65DAA(5))
A central issue in this case was the allegation of sexual abuse. The High Court made it clear in M and M (1988) FLC 91-979 that when the proceedings involve an allegation that a child has been sexually abused by a parent, it does not alter the paramount and ultimate issue for the court, of the child’s best interests. The Court went on to consider the magnitude of the risk which would justify a court in denying a parent access (as it then was) to a child and concluded that the test was best expressed:
....by saying that a court will not grant custody or access to a parent if that custody or access would expose the child to an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse.
The way this case was ultimately run, I was not asked to find that S faced an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse in her father’s care.
THE ISSUES
It is convenient to consider the issues under the umbrella of the s 60CC factors. I will first consider the primary considerations under s 60CC(2).
(a)the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents
Ms D, who prepared the Family Report, concluded that despite the turmoil and conflict between the parents, S still needs a meaningful relationship with both of her parents. Each parent claimed to agree with that. Each gave me reason to doubt them.
In the mothers’ case, almost every time the father’s relationship was to move to a more involved level, she brought forth a complaint or an obstacle.
In the father’s case, he had made his disdain of the mother and her role in S’s life obvious, with some poorly-timed and ill-conceived applications for S to live with him or spend very substantial times with him when just a baby, and through his incapacity to admit anything substantially good about the parenting skills of the mother, whom he frequently referred to as “that woman” in the course of the evidence.
It is necessary to consider these things in further detail below.
(b)the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence
The mother says there is a need to protect S from family violence. The one incident she detailed purportedly occurred on 24 August 2008 at a change-over. She alleged that while she was holding S, the father was pushing and pinching her from behind and trying to put a note down her top. She said she effectively felt pinned against the car door as she was trying to put S in the car.
The father’s account was that the mother was refusing to take a note about S that he needed to hand to her. He said she threw it on the ground. He said he picked it up and as she walked away holding the child, he put the note in S’s hand.
I am not satisfied that the evidence is of a nature to suggest any on-going issue of physical violence. It seems far more reflective of a dynamic whereby, unfortunately, S has been caught in the middle of conflict.
There is no excuse for physical confrontation. And, certainly the father’s note was not in the communication book as it probably should have been. Nevertheless, the note could have been accepted and the trauma for S avoided. The scene that developed was an unfortunate one.
Both the mother and her husband referred to feeling threatened at times by the father. They pointed to a letter (Exhibit M3) received from the father in May 2006, very early in the pregnancy. In it, he was trying to persuade the mother to pursue an on-going relationship with him, and pleading with her not to terminate the pregnancy, a course that in counselling she had said she was considering. The letter was heartfelt and the stress of the situation apparent. Still, a comment towards the end that:
…there will be consequences beyond your wildest dreams if u [sic] do this to me…
was intemperate, and provided a graphic illustration of why the mother and her husband perceived the father as a threat, even though he claimed an innocent interpretation.
There has been a history of intervention order proceedings between the parents.
On 10 July 2006 the mother obtained an interim intervention order against the father. It was not extended. She filed a further application on 3 November 2006, and received an interim order. The father voluntarily entered an undertaking on 13 December 2006 for 12 months, which he says was in exchange for the mother agreeing to DNA testing.
The mother filed a further application on 19 February 2007, and alleged the father had breached his undertaking. On 28 February 2007, the father was found to have breached the undertaking and an intervention order was made against him. The father appealed the order in the County Court on 5 June 2007. Ultimately the mother consented to the setting aside of the order on the basis of another undertaking by the father, for 12 months, without admission.
On 25 August 2008, the mother obtained an ex parte interim Intervention Order. She did not proceed then with her complaint. However on 5 September 2008 there was a hearing of the mother’s application at a Magistrates Court. The mother did not attend. She said that was because she had advised the father and the Court that she had withdrawn her application. He attended and obtained a costs order against her. He also sought an Intervention Order against the mother which was ultimately dismissed after a hearing.
The history of intervention order proceedings cannot lead me to conclude that the father has been guilty of on-going violence. I am satisfied though that the mother has felt anxious and besieged by a combination of criticisms, threats, and on-going litigation, leaving her feeling that the father would not be satisfied until S lives with him. For present purposes, the various intervention order proceedings are indicative not of violence so much as serious on-going conflict between the parties.
There have been concerns expressed by the mother as to the father’s level of care for S. In my view they do not amount to allegations of neglect or abuse, and can be considered below in terms of his parenting capacity.
Obviously the major protective issue that has been raised over the last 18 months to two years revolves around the sexual abuse allegations.
At the start of this hearing, counsel for the mother said that the mother accepted that S was “not deemed to be at physical risk with the father”. She accepted that since her trial affidavit was filed, the police had decided not to charge the father due to inconclusive evidence, and forensic psychiatrist Dr O posited an alternative explanation for S’s sexualised behaviour and disclosures, to the effect that the mother and her husband’s anxiety may well have fed and led to those behaviours.
The cross-examination of the mother made it very difficult to accept that she had moved away from the sexual abuse allegations, at least to the extent expressed on her behalf. I shall return to that when considering her capacity to facilitate a relationship between S and her father. For present purposes, I proceed on the basis that no-one argued before me that there is an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse of S in her father’s care.
The need to protect S from emotional abuse however is high. The concern is that it arises in both households.
I am satisfied in particular that there is significant conflict between the parents. Ms D described it as a “very high conflict family”. The expert evidence overwhelmingly pointed to the conflict between the parents, the distrust between them, and their incapacity to communicate at all. So did the non-expert evidence.
The father’s claim that there was no such conflict was contrary to all the evidence. He was most likely worried that, if accepted, it would be a contra-indication to shared parental responsibility and shared living arrangements. I am satisfied that his denial of conflict was unrealistic, and that he gave conflict a very limited definition, ignoring that it goes well beyond open fighting in front of a child.
I am satisfied that S was exposed to unfortunate incidents and behaviour, by-products of her parents’ conflict, including people on her mother’s side videoing some contact change-overs, and then the father’s side photographing the mother’s side videoing the change-overs. Each parent has checked or charted her body, for example for bites and bruises. They argued over toilet-training, and the communication book shows frosty transactions.
In addition, S has been hospitalised twice (in October 2008, for surgery to remove a lymph node, and in December 2008, when unwell with a high fever). Accounts differ as to what happened when the parents were both at the hospital. I am satisfied though that there was conflict. On the father’s version, any conflict at S’s bedside was brought about by the mother trying to stop his involvement. On the mother’s account, the father was bombastically interfering, attending hospital inappropriately just before S’s surgery, and not just with L but with two other people as well. The upshot was that for S, just two years old, the tension of hospital was compounded by conflict. At a time when she needed to be surrounded by calm and reassurance, she had to endure tension, tussles, and security guards.
I note too that the father was critical that the mother tried to curb the time he was due to spend with S immediately upon her release from hospital after the lymph node surgery. In the event, his time went ahead. I am not critical of the mother for what was probably a natural anxiety on her part to be with her infant daughter upon her release from hospital. The parents were so polarised that the father could not entertain – let alone respect – her perspective, only his own desire to be with S.
The disrespect between the parents was palpable. That said, at least the mother was able to acknowledge some positive attributes that the father could bring to parenting S. The father was unable to reciprocate. In fairness to him, from his perspective he has been consistently marginalised from his daughter’s life, and has had the ugliest allegations made against him so that his relationship with her has never been permitted to fully develop, only for him to find at the start of the case, that the mother purportedly no longer relied on those allegations. Still, the most he could volunteer as to the mother’s parenting was effectively that she was “not starving” S. It was unfair, unrealistic and unkind.
Each parent’s behaviour and attitude to the other parent will be explored further. For present purposes I note that the need to protect S from conflict will be a very significant consideration for me in this case.
(a)any views expressed by the child and any factors (such as the child’s maturity or level of understanding) that the court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child’s views
(b)the nature of the relationship of the child with:
(i) each of the child’s parents; and
(ii) other persons (including any grandparent or other relative of the child)
Throughout the proceedings, the mother said that it was frequently very difficult to get S to spend time with her father. She described constantly needing to coax her to go. Her account was supported by her husband. They described a little girl who was often distressed and had to be persuaded to see her father.
The fact that they now say she should be having regular unsupervised time with her father suggests that either their evidence about her distress was untrue or exaggerated, or they now understand that their own anxiety was adversely affecting her. I shall come back to that, but I note they both said that for the one period at GordonCare that occurred on the week-end before the case started, S was not particularly unhappy beforehand, and she returned happily enough at the end.
S is of course too young for anyone to seek her direct views. The Family Consultant Ms D did make observations though of S with her mother, step-father and little half-sister on the one hand, and her father, older half-brother, and paternal grandmother on the other hand.
Ms D described S as “extremely comfortable and confident” in the presence of her mother, step-father and little J, and that she was “quite vocal” throughout the observation. She interacted well with both her mother and step-father, and appeared equally “calm and content” in the company of both.
Ms D observed S as appearing “somewhat uncomfortable” at the start of the time with her father and paternal grandmother. She initially stood close to her grandmother and took a brief moment to warm to her father’s interaction. During the observation she appeared to “relax more” so that she then “freely interacted” with her father. Although S smiled throughout her time with her father, Ms D noted her as “markedly less vocal” in her interactions with him. As time progressed she was more at ease and ran around laughing. Although she began to speak “sporadically”, she continued to remain “significantly less vocal” than with her maternal family. She did not sit still or settle during the observation.
Ms D also saw S with her half-brother L. She said he played appropriately with S, although she spoke in whispers only. Again she was less vocal than in previous observations, responding to him with either head gestures or whispers. Although she took time to warm up, she soon relaxed into interactive play with him.
Ms D reported:
[The father] collected [L] and said hello to [S], she appeared somewhat confused by his presence and initially appeared to attempt to move away, however remained with her father and sat on his lap contentedly while he hugged her hello. When saying goodbye [S] turned her face instead of kissing her father and then moved quickly to stand against the Consultant’s leg as they said goodbye, she appeared somewhat anxious/apprehensive and the childcare staff took her hand to lead her to [sic] away to play.
In his evidence, the father said he was unhappy about Ms D’s report, as biased against him. I found Ms D’s report and her evidence to be professional and well-balanced. She readily acknowledged in both her report and her evidence that S had fallen over just shortly before seeing her father and had been upset. She acknowledged that it could have impacted on her response to her father, and she acknowledged that S had been with her mother before the interviews, which also could have affected her response to her father.
Although Ms D expressed a concern in the Family Report about a high probability of sexual abuse or related trauma, she had not reached a concluded view, and in fact, described the reliability of the allegations as “somewhat unclear”, and emphasised the impact on S’s behaviour of her parents’ dysfunctional relationship. When questioned about her professional opinions, in light of the additional material from the police and Dr O, Ms D readily concluded that S should be spending unsupervised time with her father. It was not the stance of a biased witness.
There was nothing in the evidence to suggest that S is other than strongly and primarily attached to her mother, with strong attachments to her step-father and half-siblings. The father was not really able to deny that, although at one point he referred to S as potentially “lonely” and lacking love in that household. He also significantly down-played the extent of S’s bonds in terms of the relatively short-term impact on S, as he saw it, of a change in her residence.
There was also nothing in the evidence to persuade me that S had other than a good base for the development of a strong and loving relationship with her father, despite the many interruptions their relationship has faced this far.
It seems that S is not only very close to her little half-siblings, J and K, but she also has a raft of close relatives and extended family on her mother and step-father’s sides.
On her father’s side, she has her half-brother L. Although she seems to have a good relationship with him, it is naturally qualitatively different from the relationship she has with her other half-siblings, with whom she has been raised, and who are close to her in age.
She appears to have a good relationship with relatives on her father’s side, most particularly her paternal grandmother. The mother gave evidence that S enjoys spending time with her paternal grandmother.
(c)the willingness and ability of each of the child’s parents to facilitate, and encourage, a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other parent
As the mother’s case is no longer being run on the basis that there is an unacceptable risk to S of sexual abuse in her father’s care, it would not serve the parents well for me to recite every detail of alleged abuse. However, to overlook what has occurred would be to ignore genuine obstacles that have interrupted the relationship between father and daughter, and understandably embittered the father. It is necessary to look to some of the detail in assessing the mother’s capacity to facilitate S’s relationship with her father. Similarly, some of the detail of the on-going applications brought by the father must be considered when it comes to his capacity to facilitate S’s relationship with her mother.
At the outset, I put to one side – as reasonable – the mother’s efforts in the early days of S’s life to limit the father’s time with S to short periods. Similarly, I do not criticise her for what was a very detailed list of instructions sent on 21 October 2007, when the father was first starting to spend time alone with the child. It was probably unnecessary when he was only to spend a few hours with her, supervised at a restaurant. He no doubt perceived it as controlling and interfering. However, it was consistent with the anxiety and concern of a protective first-time mother, who was sending her 11-month-old to spend time with someone the infant did not know at all, and even the mother herself did not know well and certainly did not trust.
The fact is however that it has to be more than coincidental that a number of times, when S’s time with her father was about to increase, the mother made complaints about his care. The major examples are as follows.
The first supervised visit occurred on 21 October 2007, supervised by the mother’s sister-in-law, Ms P. The very next day the mother took S to her GP, querying the appearance of the child’s vagina. The mother said the appointment had already been made as the maternal health nurse was concerned that S had a “fused labia”. However, at the same time, the mother complained to the doctor that her sister-in-law had described the father as “uninterested” in S the previous day, and that L was “overly affectionate” and was “smothering and kissing S all the time”. Even if these were issues raised with the mother by her sister-in-law, they were evidently not regarded as sufficiently serious for her sister-in-law to write them with her other comments in the Communication Book, in which there was no suggestion the visit went badly.
The mother’s GP then made the first notification to DHS, the substance of which was that 13-year-old L was “overly affectionate” towards S and may have received “gratification” from it. DHS closed the notification at intake on 2 November 2007.
Meanwhile, on 25 October 2007, within four days’ of that first visit, the mother filed an interim application seeking a suspension or discharge of the existing orders on the basis the father had fed the child a chilli chip at the first contact. In evidence, the mother said she also sought supervision at a contact centre because her sister-in-law had felt “intimidated” at the first visit and was no longer prepared to supervise.
Orders were made for the time to occur at a contact centre. After eight visits, the ICL arranged for unsupervised time. The first occasion was on 12 March 2008. After the second visit, on 19 March 2008, the mother stopped unsupervised time because she said the father was drunk and the child smelled of cigarette smoke.
On 21 May 2008, the final orders were made for S to spend time with her father. The first visit was that day. The next day a notification was made to DHS. The basis of the notification appears to be that the father was not providing proper care for S and that he had an “obsession” with her medical care. The mother said that she did not make the call, but admitted that she definitely expressed the concerns that were reported to DHS. Like the first notification, DHS closed this notification at the intake stage, on 28 May 2008.
Two days before the file was closed however, the mother had contacted DHS to report that S had returned from access with a bite mark on her finger. The father had said it was a bite from a kitten in a pet shop. He had taken her to the doctor and she had antibiotics. In evidence, the mother conceded that the father had acted protectively. However, at the time, she told DHS that her concern was that S had been bitten by a dangerous dog, the father owning such a dog, according to what she said. She sought advice as to whether to stop “access”. She took the child to her own GP to check about the bite.
On 9 July 2008, S’s time with her father was extended from four hours to six hours twice weekly. On 6 August 2008, a third notification was made to DHS, the mother alleging that the father had refused to return S, and that when he did so he was drunk while caring for her, was driving while drunk, and that S was returned with bruising on her legs. Again she took S to her own doctor for her bruises to be checked. That was on 12 August 2008. The doctor told her the bruises were probably due to minor, accidental falls. DHS also closed that file at intake (on 27 August 2008).
On 24 August 2008, the mother alleged the assault that I have referred to above. The next day, she started Intervention Order proceedings. She later withdrew the complaint, it seems because she was told the father had a witness who would say there was no assault.
Overnight time with the father started on 8 November 2008. On 10 January 2009, S’s extended week-end time with her father started, from 10am Saturday to 6pm Sunday each alternate week-end. On 9 February 2009, after the second week-end, a fourth notification was made to DHS, regarding the child’s “inflamed vagina” as a possible indication of sexual abuse. The notification was apparently made by the maternal grandmother. The mother said that she had no idea her mother was making the complaint. That is hard to believe. In any event that complaint was also closed at intake, on 27 February 2009.
Between 9 and 12 April 2009, the father had S for the extended Easter period. The mother and her husband describe an on-going problem escalating over the weeks after that, with S masturbating, being “scared of the scary man” in her bedroom, and referring to a man with a towel who made her scream on her bed.
On 10 July 2009, S spent the first three-day week-end with her father from 8am Friday until 6pm Sunday. The mother claimed that she was extremely unsettled upon return, would not be touched, was pulling her hair out, was refusing to use the toilet, was exhibiting sexualised behaviours, and was angry with her mother. She said that the following day S made disclosures to her that “I can’t scream mummy”, indicating a hand over her mouth. She was “scared of the man”. She said “my mutti [her word for vagina] is sore”. She said “The man touched me there” and that “He holds me tight. I can’t move I can’t scream mummy.”
The mother said that she rang her counsellor, Mr M, who sent her to her GP, from where she was referred to the Royal Children’s Hospital, then to the Gatehouse Centre, and DHS was notified. S was forensically examined, with no findings of note. She was interviewed by police, but said nothing. The mother immediately stopped the father spending time with S.
According to the mother and her husband, S’s disclosures escalated. The mother said that on 11 August 2009 S told her that the scary man was “[T]”, the father’s nephew.
On 3 September 2009, DHS arranged supervised time between S and her father. On 7 September, Phipps FM suspended previous orders but put in place time supervised by the father’s mother for four hours’ per week.
On 5 October 2009, S told a DHS worker that her father was the “scary man” and that he “hurts her”. She was questioned further by the DHS worker on 12 October 2009, and she said that “[her name for her father]” hurt her. She was observed to put her hand over her mouth and then her genital area and said “my mutti”. In November 2009, DHS closed the file on the basis that the sexual abuse allegations were not substantiated.
On 11 December 2009, Brown J made interim orders for the father to spend four hours with S, twice per week, supervised by the paternal grandmother.
On 23 May 2010 the mother told the Victoria Police SOCA Unit that S had made further disclosures including that she had to take off all her clothes when she went to bed at her father’s house, that he took photos of her in her pony underpants and put them with other girls’ naked photos on the computer. On 24 May 2010 the police interviewed S. She made no disclosures. She was reluctant to speak, but did say that she did not like her father and did not want to visit him.
The mother claimed that on 20 June 2010, after S returned from time with her father that had been supervised by her paternal grandmother, she put her fingers in J’s vagina when both girls were in the bath. The mother said that S told her that Q, (her father’s brother-in-law) “touches her there”. Later she appeared to masturbate and said that “[Q] touches my mutti and does this”, indicating touching her face and her hair and then touching her legs and the mother’s face. According to the mother, S later said that Q “puts his pee-pee (her word for “penis”) in her mouth and “it spits at her, with pink and purple” and that “his pee-pee squirting out lots of times, tissues and white and it hurts”. She said she did not like Q and told her mother it had happened that day, with her grandmother outside.
S was again interviewed by police on 22 June 2010, and made a partial disclosure that “[Q] put his pee-pee in my mouth” but she would not say anything further. The father’s time with S stopped then.
On 23 June 2010, S’s pre-school teacher notified DHS that the previous day, the mother had told him that S had been “sexually abused” by her father. It seems that DHS had again opened a file after the mother had contacted the SOCA Unit. It was closed on 2 July 2010.
The mother alleged that on 6 July 2010 S said that “[her name for the father] hurts me in the toilet” and that “he hits my head and puts his pee-pee in my mouth”. She said S said “It has a moustache, it’s pink and purple with orange. He does wee wee out of it.” She told her mother that it happens when her grandma is there in the other room.
On 15 July 2010 S was interviewed by the police for a fourth time. She said the father put his “pee-pee” in her mouth but gave very little further details. The tape was played in court. S was clearly restless and reluctant in the course of the interview, and the police officer’s questions were repeated, if not leading. S displayed little understanding about truth and lies. No significant weight could be attached to the interview.
Over the middle months of 2010, according to the mother and her husband, S’s sexualised behaviour continued, including on one occasion in July when she inserted a toy dolphin in her vagina. She continued with disclosures, such as on 1 August 2010, to the effect that her father puts his “pee-pee” in her mouth.
In August 2010, the police examined the father’s computer but found no pornographic images.
On 18 October 2010, the police advised that they were not pressing charges and the investigation into the father was closed.
Although in the course of her evidence the mother tried to impress upon me that she had never been certain that S had been sexually abused, and of course she hoped that she had not, it was clear that at times in the course of the history of these proceedings, the mother had indicated to various professionals a belief that in her father’s care S had been sexually abused.
There was no question that the mother was prepared to believe the worst about the father. There was a graphic illustration in May 2009, at a time when the parents were disagreeing about toilet-training, and she wrote in the communication book that she believed the father had deliberately poured “male urine” over a pair of S’s pants returned in her bag. The mother conceded that it was “not the smartest entry” but said that emotions were high at the time.
I am satisfied too that she delayed the paternity testing that was ordered early in the life of the case, and was slow to change S’s name to “[Sonner-Butin]”, having unilaterally changed it to Butin before the Court ordered her to include the father’s name in the surname. And I am satisfied that in the course of forging a close new family unit with her husband and their baby J, born just over a year after S, it was probably frustrating to her and her husband that the father – whom they found over-bearing in his demands – had to be a part of S’s family.
The father for his part did little to cover himself in glory in the way he conducted himself in court proceedings, and little to engender the mother’s trust or respect. I am not critical that he started proceedings just shortly before the child was born, although they were ill-fated, in that he was obviously concerned that the mother was not going to let him see his child soon after the birth. Still, his efforts were clumsy and insensitive.
In an undated letter (Exhibit M4), shortly before S’s birth, he wrote, trying to ensure his presence at the birth (although acknowledging he did not “have to be in the birthing room”). He was threatening legal proceedings if the issue could not be resolved. He wrote:
This court appearance will be the first of many, I feel.
He may well say that he was simply trying to emphasise the wisdom in reaching agreement. For the mother though she must have felt a sense of doom at that delicate time.
It was insensitive that he sought orders at that early stage (just days before S’s birth), to build his time with the unborn baby to three days’ a week by the time she was one.
It was also insensitive to file an application on 13 February 2007, when S was not yet 12 weeks’ old, seeking an order that she live with him five days’ per week. The degree of his insensitivity became clearer in the course of the evidence. The father claimed that he was only seeking such extended times with the baby because the mother had returned to work and left the child in child-care. He did not want the baby placed in crèche when he was available to care for her. It transpired that by February 2007 the mother had in fact stopped working. The father said that he was not to know that. The point is, without knowing whether or not she was in fact working, he persisted with applications for extended periods of time with the baby which were on any view inappropriate for a child of that age. He was very critical of the mother’s parenting decisions. It is little wonder that she and her husband felt besieged. That would account for irritation, frustration and anxiety on their parts, fertile ground for the distrust and unhappiness that followed.
In September 2007, the father filed an application seeking either that S live with him, or spend a minimum of 50% each week with him.
In November 2007, the father filed another application seeking that S live with him, or live with him for half of the time.
In April 2008 he again sought orders that S live with him and spend alternative week-ends and one day in between with the mother.
Final orders were made by O’Dwyer FM on 21 May 2008 for S to live with her mother and spend time with her father, gradually increasing from four-hour periods to overnight time to start in November 2008. Within two weeks, the father sought more time, via a solicitor’s letter. The mother felt there was no end to the litigation. When asked about the likely effect on her, his immediate answer was that he was “unsure”.
Moreover, it is apparent from the evidence, including references to the communication book, that the father was persistently critical of the mother’s medical care and parenting of S. He was for example, recording bites on S’s body. It was unfair, and created a high-pressure environment, and anxiety for the mother, who was caring for S and pregnant with or also caring for J, and later K.
In evidence, the father was given every opportunity to say any positive things that he could about the mother. About the best he could garner was that she did not starve S, and that she would not leave her in a hot car at the casino. When I pointed out to him that S, who has lived mostly with her mother, is apparently a lovely little girl and that some credit must go to the mother, he found it hard to compliment her even then.
Except when it comes to her interface with S’s father, there is nothing to suggest that the mother is other than a loving and caring mother. She has been unfairly criticised for the fact that S refers to her husband as “dad” or “daddy”. S has lived with her mother’s husband throughout her life and has little siblings who refer to him as “daddy”. She knows that she has her other dad “[her name for her father]”, and although it is understandable that it might rankle with the father not to be called “dad”, it does not mean that the mother and her husband have coached her into that.
Similarly, on the July 2010 VARE tape, S referred to herself as “[S Butin]”. The father would be quick to say she had been encouraged to drop the name “[Sonner]” or not discouraged from doing so. Equally however she may simply mimic the other members of her household unit. The four of them have the surname “[Butin]”. What must be said is that the mother’s husband deserves enormous credit for the contribution he has consistently made to S’s care and upkeep, financially and emotionally.
The father’s persistent criticism of the mother from early days, his pushing inappropriately for unduly long periods with S as a new-born or infant, his manner and expression perceived by the mother as threatening at times (seen in the letter referred to above), led to a loss of confidence on her part that he could care properly and protectively for S.
Between them, the parents shared an insubstantial history and little basis for parenting together. The relationship was one of mutual distrust and discomfort. Over the years of S’s young life, she has been caught in a “push-me/pull-me” vortex between her parents. From the start, the father, a man who the mother did not know well, pushed for unreasonable time and involvement with the new baby. And the mother pulled against it.
That brings me to the present. The mother claims that she has had a sort of “epiphany” (my word, not hers) about the sexual abuse issue, having been told just before trial that the police would not charge the father because the evidence was “inconclusive”, and having read Dr O’s report where he referred to an atmosphere of “high anxiety” in the mother, as well as her husband, and the mother’s belief that her own mother thought she was not acting protectively enough in regard to S. Dr O said:
…This, indeed, was fertile ground for some form of disclosure to occur, particularly as [S] was examined and questioned repeatedly in these stressful circumstances, and has over time, now made disclosures involving other male members of [the father’s] family (his brother and nephew) resulting in [the father] declaration that he and his family had been treated like a family of paedophiles.
The mother said that Dr O’s comments made her reflect for the first time that there was an explanation about S’s anxiety and sexualised behaviour that did not lead to a conclusion that she had been sexually abused. I note that it may be the first time that she has properly reflected on the possibility, but it is not the first time it has been suggested to her.
It seems that she was told of the possible correlation between a child’s sexualised behaviour and parental conflict or anxiety by other experts along the way. In fairness to her, some, including the Family Report writer, had also referred to the likelihood, to varying degrees, of some form of sexual abuse. DHS workers had even seen and corroborated S’s sexualised behaviour. Ms R described it in a report as “outside the range of normal sexualised behaviour”. But still, it seems from DHS notes, that the mother had also been told of possible innocent explanations for the child’s behaviour, most particularly as an emotional response to the conflict and turmoil between the parents.
Moreover, the mother had the benefit of Dr O’s advice several weeks before this case started. Nevertheless, the case outline prepared on her behalf, and the initial opening of the case given by counsel on her behalf, sought 13 months’ supervised time so that S would not spend unsupervised time with her father before she started school. It was only when I pressed her counsel about what seemed like an inconsistency between such a long period of supervision, and the mother’s position that she no longer asserted the father had placed the child at risk of sexual abuse, that counsel took further instructions. The mother’s case then proceeded on the basis that there should be no such supervision, or at least not for that extended period.
It was a very late change of heart. Had it been prompted primarily by Dr O’s observations, I would have anticipated her case to have been run differently. In any event, I would have expected her answers in evidence to be different. Her evidence was ambivalent. It wavered.
She told me that she accepted the police “explanation” that the evidence is inconclusive to take the matter to a criminal trial. At some points she said “I haven’t made any conclusions”, or “I’m not sure exactly what has happened”. She said “There is no conclusion that can be drawn either way”. She said she did not have any “current concerns”. When asked if the father had sexually abused S, the mother said “I’ve never said that.” She said “I can’t assume that – I don’t know – I certainly can’t say that it has” occurred. She said, “I don’t know - I accept [Dr O’s] explanation”. When asked if she would believe disclosures in the future she said, “I’d be unsure”.
At other points in her evidence, when asked if she believed there had been some sort of sexual abuse in the father’s care, the mother responded “Well yes”. She said “I believe what she says – I believe she has experienced something of that nature – whether herself or pornography – something she has seen.” When pressed as to her belief, she responded, “Obviously some form of abuse in my mind – witnessed or experienced something”. Her concern was that S could not have known about some of the things she disclosed, unless she had seen or experienced them.
It may be that the mother has, albeit late in the piece, genuinely reassessed the history between herself and the father, the level of her anxiety, and the anxiety of her husband, and how the disclosures may have unfolded. Certainly, in response to questions from me, she did concede that she might well have asked S leading questions that led to purported disclosures.
Her change of heart seems to be at least in part a genuine response to the growing realisation that DHS closed their file and spoke to her about the emotionally abusive nature of the parents’ conflict, the police are not pursuing criminal charges against the father, and Dr O, an experienced psychiatrist, has put forward a feasible explanation that S’s sexualised behaviours and purported disclosures could have been founded in the mother and her husband’s anxiety about S in the father’s care. In addition, the Family Report writer who was very concerned about the “high probability” of sexual abuse, has also referred to the difficulty in interpreting symptoms that overlap with symptoms of anxiety.
The mother’s change of heart was also likely to be prompted, at least in part, by the realisation that if she were seen as a deliberately “no contact” mother, she could lose her child in a change of residence. It was clear that was an unbearable thought to her. Contemplating it precipitated one of only a handful of occasions on which the mother showed obvious distress during a number of days in the witness box.
I was heartened by the evidence of the mother’s husband. Although he clearly wanted to support his wife in every way, and was at times far too guarded in his evidence to be considered absolutely forthright, at other times he appeared very honest. For example, he was asked if he felt exactly the same way about S as he did about his other children. He replied to the effect that he loved S, but it was actually a different feeling from the way he felt about his own children. It was a nuanced answer that impressed me.
Most significantly though, the mother’s husband became profoundly, and it seemed genuinely, emotional and tearful when talking about the realisation that he and his wife could have unwittingly brought about so much of this heartache for S, because of their own anxieties and suspicions. He broke down crying, and appeared to be absolutely authentic in the realisation and concern that he expressed.
Although the father’s view was that the mother and her husband had deliberately concocted the allegations, and coached S, the evidence did not support that. The Family Report writer was clear about that. She said the mother was “genuine”. Dr O did not suggest the mother was fabricating the story. Her ambivalence in the witness-box did not suggest she had made up a story to follow unwaveringly, or that she could just neatly turn it on or off. And nothing in S’s presentation suggested to the experts that she had been deliberately coached.
To the contrary, the mother and her husband displayed concern but also some ambivalence and uncertainty as to what had occurred, and a burgeoning understanding of the need, and a willingness to curb their own anxieties, to help S enjoy time with her father.
If the father is keen to criticise them for ambivalence, and mixed messages, it must be said that he displayed similar traits. A number of times he suggested in evidence that if S does not live with him, he may just “walk away”. I understand his concern that allegations against him could continue, but his answers on the topic were at times inconsistent, even incoherent. It was hard to tell if it was a hollow threat. It was confusing, and certainly not in S’s best interests to grow up not knowing her father, a view endorsed by Ms D.
The father failed to persuade me that he had any more willingness and ability to facilitate the mother’s relationship with S than he asserted she had shown in the opposite direction. Although he had the right words, talking about his willingness to let her see S on quite a relaxed basis, nothing in his conduct gave me any assurance that he was truly that respectful of her position in the child’s life. At one point he said that S “probably” deserves a relationship with her mother.
I have already set out what struck me as the father’s ill-conceived applications, in the sense that he was seeking very extended periods with a new baby or infant. I acknowledge he was sometimes unrepresented, but not all the time. Not only was the timing inappropriate, with little regard for child development, but it could only have caused – and did cause – heartache for the mother and her husband, and deepened their distrust of the father.
The father’s constant criticisms of the mother’s mothering were unfair. The failure he showed in court to acknowledge the mother in a favourable way, presumably when trying to appear at his best and most reasonable, made it palpably clear that in his home, it is unlikely that S’s relationship with her mother could be appropriately nurtured and developed. That is a very significant concern in this case, given the enormous difficulty that would be presented to S in changing her home away from her primary care-giver and the family in which she has been immersed. I shall come back to that, but for present purposes note the concern that the father simply did not show adequate insight into the distress that would be caused to S in such a change.
He also said that S never cried or asked about her mother in his care. Ms D said she doubted that, but that if it were true, it was “concerning”. She noted that, for example, even on the VARE police tape, when the interviewer left S alone in the room for just a few moments, the little girl murmured “Mummy” quietly to herself. Ms D said it was “very possible” that S did not feel free in her father’s care to ask for her mother.
The father went so far as to suggest that there was “not enough love” for S in her mother’s household, that she could be “lonely”, or “alone in a nuclear family”. There was absolutely no evidence to support that. To the contrary she is obviously a greatly loved member of her mother’s household and extended family. Those sorts of statements can only compound the mother and step-father’s distrust and dislike of the father, and undermine their confidence that he is capable of promoting the mother’s role to S.
In summary, when it comes to the parents’ capacity and willingness to facilitate a relationship between S and the other parent, I have concerns about both of them. At least the mother and her husband are showing the awakening of an understanding as to the importance of allowing the child’s relationship with her father to grow unfettered by their anxiety and the spiral of symptoms, questions, and disclosures that can be borne of that anxiety. The father on the other hand shows an intransigence in his negative attitude towards the mother as a parent.
It would not concern me unduly if his negativity were simply to her as a person. That would be understandable. She disappointed him when it came to the relationship that he hoped would develop. From his perspective she has been dishonest about the circumstances surrounding the conception of S. She has been obstructive to his relationship with S, and she has prompted very ugly accusations about his protection of S. But his antagonism goes beyond that, so that he cannot even easily recognise or acknowledge that his lovely little daughter must have been parented well in all other respects by her mother, given that she has had the major care of her.
(d)the likely effect of any changes in the child’s circumstances, including the likely effect on the child of any separation from:
(i) either of his or her parents; or
(ii) any other child, or other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child), with whom he or she has been living
Ms D’s evidence was that removing S from her mother, step-father and little half-siblings would damage her sense of self. She would not understand why she had been removed. It would be very distressing for her. Every time she saw her mother it would be very distressing. She could push her mother away. She could blame her mother. She would not understand. Ms D described it as likely to be a “complete disaster”.
Ms D said that the longer term effects depended upon how her relationship with her father developed and how her father would promote her relationship with her mother. She was concerned that the conflict is so great in this family that if she were with her father she would not have a relationship with her mother.
Later in her evidence, when asked how best the transition to her father’s home could work, Ms D reiterated that it would be “very difficult”. She said it would need to be done very slowly to reduce the short-term and long-term impact on S. She said it would need to be much slower than any building up of the father’s time with S.
The father’s application was for an immediate change into his full-time care. He had sought a “moratorium” (my word, not his) on any time with the mother for about a month, to enable S to settle with him. In the course of the case, he reduced that to a fortnight. Still, he did not show insight into the difficulties envisaged by the expert.
(f)the capacity of:
(i) each of the child’s parents; and
(ii) any other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child);
to provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs:
(i)the attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parents
Both parents have parenting skills.
The father has raised L. The mother has had some concerns about that. She had related an incident in the period when she knew the father, and she took L swimming. She recounted that whilst in the water, he touched her inappropriately on the breast. It is not an incident about which I can make any definitive finding. In any event, but for her distrust of the father, she may well have simply discounted the incident as the act of a pubescent boy who was needing to learn appropriate boundaries.
Similarly, the mother seemed concerned that the father had excluded L’s mother from his life. The father denied that, and said she was not interested in a relationship with him. There was no evidence for me to make a finding that he specifically excluded her from a role in her son’s life.
There was nothing in the evidence to suggest that the father has parented L badly.
At one point in the life of the litigation the mother raised a concern about the father’s drug use. That does not appear to be a problem. However, the fact that his drug test on 13 March 2008 showed “very dilute urine”, such that a false negative may occur, probably further undermined her confidence in him.
I am satisfied that the mother has in the past referred to the father as having a “borderline personality disorder”. That was not found to be the case by Dr O. He found that the father did not present with a psychiatric condition or a personality disorder. It was unfair of her, and reflected her willingness to think the worst of him.
Dr O found the mother suffering from an adjustment disorder with anxiety, feeling “besieged” by the father’s wish to continue having contact with his daughter, and feeling “trapped in a situation which remains conflicted and causes her considerable distress”. However she did not have any psychiatric condition.
There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the mother is other than a competent and loving mother to her three children. The anxiety surrounding S’s time with her father has been the only impediment to her good parenting, and that has been in the context of the “push me/pull me” situation, with fault on both sides, described above.
The father has been critical that even before the sexual abuse allegations arose, the mother took S to too many doctors, he suspected to set up claims of medical fragility to ensure that he did not have appropriate time with the child. She had claimed for example that S was diagnosed with Reynaud’s disease, a condition of the central nervous system. On 17 March 2008 she took S to a paediatrician at the ICL’s request. I cannot make definitive findings about any of this material as much of it was not dealt with directly in evidence before me. However, it seems that the paediatrician did not diagnose Reynaud’s disease. At the same time, S’s symptoms appear not to have been dismissed out of hand. The paediatrician made various recommendations about her diet.
It is obvious too on all the evidence that S had on-going problems with nappy rash and many visits to her GP were about that. Certainly, it seems that at times when sexual abuse was to the forefront of the mother’s concerns, there may have been some cross-over between medical appointments about nappy rash and/or vaginal rashes. All that said, the evidence could not sustain a definitive finding that the mother has been negligent or excessively zealous about S’s medical care.
It is unfortunate that in the course of the various sexual abuse allegations S was subjected to an internal examination by a forensic paediatrician in July 2009. I accept from the mother that an earlier examination of S’s genitalia by a family doctor in October 2007 was not an internal examination, but in order to establish whether there was any anatomical abnormality in the genital area. It is also unfortunate that S has been subjected to so many other interviews by DHS, police and a Family Report writer, as well as needing her own counsellor, Ms C.
I can be confident that the mother has otherwise parented S well. Ms D had no concerns in that regard. And DHS never removed the child from her care in very many and extensive investigations.
When it comes to S’s emotional care however, it is most probable that the mother’s anxiety about the father’s care has adversely impacted upon her. The mother has only just begun to indicate an appreciation of that connection. Ms D was clear that the mother will need counselling support in that regard. She is willing. As I have noted, the mother’s husband shows a similar appreciation to the mother, although he appeared to be more advanced in his acceptance of the impact of their anxiety on S, and the spiralling sexualised behaviour and questioning that could have led to disclosures.
For his part, the father has not indicated a strong capacity to meet S’s emotional needs. His various applications for her to live with him when still a babe-in-arms, or to spend long periods away from her mother, indicate a lack of insight into those needs. In particular, his attitude to her mother, and his inability to acknowledge how very difficult a change of residence would be for S left me concerned that he would not be able to adequately meet her emotional needs in his household.
(e)the practical difficulty and expense of a child spending time with and communicating with a parent and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis
Once the need for on-going supervised time was removed, the potential practical difficulty and expense was greatly reduced.
However, some issues remain. If a contact centre is used for changeovers, it may be some distance from the parties’ homes, and may involve expense. I shall return to this below and will need to weigh up the benefits of using a centre against the difficulty and expense.
(g)the maturity, sex, lifestyle and background (including lifestyle, culture and traditions) of the child and of either of the child’s parents, and any other characteristics of the child that the court thinks are relevant
(h)if the child is an Aboriginal child or a Torres Strait Islander child:
(i) the child’s right to enjoy his or her Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture (including the right to enjoy that culture with other people who share that culture); and
(ii) the likely impact any proposed parenting order under this Part will have on that right
(j)any family violence involving the child or a member of the child’s family
(i)the attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parents
(k)any family violence order that applies to the child or a member of the child’s family, if:
(i) the order is a final order; or
(ii) the making of the order was contested by a person
(m)any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant
Insofar as these matters are relevant, they have been dealt with in other parts of these Reasons for Judgment.
(l)whether it would be preferable to make the order that would be least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings in relation to the child;
This is a very important consideration for S. She has been the focus of litigation for most of her life. If she lives with her mother, there is the concern that her mother will continue to harbour the anxiety about sexual abuse, or other issues that would impede the father’s time with S. If she lives with her father, there is the concern that he will not properly facilitate the relationship with the mother. It is part of the very difficult dilemma for me in this case. I will try to build as many safe-guards as possible around orders to reduce the possibility of a return to court.
CONCLUSION
The first question for me is whether the parents should retain equal shared parental responsibility for S. I agree overall with the ICL’s submissions. The presumption in favour of equal shared parental responsibility is rebutted in this case. It is not in S’s best interests for major decisions, particularly about her health and education, to be made by both parents, given the high level of conflict and the lack of any effective communication between them. That is amply borne out by all of the evidence and was an issue squarely raised by the Family Report writer. The parent with whom the child resides should be the one who takes the final responsibility for those major decisions.
The form of order proposed by the ICL, designed to ensure that one parent would bear that responsibility, but still providing overall for equal shared parental responsibility, is in my view ambiguous and potentially confusing to the parents, schools, doctors, and anyone else who needs to understand where parental responsibility lies. The order needs to clearly reflect the finding that the presumption is rebutted, and that one parent shall make major decisions, albeit with an opportunity for the other parent to contribute a view.
As to where S should live, each parent has a dearly held and entrenched view. For his part, the father believes that the mother will stop at nothing to ensure that he has no relationship with his daughter. For her part, the mother believes that the father will stop at nothing to ensure that the child lives with him. History has shown there is some substance to each parent’s concern about the other. To some extent there is no perfect option.
I am satisfied however that it is in S’s best interests to continue residing with her mother, where she has always lived, and with a step-father and half-siblings with whom she is close. I am satisfied that she should be able to continue seeing her father on an unsupervised basis.
The mother and her husband will need assistance in order to support S’s on-going relationship with her father, and to move from their concerns for her in his care. I do not find they have deliberately concocted those concerns. There is no question however that their anxiety is likely to have impacted upon her. I am satisfied that they have at least begun to understand that. It may have been the thought of losing her in these proceedings that finally prompted them to re-think their attitudes and behaviour. Nevertheless, they have done so. I am satisfied that they are open to help from counselling.
The father remains fixed in his very negative view of the mother and the parenting that S receives in her household. His frustration and bitterness arising from the history and the allegations is understandable. However, he has not shown any significant capacity to move away from that, nor to assess his own contributions. He too will need support and treatment if he is to be the best possible parent to S. A major concern was that he was unable to show genuine insight into the impact on S of moving her away from her primary attachment figure and primary family unit. He also failed to show sufficient insight into the effect on her if he just “walks away” as he threatened. For her sake, it is hoped he will remain involved with her.
Parental responsibility shall thus lie with the mother. I accept the ICL’s Minute providing for the mother to provide the father written proposals regarding the child’s education and any non-urgent serious medical treatment so that he can provide to her his written views. I also accept the proposal for her to be restrained from having the child further examined or interviewed about any allegation of abuse in the father’s care unless requested by DHS, police, or the Court. I note that if urgent medical treatment is required for S in the father’s care, he must advise the mother forthwith, as she will have the responsibility for S’s treatment. However, the mother too should notify the father forthwith if such treatment is required whilst S is in her care, so that he is kept informed.
As to the unsupervised time S will spend with her father, I am satisfied that it should start immediately and that the ICL’s proposed regime is appropriate overall. The proposal provides for his time with S to increase sufficiently gradually to be sensitive to her needs, without being unduly delayed. I will make several adjustments.
The ICL proposed that the father’s mother would be in substantial attendance for the first two occasions. I propose making that four occasions. That does not reflect a concern about the father’s care. It is simply that S has spent very little time with her father for a significant period. I am told of her comfort level with the paternal grandmother and feel confident that the combination of her father and grandmother for the first four periods will enable her to settle very easily. It is likely to be an arrangement with which the father will be comfortable, as he has consistently chosen to involve his mother in S’s life, even at times when she has not been required to supervise orders.
The ICL proposed that the changeovers should occur at a children’s contact service, commencing at GordonCare M, with the hope of changing to GordonCare W when a place becomes available there. That proposal is based on the clear evidence that changeovers otherwise have been an enormous problem, with S in the midst of conflict and anxiety. The Family Report writer expressed the firm view that changeover at a contact centre would minimise the conflict for S.
At the end of the evidence I requested the ICL to make enquiries about the availability of the contact centre. It seems that GordonCare Children’s Contact Service in M will be available. There is a charge of about $50 for each round trip of changeovers. There is also travelling time involved: I was told approximately 55 minutes for the father to M and 35 minutes for the mother. The preference would be for the W contact service. The fees appear to be lower, and the drive a little shorter: about 35 minutes for the mother and about 40 minutes for the father. There does not appear to be a substantial waiting list but there was no certainty as to when changeovers could commence there.
Surprisingly, in final submissions, when the father said that he would prefer changeovers at McDonald’s in X, the mother said that she “did not mind” if the parties used GordonCare or the McDonald’s in X. That was said through counsel on both sides.
The ICL maintained that the changeovers should at least start at GordonCare. I agree. The evidence was clear enough as to how unsuccessful changeovers had been when conducted between the parties. I propose following the ICL’s orders in this regard, but will allow the parties to make any submissions at the point at which these Reasons for Judgment are delivered, in light of any indication of availability or unavailability of GordonCare. Otherwise, the costs incurred at a centre should be shared between the parents.
Similarly, it is hard to arrive at precise start and finish times for the periods S is to spend with her father, before she starts school. Much depends on the constraints of the contact centre. Doing the best I can at this point, I propose following the times proposed by the ICL, but again I shall permit any submissions that the parties may need to make at the time those reasons for judgment are given.
I propose an alteration to the ICL’s Minute of Orders relating to week-end time once S commences school in 2012. I am satisfied that it is in S’s interests for her father to collect her from school on the Friday and return her to school on the Monday. That maximises her time with him, reduces conflict between the parties by creating a neutral changeover point, and facilitates the father’s presence around S’s school on those occasions.
Counsel for the mother sought that school holiday times be set rather than left for the parties to agree, for example, as to who shall have which part of the holidays with S. It is often preferable for parents to have that flexibility. In this case, I am satisfied that certainty, rather than a ground for parental disagreement, would be more likely to promote S’s best interests. Accordingly I propose allowing a specific time of each holiday period for the father, so that the need for negotiation between the parents is removed.
Otherwise, I note that the ICL proposed five consecutive nights of the 2012 term holidays, changing to one week in the 2013 term holidays. I am satisfied that from the time she commences school, S should be able to spend one week of the term holidays with her father. By then, she should have been in a long-term routine of spending substantial periods of time with him.
I note that the father’s alternate week-end time with S will start in the early part of 2011. I am satisfied that by the September 2011 school holidays she should be able to spend five nights with him and again in the 2011/2012 summer holidays, she could spend two periods of five nights with him. For those summer holidays, it is difficult to discern which weeks would be appropriate. For the sake of clarity, I shall permit the mother to notify the father by the end of the first week of Term Four in 2011, as to the two five-day periods that S will be available, provided one period is in the first half of the holidays and the other in the second half. I heard that the mother and her family like to spend time in Queensland with family members. She will thus be able to build her holidays around the time the father will spend with S. Thereafter, I am satisfied that by the following long summer holidays, in 2012/2013, it will be appropriate for S to spend half the holidays with each parent.
Again for certainty, I note that from the September 2011 school holidays, week-end time with the father shall stop during school holiday periods. It should resume on the first week-end of each school term.
Counsel for the father submitted that each parent should have time with S at Easter, and noted that very occasionally Easter falls outside school holidays. The parties may make submissions about that.
The ICL proposes that the parties do all acts and things necessary to re-engage with the Australian Childhood Foundation or Family Transitions for counselling, and that the mother continue her counselling with Mr M.
I am satisfied that the mother should continue her counselling with Mr M. I do not propose making an order to that effect. It can lead to on-going disputes. She must realise that she will be judged on the efforts she makes towards helping herself deal with the anxiety she has experienced surrounding S’s time with her father. In any event, I am confident that she will continue in therapy. She has done so voluntarily this far. She seemed absolutely genuine that it is something that she needs and derives benefit from.
Just as the mother needs support, so does the father. He needs a heightened appreciation of the importance of the mother and her household in S’s life. Hopefully, the insurmountable communication problems between the parents could also be eased, at least to some extent. Again I do not propose an order for the father to undertake his own counselling.
I am satisfied that the organisation, Family Transitions offers an excellent program that would assist this family. It was recommended by the Family Report writer. The major resistance to it from the parents is that it is expensive. I will ask the ICL to help facilitate enquiries about that program. If either parent feels that it is out of reach, then they should do whatever is requested by the ICL in an effort to re-engage with the Australian Childhood Foundation. This is something different from their own personal counselling.
I note that the ICL proposed that each parent be at liberty to attend the child’s day-care, kindergarten, or school for functions to which parents are routinely invited. Ideally, that is what should occur. In this case however I am not satisfied that it would be workable for S. My concern is for her, in potentially having such occasions spoilt by conflict between the Butin family unit on the one hand, and the father and relatives on the other hand.
Of course the father should be kept informed of school activities, and should be able to make his own parent-teacher interview time. If a particular school function occurs while S is in his care, he may attend. The mother may not. Otherwise, the mother but not the father may attend. The parties might arrive at their own agreement in due course when the dust has settled and if they are able to relate better to each other. It is not the ideal outcome, but for now, the need for certainty and the protection of S from conflict are paramount considerations.
Counsel for the father sought an order for the ICL to serve a copy of these Reasons for Judgment on DHS, any treating medical practitioners of S, Mr M, S’s counsellor Ms C, and Family Transitions. I need to strike a balance between professionals being well-armed to deal with the family if any future problems arise on the one hand, and the need for privacy on the other.
I am satisfied that Mr M and Ms C would have their counselling roles enhanced by receiving a copy of these Reasons for Judgment. I am satisfied that a copy can usefully be kept on the DHS file. I am not satisfied that treating medical practitioners would benefit from them, and the category is too broad and too vague. I am satisfied that the ICL should be able to provide a copy to Family Transitions or the Australian Childhood Foundation if arrangements are being made for the parents’ involvement in any program.
I have tentatively provided for the ICL’s discharge after three months, allowing for the Contact Centre and Family Transitions/Australian Childhood Foundation arrangements to be made in that time. I welcome submissions if any party proposes a different time-frame.
THE ORDERS
Subject to submissions, the orders I propose are as follows:
The child S born … November, 2006 shall live with the mother.
Parental Responsibility
The mother shall have sole parental responsibility for S.
The mother shall keep the father informed, in writing, of her proposals regarding S’s education, and non-urgent serious medical treatment. The father shall be at liberty to provide his written response to the mother’s proposals within seven days, and the mother shall use her best endeavors to take the father’s response into account regarding the child’s health and education.
The mother shall advise the father, in writing, as to the day-care/kindergarten/school in which she has enrolled the child within seven days of doing so, and she shall advise him forthwith of any serious urgent medical treatment received or required by S.
The mother be and is hereby restrained by herself, her servants or agents from taking or allowing any other person to take S for any medical examination or any therapeutic intervention by any medical practitioner, psychologist, social worker, counselor or like professional which relates in any way to an allegation S has been abused (sexually, physically or emotionally) by the father or by any other person when in his care, save pursuant to a request from a protective worker employed by the Department of Human Services in Victoria or a member of a State or Territory police force or by order of the Court.
Time with the Father
S shall spend time with the father as follows:
6.1.Each Wednesday and Sunday for a period of four hours, from 1pm to 5pm for a period of four weeks starting 26 January 2011;
6.2For a period of eight hours each Wednesday and Sunday from 9.30am to 5pm for a further period of eight weeks;
6.3Each alternate week-end, from 9am Saturday to 5pm Sunday for a period of eight weeks;
6.4 Thereafter, each alternate week-end from 5pm Friday to 5pm Sunday;
6.5For the first five nights of the September 2011 term holiday period, commencing from 5pm until 5pm on the day after the fifth night;
6.6Subject to paragraphs 11 and 12, for one five-night period in the first half and one five-night period in the second half of the 2011/2012 long summer holidays, specified by the mother to the father by the end of the first week of the 2011 Term 4, to commence at 5pm on the first night and conclude at 5pm on the day after the fifth night.
6.7 Upon S commencing school in 2012:
6.7.1During term time, from the conclusion of school each alternate Friday to the commencement of school on Monday starting on the first week-end after school commences;
6.7.2For the first week in each of the term holiday periods commencing at the conclusion of school on the last day of term, and concluding at 5pm on the day after the seventh night;
6.7.3Subject to paragraphs 11 and 12, for one half of the 2012/2013 long summer holidays and thereafter, for the first half starting from the conclusion of school in even numbered years and the second half in odd numbered years.
During all school holiday periods from the September 2011 term holiday and thereafter, the father’s alternate week-end time with S shall be suspended, and resume on the first week-end after school commences.
For the first four occasions that S spends with the father, he shall ensure that the paternal grandmother shall be in substantial attendance.
Unless otherwise agreed between the parents in writing, all changeovers not at S’s day-care, kindergarten or school shall take place at a children’s contact service (with changeovers currently occurring at GordonCare Children’s Contact Service, M) with the parents to share equally the costs associated with same, and the parents shall forthwith do all acts and things as may be necessary to arrange GordonCare Children’s Contact Service, at W as the venue for changeovers as soon as a place becomes available there.
The father shall advise the mother forthwith in the event that S requires any urgent medical treatment whilst in his care.
Special Occasions
S shall spend time with the father for Christmas:
11.1 From 2pm to 6pm on 25 December 2011;
11.2Commencing 2012 and in each alternate year thereafter, from 4pm Christmas Day to 4pm Boxing Day;
11.3Commencing 2013 and in each alternate year thereafter, from 4pm on 24 December to 4pm Christmas Day.
S shall spend time with the mother for Christmas:
12.1 On 25 December 2011, subject to paragraph 10.1 above:
12.2Commencing 2012, and in each alternate year thereafter, from 4pm on 24 December to 4pm Christmas Day;
12.3Commencing 2013 and in each alternate year thereafter, from 4pm Christmas Day until 4pm Boxing Day.
In the event S is not otherwise with her father on Father’s Day, she shall spend time with him from 5pm on the evening prior to Father’s Day to 5pm Father’s Day.
In the event S is not otherwise with her mother on Mother’s Day, her week-end time with the father shall conclude at 5pm on the evening prior to Mother’s Day.
S shall spend time with the parent who is not caring for her on her birthday for not less than two hours, at times agreed, and failing agreement, from 3.30pm to 5.30pm.
Communication between the parents
The parents shall communicate via a communications book, with only child-focused communications to be contained in the book.
Counselling and Courses
The parents shall forthwith do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as requested by the ICL to enquire about enrolment in a program with Family Transitions or if such course is unavailable or either parent cannot afford the fees charged, then with the Australian Childhood Foundation.
School
As soon as practicable the mother shall authorise the principal/director of the day-care/kindergarten/school attended by S to provide to the father at his request and his expense, if any, by ordinary mail, copies of :
18.1 each order form for school photos of the child;
18.2 each newsletter and notice; and
18.3 each school report for the child.
The father shall be at liberty to attend S’s day-care/kindergarten/school to attend functions to which parents are routinely invited when S is in his care, to the exclusion of the mother, and to arrange his own parent-teacher interviews at a time different from the mother’s interview. Otherwise he shall not attend such functions.
That pursuant to s 65DA(2) and s 62B, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders and details of who can assist parties adjust to and comply with an order are set out in the Fact Sheet attached hereto and these particulars are included in these orders.
The ICL
That the ICL shall be discharged at the expiration of three months from the date of these orders.
That the ICL shall arrange for a copy of these Reasons for Judgment to be forwarded to the Department of Human Services, Ms C, Mr M, and either or both of Family Transitions and the Australian Childhood Foundation, if the parents or either of them is enrolled in a program in the organization.
All applications shall otherwise be dismissed and removed from the list of cases awaiting finalization.
That pursuant to the Family Law Rules this matter reasonably required the attendance of counsel.
I certify that the preceding one hundred & ninety (190) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Dessau delivered on 25 January 2011
Associate:
Date: 25 January 2011
Key Legal Topics
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Family Law
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Injunction
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