Burwell & Jarvis (No 2)
[2023] FedCFamC1F 453
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Burwell & Jarvis (No 2) [2023] FedCFamC1F 453
File number(s): CAC 505 of 2023 Judgment of: GILL J Date of judgment: 2 June 2023 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW - PARENTING ORDERS – Interim proceedings – Potential risk – Supervision by family member – Engagement with welfare agency Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 60CG, 65DAA, 68B Cases cited: Eaby & Speelman (2015) FLC 93-654
Fitzwater v Fitzwater (2019) 60 Fam LR 212; [2019] FamCAFC 251
Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286
Isles & Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97
Salah & Salah [2016] FamCAFC 100
SS v AH [2010] FamCAFC 13
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 58 Date of hearing: 17 and 19 May 2023 and 1 June 2023 Place: Canberra Solicitor for the Applicant: Mrs Lloyd, Jeanine Lloyd & Associates Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms Cruise, Legal Aid Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Litigant in Person Solicitor for the Intervener: Mr Gough, Director-General Community Services Directorate Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Ms Dillon-Smith, Dillon-Smith Lawyers ORDERS
CAC 505 of 2023 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS BURWELL
Applicant
AND: MR JARVIS
First Respondent
MS GODWELL
Second Respondent
DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE COMMUNITY SERVICES DIRECTORATE
Intervener
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER
order made by:
GILL J
DATE OF ORDER:
2 JUNE 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The orders of 12 April 2023 as made by a Senior Judicial Registrar are discharged.
2.Ms Burwell, the mother, born 1988 has sole parental responsibility for the children:
(a)X born 2012;
(b)Y born 2016; and,
(c)Z born 2017.
3.The children live with the mother.
4.The mother is to liaise with the case manager for Child and Youth Protection Services (“CYPS”) by keeping such informed of, and seeking advice as to anticipated arrangements for the children.
5.The mother is authorised by these orders to obtain respite care for the child X as she requires and she shall liaise with CYPS in respect of any such arrangements or services she requires to support X for as long as she considers this is necessary.
6.The mother is permitted to allow X to stay with the paternal grandmother for respite with such arrangements to be made in consultation with CYPS and only on the conditions as otherwise set out in these orders.
7.The children Y and Z spend supervised time with Mr Jarvis, the father, at E Support Services or F Support Services as agreed.
8.Other than with members of the paternal grandmother’s household or a professional supervisor, the father shall not cause or allow another adult to be present during his time with the children unless he has first obtained agreement in writing from the other parties.
9.The father shall spend time with X each Saturday from 9 am to 4 pm supervised by the paternal grandmother.
10.When the father spends time with X the paternal grandmother shall supervise such time and shall:
(a)Refuse the father’s time with X if she suspects or observes the father to be affected by drugs or alcohol.
(b)Terminate the visit if the father speaks with X about where he wishes to live or the Court proceedings.
(c)Not allow the father to denigrate the mother in the presence or hearing of X.
(d)In the event of any aggression, shouting or conflict between X and the father terminate the visit immediately.
11.The paternal grandmother is restrained from discussing the court matter with X or denigrating the mother to X.
12.The paternal grandmother shall liaise with the case manager for CYPS by keeping such informed of, and seeking advice as to anticipated arrangements for X whilst the mother permits him to remain in the paternal grandmother’s care.
13.If the paternal grandmother becomes unable to care for X for any reason, she is restrained from placing him in the care of the father and she shall contact the mother and CYPS to arrange alternative care for him.
14.The father forthwith do all things necessary to enrol in and complete the Everyman, Preventing Violence, Changing Behaviour or other agreed program and provide evidence of enrolment forthwith and a certificate of completion to the Mother upon completion.
15.The father and mother enrol and participate in a Parenting after Separation course at the earliest opportunity and provide a certificate of completion to the other parent upon completion.
16.The father undergo a hair follicle and CDT drug and alcohol test within fourteen days and provide the results to the legal representatives of each of the parties within 48 hours of receipt of the test results.
17.The mother have liberty to relist the matter in the event that the father returns a positive drug test, or an alcohol test which is in the excessive range for consumption of alcohol.
18.The father is restrained from using alcohol above the 0.05 limit or any non-prescribed drugs (noting that the father is using prescribed medication) or illicit substances whilst the children are in his care or 24 hours prior to him spending time with them.
19.That each party shall inform the other party of their current and operable email address and inform the other party of any change within 24 hours of such change.
20.The parents and paternal grandmother communicate by way of email and the WeParent App or My Family Wizard or Talking parents APP and such communication shall be limited to discussing arrangements for the children and in the event the parents cannot agree on which parenting app to use the mother shall nominate the app.
21.Each party be restrained from making critical or derogatory remarks in relation to the other parent or their family in the presence or hearing of the children and that each party shall do all things necessary to ensure that no third party makes critical or derogatory comments about the other party in the presence or hearing of the children.
22.Pursuant to s 68B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) each parent is restrained by injunction from:
(a)Abusing, insulting, belittling, rebuking, or denigrating the other parent in the presence or hearing of the children, and if any other person is doing so, shall remove the children from that environment immediately.
23.Pursuant to s 68B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the father is restrained by injunction from:
(a)Entering or remaining in a place of residence, employment, or education of the mother or any school or sporting venues the children may from to time attend other than as set out in these orders.
24.Neither party use any form of physical restraint or discipline on any child, nor allow anyone else to do so.
25.The father, the mother and paternal grandmother do all acts and things necessary to ensure that the medication prescribed for any of the children in their care is administered in accordance with the recommendations of the child’s treating medical practitioner and the medication shall travel with the child at changeovers and be available as needed and prescribed.
26.If any child is absent from school, the parents shall keep the other parent informed when the child is away and the reason for the child not attending and provide this information within a reasonable period of the child being absent, and in any event on the same day as the child being absent.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT:
27.The parties have leave to seek an urgent relisting of the matter.
28.The matter is listed for further case management at 2 pm on 17 August 2023.
29.The Independent Children's Lawyer and the mother have leave to attend on 17 August 2023 by Microsoft Teams.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Burwell & Jarvis has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GILL J
On 12 April 2023 the parties entered into interim consent orders before a Senior Judicial Registrar in Division 2 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. Those orders provided, in general terms, for X (aged 10), Y (aged about 7), and Z (aged 5) to live with the father and to spend substantial and significant time with the mother. They were silent as to the allocation of parental responsibility. At the time that those orders were made, the court and parties were awaiting the production of material (pursuant to s 69ZW Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”)) by Child and Youth Protection Services (“CYPS”).
The s 69ZW material was released on 17 May 2023 and the matter was transferred to Division 1 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.
That material was highly suggestive that the father poses a serious risk of harm to the children, by virtue of abuse or exposure to family violence.
On 19 May 2023 orders were made suspending the orders of 12 April 2023 following an examination of the material produced pursuant to s 69ZW and hearing oral evidence from a Team Leader from CYPS with the responsibility for this matter. The orders were suspended insofar as they provided for the children to live with the father and instead orders were made for the children to live with the mother and for the father to be restrained by injunction from approaching various places and permitting the father to have supervised time with the children, by written agreement with the mother.
The proceedings were then adjourned to 1 June 2023 for further hearing to enable further material to be put on, given the truncated and urgent manner of the hearing on 19 May 2023. Additionally, it was anticipated that there would be the tender of a document marked MFI1 from 19 May 2023, being a record that was produced by CYPS of an incident of severe family violence alleged to perpetrated by the father, being a record that identified the person who made the report of the incident.
In preparation for the further hearing of the matter both the mother and father filed affidavit material and set out a suite of orders that they pursued.
On the hearing of the matter further material was filed and the paternal grandmother, Ms Godwell, and the Director-General of the Community Services Directorate (the “D-G”) were both joined as parties.
The Independent Children’s Lawyer (the “ICL”) provided a minute of proposed orders which each of the parties subsequently spoke to, and which formed the basis of the orders now made.
In general terms the ICL’s proposed minute provided for sole parental responsibility to be allocated to the mother, for the children to live with the mother, for the mother to be at liberty to arrange for X to be placed into respite care including with the paternal grandmother, and for the father to have supervised time with the children. In particular, that was specified to be time with X supervised by the paternal grandmother once per week and professionally supervised time with Y and Z. A suite of other protective orders were proposed.
In general, the parties were in agreement as to these terms, although the father sought orders that would allow him to have time supervised with X by the paternal grandmother at any time, rather than restricted to once per week and sought either that there be no order as to parental responsibility or that there be an order for equally shared parental responsibility.
Significant issues emerged from the evidence and submissions of the parties.
The first is that the mother has limited capacity at present to care for X, she asserting that she has inadequate accommodation in the context of X’s high needs. Evidence previously led suggests that X has diagnose of several disorders. For that reason the mother volunteered that X would be temporarily placed with the paternal grandmother. The second significant issue is that of whether, on the receipt of the further material, the father poses a risk of abuse, or exposure to family violence to the children.
It is necessary to examine the evidence before the court to explain these issues more fully. In doing so it should be noted that whilst a court is to be cautious, and to avoid, in interim proceedings, about being drawn into contentious areas of fact, the court is still required to assess the potential risks emerging from the evidence that has been led.
The mother’s material recites a history of the parties separating in March 2018, with the children remaining primarily in her care and spending time with the father in varying amounts until early 2022, following an accident in which the mother was left disabled. From that point the children moved into the primary care of the father.
The mother describes a background of family violence perpetrated upon her by the father, including an incident where the mother asserts that she was thrown through a wall causing her, then pregnant with Z, to bleed. She asserts that both X and Y were exposed to this incident. The mother describes further coercive abuse to cause her to have sex with the father, and a specific incident in early 2018 that she says triggered the parties’ separation where the father assaulted the mother and threatened harm to her father. At that point a Family Violence Order (“FVO”) was obtained and as noted above, the children remained primarily in her care. In late 2018 a parenting plan was entered into for the father to spend time with each child, although it was not consistently adhered to.
In early 2022 the mother, X and Y were involved in an accident wherein X and Y suffered minor injuries but the mother was rendered disabled. A social worker then placed the three children into the care of the father while the mother was hospitalised. The mother did not have contact with the children until mid-2022. The mother says that the contact was generally only weekly on an electronic basis, with three face-to-face visits until the mother was transferred from hospital in Sydney to City G at which time the visits became monthly face-to-face visits.
In late 2022 the mother was released from hospital into an apartment in Suburb H where she currently resides. She says that a general practitioner has recommended ongoing treatment the X and Y following the incident but that has not occurred as the father has failed to complete the relevant paperwork. The mother describes that from January 2023 the father permitted her ad hoc overnight time with the children.
Importantly to the issue of risk posed by the father, the mother describes that in early 2023 she received a telephone call from Ms D, the father’s partner. Ms D informed the mother that she had left the father (according to the father they are still in a relationship, although Ms D has moved out of the home). She described that the previous Sunday the father had gone too far and had attacked her, kicking in the door of the toilet and attacking her in a manner to which the children Y and Z were exposed.
Exhibit F1 contains records from CYPS relevant to that incident that were based in part upon material that was not before the court, the CYPS officer having access to unredacted material, the court generally only having access to material on which the notifier was redacted. This included an assessment in early 2023 of there being several reports outlining that the father had chased the partner around the home, then into the bathroom area, then proceeded to “[attack]” her with the children present.
Also contained in Exhibit F1 was a third-party report to CYPS, being a notification by an organisation called J Support Services reporting, purportedly from Ms D, that she had been subject to coercive control and manipulation, referring specifically to an incident in early 2023 alleging the father had broken down the door, pinned Ms D down and attacked her. The report alleged that the incident was followed by Ms D suffering from an asthma attack. Again it was recorded that this occurred in the presence of children.
Further in Exhibit F1 an extract of police records was produced that recorded that Ms D had informed the police in early 2023 that some days before she had been chased by the father, the bathroom door had been damaged, and she had been attacked.
A further CYPS record of mid-2023 reports another incident where the father’s partner was escorted from home by the Australian Federal Police and taken to a safe location. A telephone call following up with Ms D in mid-2023 included Ms D’s description of controlling and coercive conduct towards her when she had attempted to leave the home on the previous day and her observation that when the police attended the father demonstrated a different persona. It also involved Ms D’s description of X running away from home frequently, of verbal abuse by the father towards Y, including describing him as “little fucking cunt”, of the father causing the children to be fearful to obtain their compliance and from angry outbursts by the father each day or each two days.
This further occurs in a context of Ms D also reporting to the police in early 2023 an incident where the father had grabbed X by the chin aggressively.
The mother further reports that in early 2023 Z described to her “I saw daddy on top of [Ms D] and he was hurting her neck.” This is a reference to Ms D.
Hence it can be seen from multiple sources that there is an extant allocation of the father attacking Ms D in early 2023 in the presence of the children.
It was noteworthy that the evidence of the CYPS team leader, who has six years’ experience in child protection, was that this type of attack carries with it a high risk as a fatality indicator in family violence and child protection settings.
It should be observed that the records of CYPS in relation to the incident involve interactions with CYPS, not only with Ms D, but also with the father and the paternal grandmother. In those interactions the paternal grandmother was a staunch supporter of the father, and strongly denied (even though she was not present) the incident described by Ms D. The paternal grandmother gave the strong impression of being in the father’s camp in respect of the allegations by Ms D.
Perhaps somewhat in contrast with this position, although the father did not go so far as to admit attacking Ms D in his affidavit material, he has admitted that an incident occurred “which the court may find was an incident of family violence.” He further accepts that it is “reasonable that the mother, the court and CYPS are concerned about issues of family violence relating to and involving” the father.
The father’s limited concessions in relation to this issue appear well made.
The current circumstances are that the mother is disabled, requires a mobility aid, and has access to carers on a twice daily basis. She asserts that she has current capacity to care for Y and Z in her two-bedroom home. She however described X as suffering from a number of disorders. The mother asserts that X’s behaviour has declined since living with the father, such that he is now a danger to the mother and to his siblings. It may be observed that in late 2019 CYPS recorded a paediatrician as asserting that X was then a danger to the mother, to his siblings, and to staff and children at school as well as potentially to himself. It may further be observed that there are reports that prior to the accident X was already verbally and physically abusive of the mother, and violent to his siblings. In addition to this, it may be observed that Y also appears to have high needs. He is recorded as having said at school that he wants to die and has also been described as being physically aggressive to another child. The oral evidence from Ms B, the Team Leader at CYPS, based on further information that was not at that point before the court, described instances of X previously attacking Y or attempting to seriously harm him and of X having engaged in sexualised behaviour since 2015. She noted issues being identified of substance-abuse with the father (it may be noted that the records contain several instances of the father failing to comply with requests to provide urinalysis for CYPS).
Child, Youth and Protection Services has indicated that it is in the process of undertaking a 12 week, ground up, holistic assessment of the family. This is intended to include assessment of the capacity of the parents and support services that were available to them. Ms B described that supports are to be made available to the mother.
In relation to the parties’ proposals, that X live with the paternal grandmother it may be observed that the mother has described a positive relationship between X and the paternal grandmother and believes the paternal grandmother is able to ensure his safety around the father. She asserts that X living with the paternal grandmother will be beneficial to him and asserts that she will be able to arrange regular time between X, the mother and his siblings.
The circumstances of X entering into the paternal grandmother’s care were described by the mother. In mid-2023, shortly after the children entered into the mother’s care pursuant to the orders of 19 May 2023, the mother told the children that they would be staying with her until things were fixed. X apparently informed the mother that her home was too small and did not provide adequate privacy. The mother suggested that he could stay with the paternal grandmother. She said that X agreed with this and that further discussions happened with the paternal grandmother, CYPS and an agency used by CYPS called F Support Services, where agreement was reached to have X enter into the paternal grandmother’s care.
Since that has occurred the father reports that he has spent time with both Y and Z supported by the paternal grandmother by consent of the mother in accordance with the orders of 19 May 2023. He has however also spent time with X without such written consent, which constituted a breach of the orders made on 19 May 2023. The father explains this was an inadvertent breach and once he understood the import of the orders he has complied.
PRINCIPLES
The paramount consideration in determining what parenting order should be made is, pursuant to s 60CA of the Act, the best interests of each child. Those best interests are to be determined on consideration of the matters set out at s 60CC of the Act, in the legislative context of the objects and principles set out in s 60B of the Act, and pursuant to s 60CG, in a manner that does not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence. Further, where applicable, s 65DAA sets out a reasoning pathway to be followed.
In this case, the key considerations were those of risk of harm to X, Y and Z, the opportunity to secure the benefits of meaningful relationship through time with the father and limitations of the parents in their capacity to provide care for, in particular, X.
Given the interim nature of the proceedings, there are significant limits that are imposed upon the manner of dealing with the s 60CC considerations in determining best interests. Such limitations were identified by the Full Court in cases such as Salah & Salah,[1] where it was observed that “it is very common in interim parenting proceedings to see factual disputes which cannot be determined without the evidence being tested in the context of a trial.”[2] Reflecting the earlier case of Goode & Goode,[3] it was accepted that the court in interim proceedings should not be drawn into:
68. …issues of fact or matters relating to the merits of the substantive case where findings are not possible. The Court also looks to the less contentious matters, such as the agreed facts and issues not in dispute...
[1] Salah & Salah [2016] FamCAFC 100.
[2] Salah & Salah [2016] FamCAFC 100 at [36].
[3] Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286.
Importantly, however, it was accepted, as identified in Eaby & Speelman,[4] that such an approach “does not mean that merely because the facts are in dispute the evidence on the topic must be disregarded, and the case determined solely by reference to the agreed facts.”[5]
[4] Eaby & Speelman (2015) FLC 93-654.
[5] Eaby & Speelman (2015) FLC 93-654 at [18].
That is, the court, despite the limitations on testing the evidence, and the inability to make concrete findings, is still required to give consideration to issues raised, such as those of risk and, as SS v AH,[6] identified:
100. …weigh the probabilities of competing claims and the likely impact on children in the event that a controversial assertion is acted upon or rejected. It is not always feasible when dealing with the immediate welfare of children simply to ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue.[7]
[6] SS v AH [2010] FamCAFC 13.
[7] SS v AH [2010] FamCAFC 13 at [100].
Given that the key issue raised to justify the departure from the current orders is that of risk, it is important to recognise the nature of the court’s function in assessing such, even in the context of the limitations imposed by the interim nature of the proceedings. In Isles & Nelissen,[8] the approach to risk was adopted (at [50]) from Fitzwater[9] as:
138. … a predictive exercise and while it is, naturally enough, liable to be influenced by factual findings about past events, the contemplation of risk entails the foresight of possible harm.[10]
[8] Isles & Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97.
[9] Fitzwater v Fitzwater (2019) 60 Fam LR 212; [2019] FamCAFC 251.
[10] Isles & Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97 at [138].
It was accepted that this is an exercise to be undertaken even where the underlying facts cannot necessarily be determined one way or another. For example, the court accepted from Fitzwater in a different but analagous context of risk of sexual abuse that:
140. It cannot be correct that the unacceptable risk of a child’s sufferance of harm through future sexual abuse can only ever be established if it is proven a fact, on the balance of probabilities, that the child (or another) has already been sexually abused in the past. Depending upon the strength of the evidence placed before the court, the possibility of past sexual abuse may of itself be sufficient to establish the chance of future sexual abuse. That has long been accepted as true (Nikolakis & Nikolakis [2010] FamCAFC 52 at [41], [44], [49]-[53], [96]; Partington & Cade (No.2) (2009) FLC 93-422 at [56]-[61]; Johnson and Page at [68], [71], [76], [77]).
The limitations inherent to interim proceedings necessarily form a part of the consideration of risk.
DISCUSSION
Although the underlying factual disputes are at this stage unresolved, what emerges is an indication that the father may present a serious risk of abuse or exposure to family violence to the children. The extent of that potential risk is marked out by the severity of the conduct alleged against him, for example in pushing the mother through a wall in the presence of X and Y, and, more recently, in attacking Ms D in the presence of the children. In particular the allegation as to the attack is an allegation of the use of life threatening force against another, an act that if in fact perpetrated by the father carries with it not only serious risk of physical harm, but also risk of heavy emotional impact in the terror that it has the capacity to cause, not only to the putative victim, but also to those, like the children, who are in close proximity to such an event.
The best interests of the children call for them to be protected, pending final hearing, from the prospect of being exposed to such.
The agreed position that the children will not live with the father, but rather will live with the mother or at her discretion, for X to live in a respite arrangement with the paternal grandmother goes a long way to providing such protection.
At the same time, maintenance of a relationship with the father who has primarily cared for the children since the accident, is also a matter that each of the parties asserts is in the interests of the children. That relationship, and potential benefits from it, can be supported whilst still protecting the children from the potential threat that emanates from the father by means of appropriate boundaries being placed around such time, including arrangements as to supervision.
The parties accept that in relation to Y and Z, those arrangements are best met by professional supervision.
The arrangements for X, who it is anticipated will be living with the paternal grandmother, are accepted by the parties to call for a different regime, although they are not in agreement about the proper boundaries.
The father and paternal grandmother seek that, provided the paternal grandmother complies with the ancillary restrictions proposed by the other parties, there be no fetters on the father’s time with X other than it be supervised by the paternal grandmother. The other parties seek that the time, supervised by the paternal grandmother be restricted to one day per week.
The serious nature of the potential risk in this case calls, at present, for the more restrictive regime to be imposed. Accepting that the paternal grandmother brings good will and diligence to the role of supervision, the issues in high risk cases of supervision by friends and relatives have been identified on many occasions previously by the court. Here a particular issue arises in the descriptions of the advocacy undertaken by the paternal grandmother to CYPS against the notion that the incident had occurred, despite admittedly not being present. Perhaps having now seen material that points cogently to the risk that the father may pose will have persuaded the paternal grandmother that there is a potentially strong risk issue posed by her son, but it is not clear that is so.
At present allowing a more ad hoc unstructured arrangement for X’s time with the father, and an unstructured calling on the paternal grandmother for supervision of her son does not offer secure enough arrangements for the time with X. Such is better provided for by defined limits on the time, restricted, at this stage, to once weekly.
The remainder of the more contentious issues is as to the allocation of parental responsibility.
The highly contentious nature of the current interim proceedings, and the nature of the allegations made within these proceedings, means that the presumption in favour of equally shared parental responsibility should not be applied.
Given the risk issues in the case, and the position of the mother as the primary carer of Y and Z, and as the decision maker in relation to respite care for X, the mother should be vested with sole parental responsibility, noting that in some respects the mother will be practically fettered in her decision making by the involvement of the D-G who are providing significant practical support for her care of the children. The D-G’s involvement also safeguards against idiosyncratic decision making, as, in the event that decisions that are made appear contrary to the children’s interests, it can be predicted that an application would be made by the D-G to the court to deal with such.
As to other issues in relation to the terms proposed by the ICL, the parents and paternal grandmother will be required to engage with CYPS rather than comply with directions. Given that the scope of the directions that may be given is unknown it is inappropriate to give them the force of an injunction. Should the engagement prove inadequate, no doubt the matter will be brought back before the court.
Similarly, whilst it is appropriate that the children receive psychological support, an indefinite injunction to cause it to happen is inappropriate.
In relation to the undertakings proposed for the paternal grandmother as supervisor, rather than undertakings such matters will be dealt with by injunction, but only to the extent of those proposed by the ICL, it not being apparent that the additional proposed conditions by the D-G will be beneficial to X.
CONCLUSION
Orders will be made generally in terms of those proposed by the ICL, as largely accepted by the parties, with appropriate modifications. The previous consent orders will be discharged, with those reinstated that should remain operative in order to provide clarity.
I certify that the preceding fifty-eight (58) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Gill. Associate:
Dated: 2 June 2023
0
5
0