Buller v Murray Grey Beef Cattle Society Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Buller v Murray Grey Beef Cattle Society Limited [2014] FCA 1127

Citation: Buller v Murray Grey Beef Cattle Society Limited [2014] FCA 1127
Parties: GARY RAYMOND BULLER and MARGARET HUNTER v MURRAY GREY BEEF CATTLE SOCIETY LIMITED (ACN 083 111 406)
File number: ACD 96 of 2014
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 3 October 2014
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – whether the Court should restrain an incorporated association of cattle breeders on an interlocutory basis at the suit of two of its members from providing pedigree information and other raw data contained in the corporation’s database to another member being information which was originally provided to the corporation by that other member
Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 140, 180, 182, 232, 233, Pt 2F.1A
Cases cited: Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Proprietary Limited v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1
Samsung Electronics Company Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238

Date of hearing:

1 October 2014

Place:

Sydney (via video link to Canberra)

Division:

GENERAL DIVISION

Category:

Catchwords

Number of paragraphs:

59

Counsel for the Applicants:

Mr P Walker SC

Solicitor for the Applicants:

Aulich Civil Law Pty Ltd

Counsel for the Respondent:

Ms AE Munro

Solicitor for the Respondent:

APJ Law


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 96 of 2014

BETWEEN:

GARY RAYMOND BULLER
First Applicant

MARGARET HUNTER
Second Applicant

AND:

MURRAY GREY BEEF CATTLE SOCIETY LIMITED (ACN 083 111 406)
Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 OCTOBER 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

1.The applicants by their solicitor continue the undertaking as to damages first given to the Court on 26 September 2014.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

2.The injunctions ordered by Foster J on Wednesday, 1 October 2014 be discharged.

3.Leave be granted to the applicants to amend their Originating Application and Statement of Claim in such manner as they may be advised, such amended documents to be filed and served by 24 October 2014.

4.The respondent file and serve its Defence by 5 November 2014.

5.Both parties have liberty to apply on three (3) days’ notice or on such shorter notice as a Judge might allow.

6.The costs of and incidental to the proceeding up to and including this day (3 October 2014) be costs in the proceeding.

7.The proceeding (including the respondent’s Interlocutory Application filed on 1 October 2014) be listed for directions at 9.15 am on 7 November 2014 before the A.C.T. List Judge.

THE COURT ALSO NOTES THAT:

8.The respondent by its Counsel hereby undertakes to the Court that, until further order, it will not supply information to anyone, other than in the ordinary course of its business, and other than the information set out in paragraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 17 of the affidavit of Gail Menegon sworn on 1 October 2014 to Mr Richard Metcalfe, namely:

(a)Two generation of pedigrees for the eight youngest age groups of…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1127
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Buller v Murray Grey Beef Cattle Society Limited was a case before the Federal Court of Australia. The dispute arose between two members of the Murray Grey Beef Cattle Society Limited (MGBCS), Buller and Metcalfe, regarding the provision of certain data by MGBCS to Metcalfe. The data in question was originally supplied to MGBCS by Metcalfe. The case centred on whether MGBCS should be restrained from providing proprietary information to Metcalfe. The court was required to decide on the applicability of contract law, the Corporations Act, and the principles governing interlocutory injunctions.

The court examined whether Buller and Metcalfe had a contractual cause of action against MGBCS based on the society's constitution and the Corporations Act. It also considered whether the directors of MGBCS had breached their duties under the Corporations Act, and whether MGBCS's actions were oppressive towards its members, warranting intervention under the Corporations Act. Furthermore, the court had to determine whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted to prevent MGBCS from providing the information to Metcalfe.

The court found that Buller and Metcalfe's contractual claim based on the society's constitution and the Corporations Act was not substantiated, as the claim would require the corporation's leave to sue and other assistance from the court, which had not been sought. The court also found that the directors of MGBCS were not parties to the proceeding. Regarding the oppressive conduct claim, the court determined that the matter was not ripe for determination on an interlocutory basis. Finally, the court found that Buller and Metcalfe had not established a sufficient likelihood of success in their claim to justify the preservation of the status quo pending the trial, nor had they demonstrated that the balance of convenience and justice favoured the grant of an interlocutory injunction.

The court discharged the injunctions previously ordered, granted leave to Buller and Metcalfe to amend their Originating Application and Statement of Claim, and set timelines for filing the Defence and listing the proceeding for directions. The court also noted that MGBCS would not supply information to anyone, other than in the ordinary course of its business, until further order.

Orders

Orders of the court

2. The injunctions ordered by Foster J on Wednesday, 1 October 2014 be discharged.

3. Leave be granted to the applicants to amend their Originating Application and Statement of Claim in such manner as they may be advised, such amended documents to be filed and served by 24 October 2014.

4. The respondent file and serve its Defence by 5 November 2014.

5. Both parties have liberty to apply on three (3) days’ notice or on such shorter notice as a Judge might allow.

6. The costs of and incidental to the proceeding up to and including this day (3 October 2014) be costs in the proceeding.

7. The proceeding (including the respondent’s Interlocutory Application filed on 1 October 2014) be listed for directions at 9.15 am on 7 November 2014 before the A.C.T. List Judge.

THE COURT ALSO NOTES THAT:

8. The respondent by its Counsel hereby undertakes to the Court that, until further order, it will not supply information to anyone, other than in the ordinary course of its business, and other than the information set out in paragraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 17 of the affidavit of Gail Menegon sworn on 1 October 2014 to Mr Richard Metcalfe, namely:

(a) Two generation of pedigrees for the eight youngest age groups of Mr Metcalfe’s cattle, including all the cattle originally in that age group whether they are still active or not.

(b) The results of all genetic testing of all those animals.

(c) The actual blood percentage of Angus and Murray Grey in all those animals.

(d) All raw data supplied to the Agricultural Business Research Institute Ltd (ACN 058 555 623) that is relevant to those animals.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before discussing the issues in more detail it is necessary to set out some relevant facts.THE RELEVANT FACTSThe Breedplan The Breedplan is a breed plan utilised by MGBCS. However, it was conceived and operated by ABRI. According to literature published by ABRI, the program which it uses is the national beef recording system for Australia and for several other countries. The Breedplan uses an advanced modern genetic evaluation system (based on best linear unbiased prediction) and technology incorporating multi-trait analysis procedures to produce EBVs for recorded cattle across a range of important production traits. The Breedplan technology can be used at a number of levels, such as within herd analyses for individual breeders, across herd analyses for members of a breed association (or breeding group) or for international genetic evaluation where breed associations from a number of countries pool their data for analysis. The rationale for this is simple according to ABRI: The larger the population of cattle being evaluated, the higher the chance of finding elite genetic material which can then be rapidly disseminated using modern artificial breeding techniques. For the purposes of the present application, it is not necessary to traverse the ideas behind or the attributes of the Breedplan to any greater extent than I have done at [12] and [13] above. When this proceeding was commenced last Friday, as I understood the case being sought to be mounted by the applicants, the matter of immediate concern from their perspective was the circumstance that MGBCS intended to provide to Mr Metcalfe and, ultimately, to the Angus Society, EBVs in respect of Mr Metcalfe’s cattle. This proposal, as it was then explained to me, would involve the provision of proprietary information held by MGBCS or by ABRI on behalf of MGBCS being information which is the product of calculations of some complexity performed by the software in the Breedplan and which goes far beyond the mere reproduction of raw data. The evidence before me at the moment does not provide any detail as to the nature of the business arrangements between MGBCS and ABRI. However, for present purposes, I propose to assume that, as I have already said, the EBVs which reside in MGBCS’s database or in ABRI’s database held on behalf of MGBCS is proprietary information belonging to MGBCS.The Current Dispute When the matter was brought before me last Friday, I was given the impression, based upon the evidence then led, that the dispute had arisen quite recently – indeed, as recently as the Monday before (22 September 2014). Having been told this, I was critical of the applicants for not bringing their application before the Court earlier or, at least, for not bringing their interlocutory application on the usual basis, that is to say, supported by affidavit evidence. However, I was also told that a meeting of the directors of MGBCS was scheduled for Monday 29 September 2014, at which time it was proposed that those directors would resolve to provide to Mr Metcalfe the information which he had requested and that the matter was, for that reason, extremely urgent. These circumstances led me to deal with the matter on an urgent basis notwithstanding the applicants’ delay.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The third basis upon which Counsel relied was s 232 and s 233 of the Corporations Act which give to the Court power to make a range of orders in circumstances where a corporation’s affairs have been conducted in an oppressive manner towards one or more of its members. In particular, Counsel submitted that his clients had engaged the Court’s jurisdiction under s 233(1)(i) of the Corporations Act and that the Court could, and would, in due course grant injunctive relief restraining MGBCS from providing to Mr Metcalfe the information which he now seeks. DECISION The principles upon which interlocutory injunctions will be granted in this Court are well settled. As the majority of the High Court said in Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Proprietary Limited v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1 at 32 [35]: … The general principle which informs the exercise of the power to grant interlocutory relief is that the court may make such orders, at least against the parties to the proceeding against whom final relief might be granted, as are needed to ensure the effective exercise of the jurisdiction invoked. The Federal Court had jurisdiction to make interlocutory orders to prevent frustration of its processes in the present proceeding. In Samsung Electronics Company Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238 at 256–262 [52]–[74], the Full Court articulated and summarised the principles as explained by the High Court in a number of cases. For present purposes, I need only refer to 256 [52]–[53], 257–258 [57] and 260–261 [62]–[68]: 52In Lenah Game Meats, a majority of the High Court held that, where an interlocutory injunction is sought (inter alia) in respect of private rights, it is necessary to identify the legal or equitable rights which are to be determined at the trial and in respect of which the final relief is sought. As Gleeson CJ said at [15]: If the respondent cannot show a sufficient colour of right of the kind sought to be vindicated by final relief, the foundation of the claim for interlocutory relief disappears. See also [8]–[21] (per Gleeson CJ); [59]–[61] (per Gaudron J); and [86]–[92]; [98]–[100]; and [105] (per Gummow and Hayne JJ). At [10], Gleeson CJ also specifically cited with approval Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies (5th ed, 1997) pp 446-456. 53At [13], Gleeson CJ expressly approved the following passage from the judgment of Mason ACJ in Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 at 153: In order to secure such an injunction the plaintiff must show (1) that there is a serious question to be tried or that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury for which damages will not be an adequate compensation unless an injunction is granted; and (3) that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction.…57In O’Neill at [65], Gummow and Hayne JJ said that the relevant principles were those explained in Beecham. Gleeson CJ and Crennan J agreed with that proposition. When referring to the well-known passage in Beecham at 622-623 (which we have extracted at [55] above), Gummow and Hayne JJ then said, at [65], that, when considering an application for an interlocutory injunction, the Court must address itself to two main inquiries (viz has the plaintiff established a prima facie case in the sense explained in Beecham and does the balance of convenience and justice favour the grant of an injunction or the refusal of that relief). Their Honours then observed: By using the phrase “prima facie case”, their Honours did not mean that the plaintiff must show that it is more probable than not that at trial the plaintiff will succeed; it is sufficient that the plaintiff show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial. That this was the sense in which the Court was referring to the notion of a prima facie case is apparent from an observation to that effect made by Kitto J in the course of argument [(1968) 118 CLR 618 at 620]. With reference to the first inquiry, the Court continued, in a statement of central importance for this appeal [(1968) 118 CLR 618 at 622]: How strong the probability needs to be depends, no doubt, upon the nature of the rights [the plaintiff] asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the order he seeks. …62The assessment of harm to the plaintiff, if there is no injunction, and the assessment of prejudice or harm to the defendant, if an injunction is granted, is at the heart of the basket of discretionary considerations which must be addressed and weighed as part of the Court’s consideration of the balance of convenience and justice. The question of whether damages will be an adequate remedy for the alleged infringement of the plaintiff’s rights will always need to be considered when the Court has an application for interlocutory injunctive relief before it. It may or may not be determinative in any given case. That question involves an assessment by the Court as to whether the plaintiff would, in all material respects, be in as good a position if he were confined to his damages remedy, as he would be in if an injunction were granted (see the discussion of this aspect in Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies (8th ed, 2010) at pp 383-389, 397-399 and 457-462). 63The interaction between the Court’s assessment of the likely harm to the plaintiff, if no injunction is granted, and its assessment of the adequacy of damages as a remedy, will always be an important factor in the Court’s determination of where the balance of convenience and justice lies. To elevate these matters into a separate and antecedent inquiry as part of a requirement in every case that the plaintiff establish “irreparable injury” is, in our judgment, to adopt too rigid an approach. These matters are best left to be considered as part of the Court’s assessment of the balance of convenience and justice even though they will inevitably fall to be considered in most cases and will almost always be important considerations to be taken into account. 64Gleeson CJ also observed in Lenah Game Meats (at [18]), that, where there is little or no room for argument about the legal basis of the applicant’s claimed private right, the court will be more easily persuaded at an interlocutory stage that a prima facie case has been established. The court will then move on to consider discretionary considerations, including the balance of convenience and justice. But, as his Honour also observed at [18]: The extent to which it is necessary, or appropriate, to examine the legal merits of a plaintiff’s claim for final relief, in determining whether to grant an interlocutory injunction, will depend upon the circumstances of the case. There is no inflexible rule. 65The resolution of the question of where the balance of convenience and justice lies requires the Court to exercise a discretion. 66In exercising that discretion, the Court is required to assess and compare the prejudice and hardship likely to be suffered by the defendant, third persons and the public generally if an injunction is granted, with that which is likely to be suffered by the plaintiff if no injunction is granted. In determining this question, the Court must make an assessment of the likelihood that the final relief (if granted) will adequately compensate the plaintiff for the continuing breaches which will have occurred between the date of the interlocutory hearing and the date when final relief might be expected to be granted. 67As Sundberg J observed in Sigma Pharmaceuticals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Wyeth (2009) 81 IPR 339 at [15], when considering whether to grant an interlocutory injunction, the issue of whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case and whether the balance of convenience and justice favours the grant of an injunction are related inquiries. The question of whether there is a serious question or a prima facie case should not be considered in isolation from the balance of convenience. The apparent strength of the parties’ substantive cases will often be an important consideration to be weighed in the balance: Tidy Tea Ltd v Unilever Australia Ltd (1995) 32 IPR 405 at [416] per Burchett J; Aktiebolaget Hassle v Biochemie Australia Pty Ltd (2003) 57 IPR 1 at [31] per Sackville J; Hexal Australia Pty Ltd v Roche Therapeutics Inc (2005) 66 IPR 325 at [18] per Stone J; and Castlemaine Tooheys at 154 per Mason ACJ. 68It may also be necessary to consider and evaluate the impact that the grant or refusal of an injunction will have or is likely to have on third persons and the public generally.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Senior Counsel who appeared for the applicants on Wednesday of this week submitted that the applicants had a cause of action in contract (with the aid of s 140 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Corporations Act)), whereby they were entitled to enforce cl 37(3) of the Constitution of MGBCS against MGBCS itself. That is to say, the proposition was that the proposal to provide to Mr Metcalfe the limited information which the Board of directors of MGBCS now intends to provide to him would constitute a transfer of the main undertaking of MGBCS and, in the absence of the approval of its members in general meeting, would be susceptible to being restrained at the suit of individual members. The second cause of action relied upon by the applicants is based upon s 180 and s 182 of the Corporations Act. Those provisions impose duties upon the directors of MGBCS. Counsel did not explain exactly how the applicants put their case based upon those provisions. If the applicants wish to agitate the corporation’s rights against its directors under those provisions, that case would need to be brought in the name of the corporation and under the provisions of Pt 2F.1A of the Corporations Act. Before bringing such an action, the applicants would need the leave of the Court to sue in the name of MGBCS. They would also require other assistance from the Court. No such leave or assistance has yet been sought from the Court. In any event, the directors of MGBCS are not parties to this proceeding. The third basis upon which Counsel relied was s 232 and s 233 of the Corporations Act which give to the Court power to make a range of orders in circumstances where a corporation’s affairs have been conducted in an oppressive manner towards one or more of its members. In particular, Counsel submitted that his clients had engaged the Court’s jurisdiction under s 233(1)(i) of the Corporations Act and that the Court could, and would, in due course grant injunctive relief restraining MGBCS from providing to Mr Metcalfe the information which he now seeks. DECISION The principles upon which interlocutory injunctions will be granted in this Court are well settled. As the majority of the High Court said in Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Proprietary Limited v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1 at 32 [35]: … The general principle which informs the exercise of the power to grant interlocutory relief is that the court may make such orders, at least against the parties to the proceeding against whom final relief might be granted, as are needed to ensure the effective exercise of the jurisdiction invoked. The Federal Court had jurisdiction to make interlocutory orders to prevent frustration of its processes in the present proceeding. In Samsung Electronics Company Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238 at 256–262 [52]–[74], the Full Court articulated and summarised the principles as explained by the High Court in a number of cases. For present purposes, I need only refer to 256 [52]–[53], 257–258 [57] and 260–261 [62]–[68]: 52In Lenah Game Meats, a majority of the High Court held that, where an interlocutory injunction is sought (inter alia) in respect of private rights, it is necessary to identify the legal or equitable rights which are to be determined at the trial and in respect of which the final relief is sought. As Gleeson CJ said at [15]: If the respondent cannot show a sufficient colour of right of the kind sought to be vindicated by final relief, the foundation of the claim for interlocutory relief disappears. See also [8]–[21] (per Gleeson CJ); [59]–[61] (per Gaudron J); and [86]–[92]; [98]–[100]; and [105] (per Gummow and Hayne JJ). At [10], Gleeson CJ also specifically cited with approval Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies (5th ed, 1997) pp 446-456. 53At [13], Gleeson CJ expressly approved the following passage from the judgment of Mason ACJ in Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 at 153: In order to secure such an injunction the plaintiff must show (1) that there is a serious question to be tried or that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury for which damages will not be an adequate compensation unless an injunction is granted; and (3) that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction.…57In O’Neill at [65], Gummow and Hayne JJ said that the relevant principles were those explained in Beecham. Gleeson CJ and Crennan J agreed with that proposition. When referring to the well-known passage in Beecham at 622-623 (which we have extracted at [55] above), Gummow and Hayne JJ then said, at [65], that, when considering an application for an interlocutory injunction, the Court must address itself to two main inquiries (viz has the plaintiff established a prima facie case in the sense explained in Beecham and does the balance of convenience and justice favour the grant of an injunction or the refusal of that relief). Their Honours then observed: By using the phrase “prima facie case”, their Honours did not mean that the plaintiff must show that it is more probable than not that at trial the plaintiff will succeed; it is sufficient that the plaintiff show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial. That this was the sense in which the Court was referring to the notion of a prima facie case is apparent from an observation to that effect made by Kitto J in the course of argument [(1968) 118 CLR 618 at 620]. With reference to the first inquiry, the Court continued, in a statement of central importance for this appeal [(1968) 118 CLR 618 at 622]: How strong the probability needs to be depends, no doubt, upon the nature of the rights [the plaintiff] asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the order he seeks. …62The assessment of harm to the plaintiff, if there is no injunction, and the assessment of prejudice or harm to the defendant, if an injunction is granted, is at the heart of the basket of discretionary considerations which must be addressed and weighed as part of the Court’s consideration of the balance of convenience and justice. The question of whether damages will be an adequate remedy for the alleged infringement of the plaintiff’s rights will always need to be considered when the Court has an application for interlocutory injunctive relief before it. It may or may not be determinative in any given case. That question involves an assessment by the Court as to whether the plaintiff would, in all material respects, be in as good a position if he were confined to his damages remedy, as he would be in if an injunction were granted (see the discussion of this aspect in Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies (8th ed, 2010) at pp 383-389, 397-399 and 457-462). 63The interaction between the Court’s assessment of the likely harm to the plaintiff, if no injunction is granted, and its assessment of the adequacy of damages as a remedy, will always be an important factor in the Court’s determination of where the balance of convenience and justice lies. To elevate these matters into a separate and antecedent inquiry as part of a requirement in every case that the plaintiff establish “irreparable injury” is, in our judgment, to adopt too rigid an approach. These matters are best left to be considered as part of the Court’s assessment of the balance of convenience and justice even though they will inevitably fall to be considered in most cases and will almost always be important considerations to be taken into account. 64Gleeson CJ also observed in Lenah Game Meats (at [18]), that, where there is little or no room for argument about the legal basis of the applicant’s claimed private right, the court will be more easily persuaded at an interlocutory stage that a prima facie case has been established. The court will then move on to consider discretionary considerations, including the balance of convenience and justice. But, as his Honour also observed at [18]: The extent to which it is necessary, or appropriate, to examine the legal merits of a plaintiff’s claim for final relief, in determining whether to grant an interlocutory injunction, will depend upon the circumstances of the case. There is no inflexible rule. 65The resolution of the question of where the balance of convenience and justice lies requires the Court to exercise a discretion. 66In exercising that discretion, the Court is required to assess and compare the prejudice and hardship likely to be suffered by the defendant, third persons and the public generally if an injunction is granted, with that which is likely to be suffered by the plaintiff if no injunction is granted. In determining this question, the Court must make an assessment of the likelihood that the final relief (if granted) will adequately compensate the plaintiff for the continuing breaches which will have occurred between the date of the interlocutory hearing and the date when final relief might be expected to be granted. 67As Sundberg J observed in Sigma Pharmaceuticals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Wyeth (2009) 81 IPR 339 at [15], when considering whether to grant an interlocutory injunction, the issue of whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case and whether the balance of convenience and justice favours the grant of an injunction are related inquiries. The question of whether there is a serious question or a prima facie case should not be considered in isolation from the balance of convenience. The apparent strength of the parties’ substantive cases will often be an important consideration to be weighed in the balance: Tidy Tea Ltd v Unilever Australia Ltd (1995) 32 IPR 405 at [416] per Burchett J; Aktiebolaget Hassle v Biochemie Australia Pty Ltd (2003) 57 IPR 1 at [31] per Sackville J; Hexal Australia Pty Ltd v Roche Therapeutics Inc (2005) 66 IPR 325 at [18] per Stone J; and Castlemaine Tooheys at 154 per Mason ACJ. 68It may also be necessary to consider and evaluate the impact that the grant or refusal of an injunction will have or is likely to have on third persons and the public generally.