FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Buller v Murray Grey Beef Cattle Society Limited [2014] FCA 1127
Citation: Buller v Murray Grey Beef Cattle Society Limited [2014] FCA 1127 Parties: GARY RAYMOND BULLER and MARGARET HUNTER v MURRAY GREY BEEF CATTLE SOCIETY LIMITED (ACN 083 111 406) File number: ACD 96 of 2014 Judge: FOSTER J Date of judgment: 3 October 2014 Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – whether the Court should restrain an incorporated association of cattle breeders on an interlocutory basis at the suit of two of its members from providing pedigree information and other raw data contained in the corporation’s database to another member being information which was originally provided to the corporation by that other member Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 140, 180, 182, 232, 233, Pt 2F.1A Cases cited: Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Proprietary Limited v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1
Samsung Electronics Company Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238Date of hearing:
1 October 2014
Place:
Sydney (via video link to Canberra)
Division:
GENERAL DIVISION
Category:
Catchwords
Number of paragraphs:
59
Counsel for the Applicants:
Mr P Walker SC
Solicitor for the Applicants:
Aulich Civil Law Pty Ltd
Counsel for the Respondent:
Ms AE Munro
Solicitor for the Respondent:
APJ Law
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
ACD 96 of 2014
BETWEEN: GARY RAYMOND BULLER
First ApplicantMARGARET HUNTER
Second ApplicantAND: MURRAY GREY BEEF CATTLE SOCIETY LIMITED (ACN 083 111 406)
Respondent
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 OCTOBER 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
1.The applicants by their solicitor continue the undertaking as to damages first given to the Court on 26 September 2014.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
2.The injunctions ordered by Foster J on Wednesday, 1 October 2014 be discharged.
3.Leave be granted to the applicants to amend their Originating Application and Statement of Claim in such manner as they may be advised, such amended documents to be filed and served by 24 October 2014.
4.The respondent file and serve its Defence by 5 November 2014.
5.Both parties have liberty to apply on three (3) days’ notice or on such shorter notice as a Judge might allow.
6.The costs of and incidental to the proceeding up to and including this day (3 October 2014) be costs in the proceeding.
7.The proceeding (including the respondent’s Interlocutory Application filed on 1 October 2014) be listed for directions at 9.15 am on 7 November 2014 before the A.C.T. List Judge.
THE COURT ALSO NOTES THAT:
8.The respondent by its Counsel hereby undertakes to the Court that, until further order, it will not supply information to anyone, other than in the ordinary course of its business, and other than the information set out in paragraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 17 of the affidavit of Gail Menegon sworn on 1 October 2014 to Mr Richard Metcalfe, namely:
(a)Two generation of pedigrees for the eight youngest age groups of…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 1127
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether Buller and Metcalfe had a contractual cause of action against MGBCS based on the society's constitution and the Corporations Act. It also considered whether the directors of MGBCS had breached their duties under the Corporations Act, and whether MGBCS's actions were oppressive towards its members, warranting intervention under the Corporations Act. Furthermore, the court had to determine whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted to prevent MGBCS from providing the information to Metcalfe.
The court found that Buller and Metcalfe's contractual claim based on the society's constitution and the Corporations Act was not substantiated, as the claim would require the corporation's leave to sue and other assistance from the court, which had not been sought. The court also found that the directors of MGBCS were not parties to the proceeding. Regarding the oppressive conduct claim, the court determined that the matter was not ripe for determination on an interlocutory basis. Finally, the court found that Buller and Metcalfe had not established a sufficient likelihood of success in their claim to justify the preservation of the status quo pending the trial, nor had they demonstrated that the balance of convenience and justice favoured the grant of an interlocutory injunction.
The court discharged the injunctions previously ordered, granted leave to Buller and Metcalfe to amend their Originating Application and Statement of Claim, and set timelines for filing the Defence and listing the proceeding for directions. The court also noted that MGBCS would not supply information to anyone, other than in the ordinary course of its business, until further order.
Orders
Orders of the court
2. The injunctions ordered by Foster J on Wednesday, 1 October 2014 be discharged.
3. Leave be granted to the applicants to amend their Originating Application and Statement of Claim in such manner as they may be advised, such amended documents to be filed and served by 24 October 2014.
4. The respondent file and serve its Defence by 5 November 2014.
5. Both parties have liberty to apply on three (3) days’ notice or on such shorter notice as a Judge might allow.
6. The costs of and incidental to the proceeding up to and including this day (3 October 2014) be costs in the proceeding.
7. The proceeding (including the respondent’s Interlocutory Application filed on 1 October 2014) be listed for directions at 9.15 am on 7 November 2014 before the A.C.T. List Judge.
THE COURT ALSO NOTES THAT:
8. The respondent by its Counsel hereby undertakes to the Court that, until further order, it will not supply information to anyone, other than in the ordinary course of its business, and other than the information set out in paragraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 17 of the affidavit of Gail Menegon sworn on 1 October 2014 to Mr Richard Metcalfe, namely:
(a) Two generation of pedigrees for the eight youngest age groups of Mr Metcalfe’s cattle, including all the cattle originally in that age group whether they are still active or not.
(b) The results of all genetic testing of all those animals.
(c) The actual blood percentage of Angus and Murray Grey in all those animals.
(d) All raw data supplied to the Agricultural Business Research Institute Ltd (ACN 058 555 623) that is relevant to those animals.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Senior Counsel who appeared for the applicants on Wednesday of this week submitted that the applicants had a cause of action in contract (with the aid of s 140 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Corporations Act)), whereby they were entitled to enforce cl 37(3) of the Constitution of MGBCS against MGBCS itself. That is to say, the proposition was that the proposal to provide to Mr Metcalfe the limited information which the Board of directors of MGBCS now intends to provide to him would constitute a transfer of the main undertaking of MGBCS and, in the absence of the approval of its members in general meeting, would be susceptible to being restrained at the suit of individual members. The second cause of action relied upon by the applicants is based upon s 180 and s 182 of the Corporations Act. Those provisions impose duties upon the directors of MGBCS. Counsel did not explain exactly how the applicants put their case based upon those provisions. If the applicants wish to agitate the corporation’s rights against its directors under those provisions, that case would need to be brought in the name of the corporation and under the provisions of Pt 2F.1A of the Corporations Act. Before bringing such an action, the applicants would need the leave of the Court to sue in the name of MGBCS. They would also require other assistance from the Court. No such leave or assistance has yet been sought from the Court. In any event, the directors of MGBCS are not parties to this proceeding. The third basis upon which Counsel relied was s 232 and s 233 of the Corporations Act which give to the Court power to make a range of orders in circumstances where a corporation’s affairs have been conducted in an oppressive manner towards one or more of its members. In particular, Counsel submitted that his clients had engaged the Court’s jurisdiction under s 233(1)(i) of the Corporations Act and that the Court could, and would, in due course grant injunctive relief restraining MGBCS from providing to Mr Metcalfe the information which he now seeks. DECISION The principles upon which interlocutory injunctions will be granted in this Court are well settled. As the majority of the High Court said in Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Proprietary Limited v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1 at 32 [35]: … The general principle which informs the exercise of the power to grant interlocutory relief is that the court may make such orders, at least against the parties to the proceeding against whom final relief might be granted, as are needed to ensure the effective exercise of the jurisdiction invoked. The Federal Court had jurisdiction to make interlocutory orders to prevent frustration of its processes in the present proceeding. In Samsung Electronics Company Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238 at 256–262 [52]–[74], the Full Court articulated and summarised the principles as explained by the High Court in a number of cases. For present purposes, I need only refer to 256 [52]–[53], 257–258 [57] and 260–261 [62]–[68]: 52In Lenah Game Meats, a majority of the High Court held that, where an interlocutory injunction is sought (inter alia) in respect of private rights, it is necessary to identify the legal or equitable rights which are to be determined at the trial and in respect of which the final relief is sought. As Gleeson CJ said at [15]: If the respondent cannot show a sufficient colour of right of the kind sought to be vindicated by final relief, the foundation of the claim for interlocutory relief disappears. See also [8]–[21] (per Gleeson CJ); [59]–[61] (per Gaudron J); and [86]–[92]; [98]–[100]; and [105] (per Gummow and Hayne JJ). At [10], Gleeson CJ also specifically cited with approval Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies (5th ed, 1997) pp 446-456. 53At [13], Gleeson CJ expressly approved the following passage from the judgment of Mason ACJ in Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 at 153: In order to secure such an injunction the plaintiff must show (1) that there is a serious question to be tried or that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury for which damages will not be an adequate compensation unless an injunction is granted; and (3) that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction.…57In O’Neill at [65], Gummow and Hayne JJ said that the relevant principles were those explained in Beecham. Gleeson CJ and Crennan J agreed with that proposition. When referring to the well-known passage in Beecham at 622-623 (which we have extracted at [55] above), Gummow and Hayne JJ then said, at [65], that, when considering an application for an interlocutory injunction, the Court must address itself to two main inquiries (viz has the plaintiff established a prima facie case in the sense explained in Beecham and does the balance of convenience and justice favour the grant of an injunction or the refusal of that relief). Their Honours then observed: By using the phrase “prima facie case”, their Honours did not mean that the plaintiff must show that it is more probable than not that at trial the plaintiff will succeed; it is sufficient that the plaintiff show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial. That this was the sense in which the Court was referring to the notion of a prima facie case is apparent from an observation to that effect made by Kitto J in the course of argument [(1968) 118 CLR 618 at 620]. With reference to the first inquiry, the Court continued, in a statement of central importance for this appeal [(1968) 118 CLR 618 at 622]: How strong the probability needs to be depends, no doubt, upon the nature of the rights [the plaintiff] asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the order he seeks. …62The assessment of harm to the plaintiff, if there is no injunction, and the assessment of prejudice or harm to the defendant, if an injunction is granted, is at the heart of the basket of discretionary considerations which must be addressed and weighed as part of the Court’s consideration of the balance of convenience and justice. The question of whether damages will be an adequate remedy for the alleged infringement of the plaintiff’s rights will always need to be considered when the Court has an application for interlocutory injunctive relief before it. It may or may not be determinative in any given case. That question involves an assessment by the Court as to whether the plaintiff would, in all material respects, be in as good a position if he were confined to his damages remedy, as he would be in if an injunction were granted (see the discussion of this aspect in Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies (8th ed, 2010) at pp 383-389, 397-399 and 457-462). 63The interaction between the Court’s assessment of the likely harm to the plaintiff, if no injunction is granted, and its assessment of the adequacy of damages as a remedy, will always be an important factor in the Court’s determination of where the balance of convenience and justice lies. To elevate these matters into a separate and antecedent inquiry as part of a requirement in every case that the plaintiff establish “irreparable injury” is, in our judgment, to adopt too rigid an approach. These matters are best left to be considered as part of the Court’s assessment of the balance of convenience and justice even though they will inevitably fall to be considered in most cases and will almost always be important considerations to be taken into account. 64Gleeson CJ also observed in Lenah Game Meats (at [18]), that, where there is little or no room for argument about the legal basis of the applicant’s claimed private right, the court will be more easily persuaded at an interlocutory stage that a prima facie case has been established. The court will then move on to consider discretionary considerations, including the balance of convenience and justice. But, as his Honour also observed at [18]: The extent to which it is necessary, or appropriate, to examine the legal merits of a plaintiff’s claim for final relief, in determining whether to grant an interlocutory injunction, will depend upon the circumstances of the case. There is no inflexible rule. 65The resolution of the question of where the balance of convenience and justice lies requires the Court to exercise a discretion. 66In exercising that discretion, the Court is required to assess and compare the prejudice and hardship likely to be suffered by the defendant, third persons and the public generally if an injunction is granted, with that which is likely to be suffered by the plaintiff if no injunction is granted. In determining this question, the Court must make an assessment of the likelihood that the final relief (if granted) will adequately compensate the plaintiff for the continuing breaches which will have occurred between the date of the interlocutory hearing and the date when final relief might be expected to be granted. 67As Sundberg J observed in Sigma Pharmaceuticals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Wyeth (2009) 81 IPR 339 at [15], when considering whether to grant an interlocutory injunction, the issue of whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case and whether the balance of convenience and justice favours the grant of an injunction are related inquiries. The question of whether there is a serious question or a prima facie case should not be considered in isolation from the balance of convenience. The apparent strength of the parties’ substantive cases will often be an important consideration to be weighed in the balance: Tidy Tea Ltd v Unilever Australia Ltd (1995) 32 IPR 405 at [416] per Burchett J; Aktiebolaget Hassle v Biochemie Australia Pty Ltd (2003) 57 IPR 1 at [31] per Sackville J; Hexal Australia Pty Ltd v Roche Therapeutics Inc (2005) 66 IPR 325 at [18] per Stone J; and Castlemaine Tooheys at 154 per Mason ACJ. 68It may also be necessary to consider and evaluate the impact that the grant or refusal of an injunction will have or is likely to have on third persons and the public generally.