Building Careers Australia Pty Ltd v D'Limi

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   BUILDING CAREERS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD -v- D'LIMI [2020] WASC 409

CORAM:   MASTER SANDERSON

HEARD:   11 & 14 SEPTEMBER 2020

DELIVERED          :   15 SEPTEMBER 2020

PUBLISHED           :   13 NOVEMBER 2020

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1861 of 2020

BETWEEN:   BUILDING CAREERS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

Plaintiff

AND

LEZLY KAYE KATHLEENA D'LIMI

First Defendant

OCEANIA NOMINEES PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE D'LIMI FAMILY TRUST

Second Defendant

OCEANIA NOMINEES PTY LTD

Third Defendant


Catchwords:

Employment agreement - Application to restrain former employee competing with former employer - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Limited injunction granted

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff : CS Williams
First Defendant : M Holler
Second Defendant : M Holler
Third Defendant : M Holler

Solicitors:

Plaintiff : Solomon Brothers
First Defendant : Morgan Alteruthemeyer Legal Group
Second Defendant : Morgan Alteruthemeyer Legal Group
Third Defendant : Morgan Alteruthemeyer Legal Group

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Austral Ships v Clay [2018] WASC 178

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neil (2006) 227 CLR 57

Crowe Horwarth (Aust) Pty Ltd v Loone [2017] VSCA 181

Smith v Nomad Modula Building Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 169

MASTER SANDERSON:

  1. This is the plaintiff's application for interim injunctions.  Later in these reasons I will set out the precise form of orders sought by the plaintiff.  For present purposes it is enough if I say that as against the second and third defendants, the plaintiff seeks to enforce a restraint of trade agreement.  As against all of the defendants, they seek an injunction restraining the use by the defendants of the plaintiff's confidential information.  The matter first came on for hearing on 20 August 2020.  At that time I made relevantly the following order:

    2. Until further order, each of the defendants be:

    (i) required to forthwith destroy all copies of a document comprising a spreadsheet titled 'Companies' ('the Document') and any other documents or other records, constituting or recording any information derived from the Document; and

    (ii) restrained from making any use of or disclosing to any third parties the Document or any information contained within the Document.

  2. The matter was then programmed through to a full hearing on 11 September 2020.  At that hearing the plaintiff relied on eight affidavits sworn by various persons.  The defendants relied on three affidavits sworn by the first defendant and three further affidavits.  From time to time in these reasons I will refer to the affidavit material.  However the plaintiff provided a statement of claim which was indorsed on the writ of summons.  It is convenient to outline its cause of action against the defendants by reference to that pleading.

  3. The plaintiff carries on a business involving a recruitment of permanent and temporary employees in the construction and mining sectors in Western Australia.  The second and third defendants are the same company – for some reason the plaintiff has issued proceedings against the company in its own right and in its capacity as the trustee of the D'Limi…

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Details
Case
[2020] WASC 409
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Building Careers Australia Pty Ltd v D'Limi, Building Careers Australia Pty Ltd (the plaintiff) sought an interlocutory injunction against D'Limi and her company Oceania to restrain them from competing with the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that D'Limi, a former employee, was now providing similar services to the plaintiff under a contractor agreement with Oceania, in breach of a restraint of trade clause in her employment contract. The primary legal issues the court had to decide were whether the plaintiff had demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits to justify the preservation of the status quo pending trial, and whether the balance of convenience favoured the grant of the injunction. The court had to assess whether the restraint of trade clause was reasonable and enforceable, taking into account various factors such as the nature of the employer's business, the employee's position, access to confidential information, and the duration of the employment.

The court examined the principles governing applications for interlocutory injunctions and the specific legal issues relating to restraint of trade clauses in employment contracts. It noted that such clauses are void unless they are reasonable, and reasonableness depends on factors including the interests of the parties and the public. The court also highlighted that the validity of a restraint must be assessed at the time of the contract. In this case, the court considered the affidavit evidence provided by the plaintiff, which suggested that D'Limi had requested to be engaged as a contractor through her company instead of being directly employed by the plaintiff. The court acknowledged that its role was not to make binding findings of fact at this stage but to determine if there was a serious question to be tried and whether the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction.

The court concluded that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case for the injunction as there was a serious question to be tried regarding whether D'Limi was engaged under a contractor agreement in breach of the restraint of trade clause. However, the court found that the balance of convenience did not favour the grant of the injunction, primarily because the plaintiff had not demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted. The court emphasised that the plaintiff's inability to identify any actual loss or damage caused by D'Limi's actions was a significant factor in its decision. Therefore, the court declined to grant the interlocutory injunction.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There was no dispute between the parties as to the principles that apply to applications for an interlocutory injunction. The two enquiries are whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, being the demonstration of a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in all the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending trial and whether the balance of convenience favours the grant of the injunction. How strong the likelihood of success needs to be depends upon the nature of the rights the plaintiff asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the orders the plaintiff seeks: see Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neil (2006) 227 CLR 57 [81] – [84]. The leading authority on restraint of trade provisions in employment contracts in Western Australia is the Court of Appeal decision in Smith v Nomad Modula Building Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 169. The general principles in respect of restraint of trade clauses were recently recited in Austral Ships v Clay [2018] WASC 178 [56] – [66] per Smith AJ. Against that background, a number of points can be highlighted. First, the starting position is that restraints of trade will be void as contrary to public policy unless they are reasonable; reasonableness being assessed by reference to the interests of the parties concerned and by reference to the interest of the public. Second, the validity of this restraint must be decided as at the date of contract. Third, whether a restraint of trade is reasonable is a question of law, which depends on the true construction and legal effect of the contract. Fourthly, the factors that are to be taken into account in determining whether a restraint of trade provision is reasonable include the nature of the employer's business, the nature of the employee's position, whether the employee has had access to confidential information of the employer, the relationship of the employee with clients and other employees of the business, the duration of the employment, the extent of the consideration provided by the employer for the restraint and the likely duration of the former employee's personal relationship with customers of the employer. Before dealing with the relevant facts, I should make the point that it is not my role on an application for an interlocutory injunction to make any binding finding of fact. What I have to determine is whether there is a serious question to be tried and whether the balance of convenience favours granting the injunction. On that basis, the analysis which follows of the relevant surrounding circumstances should not be seen as in any way determinative of any issue. Matters may emerge at trial which are not evident in the affidavit material. Really the matters to be determined at trial differ significantly from the matters which are to be determined on this application. There is a major difference between the parties as to whether or not the second defendant was engaged by the plaintiff under the Contract Agreement. The circumstances under which that Contract or Agreement are alleged by the plaintiff to have been entered into are found in the affidavit of Niall Peter Conlon affirmed 14 August 2020. Mr Conlon says:15.On or about October 2018, I spoke with Ms D'Limi in relation to her engagement with BCA. During the course of that conversation, Ms D'Limi said to me words to the effect that she requested that, instead of her being employed by BCA, BCA engage her company as a contractor to provide Ms D'Limi's services to BCA. I cannot now recall if Ms D'Limi told me the name of her company during the conversation. I said to Ms D'Limi that I agreed to the contractor arrangement being entered into. I also said words to the effect that the arrangement would be in line with her original employment contract, and we would have to put in place a contractor agreement in line with the employment contract.…17.Since my conversation with Ms D'Limi, BCA has received invoices from the second defendant ('Oceania') for the provision of Ms D'Limi's services to BCA. BCA has paid the invoiced amounts to Oceania. BCA has not made any payments to Ms O'Limi personally.18.In or about March 2019, I prepared a contractor agreement to formalise the arrangement between BCA and Oceania.19.On or about 10 or 11 April 2019, while attending the BCA state manager's meeting in Sydney, I handed to Ms D'Limi a copy of the contractor agreement that I had prepared. Annexed hereto and marked 'NPC-4' is a copy of the document that I provided to Ms D'Limi.20.At the time that I handed to Ms D'Limi a copy of the contractor agreement that I had prepared, I said words to the effect that I would send her a soft copy of the document. Upon review of my notes and emails, I cannot find any record of having sent to Ms D'Limi a soft copy of that document.