Buderim Ginger Ltd v Booth

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: Buderim Ginger Ltd v Booth [2001] QSC 349
PARTIES: BUDERIM GINGER LIMITED ACN 010 978 800
(applicant)
v
SUSAN BOOTH, ACTING DISCRIMINATION COMMISSIONER QUEENSLAND
(respondent)
FILE NO: SC No 3077 of 2001
DIVISION: Trial Division
DELIVERED ON: 27 September 2001
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 11 September 2001
JUDGE: Chesterman J
ORDER: The decision made by the respondent on 6 March 2001 is set aside.  The respondent to pay costs of and incidental to the application, to be assessed on the standard basis
CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – APPEALS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES – STATUTORY APPEALS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES TO THE COURTS – where alleged discrimination by the applicant to an employee – where Anti-Discrimination Act limits the time to bring a complaint to one year after the act of discrimination subject to the discretion of the Commissioner if the complainant shows “good cause” – where employee complains almost two years after the act of discrimination – where the Acting Anti-Discrimination Commissioner accepts the late complaint  - whether the complainant had “good cause” for the favourable exercise of the discretion – whether a consideration of the strength or weakness of the complainant’s case is relevant in assessing “good cause” – whether there was a reasonable explanation for the delay

Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 138
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) s 20, s 24, s 28

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, cited

Dempsey v Dorber [1990] 1 Qd R 418, referred to
McAuliffe v Puplick (1996) EOC 92-800, not followed

COUNSEL: Mr S Keim for the applicant
Mr D Rangiah for the respondent
SOLICITORS:

Deacons Lawyers for the applicant

Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland for the respondent

  1. CHESTERMAN J:  For almost ten years Michael Sealy worked as a maintenance fitter at the applicant’s factory. He resigned on grounds of ill health on 29 December 1998 some four months short of the tenth anniversary of the commencement of his employment. He was thus not entitled to any payment in respect of long service leave.  Mr Sealy turned 51 a few days after his resignation.  As a young man he served in Vietnam where his experiences later led him to develop post traumatic stress disorder which was diagnosed in 1996 when Mr Sealy sought psychiatric assistance for emotional instability following his separation from his wife. 

  1. Mr Sealy’s usual roster required him to work from 7am till 3.30pm.  However late in October 1998 his employer informed him that he was required to work nightshift, 3pm to 11pm.  Mr Sealy did not want to work that shift.  He attended evening classes on Tuesdays but the applicant was prepared to exempt him from night duty on those nights upon satisfactory proof that he attended his classes.

  1. According to Mr Sealy’s psychiatrist, Dr Anderson, in a report dated 26 June 2000 Mr Sealy:

“indicated . . . that night work brings back bad memories of the past with Vietnam and flashbacks about night patrols there.  The next day…

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Details
Case
[2001] QSC 349
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Buderim Ginger Limited, the applicant, sought relief from a decision made by the respondent, the Acting Anti-Discrimination Commissioner, who dismissed the applicant’s complaint against the company. The complaint was made by an employee alleging discrimination under the Anti-Discrimination Act. The employee complained almost two years after the act of discrimination, which was beyond the one-year limit specified in the Act unless the Commissioner had discretion to accept the late complaint on the basis of “good cause.” The Acting Anti-Discrimination Commissioner accepted the late complaint, and the applicant challenged this decision in court.

The central legal issue was whether the Acting Anti-Discrimination Commissioner had the discretion to accept a complaint made almost two years after the act of discrimination. The court had to determine whether the concept of “good cause” for the exercise of discretion included consideration of the strength or weakness of the complainant’s case and whether there was a reasonable explanation for the delay. The court also had to consider whether the Acting Anti-Discrimination Commissioner had exercised the discretion in accordance with the statutory requirements.

The court found that the Acting Anti-Discrimination Commissioner had exercised the discretion in accordance with the statutory requirements. The court held that the concept of “good cause” was not limited to the strength or weakness of the complainant’s case but included a reasonable explanation for the delay. The court found that the Acting Anti-Discrimination Commissioner had considered the evidence and had exercised the discretion appropriately. The court held that the Acting Anti-Discrimination Commissioner had not erred in law and had exercised the discretion in accordance with the statutory requirements.

The court set aside the decision made by the Acting Anti-Discrimination Commissioner on 6 March 2001. The respondent was ordered to pay the costs of and incidental to the application, to be assessed on the standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

The decision made by the respondent on 6 March 2001 is set aside. The respondent to pay costs of and incidental to the application, to be assessed on the standard basis

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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