Buckton v BHP Coal Pty Ltd - [2001] QCA 35

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: Buckton v BHP Coal P/L [2001] QCA 35
PARTIES: MICHAEL JAMES BUCKTON
(plaintiff/respondent)
v
BHP COAL PTY LTD ACN 010 595 721
(defendant/appellant)
FILE NO/S: Appeal No 3777 of 2000
SC No 72 of 1999
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING
COURT: Supreme Court at Mackay
DELIVERED ON: 16 February 2001
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 1 November 2000
JUDGES: Pincus and Davies JJA and Byrne J
Joint reasons for judgment of Davies JA and Byrne J;
separate reasons of Pincus JA, concurring as to the orders
made.
ORDER: Appeal dismissed with costs.
CATCHWORDS: LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – POSTPONEMENT OF THE BAR – EXTENSION OF PERIOD – CAUSE OF ACTION IN RESPECT OF PERSONAL INJURIES – KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL FACTS – MATERIAL FACTS OF A DECISIVE CHARACTER – where injury was sustained in the course of the plaintiff’s employment – where repetition of tasks caused injuries to plaintiff’s thoracic and cervical spine – where evidence established a right of action – whether defendant could establish a defence based on expiration of the limitation period – whether the fact that the plaintiff’s disability, in consequence of his initial injury, caused a reduction of his capacity to continue to earn the high level of income available in a coal mine was a material fact of a decisive character – whether that fact was within the means of knowledge of the plaintiff at a time prior to 12 May 1998 – whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would have sought advice as to whether his earning capacity was impaired – whether the primary judge erred in exercising his discretion to extend the limitation period
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 30(1)(a)(iv)
COUNSEL: P A Keane QC with L F Kelly for the appellant
S C Williams QC with B A Harrison for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Clayton Utz for the appellant
Taylors Solicitors (Mackay) for the respondent

PINCUS JA: As Davies JA and Byrne J point out in their reasons, which I have had the advantage of reading, the respondent's case is that he hurt his neck in 1983 while moving sieve bends and subsequently the same sort of thing happened on other occasions. The statement of claim alleges that these incidents – i.e. those relating to moving the sieve bends – caused him damage for which the appellant is liable. In short, the respondent's case depends on injury from moving sieve bends.
There are passages in the evidence supporting the primary judge's conclusion, as the joint reasons of Davies JA and Byrne J demonstrate. But the proper fate of the appeal is a question I have found difficult.
The respondent's solicitors commissioned a report from a consultant, made in October 1999, which says that "incidents involving the sieve bend occurred in May 1983, 13th September, 1991, 17th November, 1991 and 3rd March, 1993". This contrasts with the respondent's affidavit made on 21 January 2000, which seems to complain of numerous incidents involving…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2001] QCA 35
Decision Date: 16/02/2001

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Buckton v BHP Coal Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, Mr. Buckton, sought damages for personal injuries sustained during his employment at a coal mine operated by the defendant, BHP Coal Pty Ltd. The dispute centred around the applicability of the Limitation of Actions Act, specifically whether the statutory limitation period for pursuing claims related to personal injuries was appropriately extended. The case was heard and determined by the High Court of Australia, which was called upon to review the decision of the lower court that had granted an extension of the limitation period.

The key legal issues before the court were whether the defendant could successfully argue that the plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the expiration of the limitation period, and whether the plaintiff had knowledge of material facts that would have led a reasonable person in his position to seek legal advice earlier. The material facts in question related to the plaintiff's reduced earning capacity as a consequence of his initial injury, and whether this fact was of a decisive character and known to the plaintiff prior to a specific date. The court also considered whether the primary judge had correctly exercised his discretion to extend the limitation period.

The High Court found that the primary judge had not erred in exercising his discretion to extend the limitation period. The court held that the fact that the plaintiff's disability had caused a reduction in his capacity to earn the high income available in a coal mine was a material fact of a decisive character, but it was not within the means of knowledge of the plaintiff at a time prior to 12 May 1998. The court also determined that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would not have sought advice as to whether his earning capacity was impaired. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the defendant.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.

CITATION:	Buckton v BHP Coal P/L [2001] QCA 35
PARTIES:	MICHAEL JAMES BUCKTON (plaintiff/respondent) v BHP COAL PTY LTD ACN 010 595 721 (defendant/appellant)
FILE NO/S:	Appeal No 3777 of 2000 SC No 72 of 1999
DIVISION:	Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:	General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING
COURT:	Supreme Court at Mackay
DELIVERED ON:	16 February 2001
DELIVERED AT:	Brisbane
HEARING DATE:	1 November 2000
JUDGES:	Pincus and Davies JJA and Byrne J Joint reasons for judgment of Davies JA and Byrne J; separate reasons of Pincus JA, concurring as to the orders made.
ORDER:	Appeal dismissed with costs.
CATCHWORDS:	LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – POSTPONEMENT OF THE BAR – EXTENSION OF PERIOD – CAUSE OF ACTION IN RESPECT OF PERSONAL INJURIES – KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL FACTS – MATERIAL FACTS OF A DECISIVE CHARACTER – where injury was sustained in the course of the plaintiff’s employment – where repetition of tasks caused injuries to plaintiff’s thoracic and cervical spine – where evidence established a right of action – whether defendant could establish a defence based on expiration of the limitation period – whether the fact that the plaintiff’s disability, in consequence of his initial injury, caused a reduction of his capacity to continue to earn the high level of income available in a coal mine was a material fact of a decisive character – whether that fact was within the means of knowledge of the plaintiff at a time prior to 12 May 1998 – whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would have sought advice as to whether his earning capacity was impaired – whether the primary judge erred in exercising his discretion to extend the limitation period
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 30(1)(a)(iv)
COUNSEL:	P A Keane QC with L F Kelly for the appellant S C Williams QC with B A Harrison for the respondent
SOLICITORS:	Clayton Utz for the appellant Taylors Solicitors (Mackay) for the respondent