Buckley v The Queen - [2005] HCATrans 995

[2005] HCATrans 995

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B86 of 2005

B e t w e e n -
JASON CHARLES BUCKLEY
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent

GLEESON CJ
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 9 DECEMBER 2005, AT 10.00 AM

MR P.E. SMITH: May it please your Honours, I appear for the appellant. (instructed by Terry Fisher & Company)

MRS L.J. CLARE: If the Court pleases, I appear for the respondent. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland))

GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Smith.

MR SMITH: Your Honours, the appellant submits that three key errors appear in the sentencing process here. The first one is that the learned sentencing judge made no reference to the principles laid down by this Court concerning sentences of indefinite detention. In fact, those cases were not even referred to at the sentence before his Honour. It is submitted the Court of Appeal on error held it was not necessary to refer to those principles or make findings in accordance with such principles.

KIRBY J: There is no suggestion that there is anything peculiar in the Queensland legislation that makes those principles inapplicable in Queensland?

MR SMITH: No, your Honour. The second point to be raised by the appellant is that section 168(1) of the Penalties and Sentences Act requires the court not only to give reasons but “detailed reasons for imposing the [indefinite] sentence”. The submission will be the learned sentencing judge failed to demonstrate in his decision attention to each of the statutory preconditions to the exercise of power which, in my submission, is essential before that power can be exercised.

GUMMOW J: That is certainly the way the then Solicitor‑General, Mr Keane, emphasised it to us when we were considering the validity of these provisions, I think.

MR SMITH: That is in the case of Fardon, I assume, your Honour.

GUMMOW J: Yes.

MR SMITH: Of course, Fardon concerned different legislation, ie, legislation which enabled the Executive to apply to a court to keep a prisoner in after their sentence had been finished but the principles are similar.

GUMMOW J: Are those sections in this Act?

MR SMITH: No, they were in an Act called the Dangerous Offenders Prisoners Act.

GUMMOW J: Right.

MR SMITH: I just cannot recall the precise name, your Honour, but it is a different Act to this one.

GUMMOW J: How long have these provisions been in this Act?

MR SMITH: These came in in 1992. Prior to that there were detentions at Her Majesty’s pleasure. There were a number of different pieces of sentencing legislation in Queensland but the new government as it then was brought in the Acts together and passed this legislation. Anyway, that is the second point ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J: Anyhow, these sections were there when the Act was originally enacted. That is what I…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Buckley v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Buckley v The Queen [2005] HCATrans 995
Case: [2005] HCATrans 995
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Buckley appealed his conviction for murder in the Supreme Court of New South Wales to the High Court of Australia. The central issue on appeal concerned the admissibility of certain evidence obtained from the appellant, specifically a confession made to police. The appellant argued that this confession was improperly obtained and should have been excluded from evidence by the trial judge.

The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge erred in admitting the confession into evidence, considering the circumstances under which it was made. This involved an examination of the principles governing the admissibility of confessions, particularly where there are allegations of unfairness or impropriety in the manner of obtaining the statement. The court had to assess whether the confession was voluntary and whether its admission would have been unfair to the appellant.

The High Court ultimately allowed the appeal, quashing the conviction and ordering a new trial. The majority of the court found that the confession was obtained in circumstances that rendered it inadmissible. They applied the principle that a confession will be excluded if it was not voluntary or if its admission would be unfair to the accused, considering factors such as the appellant's mental state, the length of questioning, and the inducements or threats made. The court concluded that the trial judge had misapplied these principles and therefore erred in admitting the confession.

Orders