Buckland v Epworth Foundation
[2014] VCC 620
•15 May 2014
| IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA AT MELBOURNE CIVIL DIVISION | Revised Not Restricted Suitable for Publication |
DAMAGES AND COMPENSATION
SERIOUS INJURY DIVISION
Case No. CI-12-05471
| REBECCA BUCKLAND | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| EPWORTH FOUNDATION AND VICTORIAN WORKCOVER AUTHORITY | Defendants |
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JUDGE: | HIS HONOUR JUDGE DYER | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 1 April 2014 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 15 May 2014 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Buckland v Epworth Foundation & Anor | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2014] VCC 620 | |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
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Subject: ACCIDENT COMPENSATION
Catchwords: Accident Compensation Act 1985 – serious injury – plaintiff injured in specific incident – organic injury to non-dominant left wrist – development of complex regional pain syndrome – development of later psychiatric injury – leave sought in respect of pecuniary loss and pain and suffering in respect of paragraphs (a) and (c) – suitable employment – rehabilitation and/or retraining – leave granted.
Legislation Cited: Accident Compensation Act 1985
Cases Cited:Doolan v Rayners Sawmills Pty Ltd & Anor. [2008] VSCA 219; Elias-Mikre v Royal Melbourne Hospital (Melbourne Health) [2013] VCC 1860
Judgment: Leave granted to the plaintiff to bring proceedings for pecuniary loss and pain and suffering damages.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr T Monti QC with Mr M Carey | Slater & Gordon |
| For the Defendant | Mr C D Griffin | Hall & Wilcox |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
1 The plaintiff, Rebecca Buckland, is a highly qualified nurse who suffered an injury to her non-dominant left wrist when assisting an elderly patient at the Epworth Hospital on 3 January 2006. At that time, she was 27 years of age and had been employed as a clinical resource nurse and nurse educator at the hospital since April 2005.
2 As a consequence of the initial injury, the plaintiff claims that she has developed ongoing problems affecting the left wrist and hand, in particular, a clinically diagnosed chronic regional pain syndrome type 1. She claims leave, pursuant to the provisions of s134AB(16)(b) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (“the Act”), to commence common law proceedings on the basis that this injury satisfies the test for “serious injury”, as defined in paragraph (a) of the serious injury definition set out in s134AB(37) of the Act.
3 Alternatively, the plaintiff alleges that she has suffered non-organic consequences of her injury of such severity that she is entitled to a grant of leave on the basis that such consequences satisfy the serious injury test, as defined in paragraph (c) of the definition.
4 The essential issue between the parties is the entitlement to leave in respect of pecuniary loss damages with the defendant stressing the plaintiff’s age, her pre-accident level of qualification and the requirements set out in ss(38)(g) of the Act as a precursor to any grant of leave in respect of a claim for pecuniary loss damages. Mr Griffin of counsel, who appeared for the defendant, quite properly restricted the challenge to the plaintiff’s application to the issues concerning the plaintiff’s future employment capacity and, particularly, the issues raised in relation to rehabilitation and retraining in ss(38)(g). No attack was made on the plaintiff’s credit and no submission was put by the defendant as to why the plaintiff should not be granted leave in respect of pain and suffering damages.
5 The essence of the defendant’s position was neatly described by Mr Griffin when the case was opened:
“This is a situation where a woman of very considerable intelligence and education, with a broad range of non-physical skills and at a very young age, has yet to really explore the possibilities of rehabilitation to a stage where she could return to the administrative managerial teaching sort of roles that she had done, has been trained for and, in fact, has tertiary qualification in.”[1]
[1]Transcript (“T”) 6, Lines (“L”) 22–29
The evidence
6 The only viva voce evidence called was that of Ms Buckland, who had sworn affidavits in support of her application on 18 May 2012 and 24 March 2014. It is convenient to set out in summary form the relevant matters from those affidavits:
·The plaintiff completed secondary school at Swan Hill in 1996 and completed a Bachelor of Nursing at Latrobe University in 2000. She worked as a teacher’s aide at a school in Bendigo where her mother taught.
·The plaintiff did post graduate work at Austin Hospital, graduating in anaesthetics and commenced various teaching positions at Swinburne University, Victoria University, RMIT and the Defence Forces.
·The plaintiff commenced working for the first defendant in April 2005 full time as a clinical resource nurse and was offered a position as nurse educator a few months later.
·The plaintiff had been involved in a variety of sporting activities prior to suffering her injury, including playing badminton regularly. She had played this at an elite level at school and whilst at university.
·She had married prior to sustaining her injury in January 2006 and enjoyed an active social life. She had enrolled in a Masters of Education through RMIT.
·The plaintiff suffered injury on 3 January 2006 when an elderly patient suffering from dementia grabbed at her left wrist and twisted it severely, apparently in fear.
·The plaintiff continued to work and the severe pain in her wrist continued. She attended the Accident & Emergency Department of the hospital the following day. She was given conservative treatment which continued for some weeks involving the use of a splint and some hand therapy. The plaintiff continued to work doing modified duties and was eventually referred to Mr McCoombe, hand surgeon, on 6 February 2006. The conservative treatment continued under Mr McCoombe’s care and eventually the plaintiff was referred to Mr Berger, hand surgeon, for a second opinion in May 2006. Surgery was recommended and performed in September 2006. The surgery involved a left ulnar osteotomy with insertion of a plate.
·Following surgery the plaintiff had two weeks off work and suffered tendonitis around the plate. She was taking strong pain killers including Endone and OxyContin.
·The plaintiff developed emotional symptoms which she describes as feeling “suicidal, depressed and lacking in motivation”.[2] She was admitted to the Melbourne Clinic for 3 ½ months.
·After discharge from the inpatient care, she continued to see both a psychologist and psychiatrist and attempted to return to work in March 2007. This was work in infection control and the plaintiff was unsuccessful after three attempts.
·In 2008 the plaintiff made a further attempt to return in the education area of the General Medicine Ward at the first defendant’s Freemasons Hospital. Again, this was unsuccessful.
·Further attempts to return to work were made in late 2008 and early 2009. These were short term research positions. The plaintiff maintained she was unable to do work in a clinical setting due to the restriction on the left wrist.
·The plaintiff continued to see Mr Berger in 2008 and 2009 but was given no further surgical option. She had further treatment including myotherapy which was unsuccessful in terms of her left wrist pain.
·The plaintiff deposes to matters affecting her enjoyment of life generally, including the breakdown of her first marriage, the forming of a further relationship in 2009 leading to a second marriage and the birth of her daughter Addison on 28 May 2010.
·On 28 October 2011, the first defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment. At the time of swearing her first affidavit on 18 May 2012, the plaintiff maintained that there was no job which she believed herself fit to perform. The ongoing symptoms in the left arm caused extreme pain and difficulty when demonstrating nursing tasks. Additionally, the medications she had taken affected her memory and concentration to the extent that she had little or no confidence with individuals and groups where she had previously been involved in teaching.
[2]Exhibit A, page 20
7 In her second affidavit sworn on 24 March 2014, the plaintiff deposes to further matters relevant to the present application:
·The plaintiff has continued active treatment with Dr McIntosh, psychiatrist, who she sees approximately once every six weeks.
·Apart from suffering fewer panic attacks, the plaintiff has not mastered pain control techniques and still suffers pain in her left wrist.
·The plaintiff was at the time of swearing the affidavit not registered to work as a Division 1 Nurse or an on-call nurse.
·The plaintiff’s physical pain limits her as does her capacity for memory and concentration.
·The plaintiff is involved in much of the care of her daughter, Addison, whom she drives to her in-laws and to kindergarten.
·The plaintiff was in the latter stages of her second pregnancy at the time of swearing the affidavit.
·The plaintiff feels she could only work for a limited number of hours in unskilled work such as medical reception.
·The plaintiff confirmed in her evidence before being cross-examined that she was only several days away from giving birth to her second child.
8 In cross-examination Mr Griffin concentrated on the matters of pecuniary loss that had been outlined in the opening. In particular I noted:
·Approximately 12 months after graduation the plaintiff commenced a teaching role in nursing.[3]
[3]T14, L2 – 4
·The plaintiff’s work with the first defendant pre-injury was 38 hours per week, 76 hours per fortnight.[4]
[4]T15, L23 – 24
·The plaintiff’s psychological problems manifested themselves at a time she was having a relationship breakup with her first husband in late 2006.[5]
[5]T17, L25 – 30
·After treatment, the plaintiff applied for a more permanent position at the hospital in February 2008 but later withdrew the application.[6] She did not feel she was up to fulfilling the commitments of the role.[7]
[6]T18, L11 – 27
[7]T19, L21 – 23
·The plaintiff’s stated experience in recruitment managing and rostering was used within the nursing context.[8]
[8]T21, L27 – T22, L1
·The plaintiff had returned to duties in accordance with return to work plans on a number of occasions in 2008 and 2009.[9]
[9]T25, L12 – T26, L22
·There were occasions when the return to work plans were interrupted by psychiatric admissions. The plaintiff had her fifth admission to the Melbourne Clinic on 7 February 2009.[10]
[10]T26, L23 – 28
·The plaintiff was working almost full time by April 2010 up until she was unable to work due to the birth of her first child.[11]
[11]T27, L28 – T28, L5
·The plaintiff completed her Master’s Degree in Education done over four years, which was one year longer than normal.[12]
·The plaintiff felt herself capable of only very light duties on a very part time basis in a role such as medical administration or receptionist.[13]
·In 2011 the plaintiff attended a pain management clinic at Epworth Camberwell under the care of Dr de Graaff.[14]
·Moving the left arm caused pain through the shoulder and down through the arm into the hand. Pain had begun to develop in the right arm.[15]
·The plaintiff’s skills in leadership, supervisory and mentoring roles had been eroded by a lack of self-confidence and the ability to concentrate or have confidence in what she was doing.[16]
·In relation to attending a course to assist in her rehabilitation, the plaintiff stated she had already done several.[17]
·The plaintiff agreed there had been some improvement in her condition over the last year, although she was struggling with her mental health a great deal due to the absence of medication during her pregnancy.[18]
·The plaintiff would consider further study towards a medical degree or psychology if she had memory and functioning capacity to do that.[19]
·The plaintiff did not currently have registration to practise in nursing as the registration body asked her to withdraw her application in 2010 or 2011.[20]
[12]T28, L27 – T29, L3
[13]T33, L20 – 23
[14]T38, L16 – 26
[15]T41, L11 – 24
[16]T43, L26 – T44, L22
[17]T46, L8 – 10
[18]T47, L14 – 19
[19]T49, L28 – T50, L2
[20]T51, L18 – 23
9 In re-examination, the plaintiff was asked about the withdrawal of the job application in 2008 at Epworth Hospital.
·The withdrawn job application (for Nurse Educator) was due to the plaintiff’s feeling that she did not have the ability to make critical decisions at that level and be reliable enough in her work to fulfil that role.[21]
·A difficulty with return to work due to pain in the arm was the plaintiff’s inability to achieve functional sleep and minimal dexterity in the hand.[22]
·The plaintiff in consultation with Nabenet appointed by the defendant had reviewed her CV in order to gain interviews and in response to a request for retraining or rehabilitation was told that she already had enough qualifications and was not a candidate for any retraining.[23]
[21]T52, L12 – 25
[22]T55, L12 – 17
[23]T56, L28 – T57, L10
The medical evidence
10 The medical evidence relied upon by both parties was tendered in evidence and set out in Exhibits A and 1. There was little dispute between the parties in relation to the plaintiff’s physical injuries. Indeed, the defendant only relied upon a report from Dr Chris Baker, occupational physician, dated 16 August 2011 in relation to the physical injury.
11 On examination in 2011, Dr Baker found an abnormal finding in that the left hand was paler than the right and grip strength of the left hand was weak.[24] He did not express a specific diagnosis in his report other than to comment:
“From the physical perspective she suffers with chronic pain with impingement of the ulna. It is noted that some individuals consider there is a diagnosis of Complex Regional Pain Syndrome but other than some slight change of colour with the hand being whiter compared to the right side, there is a lack of other signs.”[25]
[24]Exhibit 1, Defendant’s Court Book (“DCB”) 33
[25]Exhibit 1, DCB 34
12 The plaintiff’s treating surgeon, Mr Anthony Berger expressed an opinion in February 2012:
“Mrs Buckland appears to have chronic pain that has been initiated by mild instability of the distal radioulnar joint and some ulnar nerve symptoms. I believe these have most likely occurred as a result of the injury described above.”[26]
[26]Exhibit A, Plaintiff’s Court Book (“PCB”) 67
13 Medico-legal opinions are as follows:
–Mr K Brearley most recently on 19 December 2013:
“The diagnosis of the left wrist remains as before, namely Chronic Regional Pain Syndrome type 1.”[27]
–Dr H Sutcliffe, occupational physician, most recently on 26 March 2014:
“Ms Buckland sustained musculoligamentous injury in the course of her employment on 3 January 2006 when her left wrist was twisted by a patient. She had immediate onset of pain which has persisted and increased since. She had onset of major depression as a result of pain and disability and has required treatment since.”[28]
–Dr R Hjorth, neurologist, 3 September 2012:
“I agree that the basic diagnosis here is that of reflex sympathetic dystrophy (Chronic Regional Pain Syndrome).”[29]
– Dr P Blombery, consultant physician (vascular disease) most recently on 25 March 2014:
“Ms Buckland continues to have features of Chronic Regional Pain Syndrome type 1 complicating an injury to her wrist that she sustained in the course of her employment on 3 January 2006.[30]
– A report is provided from Dr L. Sedal dated 17 December 2013 which makes no reference to a diagnosis. [31] (it appears that the page of Dr Sedal’s report has been omitted.)
[27]Exhibit A, PCB 155
[28]Exhibit A, PCB 199.7
[29]Exhibit A, PCB 202
[30]Exhibit A, PCB 212.2
[31]Exhibit A, PCB 213 – 215
Analysis of the physical or organic injury
14 I am satisfied on the whole of the evidence both from the plaintiff and on reading the medical material that the plaintiff suffers an organically based injury to the left wrist that restricts her significantly in the use of the left wrist and hand. I am unable to be satisfied that that left wrist injury is related to the cervical spine complaints, headaches and/or right arm condition from the basis of any evidence related to organic injury. I am satisfied that the consequences of the injury to the left wrist limit the plaintiff’s capacity for her pre-injury employment totally and provide only limited employment opportunities such as part time work as a medical receptionist.
15 I am further satisfied that the plaintiff did participate in a considerable amount of rehabilitation and retraining. I note by way of example that the return to work plan dated 8 October 2009[32] is entitled “Plan No 18” and provides for the plaintiff to be working 19 hours per week as against her pre-injury 78 hours per fortnight.
[32]Exhibit 1, DCB 121 – 122
16 I am satisfied that the continuing consequences of her physical injury to the left arm do not equip her with an ability to perform duties in excess of those which were being performed by her at or about that time. I am therefore satisfied that in relation to the physical injury alone, the plaintiff satisfies both the ongoing permanent loss of earnings of not less than 40 per cent as required in sub-paragraph (e) of s134AB(38).
17 I accept the evidence concerning the plaintiff’s participation in the return to work programs that were developed for her and also her attendance at the pain management program in 2010 and the attendances with the Nabenet vocational provider in 2011. On those bases I am satisfied that the plaintiff has not only been reasonable in her attempts to participate in rehabilitation or retraining, but has in fact made requests for additional rehabilitation or retraining which have been declined on behalf of the defendants by Nabenet.
18 I am more than satisfied that the plaintiff has complied with the requirements of paragraph (g) of sub-s38.
Analysis of the psychiatric or non-organic injuries
19 In relation to the psychiatric or non-organic injuries or conditions which are said to constitute a mental or behavioural disturbance or disorder for the purposes of paragraph (c) of the definition of serious injury set out in sub-s37 of s134AB, there has been some divergence of medical opinion. Given that the plaintiff has had extensive psychiatric treatment, including numerous inpatient admissions to both the Melbourne Clinic and the Victoria Clinic, I am of the view that Dr Rowan McIntosh, as the treating psychiatrist since 2007, is in an advantageous position to express an opinion as to the plaintiff’s current psychiatric condition and vocational capacity into the foreseeable future.
20 Dr McIntosh initially saw the plaintiff in October 2007 by which time she had already been treated with extensive psychotropic medication and inpatient treatment at both the Melbourne Clinic and the Victoria Clinic under the care of Doctors Aizenstros and Mishra.[33] When Dr McIntosh commenced his treatment he diagnosed the plaintiff as suffering “quite a significant depressive illness”. He found her presentation:
“… in a tearful, hopeless state – she described significant suicidal preoccupations/despair, she told me that she spent extended periods cogitating on the ‘inevitability’ of taking a significant overdose.”[34]
[33]Exhibit A, PCB 68 – 75
[34]Exhibit A, PCB 46
21 Dr McIntosh has continued to treat the plaintiff and reported most recently on 27 March 2014. At that stage, he had been provided with three reports from Dr Paul Kornan, consultant psychiatrist, who reported to the defendant’s solicitors on three occasions in 2013. I note that Dr Kornan’s reports, particularly the supplementary report dated 13 June 2013, query a causal relationship between the plaintiff’s then psychiatric problems and the physical injury sustained in the course of her employment in 2006. Dr Kornan had commented:
“It is likely to be accepted that she has ‘no current work capacity’ but it seems obvious that this is not related to employment factors at this stage but due to background personality and other non-work-related issues.[35]
[35]Exhibit 1, DCB 78
22 The defendant also relied upon the opinion of Dr Timothy Entwisle who most recently reported on 4 February 2014, having examined the plaintiff on three occasions since August 2011. Dr Entwisle diagnosed major depressive illness and Chronic Pain Syndrome but differed from the opinion of both Dr Kornan and Dr McIntosh in suggesting that the plaintiff “has a capacity for employment as well as rehabilitation and retraining.”[36]
[36]Exhibit 1, DCB 62
23 Having been provided with Dr Kornan’s opinions, Dr McIntosh described the plaintiff’s psychiatric state as follows:
“My overall impression is that Ms Buckland’s current mental condition is that she is somewhat better than 12 to 18 months ago. In the past few months, I don’t think she would fulfil criteria for Major Depression. But her anhedonia, he chronic grumbling dysphoria and her ongoing issues with anxiety/mild irritability – that perhaps a diagnosis of Chronic Adjustment Disorder with depressed and anxious mood would be appropriate. However, overall I remain of the view that pain and all the secondary repercussions of her original wrist injury – are her principal issues. My opinion has been over the years that unfortunately, pain has literally ‘unleashed’ a significant mood disorder – the severity of which has lessened somewhat than in the past 6 or 12 months.”[37]
[37]Exhibit A, page 49.2
24 Dr McIntosh expressed what I interpret as a hopeful view in relation to a gradual improvement following the cessation of litigation. He nevertheless commented as follows:
“I continued to believe that pain will be the major determinant of her mental health issues in the next 5 to 10 years.”[38]
[38]Exhibit A, page 49.3
25 He went on to say:
“As to the effect of the injury on her quality of life; it has been profound. In her mid-20s, Ms Buckland’s quality of life was very good. She was working intensively. She was able to study and socialise. She has now endured many years of distress and her future quality of life may never return to what she had experienced pre-injury.”[39]
[39]Exhibit A, page 49.3
26 The defendant relied upon a number of reports from Dr Timothy Entwisle, who had examined the plaintiff in 2011, 2012 and most recently on 3 February 2014. In his report, following that most recent examination, he confirmed that the plaintiff had been an inpatient at the Melbourne Clinic or the Victoria Clinic with some 10 admissions between 2007 and 2012 and that she had undergone some 28 transcranial magnetic stimulations. He had been provided with a list of potential suitable employment options, including:
·nurse educator (modified);
·executive coach;
·vocational counsellor;
·counsellor;
·recruitment consultant; and
·on call nurse.
27 He noted in his report:
“More recently she has attended Nabenet. She told me she is ‘looking for anything’ to do. She wants to work again. She indicated that a role such as a receptionist is something that she has applied for. She hopes to work eventually.”[40]
[40]Exhibit 1, page 61
28 Dr Entwisle expressed an opinion that the plaintiff would be “deemed as having a work capacity with respect to a number of options included in the “IPAR Vocational Assessment Report”.[41] In that report he also comments, “The prognosis is for further psychiatric treatment and medication in the context of chronic pain and pre-existing personal and family history of psychiatric illness”.
[41]Exhibit 1, page 62
29 Dr Entwisle provided a further report, dated 14 March 2014, where he considered that from a psychiatric perspective alone the plaintiff had a capacity for the following employment options which had been identified by Nabenet:
·telephone triage nurse;
·practice nurse;
·nurse educator;
·medical insurance assessor;
·project officer; and
·health clerk.
30 The final medical opinion relied upon in relation to the plaintiff’s psychiatric condition was from Dr David Weissman, who had examined the plaintiff for medico-legal purposes in August 2011, April 2012, and December 2013.[42] At the time of his most recent examination he commented, “In my view, on purely psychiatric grounds alone, she continues to be totally incapacitated for all work”.[43]
[42]Exhibit A, page 97-140
[43]Exhibit A, page 139
31 If the question of the plaintiff’s current capacity for employment on purely psychiatric grounds had been in dispute before me, I would have preferred the view of Dr McIntosh, based upon his extensive treatment of the plaintiff since 2007. Wisely, however, counsel for the defendant limited the challenge to the plaintiff’s entitlement to leave on the basis of the requirement in ss(38)(g) which in effect prohibits a grant of leave in respect of loss of earning capacity –
“ … where a worker has, or would have after rehabilitation or retraining, and taking into account the worker’s capacity for suitable employment after the injury and where applicable, the reasonableness of the worker’s attempts to participate in rehabilitation and retraining, a capacity for any employment … ”
32 I was referred to Doolan v Rayners Sawmills Pty Ltd & Anor.[44] In that case Kellam JA reaffirms the statutory onus placed upon a plaintiff to prove that the relevant statutory threshold (ie. a loss of income of 40 per cent or more) is established by the plaintiff taking into account matters including the reasonableness or otherwise of the worker’s attempts to participate in rehabilitation or retraining. In that case the evidence before the court was that the worker there had “some potential for alternative employment of a light to medium nature”.[45] There was no evidence placed before the court as to what the earnings from such employment might be and therefore the court could not appropriately apply the statutory test.
[44][2008] VSCA 219, especially at [107]
[45]Ibid at [107]
33 I was also referred to a decision in this court of Elias-Mikre v Royal Melbourne Hospital (Melbourne Health).[46] In this case His Honour Judge Jordan considered the question of rehabilitation and retraining at paragraphs 60 to 64. He commented:
“[T]he fact remains her residual capacity is largely untested. She worked full time up until July 2010 and, whilst she said she went off work due to back pain, she also knew she was pregnant at that time.
She is still very young and the question of rehabilitation and retraining has really not been explored.”[47]
[46][2013] VCC 1860
[47]Ibid at [62] – [63]
34 In my view the question of rehabilitation and retraining has been extensively explored by the plaintiff in the present case. Whilst there is some slight similarity in the facts between Elias-Mikre and the present case, in that (a) the plaintiff is pregnant and expecting her second child; and (b) the plaintiff is quite young, there the similarity ends. In this case the plaintiff has extensively involved herself in rehabilitation activities. She has participated in numerous return to work plans before her employment was terminated in 2011. She has thereafter used the services of Nabenet, provided by the defendants, in order to assist with preparation of resumes to secure other employment. As I have stated in relation to the physical injuries, a stage has been reached where requests for additional rehabilitation or retraining have been declined on behalf of the defendants.
35 In relation to the psychiatric injuries which need to be assessed in accordance with paragraph (c) of the definition, I conclude that the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of ss(38)(g).
Conclusion
36 The defendant has not challenged entitlement to leave for pain and suffering damages either in respect of the physical injury to the left wrist, or the subsequent psychiatric/psychological sequelae. I further find that (a) the organic injury limits the plaintiff’s work capacity indefinitely into the future to less than 60 per cent of her pre-injury earning capacity; and (b) in relation to the psychiatric/psychological injury she has no current capacity as a consequence of that injury and such incapacity is likely to continue indefinitely.
37 I am satisfied that the plaintiff has complied with the statutory requirements for rehabilitation and/or retraining, both in respect of the organic and non-organic injuries. I am satisfied that the plaintiff is entitled to leave in accordance with the provisions of s134AB(16)(b) to bring proceedings to recover damages at common law for both pecuniary loss damages and pain and suffering damages in respect of injury arising in the course of the plaintiff’s employment with the first defendant on or about 3 January 2006.
38 I will hear the parties in respect of the formal orders and the question of costs.
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