Buck v Jones

The appeal in *Buck v Jones* concerned a defamation action arising from a talkback radio broadcast. The plaintiffs alleged that a statement made by a caller, broadcast by the radio station, conveyed defamatory imputations about them. A witness testified as to the meaning she attached to the statement. The central dispute revolved around whether the trial judge adequately directed the jury regarding the use of this witness's evidence, specifically whether it could be used to determine the meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable listener, and whether the jury's findings were inconsistent.

The court was required to determine several legal issues. Firstly, whether counsel had impermissibly used the witness's evidence in their address to the jury. Secondly, whether the trial judge's directions to the jury were sufficient to ensure they understood that the witness's evidence could not be determinative of the meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable listener. Thirdly, the court had to consider whether the jury's findings, which found that the imputation was conveyed by the matter published by the caller but not by the matter published by the broadcaster, were necessarily inconsistent. Finally, the court had to decide whether, assuming one finding to be correct, the other finding was perverse, and consequently, whether the court could substitute its own finding or if a new trial was required.

The court reasoned that the jury's findings were not necessarily inconsistent, but that there had been an error in relation to the jury's answers concerning the imputation conveyed by the broadcaster. The court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the jury's answers to specific questions and ordering a new trial between the fourth plaintiff and the defendants concerning a particular imputation. The court also made detailed orders regarding costs, including that the third and fourth appellants pay certain costs, the third appellant pay the respondents' costs of his appeal, and the respondents pay the fourth appellant's costs of her appeal. The order for the fourth appellant to pay the first and second respondents' costs of the trial was set aside, with those costs to be determined by the judge presiding over the new trial. The first and second respondents were granted a certificate under the Suitors Fund Act, subject to qualification.