Bucic v Arnej Pty Ltd (No 3)

Case [2019] VSC 410


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

PERSONAL INJURIES LIST

S CI 2015 05539

MARIN BUCIC Plaintiff
v  
ARNEJ PTY LTD Defendant

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JUDGE:

ZAMMIT J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

22 May 2019

DATE OF RULING:

19 June 2019

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

Bucic v Arnej Pty Ltd (No 3)

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2019] VSC 410

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COSTS – Counsel’s fees – Certification – Expertise of the Costs Court – Need for consistency in like cases – Counsels’ fees to be determined by Costs Court and taxed in default of agreement.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Plaintiff Mr J B Richards QC with Mr D Dealehr Carbone Lawyers
For the Defendant Mr S A Smith SC Moray & Agnew

HER HONOUR:

  1. This ruling needs to be read in conjunction with my reasons in Bucic v Arnej Pty Ltd (No 2).[1] In that ruling I addressed the issue of costs, save for the plaintiff’s application for certification of counsels’ fees. This ruling concerns only a question of certification of counsels’ fees.

  1. The plaintiff sought certification of senior counsel’s fees at $9,900 per day and junior counsel’s fee at 50 per cent thereof. It was submitted that certification in the above amounts be allowed for 18 days, which included three days preparation and half a day conferencing. It was submitted that the matter was of sufficient complexity to warrant certification at the upper level and the number of days sought.

  1. The defendant submitted that the Court should certify for 16 days in total, which included one day for preparation and half a day for conferencing. The defendant further submitted that an appropriate allowance was $8,800 per day for senior counsel’s fees and junior counsel’s fee at 50 per cent thereof.

  1. I refer to the decision of Macaulay J in Henwood v Nansor Australia Pty Ltd (costs ruling).[2] I adopt his Honour’s summary of the principles set out at paragraphs [13]–[16]. Unlike in that case, in the present case, neither party has sought an order that the taxation of costs be determined by the Costs Court in default of agreement. The sole issue is as to the certification of counsel’s fees.

    [2][2013] VSC 655 (‘Henwood’).

  1. In my opinion, the associate judges in the Costs Court are in a better position to determine whether the amount claimed is excessive, or whether it falls within the usual ‘market’ of counsel’s fees for a matter of this kind. As Macaulay J said in Henwood: ‘individual judges, by reason of their past experience as counsel in a particular field, their continuing involvement with the profession, and the period of time since they practised as counsel, will have greater or lesser degrees of knowledge of what is a fair and reasonable fee in a particular practice area.’[3]

    [3]Ibid [18]. See footnote 14.

  1. I do not consider that I am best placed to determine the issue of certification. There is benefit to the profession at large for there to be some guidance from the Costs Court in relation to a matter such as this one. All issues were in dispute and the plaintiff was required to call numerous witnesses, including medico-legal experts, to make good his proofs.

  1. It was a relatively complex matter which required, for example, an assessment of damages in the context of pre-existing injuries and what, if any, reduction should be made. The principal judgment ran for over one hundred pages and, in particular, contained a detailed analysis of the medical evidence. I should add that, in my view, it was a matter in which it was appropriate for both senior and junior counsel to be briefed. It was not disputed that each counsel is entitled to fees.

  1. I will make an order that counsels’ fees be determined by the Costs Court and taxed in default of agreement.


Details
AGLC
Bucic v Arnej Pty Ltd (No 3) [2019] VSC 410
Case
[2019] VSC 410
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Bucic v Arnej Pty Ltd, the parties were engaged in a dispute concerning the determination of counsel's fees. The case was heard in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. The primary issue before the court was the process by which counsel's fees should be assessed and the extent to which the expertise of the Costs Court should be utilised. Additionally, the court had to consider the need for consistency in similar cases and the appropriate method for determining fees in the absence of agreement between the parties.

The court examined the legal principles surrounding the certification of costs and the role of the Costs Court in such matters. It considered whether the Costs Court had the requisite expertise to assess the reasonableness of counsel's fees and whether there was a need for uniformity in the determination of fees across comparable cases. The court also explored the implications of the parties' inability to reach an agreement on the fees, and the appropriate recourse available under the law.

The court concluded that the expertise of the Costs Court was sufficient to determine the reasonableness of counsel's fees. It emphasised the importance of consistency in the assessment of fees in similar cases to ensure fairness and predictability in the legal process. The court held that where parties could not agree on the fees, the Costs Court should determine the fees, and these fees should be taxed in default of agreement. The court's decision underscored the importance of the Costs Court's role in maintaining consistency and fairness in the assessment of legal costs.

In light of the court's reasoning, the final orders provided that the counsel's fees would be determined by the Costs Court and taxed in default of agreement. This decision ensured that the parties would have a clear framework for the resolution of their dispute regarding counsel's fees, promoting consistency and fairness in the legal process.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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