FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BSE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 689
Appeal from: BSE15 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2017] FCCA 2535 File number: VID 1213 of 2017 Judge: MCKERRACHER J Date of judgment: 17 May 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection (class XA) visa – where a delegate of the Minister refused to grant a visa – where the Refugee Review Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision – application for judicial review to the Federal Circuit Court dismissed – unparticularised and novel grounds of appeal – impermissible merits review sought – leave to advance new ground of review refused
Held: appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(aa), 46A(1) Cases cited: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 70 AAR 413 Date of hearing: 10 May 2018 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 20 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr C McDermott Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submits to any order of the Court, save as to the question of costs ORDERS
VID 1213 of 2017 BETWEEN: BSE15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MCKERRACHER J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 MAY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MCKERRACHER J:
The appellant appeals a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which dismissed his application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (as it then was, now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal): BSE15 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2017] FCCA 2535. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to grant the appellant a Protection (class XA) visa.
BACKGROUND
The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He arrived at Christmas Island as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 2 August 2012 and subsequently applied for a visa. On 14 March 2014, the Minister's delegate refused to grant the appellant a visa. The appellant then sought a review of the delegate's decision in the Tribunal. The appellant's authorised representative made written submissions to the Tribunal on his behalf both before, and after, the hearing in which he participated on 5 May 2015.
THE CLAIMS
The appellant claimed he had been constantly harassed and detained by Sri Lankan authorities, who frequently came to his family home in search of his father, a suspected supporter of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The appellant made claims on the basis of his Tamil ethnicity, his imputed political support of the LTTE, his status as a failed asylum…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 689
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in the appeal were whether the Federal Court could permit the appellant to advance a new ground of review that was not raised before the Federal Circuit Court and whether the Tribunal’s findings of fact were susceptible to review for jurisdictional error. The appellant argued that the Tribunal failed to properly consider his claims based on his Hindu faith and Tamil ethnicity, but did not provide detailed argument or evidence to support this contention.
The Federal Court found that the appellant’s grounds of appeal were unparticularised and did not identify any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. The Court noted that it was not within its power to re-find facts or to reject the merits of the Tribunal's findings. The Court held that the Tribunal had considered the appellant's claims based on his Tamil ethnicity and Hindu faith, and had rejected the notion that he would face a real chance of serious harm simply because of his ethnic or religious background. The Court found no error in the Tribunal’s assessment of the country information or its conclusions regarding the appellant’s claims. The Court also refused to permit the appellant to advance a new ground of review that had not been previously considered by the Federal Circuit Court.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. The Court ordered that the appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be taxed if not agreed. The entry of orders is governed by Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At the hearing before me, the appellant did not seek to advance any substantive argument. He simply asked for a further opportunity to present his case to the ‘RRT’ and, from the bar table without any additional evidence, indicated that he would be able to provide sufficient evidence to persuade the Tribunal as to his credibility. He asked for an opportunity to listen to the audio tapes of the interview. As counsel for the Minister rightly observed, the time for presentation of evidence in support of the claims has passed. No argument was advanced to suggest an inadequate opportunity to present evidence or any other legal impediment. On an examination of the Tribunal record, it appears that a fulsome opportunity was afforded the appellant to present evidence in support of his claims and to explain his claims as he saw fit to do so. CONSIDERATION Ground one is unparticularised. No attempt is made to impugn the credibility findings of the Tribunal. The Tribunal's findings were open to be made for the reasons it gave. As the High Court and this Court has made clear, the fact that the complaints of the appellant may be as to fact finding or indeed credibility does not automatically protect the decision from examination for jurisdictional error. However the categories of case in which such findings may be reviewed are specific and limited. The Tribunal’s findings are not susceptible to being impugned on any of the accepted categories identified: see, for example, the Full Court in CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 70 AAR 413 (at [38]). Further, it is essential to recognise that it is not within the power of this Court nor the Federal Circuit Court to re-find the facts as a fact finder. It is the legality of the decision of the Tribunal or the Federal Circuit Court that is in issue. The appellant seeks to do no more than invite this Court to reject the merits of the Tribunal's findings of fact. This ground must be dismissed. Ground two was not advanced before the Federal Circuit Court and as such the appellant requires leave to raise it in this Court. The appellant has not demonstrated that he did advance any claim to engage Australia's protection obligations on the basis simply of his Hindu faith. But, importantly, the Tribunal clearly understood and accepted (at [21]) that he was 'ethnically Tamil and a Hindu by religion'. The Tribunal rejected (at [31]) the proposition that the appellant would be imputed as holding a pro-LTTE or anti-government political opinion because he was a young Tamil male. At [37], based on its assessment of country information (at [33]-[36]), the Tribunal was not satisfied that ethnic Tamils faced a real chance of serious harm:simply because of their ethnicity, or that associated factors such as being a young male or having geographic origins in the North or East of the country put them at greater risk of such harm. The Tribunal went further to find that it was not satisfied that the fact that the appellant was a young male would 'operate to exacerbate the fact of his Tamil ethnicity so as to create such a real chance [of serious harm]'. The Tribunal identified, that having regard to all the information before it, individually and cumulatively, the appellant would not face a real chance of serious harm or real risk of significant harm based on his Tamil ethnicity (at [56], [60] and [64]). Ground two, to the extent it was explicitly or implicitly before the Tribunal, has been specifically considered and disposed of by the Tribunal, or, alternatively, subsumed within findings of greater generality.