Brzozek and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) - [2019] AATA 1306

Brzozek and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2019] AATA 1306 (17 June 2019)
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2018/3427
Re:Barbara Brzozek
APPLICANT

AndSecretary, Department of Social Services
RESPONDENT

File Number: 2018/3480
Re:Raymond Shaw
APPLICANT

AndSecretary, Department of Social Services
RESPONDENT

DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member D. J. Morris
Date:17 June 2019
Place:Melbourne

In relation to applications 2018/3427 and 2018/3480 the reviewable decisions are set aside and, in substitution, Ms Barbara Brzozek and Mr Raymond Shaw were not members of a couple on 18 September 2017.
......[sgd]..................................................................
Senior Member D. J. Morris
Catchwords
SOCIAL SECURITY – are applicants members of a couple – if so, is discretion enlivened for determination that they are not a member of a couple for the purposes of the Act – consideration of circumstances of the two applicants – factors to take into account in arriving at decision – decisions set aside and new decisions substituted therefor
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 37
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth), ss 4, 24
Cases
Cullinane and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services, Re [2004] AATA 789
Gordon and Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, Re [2006] AATA 792
Kazmierczak v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2010] FCA 1084
Pelka v Secretary, Department of Social Security (2006) 151 FCR 546
Sperring and Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, Re [2007] AATA 1050
VBH and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services, Re [2006] AATA 1
VCG and Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, Re [2006] AATA 956
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member D. J. Morris
17 June 2019

Ms Barbara Brzozek and Mr Raymond Shaw have each brought an application to the General Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal seeking review of a decision of the Social Services and Child Support Division of the Tribunal (the first-tier review) made on 26 March 2018 to affirm decisions made by the then Department of Human Services, now renamed Services Australia (the Department), that the Applicants were members of a couple on 18 September 2017, for the purposes of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) (the Act).
The task for the Tribunal is to decide whether, on 18 September 2017, Ms Brzozek and Mr Shaw were members of a couple and, if so, may be treated as not being each a member of a couple under section 24 of the Act. How they are treated affects the rate of age pension they each receive.
A concurrent hearing of both Ms Brzozek and Mr Shaw’s applications was held on 1 March 2019. Ms Brzozek made submissions and gave evidence on her own behalf as well as on behalf of Mr Shaw. Mr Shaw also made an oral statement to the Tribunal. Ms Maggie Tagg, financial adviser to the Applicants, was given leave to make an oral statement to the Tribunal. The Respondent was represented by Ms Ailsa Bramley, a legal officer of the Department.
The Respondent lodged two volumes of documents (T-documents) in accordance with obligations under section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The T-documents relating to Ms Brzozek’s application were admitted as Exhibit R2 and the T-documents relating to Mr Shaw’s application were admitted as Exhibit R1. The Respondent also lodged a Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions. The Applicants lodged a number of documents which were taken into evidence and are listed in the Appendix to these reasons.
At the conclusion of the hearing, parties were given leave to make further submissions in writing, which were received by the Tribunal and taken into account.
Background
Ms Brzozek has received the age pension since September 2017 and also receives a carer allowance. She was paid carer allowance from 2010 to September 2017. Mr Shaw received a disability support pension (DSP) from June 2010 to May 2014 (T4, P 18). He then transferred to the age pension.
When Mr Shaw applied for the DSP in 2009, he advised the Department that he was partnered with Ms Brzozek and that they had commenced living together on 1 December 2000.
The Department has a form for Centrelink customers entitled Relationship details – separated under one roof (the form). On 9 July 2010 Mr Shaw completed the form and lodged it with the Department (R1, p 21). He advised that he separated from Ms Brzozek on an unspecified date in 2000 (sic) and set out further particularised details of why the Department should consider them not to be a couple.
Around 13 July 2010 Ms Brzozek also lodged the form (R2, p 169) with the Department, completed by her with her details and signed on 8 July 2010. She stated she and Mr Shaw separated on 12 March 2010, gave details about her domestic household relationship with Mr Shaw, and gave further details on why the Department should consider them not to be a couple.
The Department made a decision on 3 August 2010 that Ms Brzozek and Mr Shaw are not members of a couple, with a date of separation of 12 March 2010. The date the rate of their respective pensions increased was from 9 July 2010, which was also the date of notification from Ms Brzozek and Mr Shaw.
On 22 April 2013, the Department again sent Mr Shaw the form. He filled it in and returned it on 3 May 2013. At the time Mr Shaw spoke to an officer of the Department who relevantly recorded (R2, p 53):
Due to Carer’s use of “partner” during phone conversations with clink it has been requested that seperated [sic] under one roof forms be completed to correctly ascertain relationship status.
I have spoken at length with Mr Shaw and he has advised that there is no member of a couple relationship happening between him and his carer and that they only share a home for financial/caring reasons.
There was no dispute at the Tribunal hearing that the carer referred to in this conversation is Ms Brzozek.
The details Mr Shaw provided in the form lodged on 3 May 2013 were essentially the same as in the 2010 form, with the following variations:
(a)that he and Ms Brzozek go on holidays together on average once a year using their V-Line (railway) vouchers and approximately four times a year with a four-wheel drive group;
(b)that their shared social activities are generally family occasions and Ms Brzozek’s young grandchildren have always called him ‘grandad’;
(c)that Ms Brzozek works and has her son or daughter as contact in case of emergency;
(d)that each of them pay half of the household’s telephone, electricity and gas bills; and
(e)that Ms Brzozek does 95 per cent of the household tasks including all the washing, almost all of the gardening and 50 per cent of general maintenance chores “depending on the task”.
Mr Shaw wrote (R1, p 60) that Ms Brzozek is his registered carer and looks after all his “necessary illness requirements”, that she supports him “as a friend”. Mr Shaw stated that he has a financial adviser, Ms Tagg, but controls his own banking and money independently.
On 6 May 2013 Ms Brzozek lodged a completed form, with essentially the same details as the form she lodged in 2010.
In August 2017, Ms Brzozek completed and lodged another form (R2, p 248), with new information. She said the reasons she continued to live in the same residence as Mr Shaw were that she was not in a financial position to purchase a suitable unit for herself; her eyesight was deteriorating; and because of Mr Shaw’s physical and mental health (see R2, p 249). She said that there was “no change from previous advice to Centrelink in 2013 – except verbal communication has deteriorated. Physical aggression has been reported to [local] police and has since been controlled.” Ms Brzozek advised that the kitchen had been altered for easier accessibility but that these changes were not jointly financed. Ms Brzozek advised that they took turns in the kitchen because it “saves arguments” and that Mr Shaw had many of his own utensils that he prefers to use. She said Mr Shaw uses the main bathroom in the house and she uses an en suite bathroom. She advised that they shared a queen-sized bed as Mr Shaw required certain overseeing at night for health reasons, but there was no sexual relationship.
In terms of financial matters, they both have their own Medicare cards, they do not have access to each other’s bank accounts and she pays utility bills with Mr Shaw reimbursing her for 50 per cent of the cost. They do not have joint health insurance, are not beneficiaries of each other’s wills and own their own cars, the running costs of which they pay individually.
Ms Brzozek said that she attends Mr Shaw’s medical appointments with him and he drives her to appointments with her eye specialist. Ms Brzozek has a caravan and she advises that Mr Shaw assisted her with hooking it to her car and occasionally went away with her and other members of a caravan club.
On 7 September 2017 the Department sent the form to Mr Shaw and asked him to complete and return it. On 15 September 2017 the Department advised Mr Shaw that he was considered to be living with Ms Brzozek as members of a couple. Three days later the Department issued him with a notice reducing the rate of his age pension “because the combined value of your assets and those of your partner has increased”.
Mr Shaw sought a review of this decision by an Authorised Review Officer (ARO), an officer of the Department not involved in the original decision. The ARO reviewed the original decision and on 30 November 2017 affirmed it.
On 20 February 2018 both Mr Shaw and Ms Brzozek lodged applications for review with the Social Services and Child Support Division (the first-tier review). The first-tier review conducted a hearing by telephone on 26 March 2018 and at the conclusion of that hearing affirmed the original decision.
The Legislative framework
Part 1.2 of the Act concerns definitions of terms used in the Act. Section 4 concerns Family relationships – definitions – couples. Section 4(2) of the Act provides:
Member of a couple – general
(2)Subject to subsection (3), a person is a member of a couple for the purposes of this Act if:
(a)the person is legally married to another person and is not, in the Secretary’s opinion (formed as mentioned in subsection (3)), living separately and apart from the other person on a permanent or indefinite basis;…
Section 4(3) of the Act relevantly states:
(3)In forming an opinion about the relationship between 2 people for the purposes of paragraph (2)(a), subparagraph (2)(aa)(ii) or subparagraph (2)(b)(iii), the Secretary is to have regard to all the circumstances of the relationship including, in particular, the following matters:
(a) the financial aspects of the relationship, including:
(i) any joint ownership of real estate or other major assets and any joint liabilities; and
(ii) any significant pooling of financial resources especially in relation to major financial commitments; and
(iii) any legal obligations owed by one person in respect of the other person; and
(iv) the basis of any sharing of day-to-day household expenses;
(b) the nature of the household, including:
(i) any joint responsibility for providing care or support of children and
(ii) the living arrangements of the people; and
(iii) the basis on which responsibility for housework is distributed;
(c) the social aspects of the relationship, including:
(i) whether the people hold themselves out as married to, or in a de facto relationship with, each other; and
(ii) the assessment of friends and regular associates of the people about the nature of their relationship; and
(iii) the basis on which the people make plans for, or engage in, joint social activities;
(d) any sexual relationship between the people;
(e) the nature of the people's commitment to each other, including:
(i) the length of the relationship; and
(ii) the nature of any companionship and emotional support that the people provide to each other; and
(iii) whether the people consider that the relationship is likely to continue indefinitely; and
(iv) whether the people see their relationship as a marriage-like relationship or a de facto relationship.
Section 4(6) of the Act states that a person is not a member of a couple if a determination under section 24 is in force in relation to the person. Section 24 relevantly provides:
(1)Where:
(a)a person is legally married to another person; and
(b)the person is not living separately and apart from the other person on a permanent or indefinite basis; and
(c) the Secretary is satisfied that the person should, for a special reason in the particular case, not be treated as a member of a couple;
the Secretary may determine, in writing, that the person is not to be treated as a member of a couple for the purposes of the Act.
Consideration
The Tribunal and the Courts have considered this part of the Act on many occasions. In Re Cullinane and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2004] AATA 789, Senior Member McCabe (as he then was) said, at [16]:
Application of the criteria will often be difficult because relationships come in many forms. Not all relationships are happy, and they do not always conform to the stereotypes of family life. And why should they? People must be free to structure their domestic arrangements as they please. But it is still necessary to attempt to characterise a relationship where the decision whether or not to take into account the other person’s income depends on whether they are members of a couple, or merely share a common address. The criteria [that is, the criteria in section 4(3) of the Act] offer common-sense indicators. One need not satisfy them all; indeed, one may satisfy few of them but still be considered to be a member of a couple if the decision-maker forms the view the applicant is in fact a member of a couple. The matters referred to in s 4(3) inform the exercise of the discretion, but they are not the end of the story. The decision-maker must consider all of the circumstances.
The Tribunal notes that, in that case, Mr and Mrs Cullinane were married and had been for the preceding 25 years.
Along the same vein, Senior Member Isenberg said in Re Sperring and Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] AATA 1050 (Sperring), at [70]:
Determining whether a relationship is ‘marriage-like’ is a difficult task. The assessment is made somewhat easier by the commonsense [sic] criteria identified in the legislation, as addressed above. As observed in Cullinane (where there was found to be a marriage-like relationship) being a member of a couple involves a lot more than sharing a common address. However, all the criteria need not be satisfied. In fact, one may satisfy few of them but still be considered to be a member of a couple. All of the circumstances need to be considered. Each matter is different.
The Tribunal’s task, standing in the shoes of the Secretary, is to form an objective opinion about the circumstances of Ms Brzozek and Mr Shaw’s relationship, including considering the various criteria set out in section 4 of the Act. Importantly, this opinion is not formed from the views that the two people themselves might have, although the decision-maker’s opinion may be informed by those views (see, for example, the remarks of Senior Member Handley in Re VBH and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2006] AATA 1, at [94]).
French J (as His Honour then was of the Federal Court) stated, in Pelka v Secretary, Department of Social Security (2006) 151 FCR 546 (Pelka), at [46]:
Having regard to the current provisions of s 4(3) and the approaches discussed in the earlier authorities mentioned, a decision-maker concerned with whether an unmarried person is in a marriage-like relationship with another person of the opposite sex:
1. Must have regard to their interpersonal relationship as a whole not limited by the factors listed in s 4(3).
2. Must have regard to each of
(a)the financial aspects of the relationship;
(b)the nature of the household;
(c)the social aspects of the relationship;
(d)any sexual relationship between the people;
(e)the nature of the people’s commitment to each other.
3. Having regard to the preceding five matters, must have regard to all factors relevant to each and, in particular, must have regard to the factors listed under each heading in s 4(3).
4. Must specifically consider the total picture of the relationship created by all of these factors bearing in mind that consideration must be given to those which weigh against a marriage-like relationship and those which weigh in favour of it.
5. Must undertake the preceding consideration bearing in mind that a marriage-like relationship is not disclosed by any one of the following matters:
(a) financial cooperation;
(b) cohabitation;
(c) a sexual relationship;
(d) cooperative household arrangements;
(e) mutual commitment.
In terms of the financial aspects of the relationship, the Respondent noted that Mr Shaw and Ms Brzozek jointly own the house in which they currently reside and were (at that time) joint borrowers for the loan, and that the Certificate of Title shows them as tenants in common. They share utility bills, 50 per cent each, and maintain separate bank accounts. Ms Bramley referred the Tribunal to the remarks of Deputy President Forgie in Re VCG and Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2006] AATA 956, at [52]:
As tenants in common, neither would take title to the whole of the property were the other to die i.e neither had a right of survivorship. That is to be contrasted with the situation had they been joint tenants. In that case, each would have had a right of survivorship and each would have inherited the other’s share upon the other’s death. That they chose to be tenants in common reflects a wish to maintain the separateness of their financial interest in the home property.
The Respondent submitted that although the two Applicants maintain separate bank accounts and share household bills equally, they both benefit from the pooling of resources which reduces their accommodation and living expenses, and that the financial aspects of the relationship between Ms Brzozek and Mr Shaw are indicative of members of a couple.
In respect of the nature of the household, the Respondent submitted that at the time of the decision the Applicants shared a bedroom but used separate bathrooms; that they used the same kitchen and made meals for each other some four or five times a week and shared a laundry; that there are no rooms in the house reserved for the sole use of either Mr Shaw or Ms Brzozek; and that they share chores such as cleaning, gardening and general maintenance.
In terms of social aspects of the relationship, the Respondent submitted that they are ‘balanced’ in that they participate in some joint activities such as ballroom dancing, some family gatherings and joint holidays; they do not feel obliged to advise each other of their whereabouts when they leave the house; and that Ms Brzozek’s children refer to Mr Shaw as ‘grandad’.
In terms of any sexual relationship, the Respondent accepted that there is no such relationship but noted other Tribunal decisions where this factor is not determinative. The Tribunal, with respect, agrees with the view of Deputy President Groom in Re Gordon and Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2006] AATA 792, that the absence of this element in a relationship may not be conclusive in forming an opinion.
In terms of the nature and commitment of the Applicants to each other, the Respondent submitted, citing Pelka, that the nature of the commitment has to be qualitatively different from the commitment that either party to the relationship has to any other person and that this applies in the case of Mr Shaw and Ms Brzozek. The Respondent submits that the commitment between them is greater than that of two people sharing a house and living independently. Understanding that this must be viewed through the lens of deciding whether or not a person is a member of a couple, the Tribunal takes the view that caution should be applied in drawing such a conclusion. Logically, a person may have a qualitatively different relationship with another person (for instance an employer, or a long-standing friend, including a friend they might share accommodation with) from a relationship that the person may have with any other person, without that fact necessarily assisting in forming the opinion that the Act requires to be formed for a section 24 determination.

The Respondent submitted that the overall circumstances of the relationship between the Applicants are indicative of their being members of a couple and that, to share a bed, the level of familiarity takes the relationship beyond that of two people who may, for instance, be friends or siblings.
In terms of whether the discretion under section 24 is enlivened for Ms Brzozek and Mr Shaw to be treated as not a member of a couple for section 4(2) purposes, the Respondent submitted that the decision-maker must be satisfied that there is a ‘special reason’ in the particular case. Citing the reasoning of Barker J in the Federal Court of Australia in Kazmierczak v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2010] FCA 1084, the Respondent submitted that there is no evidence that Ms Brzozek and Mr Shaw were unable to pool resources or that they faced financial difficulties ‘beyond the straitened circumstances of many social security recipients’ (Respondent’s SFIC, p 18), and that the justification in paying a higher rate to an un-partnered person than to a member of a couple living together is that the un-partnered person does not enjoy the same economies of shared living costs.
Ms Tagg provided a written statement dated 5 October 2018 (Exhibit A2). She advised the Tribunal that she has been financial planner for both of the Applicants since 2009. Ms Tagg stated:
There has been no change to Ray and Barb’s relationship and financial arrangements since 2010 to justify Centrelink changing their decision and now assessing them as a couple. Ray and Barb are financially independent and operate separate bank accounts, share the household expenses and are not beneficiaries of each other’s superannuation policies.
Ms Tagg acknowledged that when she first became the Applicants’ financial adviser, they were living in a de facto relationship but said that the relationship broke down in 2010 after Mr Shaw suffered a severe stroke. She said that, at that time, neither Mr Shaw nor Ms Brzozek were in a financial position to split assets and purchase individual residences, and Mr Shaw still required support and care from Ms Brzozek, because of his health issues, so they decided to maintain cohabitation and share certain financial expenses.
Ms Brzozek made a submission, for both her and Mr Shaw, in response to the Respondent’s submission (Exhibit A8). She said that she and Mr Shaw do not sleep together; she told the Tribunal that she did share a bed with him for a period because of Mr Shaw’s sleep apnoea, because he refused to use a CPAP machine and she was worried about his irregular night breathing. She said the Respondent was incorrect that they made meals for one another and told the Tribunal that the two Applicants had discharged the mortgage and no longer had a joint home loan.
Ms Brzozek said that they no longer holiday together and told the Tribunal that she recently travelled to Canada with a female friend while Mr Shaw travelled around Australia with a male friend of his. Ms Brzozek said that, in terms of grocery shopping, they each bought items from separate supermarkets that they individually needed.
Mr Shaw submitted a written statement (Exhibit A9) in which he stated he cooked his own meals and agreed that Ms Brzozek did most of the household cleaning with outside assistance. Mr Shaw said he made his own social arrangements with his family and male and female friends and did not usually attend group functions with Ms Brzozek unless night driving is required (Ms Brzozek having given evidence she is unable to drive at night owing to her eyesight deterioration), and that the “only regular social activity we share is Thursday evening dancing sessions.”
Adopting the wise approach in Pelka, the Tribunal must look at the total picture of the relationship. In this respect, the Tribunal finds the evidence of Ms Tagg at the hearing particularly important. Ms Tagg is of the view that the de facto relationship that did exist between Mr Shaw and Ms Brzozek ended around 2010 when Mr Shaw’s health sharply declined following his stroke. The Tribunal balances this by agreeing with the Respondent that there are certain aspects of the relationship which point towards the Applicants being a couple, such as some social interactions, albeit sporadic ones. Pointing in the other direction is the consistent evidence of separate financial arrangements, attested to by bank statements submitted in evidence, and meticulously halved utility costs, as well as the separate holidays referred to above. There was slightly inconsistent evidence concerning meals but the Tribunal is satisfied on reading the papers and hearing the oral evidence that meal preparation is generally done individually, as is grocery shopping, so the ordinary economies of scale in this area of living do not appear to generally apply to Ms Brzozek or Mr Shaw.
At the first-tier review, the Tribunal recorded that Mr Shaw and Ms Brzozek were credible witnesses, and the Tribunal in this review finds the same, with the slight qualification that Mr Shaw’s decline in health meant he only made a short oral statement to the hearing and was not subject to questioning. The Tribunal accepts that while it was unusual that the Applicants shared a bed for a period (but no longer), that this was motivated by Ms Brzozek’s carer role and her concern about Mr Shaw’s sleep apnoea, and for this special reason this factor, which would axiomatically usually point to certain intimacy between two people, does not in this particular case weigh heavily in my assessment of whether they are members of a couple.
Senior Member Isenberg said in Sperring, at [72]:
Even without looking at the relationship in a ‘narrow way’ and without having a ‘fixed view’ of what constitutes a marriage (per Cullinane), Centrelink would need to have satisfied me that Ms Sperring and Mr Dowers had demonstrated more ‘marriage like’ characteristics in their association for me to find such a relationship. For example, I would find Centrelink’s arguments more convincing if there was evidence that Ms Sperring and Mr Dowers owned assets together or shared a bank account; if they did not split the weekly rent or their electricity bill but paid these expenses together; if Ms Sperring also cooked for Mr Dowers when she cooked for her daughters and they all ate dinner together; if they socialised together or presented themselves as a couple to others, at the children’s school for example, and if they holidayed together and if there was an ongoing sexual relationship between them.
While in that matter the Applicant was married to the other party, many of the elements cited apply to the circumstances of Ms Brzozek and Mr Shaw at the time the reviewable decision was made. Ms Bramley submitted on behalf of the Respondent that this matter is finely balanced. The Tribunal agrees. The Tribunal finds, taking into account the totality of all the evidence, that the correct decision in September 2017 was that Ms Brzozek and Mr Shaw should not be considered as a couple. The Tribunal is satisfied that the discretion was enlivened for a determination under section 24 of the Act at that time, and the preferable decision is that such a determination be made.
The Tribunal makes the concluding point that forming an opinion in such matters often involves considerations that are finely balanced. The medical situation of Mr Shaw and the independent evidence of Ms Tagg were pivotal in coming to the conclusion that the Tribunal has come to. The Tribunal also notes that some of this information was not available at the first-tier review. It is also important to note that the Department may review such determinations at any time, depending on evidence of changed circumstances in relation to a person’s state of affairs.
DECISION
In application 2018/3427 with Ms Barbara Brzozek as the Applicant and the Secretary, Department of Social Services as the Respondent, the reviewable decision is set aside and substituted with a decision that Ms Brzozek was not a member of a couple on 18 September 2017.
In application 2018/3480 with Mr Raymond Shaw as the Applicant and the Secretary, Department of Social Services as the Respondent, the reviewable decision is set aside and substituted with a decision that Mr Shaw was not a member of a couple on 18 September 2017.

47. I certify that the preceding 46 (forty-six) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member D. J. Morris

..........[sgd]............................................................
Associate
Dated: 17 June 2019

Date of hearing: 1 March 2019

Advocate for the Applicant: Barbara Brzozek / Self Represented

Advocate for the Respondent:
Ms Ailsa Bramley

Solicitors for the Respondent: Services Australia
Appendix – List of Exhibits
A1Statement of Barbara Brzozek, received on 25 June 2018
A2Statement of Maggie Tagg, dated 5 October 2018
A3Aged Care Support Plan for Barbara Brzozek, dated 13 December 2017
A4Letter from Andrew Ward, dated 2 October 2018
A5Email from Defence Health Care to Raymond Shaw, dated 4 October 2018
A6Letter from Ray Jans, dated 8 October 2018
A7Statement of Barbara Brzozek, received on 7 February 2019
A8Statement of Barbara Brzozek on Findings of Fact, received 7 February 2019
A9Statement of Raymond Shaw, dated 29 January 2019
A10Facts and Arguments of Applicants, received 7 February 2019
A11Statutory Declaration of Barbara Brzozek, declared on 14 January 2019
A12Statutory Declaration of Raymond Shaw, declared on 14 January 2019
A13Background of Relationship (Barb and Ray), received 7 February 2019
A14(Further) Statement of Barbara Brzozek, received 7 February 2019
A15Document prepared for Mr Tony Smith, MP for Casey, undated, received 7 February 2019
R1T-documents volume 1
R2T-documents volume 2

Date of hearing:	1 March 2019
Advocate for the Applicant:	Barbara Brzozek / Self Represented
Advocate for the Respondent:	Ms Ailsa Bramley
Solicitors for the Respondent:	Services Australia