Bruno Anthony Strangio v Equity-One Mortgage Fund Limited

[2015] HCASL 6

BRUNO ANTHONY STRANGIO

v

EQUITY-ONE MORTGAGE FUND LIMITED & ANOR

[2015] HCASL 6
M105/2014

1. The first respondent, a finance provider, sought possession of a property mortgaged by way of security for two loans made to a company.  The applicant was the sole director of that company, and his sister had guaranteed the loans.  The Supreme Court of Victoria (Randall AsJ) made an order that the first respondent recover possession of the property, and that the company and the guarantor pay to the first respondent the sum of $456,917.50 together with costs on an indemnity basis.

2. The company and the guarantor filed an appeal against that judgment. After filing, the company's solicitors were granted leave to cease acting, and the guarantor indicated that she wished to discontinue the appeal.  The applicant sought leave to appear on behalf of the company, but the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Warren CJ, Tate JA and Sifris AJA) refused leave and dismissed the appeal (the "First Judgment").

3. The applicant then lodged caveats to prevent transfer of the property.  Those caveats were removed following an application by the first respondent to the Supreme Court (Macaulay J).  The applicant's subsequent application to the Court (Almond J) for a stay was refused.  At neither stage was the applicant granted leave to appear on behalf of the company.   

4. The applicant later filed in the Court of Appeal summonses by which he sought:  an order that an appeal by him against the orders of Macaulay J not be taken to be abandoned by his failure to file a document within the specified time; a stay of the orders made by Macaulay J pending determination of the appeal; and an extension of time to appeal from the orders made by Almond J.  The Court of Appeal (Neave and Tate JJA) refused the applicant leave to appear on behalf of the company, and refused to make the orders sought in the summonses to the extent that they related to the applicant personally (the "Second Judgment").

5. The applicant now seeks special leave to appeal to this Court from both the First Judgment and the Second Judgment. The applicant does not have legal representation. The application therefore falls to be dealt with under r 41.10 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth).

6. The application for special leave to appeal from the First Judgment exhibits several procedural defects.  The applicant has not filed a separate application as required by r 41.01.1.  The applicant would require an enlargement of time within which to lodge his application, and no such enlargement has been sought under r 41.02.2.  Any application would also raise substantial questions as to competence given that the applicant was not a party to the proceedings culminating in the First Judgment.  However, in our view, it is not necessary to determine the effect of these shortcomings as there is no basis on which to doubt the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeal.

7. As regards the application for special leave to appeal from the Second Judgment, the proceedings below involved questions of practice and procedure which were resolved by the application of well-settled principles.  An appeal to this Court would enjoy no prospects of success.  The application is dismissed.

8. Pursuant to r 41.10.5, we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.

V.M. Bell
5 March 2015 S.J. Gageler