JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: BROWN -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2009] WASCA 74
CORAM: PULLIN JA
BUSS JA
MILLER JA
HEARD: 20 MARCH 2008
DELIVERED : 9 APRIL 2009
FILE NO/S: CACR 165 of 2008
BETWEEN: LYALL JOHN BROWN
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :YEATS DCJ
File No :IND BUN 16 of 2007
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Sentence - Activation of suspended sentence - Whether trial judge should have exercised discretion not to activate suspended term - Principles to be applied
Legislation:
Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA), s 63A
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 80(1), s 80(5), s 89(1)
Result:
Leave to appeal refused
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: Ms R M Parks
Respondent: Ms J D Whitbread
Solicitors:
Appellant: Edward John Myers
Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Hall v The Queen [1999] WASCA 225; (1999) 21 WAR 364
Hutchins v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 258
Nguyen v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 8
R v Olbrich [1999] HCA 54; (1999) 199 CLR 270
PULLIN JA: I agree with Miller JA.
BUSS JA: I agree with Miller JA.
MILLER JA: The appellant was charged on indictment in the District Court at Bunbury with the offence of grievous bodily harm. It was alleged that, on or about 19 February 2006, at Collie, he unlawfully did grievous bodily harm to William John Hammond.
The appellant was convicted of this charge after trial. He was dealt with in the District Court at Bunbury by Bowden DCJ on 15 August 2007. He was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of 18 months, but the sentence was suspended for a period of 2 years. In addition, a lifelong violence restraining order was made under the provisions of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) (s 63A). This was because the appellant was convicted of a violent personal offence within the meaning of the definition of that term in s 63A(5) of the Restraining Orders Act 1997.
The violence restraining order was for the benefit of Mr Hammond and it precluded the appellant from communicating, or attempting to communicate, by any means whatsoever with him. In addition, the appellant was ordered not to enter any premises where Mr Hammond lived or worked, or to be within 25 metres of the nearest external boundary of such premises, or to approach within 25 metres of Mr Hammond.
When sentenced by Bowden DCJ, the appellant was warned of the consequences of committing any further offence within the 2‑year period for which the term of imprisonment was suspended. His Honour said:
Now, Mr Brown, it is very important that you understand what that sentence is. That means if you commit any further offence within…
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- Case
- [2009] WASCA 74
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the trial judge had exercised their discretion appropriately in activating the suspended sentence. The appeal hinged on the principles and criteria that should guide a trial judge when considering the activation of a suspended sentence. Specifically, the Court was required to examine whether the trial judge had taken into account all relevant factors, including the nature and seriousness of the new offence, the circumstances of the original sentencing, and the principle of proportionality in sentencing.
The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had not adequately exercised their discretion in activating the suspended sentence. The Court emphasised that a trial judge must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the offender's conduct since the original sentence, their rehabilitation prospects, and the deterrence value of the sentence. The Court found that the trial judge had failed to sufficiently weigh these factors, leading to an inappropriate activation of the suspended term. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the trial court for reconsideration of the sentence.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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Ratio Decidendi