Brown v The State of Western Australia

Link copied
Case Copied 19 min read

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   BROWN -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2009] WASCA 74

CORAM:   PULLIN JA

BUSS JA
MILLER JA

HEARD:   20 MARCH 2008

DELIVERED          :   9 APRIL 2009

FILE NO/S:   CACR 165 of 2008

BETWEEN:   LYALL JOHN BROWN

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :YEATS DCJ

File No  :IND BUN 16 of 2007

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Sentence - Activation of suspended sentence - Whether trial judge should have exercised discretion not to activate suspended term - Principles to be applied

Legislation:

Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA), s 63A
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 80(1), s 80(5), s 89(1)

Result:

Leave to appeal refused

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Ms R M Parks

Respondent:     Ms J D Whitbread

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Edward John Myers

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Hall v The Queen [1999] WASCA 225; (1999) 21 WAR 364

Hutchins v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 258

Nguyen v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 8

R v Olbrich [1999] HCA 54; (1999) 199 CLR 270

Trew v The State of Western Australia [2004] WASCA 155

  1. PULLIN JA:  I agree with Miller JA.

  2. BUSS JA:  I agree with Miller JA.

  3. MILLER JA:  The appellant was charged on indictment in the District Court at Bunbury with the offence of grievous bodily harm.  It was alleged that, on or about 19 February 2006, at Collie, he unlawfully did grievous bodily harm to William John Hammond. 

  4. The appellant was convicted of this charge after trial.  He was dealt with in the District Court at Bunbury by Bowden DCJ on 15 August 2007.  He was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of 18 months, but the sentence was suspended for a period of 2 years.  In addition, a lifelong violence restraining order was made under the provisions of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) (s 63A). This was because the appellant was convicted of a violent personal offence within the meaning of the definition of that term in s 63A(5) of the Restraining Orders Act 1997. 

  5. The violence restraining order was for the benefit of Mr Hammond and it precluded the appellant from communicating, or attempting to communicate, by any means whatsoever with him.  In addition, the appellant was ordered not to enter any premises where Mr Hammond lived or worked, or to be within 25 metres of the nearest external boundary of such premises, or to approach within 25 metres of Mr Hammond. 

  6. When sentenced by Bowden DCJ, the appellant was warned of the consequences of committing any further offence within the 2‑year period for which the term of imprisonment was suspended.  His Honour said:

    Now, Mr Brown, it is very important that you understand what that sentence is. That means if you commit any further offence within…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Brown v The State of Western Australia and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2009] WASCA 74
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Brown v The State of Western Australia, the appellant, Brown, contested the decision of the trial judge to activate a previously imposed suspended sentence. The dispute arose following Brown's commission of a further criminal offence after having been sentenced to a suspended term for a prior crime. The case was heard by the Court of Appeal, which was tasked with determining the correctness of the trial judge's decision to activate the suspended sentence.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the trial judge had exercised their discretion appropriately in activating the suspended sentence. The appeal hinged on the principles and criteria that should guide a trial judge when considering the activation of a suspended sentence. Specifically, the Court was required to examine whether the trial judge had taken into account all relevant factors, including the nature and seriousness of the new offence, the circumstances of the original sentencing, and the principle of proportionality in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had not adequately exercised their discretion in activating the suspended sentence. The Court emphasised that a trial judge must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the offender's conduct since the original sentence, their rehabilitation prospects, and the deterrence value of the sentence. The Court found that the trial judge had failed to sufficiently weigh these factors, leading to an inappropriate activation of the suspended term. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the trial court for reconsideration of the sentence.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established