Brown v Premier Pet T/A Bay Fish
[2012] FMCA 1089
•6 November 2012
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BROWN v PREMIER PET T/A BAY FISH | [2012] FMCA 1089 |
| INDUSTRIAL LAW – Termination of employment for proscribed reason – refusal to work additional hours – whether the additional hours are reasonable – onus of proof –dismissal – claim for reinstatement. |
| Fair Work Act2009, ss.12, 62(1), 62(2), 63(3), 340(1), 341, 342(1) Storage Services and Wholesale Award 2010 |
| Laz v Downer Group Pty Ltd (2000) 108 IR 244 Greater Dandenong City Council & Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union (2001) FCA 349 Working Hours Case - July 2002 - PR072002 [2002] AIRC 857 MacPherson v Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 189 IR 50 Badman v Grasshoppers Early Learning Centres Pty Ltd [2009] FMCA 32 Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union v Arnotts Biscuits Ltd (2010) 188 FCR 221 Jones v Queensland Tertiary Admissions Centre Ltd (No 2) (2010) 186 FCR 22 |
| Applicant: | ADAM RICHARD BROWN |
| Respondent: | PREMIER PET T/A BAY FISH |
| File Number: | BRG 753 of 2011 |
| Judgment of: | Jarrett FM |
| Hearing date: | 6 November 2012 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 6 November 2012 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 6 November 2012 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant appeared in person |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Pratt, directly instructed by the respondent |
ORDERS
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
The respondent Premier Pet T/A Bay Fish contravened section 340(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 by dismissing the applicant Adam Richard Brown from his employment on 15 July 2007.
THE COURT ORDERS:
The respondent forthwith reinstate the applicant to his former employment.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRG 753 of 2011
| ADAM RICHARD BROWN |
Applicant
And
| PREMIER PET T/A BAY FISH |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Ex tempore
Mr Brown was employed by the respondent, Premier Pet Pty Ltd, as a fish keeper or fish treater, as variously described in some of the material. He was employed on a full time permanent basis in the respondent’s Brisbane fish room. His employment commenced on 14 March 2011 and his employment was terminated on 15 July 2011.
Mr Brown alleges that his termination was adverse action, taken in contravention of s.340(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 by his employer against him, because he had chosen to exercise a workplace right.
Having regard to the material before me and the submissions that have been made, there seems to be no issue that the respondent terminated the applicant’s employment and that that action is adverse action for the purposes of item 1 (a) of the table in s.342(1) of the Act.
Mr Brown says that there were two workplace rights that he was exercising or which he might be seen as having exercised and which were the reason, or part of the reason, for his termination. The first right was his right to refuse to work unreasonable overtime. The second was his right to take his dispute about being required to work overtime to Fair Work Australia.
I will deal with the second of those first. It requires some findings of fact.
The evidence in this case was given by four witnesses: Mr Brown, Glen Ian Briggs on behalf of the respondent, John Mason on behalf of the respondent and Jared Ross Patrick on behalf of the respondent.
Mr Briggs gave evidence in his affidavit that on 7 July, 2011 the respondent’s management team decided to introduce mandatory rostering arrangements to apply to all the staff who were employed in the Brisbane fish room. Routine maintenance work was required to be performed in the Brisbane fish room on non-trading days, including Saturday, Sunday and public holidays. That work was done by a few employees on a regular basis, but management wanted to spread the burden of that work across the whole of its workforce at the Brisbane fish room.
Mr Briggs says that he wrote to Mr Brown explaining the operational reasons for management’s decision to change from a voluntary system of overtime on the weekends and public holidays, it seems, and providing him with 14 days notice of the new rostering arrangements.
Mr Brown received the letter. He appends it to his affidavit, filed on 8 October, 2012. He says that he was the only person to receive the letter and there is some support for that in the affidavit of Mr Mason. Inferentially, it was only Mr Brown that had a difficulty with working overtime on non-trading days.
Mr Briggs goes on to say that after he gave the letter to Mr Brown and between then and 14 July, there were discussions between Mr Brown and Mr Briggs and another person, Mr Hackney (who did not give evidence) that were centred around the non-trading day rostering arrangements. The long and short of it is that Mr Brown and Mr Briggs could not agree about Mr Brown’s participation in the involuntary roster system for non-trading days.
Mr Briggs says that it was explained to Mr Brown that the reason for the change was to introduce some fairness into the overtime system and that there would be an ability to swap allocated overtime shifts with another staff member if Mr Brown was able to find somebody who was willing to perform the extra paid overtime.
Mr Briggs says that Mr Brown consistently said words to the effect that he only wanted a 38 hour a week job, with occasional overtime. That seems to be consistent with Mr Brown’s evidence. He says that he only wanted a 38 hour a week job, with occasional overtime and he gave evidence that from time to time he did overtime in the course of a week. Indeed, his case was that he did not object to overtime on the weekend either, but he objected to the rostered arrangements and the requirement for there to be overtime worked on an involuntary basis on the weekends. He explained that he would be prepared to work on some weekends, provided that there was time in lieu during the working week, but apparently the parties were not able to agree about that.
Mr Briggs says that on 14 July 2011 he asked a man called John Mason to attend a meeting with Mr Brown and Mr Briggs. Mr Mason is the general manager of Premier Pet and he has sworn an affidavit in these proceedings. At the meeting the involuntary overtime roster was discussed and Mr Mason says this:
I also recall on this meeting I made it quite clear to Adam that if he continued to refuse to comply with Premier Pet’s reasonable requirements that he participate in the non‑trading day roster, then his employment would be in jeopardy. Notwithstanding this Adam was unwilling to change his stance. We agreed to reconvene the meeting again the following day.
Quite clearly, then, there was a threat hanging over Mr Brown’s head that if he did not agree to what his employer wanted, his employment would be in jeopardy. That afternoon, I accept, Mr Brown lodged a form 8 with Fair Work Australia, which was intended to institute a dispute in Fair Work Australia and to engage the process as set out in the Fair Work Act to have that dispute dealt with.
Mr Brown says that he gave notice of those proceedings to the respondent the next day, by giving a copy of the document in an envelope to Mr Briggs. Mr Briggs does not recall receiving it. He reconstructed what he might have done if he had received the document. He says he would have given it to Mr Mason and he would not have signed the letter of termination (that was subsequently given to Mr Brown), but that was particularly unhelpful evidence, I thought.
Mr Brown also gave evidence that there was a subsequent meeting between the three gentlemen: Mr Mason, Mr Briggs and Mr Brown, on the morning of the 15 July 2011 and at that meeting Mr Briggs gave to Mr Mason the form 8. Mr Brown says that Mr Mason screwed it up and put it in the bin. Mr Mason disagreed with that proposition.
On balance I find that Mr Brown did not give the form 8 document to Mr Briggs, as he alleges. I am satisfied that it is more likely that he did not give notice of that to Mr Briggs or to Mr Mason and that is consistent with his view that he had 14 days after he made the complaint to Fair Work Australia to provide the respondent with a copy of it.
Although I said, during the course of submissions, that that finding might be critical in this case, ultimately I do not think it is. That is because it is clear on all of the evidence - the evidence of Mr Brown, the evidence of Mr Mason and the evidence of Mr Briggs - that the real reason for the termination was the refusal by Mr Brown to participate in a mandatory work roster, requiring him to work overtime on what are described as non-trading days.
It follows, therefore, that I am not satisfied that there is a prima facie case that Mr Brown’s employment was terminated for one of the proscribed reasons advanced by Mr Brown, namely, the making of a complaint to Fair Work Australia. In that respect his claim fails.
I deal, then, with the second category of workplace right asserted by Mr Brown. Section 341 of the Fair Work Act provides that a person has a workplace right if the person is entitled to the benefit of a workplace law. Having regard to the definitional section in the Fair Work Act (s.12), the Fair Work Act itself is a workplace law. And so Mr Brown has the benefit of the Act.
Section 62 of the Act provides for hours of work. It provides for a maximum weekly hours of work in s.62(1) and it provides that in these words:
Maximum weekly hours of work
(1) An employer must not request or require an employee to work more than the following number of hours in a week unless the additional hours are reasonable:
(a) for a full‑time employee—38 hours; or
(b) for an employee who is not a full‑time employee—the lesser of:
(i) 38 hours; and
(ii) the employee’s ordinary hours of work in a week.
Section 62(2) provides that an employee may refuse to work additional hours beyond those referred to in s.62(1)(a) or (b) if they are unreasonable. In my view, s.62(2) creates an entitlement in an employee to refuse to work additional hours. That is, Mr Brown is entitled to the benefit of s.62(2) of the Fair Work Act. By refusing to participate in the involuntary non-trading day roster, Mr Brown has purported to exercise a workplace right, namely, his entitlement to refuse to work unreasonable hours, pursuant to s.62(2).
Having regard to the tests that were explained by Wilson FM in Badman v Grasshoppers Early Learning Centres Pty Ltd [2009] FMCA 32, and the Federal Court decisions of Logan J in Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union v Arnotts Biscuits Ltd (2010) 188 FCR 221 and Collier J in Jones v Queensland Tertiary Admissions Centre Ltd (No 2) (2010) 186 FCR 22 it seems to me that Mr Brown has successfully invoked the provisions of s.361 of the Fair Work Act. That is to say, he has raised a sufficient prima facie case, to shift the onus to the respondent to show that it did not take the alleged adverse action against Mr Brown for a proscribed reason.
In the circumstances, the Act requires me to presume that the alleged adverse action was taken for the reason contended for by Mr Brown unless the respondent proves otherwise. It is, therefore, for the respondent to prove that it did not take the relevant action against Mr Brown - terminating his employment - for the reason contended for by him.
Mr Brown contends that his employment was terminated because he exercised his workplace right to refuse to work unreasonable additional hours. His employer says that he was terminated because he refused a proper direction from his employer to work reasonable additional hours, as his employer was entitled to request him to do, having regard to the provisions of s.62(1) of the Fair Work Act.
It seems to me that it is necessary for the respondent to demonstrate that the relevant adverse action was not taken against Mr Brown for the reason asserted by him. As part of that exercise it is for the respondent to demonstrate that the additional hours it required Mr Brown to work were not unreasonable.
Section 62(3) provides a list of matters that need to be taken into account when determining what is reasonable in terms of additional hours. There are a number of matters set out in that subsection. Those factors have their genesis in the Working Hours Case - July 2002 - PR072002 [2002] AIRC 857 and as applied by Raphael FM in MacPherson v Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 189 IR 50 (reversed on other grounds: Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v MacPherson (2010) 185 FCR 383.
The first of the relevant factors is whether there is any risk to employee health and safety from working the additional hours. Here it was not suggested that there was - the additional hours being three hours on a non-trading day once every seven to 10 non-trading days. Mr Brown did not contend that there was any particular risk to his health or safety, or that of any other employee.
The second reason is the employee’s personal circumstances, including family responsibilities. The first thing to say about that is that the reference to family responsibilities is an inclusive reference, not an exhaustive one. And so all or any of the employee’s personal circumstances may be taken into account. The fact that there is no need to attend to childcare responsibilities, or that somebody does not have the care and control of another person, for example, whilst relevant, is not determinative. The respondent was at pains to point out that Mr Brown had no family responsibilities that would have prevented him from working the additional hours.
In this case, Mr Brown lives with his mother. She requires his assistance with some things, although she lives relatively independently. That was my impression of the evidence. But Mr Brown has other interests, apart from the work that he was doing for the respondent. He is a bankrupt, and presently his estate is being administered by a trustee, pursuant to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. But that does not mean that he cannot occupy himself in business activities should he so choose. In the past, Mr Brown has conducted a business, via a company, in the nature of an internet retailer of swords. It may be that he sold that business to his mother before his bankruptcy, but it is clear enough that he continues to work in the business. Whether he maintains an interest in the business beyond what he might have disclosed to his trustee in bankruptcy, or beyond what might be disclosed by the ASIC records is, at the end of the day, neither here nor there. He chooses to devote his time to that, as he is entitled so to do.
The next factor set out in s.62(3) is the needs of the workplace or the enterprise in which the employee is employed. There is very little evidence before me about the needs of this particular workplace. There is no evidence about the nature or extent of the work that Mr Brown was employed to do. There is no evidence about the nature or extent of the work done by other employees. There is no evidence about the nature and extent of the respondent’s enterprise, apart from some very generalised evidence given by Mr Patrick in his affidavit of 18 October, 2012.
Accordingly, it is impossible, in my view, to come to any conclusion about the needs of the workplace or enterprise in which Mr Brown was employed. The highest the evidence gets at paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of Mr Patrick, is that there were some complaints about Mr Brown’s conduct and behaviour, in that he was “not pulling his weight, as well as general unhappiness and poor morale amongst the Brisbane fish room staff”. Mr Patrick says that in order to address those problems, (Mr Brown’s conduct and behaviour which led to complaints being made by other staff that he was not pulling his weight, as well as general unhappiness and poor morale amongst the Brisbane fish room staff), the management team decided to introduce more equitable rostering arrangements, including a mandatory non-trading day roster in respect of the Brisbane fish room operations – see paragraph 6 of Mr Patrick’s affidavit.
Thus it seems that the rostering arrangements for the mandatory non-trading day roster were introduced not to deal with any particular problems in terms of the business, or the way in which the business was conducted, but rather to deal with, as paragraph 5 puts it, “Adam’s conduct”.
The next factor to take into account is whether the employee is entitled to receive overtime payments, penalty rates or other compensation for, at a level of remuneration that reflects an expectation of working additional hours. It is clear enough that if Mr Brown worked overtime, he would be paid overtime rates. So much is provided for by the Storage Services and Wholesale Award 2010.
It is also relevant to take into account, either as simply another relevant matter for consideration, or under this particular factor, that one of the reasons that Mr Brown wished not to work more than 38 hours a week, or not many hours more than 38 hours a week, was the effect that it might have on his liability to make contributions from his income to his trustee in bankruptcy. This issue was not explored in any detail at all in the evidence, and so one does not know what effect working the proposed additional hours may have had on his liability to contribute from his income to his estate in bankruptcy. But it was a concern for Mr Brown. Beyond remarking that it was a concern for him, I can make no other findings about it.
The next factor is any notice given by the employer of any request or requirement to work the additional hours. As Mr Briggs sets out in his affidavit, 14 days’ notice was given of the change to the working arrangements, that is, the introduction of a mandatory, as opposed to voluntary, overtime arrangement.
The next factor is the notice given by Mr Brown of his intentions to refuse to work the additional hours. He gave notice. There is no doubt about that.
The next factor to take into account is the usual patterns of work in the industry, or the part of an industry in which the employee works. There is no evidence about any of that.
The next factor is the nature of the employee’s role, and the employee’s level of responsibility. Again, no evidence about that.
The next is whether the additional hours are in accordance with averaging terms included under s.63 in a modern award or enterprise agreement that applies to the employee, or with an averaging arrangement agreed to by the employer and the employee under s.64 of the Fair Work Act. It was not suggested that any of those matters were relevant in this particular case, but I do know that part 5 of the Storage Services and Wholesale Award 2010 provides for hours of work and related matters, and in clause 22.1, provides for ordinary hours of work for day workers - that is, 38 hours per week, Monday to Friday. Provision is made for the spread of work, and the way in which the working hours might be arranged. There are provisions made for changing the ordinary hours of work around for rostered days off.
It was suggested that clause 24.5 of the Award clearly recognised that the employer was entitled to require an employee to work on a Saturday, Sunday or some other holiday, because clause 24.5 provided for the rates of pay that were to be paid in the event that an employee was required to work overtime on a Saturday or a Sunday or a public holiday. I do not think that there is any doubt at all that an employer can require an employee to work overtime. Section 62(1) of the Fair Work Act deals with that. I do not think there is any doubt either that an employer can require an employee to work additional hours as overtime, which might happen to fall on a Saturday, Sunday or a public holiday. What is at issue is whether the additional hours in this case were unreasonable. In my view, clause 24.5 of the Award does not assist in that determination.
The last factor to be taken into account under s.63 is “any other relevant matter”. There are a couple of “other relevant” matters in my view. The first is that there seems to have been no negotiation or discussion between the employee and the employer about the proposed involuntary roster. The respondent told the Mr Brown what was to happen. Mr Brown was unhappy. However, he made some suggestions that might have assisted the implementation of the involuntary roster - time in lieu during the working week, for example. But those suggestions fell on deaf ears. It was, to put it in the vernacular, the employer’s way or the highway. That is unfortunate, because clause 10 of the relevant award relied upon by the respondent in this case provides a mechanism for dispute resolution, a mechanism which does not seem to have been taken up by the respondent in the circumstances of this particular dispute. Rather, the respondent simply resorted to terminating Mr Brown’s employment when Mr Brown would not agree to the respondent’s terms. That is a relevant consideration.
The second matter of considerable significance, it seems to me, is that there is no evidence that suggests that these additional hours, in the circumstances of this particular employee, are not unreasonable reasonable. That is to say, there is no evidence that having regard to the overtime that Mr Brown otherwise works on a regular basis, the imposition of further overtime on an involuntary basis is not unreasonable. There is no evidence before me about how much overtime Mr Brown worked from time to time, either specifically or on an average. Mr Brown made some submissions about that, but there is no evidence about it, and he suggested that he could tender his pay slips but he had no confidence in the accuracy of the pay slips. As matters transpired, they were not tendered and they did not form part of the evidence. But the onus is on the respondent. The respondent produces no evidence to demonstrate that the amount of overtime worked by Mr Brown in the circumstances means that the imposition of additional involuntary overtime is not unreasonable, particularly when that involuntary overtime falls on a weekend or a public holiday.
The amount of overtime suggested is three hours, the minimum that must be provided according to the Award. The imposition of a three-hour period on a weekend, Saturday or a Sunday, or a public holiday, has the potential to be particularly inconvenient and one might imagine that an employee is reluctant to take on that inconvenience. Whether it is reasonable to require an employee to take on that inconvenience depends on not only all of the matters to which I have already referred, but also the amount of overtime which an employee ordinarily works.
One of the issues for consideration in MacPherson v Allied Coal (above) was the amount of hours which the employee in that case would be required to work if the mandatory overtime arrangements in that case were implemented. Raphael FM made the point that it was not the number of additional hours which were important, either by themselves or when totalled with the ordinary time hours that an employee might accumulate over the course of a working week. His Honour pointed out that it is the circumstances in which that overtime is required to be worked which are important.
In this case, the matters to which I have already referred are, in my view, important. It is also important to understand that Mr Brown does not refuse to work overtime. Nor does he refuse to work overtime on the weekends, because his suggestion was that there ought to be some time off in lieu or some recognition in his ordinary hours, during the working week, which take into account the time that he worked on the weekend, so that for his own purposes - his own legitimate purposes, in my view, his working hours do not exceed a particular total. That there could be such a time-off in lieu arrangement between the employer and the employee is expressly provided for in the award: see clause 22.1 of the Award.
In all of those circumstances. I am not satisfied that the employer has discharged the onus on it to demonstrate that it did not terminate Mr Brown’s employment for the reasons that he asserts. The contravention is made out.
In these proceedings, Mr Brown originally claimed compensation and the imposition of a pecuniary penalty but for reasons delivered by me earlier in these proceedings, he cannot pursue those claims. The only outstanding claim is one for reinstatement.
It is said that reinstatement is not appropriate because the employer has moved on and the relationship between the employer and the employee has irretrievably broken down. The employer in this instance is a company. It is not a circumstance where there is a personal respondent.
In Greater Dandenong City Council & Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union (2001) FCA 349, Wilcox J said this at paragraph 39:
Finally, at paragraph 126, Madgwick J, the trial judge, turned to remedies. He held there are plainly mitigating circumstances so a nominal penalty will suffice. His Honour observed, in paragraph 127, that where reinstatement is sought for proven unlawful termination of employment, it should generally be regarded as the primary remedy and awarded except where it would be impracticable to do so, or where there are other just and compelling reasons against that course.
Here it is said that the necessary relationship between employer and employee is missing - it has been destroyed. It is further said that the circumstances of the respondent’s business are such that it is no longer practicable for reinstatement to be ordered.
In Laz v Downer Group Pty Ltd (2000) 108 IR 244, Moore J said at paragraph 36:
[36] I accept that it is relevant to consider whether a satisfactory working relationship can be re-established. But as von Doussa J said in Ettridge v TransAdelaide (1998) 80 IR 422 at 430 (in relation to the exercise of the power conferred by s170CR):
In considering whether the discretion to order reinstatement should be exercised, a central consideration is whether a satisfactory working relationship can be re-established between the parties. As Moore J observed in Bean v Milstern Retirement Services Pty Ltd (unreported, Industrial Relations Court of Australia, 2 June 1995) in many instances personal tensions created by litigation can be expected to lessen if not dissipate entirely with the passage of time.
See also Perkins v Grace Worldwide (Australia) Pty Ltd (1997) 72 IR 186 at 191 and Sherman v Peabody Coal Ltd (1998) 88 IR 408 at 424-425.
In this case, the senior management with whom Mr Brown had his disagreements have left the company. Mr Mason is no longer there and Mr Briggs is no longer there. Mr Patrick remains the managing director of the respondent but he is based in Narrangba, whereas Mr Brown’s employment was based at the Brisbane fish room - a different location.
Mr Patrick’s affidavit makes it clear that his role as general manager was just that - a managerial role, and he had little contact with Mr Brown. According to his affidavit, most of his contact with Mr Brown was via Mr Mason and Mr Briggs.
Having regard to those matters, I am not satisfied that there has been such a break down in the relationship between employer and employee as to mean that reinstatement is not a viable option. Put another way, I am not satisfied that the tensions that have been created by this litigation will mean that reinstatement is not appropriate, mainly because Mr Mason and Mr Briggs are no longer a part of the company. And so, whomever it is that supervises Mr Brown if it was that he was reinstated, would be somebody new and perhaps unfamiliar with these proceedings. There is certainly no evidence to the contrary.
The next issue to consider then is the current situation of the business. Mr Patrick gives four paragraphs of evidence about that. He says that the respondent’s overall business operations and sales revenue have decreased and as a result, staffing levels in the Brisbane fish room have downsized considerably since Mr Brown was employed some 15 months ago. He then, in paragraph 12 of his affidavit, falsifies that evidence. He says:
As of 31 July 2011, 15 permanent staff and five casual staff were employed in the Brisbane fish room. (that is a total of 20 staff) By contrast, as at 30 September 2012, only seven permanent staff and 11 casual staff, two of whom were juniors, were employed in the Brisbane fish room (that is 18 staff, a difference of two).
I accept that there’s a difference between 15 permanent staff and seven permanent staff on the one hand, and five casual staff and 11 casual staff on the other but that may be no more than a change in the way in which the respondent has chosen to employ its workers. The issue is not explored in the evidence in any detail. One is left to speculate and I refuse to speculate.
Mr Patrick says the marked increase in the casualised nature of the working arrangements in the Brisbane fish room reflects the unpredictable nature of sales of live fish in the present business climate. The overall number of working hours performed in the Brisbane fish room has also decreased by 14 per cent. One wonders whether that then means that there is now no need for an involuntary roster arrangement. Further Mr Patrick asserts in his affidavit that there is not presently a sufficient amount of work available in the Brisbane fish room to support an additional full time permanent employee but as counsel for the respondent quite properly conceded, the fact that the position does not exist any more is not an answer to a claim for reinstatement.
Finally, in paragraph 11 of his affidavit, Mr Patrick says that since July, 2011 live fish sales revenue has decreased by 12 per cent. He does not say, however, 12 per cent of what. 12 per cent could mean anything in the context of this business, this business about which there is no evidence as to its size. It is submitted that it is a small business but there is no evidence to suggest that that is so. I note that it has a Brisbane fish room, a Melbourne fish room and has some premises at Narrangba. That tends to suggest an operation which is of some size.
In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that reinstatement is an appropriate option in this case.
I declare that the respondent, Premier Pet Pty Ltd, trading as Bay Fish, contravened s.340(1), of the Fair Work Act 2009 when it dismissed the applicant, Adam Richard Brown, from its employment on 15 July, 2011.
ORDERS DELIVERED
I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Jarrett FM
Date: 20 November 2012
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