Brown v Manuel - [1996] QCA 65

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL	[1996] QCA 065
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
Brisbane	Appeal No. 95 of 1995
[Brown v. Manuel]
BETWEEN:

JUNE EDNA BROWN

(Plaintiff) Respondent

AND:

ERIC CYRIL MANUEL

(Defendant) Appellant
Davies J.A.
Mackenzie J
Helman J.

Judgment delivered 22/03/1996

Joint reasons for judgment of Davies J.A. and Mackenzie J.; Helman J. dissenting in part.

APPEAL ALLOWED BY SETTING ASIDE THE DECLARATIONS MADE BELOW AND

SUBSTITUTING THE FOLLOWING DECLARATIONS:

(1)	THAT THE APPELLANT HOLDS THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS LOT 377 ON REGISTERED PLAN 88465, COUNTY WARD, PARISH NERANG, CERTIFICATE OF TITLE VOLUME 3165, FOLIO 26 AS TRUSTEE FOR THE RESPONDENT AND HIMSELF AS TENANTS IN COMMON IN THE SHARES OF 6/10 FOR THE APPELLANT AND 4/10 FOR THE RESPONDENT;
(2)	THAT THE APPELLANT HOLDS THE VOLVO 265 MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTERED IN HIS NAME AS TRUSTEE FOR THE RESPONDENT AND HIMSELF IN THE INTERESTS OF 6/7 FOR THE APPELLANT AND 1/7 FOR THE RESPONDENT.

ORDER THAT THE APPELLANT PAY THE RESPONDENT ONE-HALF OF HER TAXED COSTS OF THE APPEAL. RESPONDENT TO RETAIN HER COSTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW.

CATCHWORDS:	EQUITY - constructive trusts - de facto relationship - apportionment of interests in property
Counsel:	Mr P.T. Morrow for the appellant. Mr R.M. Bourke for the respondent.
Solicitors:	Sabben's Solicitors for the appellant. Primrose Couper Cronin Rudkin for the respondent.
Hearing date:	20 October 1995

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

Appeal No. 95 of 1995

Brisbane

Before

Davies J.A.
Mackenzie J.
Helman J.

[Manuel v. Brown]

BETWEEN:

ERIC CYRIL MANUEL

(Defendant) Appellant

AND:

JUNE EDNA BROWN

(Plaintiff) Respondent

JOINT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - DAVIES J.A. AND MACKENZIE J.

Judgment delivered the 22nd day of March 1996

We have had the advantage of reading the reasons of Helman J. We adopt his Honour's
description of the relevant facts as found by the learned trial Judge. As his Honour has pointed out,

the learned trial Judge described the relationship between the parties during the 18 years in which

they lived together as a de facto relationship and said that each of the parties had expectations of the

other of the nature of those normally found or expected in a marital or quasi marital relationship.

Nevertheless it is not surprising, when one has regard to the learned trial Judge's description

of the appellant as mean, bitter, ungenerous and uncharitable, both financially and psychologically,

and to the fact that the parties were involved in bitter litigation against one another, that answers to

questions to them directed to the existence of a commitment to each other were quite unhelpful. The

learned trial Judge, rightly in our view, thought it unrealistic in the circumstances to look for evidence

of manifestations of love or affection between the parties.

The learned trial Judge also found as a fact that, because "to say the very least" the appellant

was not a gregarious person and preferred his own company to that of anyone else, the respondent

sought social…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Brown v Manuel

Details

AGLC: Brown v Manuel [1996] QCA 65
Case: [1996] QCA 65
Decision Date: 22/03/1996

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Brown v Manuel, the parties were engaged in a dispute over the apportionment of interests in a property situated in New South Wales. The plaintiff, Brown, sought a declaration that a constructive trust should be imposed on the property held by the defendant, Manuel, due to their de facto relationship. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division.

The court was required to determine whether a constructive trust should be imposed on the property in question. This involved examining the nature of the relationship between the parties and assessing whether any contributions, whether financial or otherwise, made by the plaintiff entitled them to a share in the property. The court also needed to consider the principles governing the imposition of constructive trusts in the context of de facto relationships.

The court found that the relationship between the parties qualified as a de facto relationship, and that the contributions made by the plaintiff warranted an equitable interest in the property. The court acknowledged the financial contributions made by the plaintiff, as well as their non-financial contributions to the relationship and the property. The court held that a constructive trust should be imposed to reflect the parties' shared intention regarding the property. Consequently, the court ordered the property to be divided between the parties in accordance with their respective contributions.

Orders