Brown v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Brown v Commissioner of Taxation [2001] FCA 240

EVIDENCE – where Taxpayer failed to declare home unit as part of his income – where Taxpayer claimed he believed home unit was a gift– where Taxation Office investigated Taxpayer’s claim – where Taxpayer’s accounting and legal representatives initiated meeting with members of the Taxation Office – whether meeting inadmissible under Evidence Act s131(1)(a)– whether operation of s131(1)(a) excluded by s131(2)(g) – whether evidence relevant

Evidence Act s 131

Hayes v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 96 CLR 47 referred to

JOHN JOSEPH BROWN v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION

N 1480 of 1999

EMMETT J
13 MARCH 2001
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1480 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

JOHN JOSEPH BROWN
APPLICANT

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

EMMETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 MARCH 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. Paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 of the affidavit of Donald Caldbeck dated 19 October 2000 be rejected.
    2. Paragraph 2 of the affidavit of Donald Caldbeck dated 1 November 2001 be rejected.
    3. Paragraph 3 of the affidavit of Donald Caldbeck dated 5 March 2001 be rejected.
    4. Affidavit of Graham Thomas Smith sworn 24 October 2000 be rejected.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1480 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

JOHN JOSEPH BROWN
APPLICANT

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

EMMETT J

DATE:

13 MARCH 2001

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This proceeding is an appeal to the Court by the applicant, Mr John Joseph Brown (“the Taxpayer”) against an appealable objection decision made by the respondent, the Commissioner of Taxation (“the Commissioner”) on 9 November 1999.  By that decision, the Commissioner disallowed an objection by the Taxpayer dated 26 May 1999 to an amended assessment issued by the Commissioner to the Taxpayer on 28 March 1996 in respect of the year of income of the Taxpayer ended 30 June 1991 (“the Tax Year”). 

  2. The question in the proceeding is whether the value of a home unit situated at Mermaid Beach, Queensland (“the Unit”) that was transferred to the Taxpayer on 11 July 1990 by Ray Development Corporation Pty Limited (“RDC”), which the Commissioner assessed at $984,725, was assessable income of the Taxpayer for the Tax Year.  There are subsidiary issues concerning additional tax and interest imposed by the Commissioner.

  3. Counsel for the Commissioner sought to read in the proceeding affidavits by officers of the Australian Taxation Office (“the ATO”) being Mr Donald Caldbeck and Mr Graham Thomas Smith.  The evidence relates to discussions that took place at a meeting held on 9 October 1995 (“the Objected Evidence”).  The meeting was attended by the Taxpayer and Messrs Caldbeck and Smith.  Also in attendance were Mr Phillip Henry and Ms Jenny Nairne from KPMG, the Taxpayer’s tax accountants, Mr A.J. Stammers,…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 240
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Brown v Commissioner of Taxation involved a dispute over whether certain communications made between the taxpayer, Mr Brown, and the Commissioner of Taxation during negotiations should be admissible in court. The Commissioner argued that these communications, which took place during discussions aimed at resolving tax disputes, were protected by Section 131(1)(a) of the Evidence Act, which excludes such evidence when made between persons in dispute in connection with an attempt to negotiate a settlement. However, Mr Brown contended that these communications were not protected as they were not made in the context of a negotiation but rather as part of a broader dispute over the treatment of the value of a unit as income. The court had to determine whether the communications were indeed protected under the statute and, if not, whether they could be admitted to prevent any potential misleading of the court.

The court examined the nature of the communications and the context in which they occurred. It was noted that the discussions took place after a meeting where Mr Brown had expressed a desire to resolve the dispute with the ATO. The court considered whether these communications were part of a negotiation or an attempt to resolve the dispute. The court found that the communications were made during an attempt to negotiate a settlement and thus fell within the exclusion of Section 131(1)(a). However, the court also considered whether the exclusion should not apply under Section 131(1)(g) if the evidence was likely to mislead the court unless contradicted or qualified. After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that the exclusion should apply, and the communications were inadmissible.

Based on the reasoning above, the court ruled that the affidavits containing the communications were inadmissible and rejected them as evidence. The court's decision was that the taxpayer's arguments regarding the admissibility of the communications were not sufficient to exclude them from the statutory protection. Consequently, the court ordered the rejection of specific paragraphs of the affidavits submitted by both parties, as they contained inadmissible evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 of the affidavit of Donald Caldbeck dated 19 October 2000 be rejected.

2. Paragraph 2 of the affidavit of Donald Caldbeck dated 1 November 2001 be rejected.

3. Paragraph 3 of the affidavit of Donald Caldbeck dated 5 March 2001 be rejected.

4. Affidavit of Graham Thomas Smith sworn 24 October 2000 be rejected.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Mr Smith replied:“The land was owned by Monacorp Pty Ltd who sold it to Nauri Gold Coast Pty Ltd. Ray Development Corporation Pty Ltd owned shares in Monacorp. The Unit was owned by Ray Development Corporation. Mr Brown received a commission on the sale and the value of the Unit has not been declared in Mr Brown’s income tax return.”Mr Smith’s affidavit then proceeds to set out his recollection of the discussion that then ensued.SECTION 131(1)(a) OF THE EVIDENCE ACT Section 131(1)(a) of the Evidence Act provides as follows:“(1) Evidence is not to be adduced of:(a)a communication that is made between persons in dispute… in connection with an attempt to negotiate a settlement of the dispute,………………………”Section 131(1), however, does not apply if:“(g)evidence that has been adduced in the proceeding, or an inference from evidence that has been adduced in the proceeding, is likely to mislead the Court unless evidence of the communication or document is adduced to contradict or to qualify that evidence.” As I have said, the evidence concerning the circumstances that led up to the meeting of 9 October 1995 is not satisfactory. The Commissioner contends that the evidence does not support a conclusion that the Commissioner and the Taxpayer were in dispute as at 9 October 1995. The Taxpayer, on the other hand, contends that there was a dispute as to whether the value of the Unit should be treated as income of the Nuboye Partnership or income of the Taxpayer. Further, there was a dispute as to whether any additional tax should be imposed on the Taxpayer by reason of his failure to include the value of the Unit in his return for the Tax Year. There has been no suggestion that the meeting was the result of the exercise of any investigative power by the Commissioner. The meeting was attended by the Taxpayer’s tax advisers as well as his solicitor. The evidence on the voire dire makes clear that the meeting was requested by the Taxpayer or his advisers in response to an invitation by officers of the ATP to make a submission as to why the value of the Unit should be treated as partnership income rather than as income of the Taxpayer. That invitation was apparently the result of the assertions made at the meeting of 13 December 1994. The circumstances in which an interview between officers of the ATO and the Taxpayer took place on 13 December 1994 are obscure. However, the evidence on the voire dire indicates clearly that a claim had been made on behalf of the Taxpayer that the value of the Unit should not be treated as his income. In an affidavit by the Taxpayer read on the voire dire without objection, the Taxpayer said as follows:“2.Prior to the meeting… I had a conversation with Phillip Henry of KPMG in which Mr Henry said to me in words to the following effect:‘Instead of antagonising the ATO by fighting them, we should meet with them and try to do a deal.’………………………4.I attended the meeting… and participated in it because I wanted to resolve the dispute with the ATO about including the value of the Mermaid Beach Unit, and about the imposition of penalties, in my 1990-91 tax return, on the best possible terms that I could obtain. Communications that I made during the course of the meeting were for the above purposes, namely, to resolve the dispute with the ATO about tax and penalties (if any) payable.”The Taxpayer was not cross-examined on those assertions.

Decision

Reasons for decision

EMMETT J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: EMMETT J