Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Brough v Director of Public Prosecutions [2014] NSWSC 1396 Hearing dates: 22 September 2014 Decision date: 13 October 2014 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Button J Decision: (1) Extension of time for the filing of the appeal granted.
(2) Orders one to four in the amended summons of the plaintiff are dismissed.
(3) Each party is to pay their own costs.
Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW - appeal from Local Court to Supreme Court - whether failure to commence a new sentence before the expiry of a pre-existing non-parole period gives rise to a question of law alone - whether a failure to find special circumstances gives rise to a question of law alone - whether error of law with regard to either question has been established Legislation Cited: Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2011 (NSW), ss 52, 53, 55, 61
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 44, 55, 58
Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW), rr 6, 51B.9 and 51B.10Cases Cited: Bimson, Roads and Maritime Services v Damorange Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 734
David Morse (Office of State Revenue) v Chan and Anor [2010] NSWSC 1290
R v Hammoud [2000] NSWCCA 540; 119 A Crim R 66
R v PL [2009] NSWCCA 256; 199 A Crim R 199
R v PL [2012] NSWCCA 31
R v Simpson [2001] NSWCCA 534; 53 NSWLR 704
Zreika v R [2012] NSWCCACategory: Principal judgment Parties: Corey Brough (Plaintiff)
Director of Public Prosecutions (Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
C Bruce SC (Plaintiff)
D T Kell (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Aboriginal Legal Service (NSW/ACT) Limited (Plaintiff)
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2014/229258 Decision under appeal
- Date of Decision:
- 2013-09-05 00:00:00
- Before:
- Toose LCM
Judgment
On 5 September 2013, Mr Corey Brough was sentenced in the Local Court of New South Wales at Lithgow by Magistrate Toose for three offences. At the time, he was serving a number of pre-existing sentences, with regard to which the overall non-parole period was less than 75% of the overall head sentence. His solicitor submitted to the learned Magistrate that the new offences could commence before the expiry of the pre-existing overall non-parole period, but also submitted that "your Honour can choose any date your Honour feels is appropriate". His solicitor made no submission about special circumstances that could alter the ratio between the non-parole period and the head sentence of the new sentences.
In the event, her Honour imposed three wholly concurrent sentences of imprisonment to commence on the day upon which the pre-existing overall non-parole period came to an end. In her Honour's remarks on sentence, nothing was said about special circumstances, and the ratio between the non-parole period and the head sentence confirms that none were found.
A severity appeal to the District Court on the part of Mr Brough is statute barred due to the effluxion of time.
Mr Brough has appealed to this Court. Based upon the grounds of appeal, the issues…
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- Case
- [2014] NSWSC 1396
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the relevant statutory provisions and case law to determine the nature of the questions presented. It found that the interpretation of the legislation regarding the commencement of a new sentence and the existence of special circumstances did indeed involve legal questions. The court noted that the Local Court's jurisdiction to hear such appeals was contingent upon the appeal being limited to questions of law, and that if errors of law were found, the Supreme Court had the authority to hear the appeal. The court further reasoned that since the appellant's appeal strictly pertained to legal questions, and assuming errors of law were identified, the Supreme Court was empowered to grant leave to appeal.
In light of the above, the Supreme Court found that the appeal was appropriately limited to questions of law. It concluded that if the Local Court's interpretation of the legislation was erroneous, it would constitute an error of law warranting the grant of leave to appeal. The court accepted that the questions presented were indeed questions of law, and granted the appellant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The orders of the Local Court were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Local Court for rehearing, pending the outcome of the appeal.
Orders
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Background
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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