Brott v McDonald
[1989] HCATrans 65
-~
~ :,;-.~
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M38 of 1988
B e t w e e n -
ISSAC ALEXANDER BROTT
Applicant
and
SONIA ANNE McDONALD
Respondent
Application for special
leave to appeal
MASON CJ DAWSON J McHUGH J
Brott TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 17 MARCH 1989, AT 10.41 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MlT3/l/PLC 1 17/3/89
MR M.E.J. BLACK, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear
with my learned friend, MR G.T. PAGONE, for the
applicant in-the matter. (instructed by
S.V. Winter & Co)
MR R.A. SUNBERG, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my
learned friend, MR S.P. WHELAN, for the respondent.
(instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions)
MR BLACK: If the Court pleases, this application raises two
points. They each arise under the Corrrrnonwealth ROYAL COMMISSIONS ACT and one of them involves the interrelationship between the Corrrrnonwealth Act and
a Victorian evidentiary provision governing royal
corrrrnissions.
| MASON CJ: | Can I ask you this question at the outset: | can |
you appeal to the Full Court?
| MR BLACK: | No, Your Honour. | ||
| MASON CJ: | You cannot? | ||
| MR BLACK: |
|
magistrate's decision, the Act specifically prevents
any further appeal. The only place to come is here.
MASON CJ: Yes. I thought there had been some legislative
amendment in recent years that had remedied this
position. You are likely to know more about it than
I do.
| MR BLACK: | Your Honour, my understanding is that that is the |
position. I have not heard of it being changed and I know it certainly was the position when I looked
at it. Your Honour, we all believe, all being, if
I may say so, Victorians, that it has not changed.
DAWSON J: This Court has said that it ought to change.
| MR BLACK: | Yes, we would respectfully say that too. |
| MASON CJ: | P~rhaps if we refuse you special leave it may |
accelerate the process of change.
MR BLACK: It never does, Your Honour, it never does. Might I
hand to the Court co.pies of·the relevant provisions
of the Commonwealth Act. Those are sections 6D and 6DD and also copies of section 30 of the Victorian
EVIDENCE ACT? The Court will be aware that this matter arose when a witness - - -
MASON CJ: Yes, we are familiar with the circumstances in
which it arose.
| MR BLACK: | Yes, Your Honour. Well, the two points were |
these - - -
MlT3/2/PLC
| Brott | 2 | 17/3/89 |
MASON CJ: It was determined in advance, in effect, of
a plea being taken and no evidence was actually
adduced as a result of the ruling.
| MR BLACK: | We make no point about the procedural matter. |
MASON CJ: That has disappeared out of the case?
| MR BLACK: | That has disappeared but there are two points |
that remain and the first concerns the power of
a commissioner to make a non-publication order
before any evidence is given and we say he
certainly has that power contrary to the findings
of the learned primary judge, :and the second point
is that, we submit, section 30 of the Victorian
EVIDENCE ACT, which is a protected provision
except in the case of prosecution for perjury,
operates in the case of a joint Commonwealth/Victorian
royal commission to protect a person according to
its terms and in that sense this case, we say,
is the reverse of the situation considered by this
Court in GIANNARELLI V REG, 154 CLR 212, where the
Commonwealth section protected the two Giannarelli
brothers from prosecution under Victorian law for perjury and we say this is the reverse situation.
MASON CJ: Let us proceed to the first of those questions.
| MR BLACK: | The factual basis upon which it arises is simply |
this - and we would have to satisfy the Court that,
in fact, it was a non-publication direction, and
we say it was. What happened was - and it appears at page 33 of the application book; it is page 4 of the judgment of Mr Justice Crockett.
MASON CJ: It is page 28 of my application book.
| MR BLACK: | I am sorry, the numbering was not done for which I |
apologize.
| MASON CJ: | I think I have two copies of Mr Justice Crockett's |
judgment as well, just to impress me with His Honour's reasoning.
| MR BLACK: | Yes. | Your Honour, and also, I regret to say, |
to irritate Your Honour, the second copy is missing
a couple of pages.
| McRUGH J: | My first copy is missing one page and the second |
copy is missing a different page.
| MR BLACK: | Yes. | I do apologize. | My learned friend says his |
is upside-down, but the point is still a good point,
Your Honour.
What happened was Mr Meagher said to the
commissioner:
| MlT3/3/PLC | 3 | 17/3/89 |
| Brott |
I ask that these proceedings be in confidence.
The connnissioner said:
Yes, these proceedings will be.
Mr Meagher: Mr Brott please. The Connnissioner: Mr Brott ... I have directed that these proceedings be
confidential. I would like you to pay particular attention to that because it
involves that you do not tell anybody outside this room what ... during the
course of this hearing; do you understand that? . . . . Yes. Now, we say that that is, and can only have been
a non-publication order for the reason that it could
not have been an order - it was obviously intended to
be taken seriously. It was obviously intended to be
the exercise of power. It could not have been a privacy under section 6IX2) because that has to have
a special subject-matter and it involves everyone
going out of court. It does not, on any view, in
ou~ submission, read as a general privacy orderbecause nobody was ordered out of court so it was,
in substance, in our submission, a non-publication
order under section 6D(3). Otherwise, it could not
have been anything and it was obviously intended to besomething. And it was a non-publication order because
the connnissioner, having said to the world at large
in the commission that it was going to be "in confidence",
then specified what he meant by telling Mr Brott he
was not to tell anyone about it .
Now, Mr Justice Crockett said it was not any of
those things and fundamental to His Honour's reasoning
was this: His Honour said "this can only operate retrospectively and you only prohibit publication after the matter has come out" and that, together with the factual matters with which we say His Honour was wrong., caused His Honour to say that the section had
no application "in these circumstances". Now, the point, and we say it is an important point, is this: can the connnissioner under the Commonwealth Act
direct non-publication before the evidence is given?Policy would seem to suggest, in our submission, that he ought to be able to otherwise, to put it bluntly,
the cat is out of the bag. The construction for which we will put on the section involves that the hearing can proceed in public, it does not ·have to be done in
private, and also everyone knows where everyone stands.So, the connnission proceeds; the evidence is given but it being known what it it is going to be about,
there is an order for non-publication.
| MlT3/4/PLC | 4 | 17/3/89 |
| Brott |
Now, His Honour's judgment, in our submission,
is incorrect where he interprets the language as having
a retrospective operation only. The word in (3)(a), "given11 , in our submission, on analysis is, in fact, neutral. It is a past participle but does not have a verb so it may mean, and in our submission
sensibly would mean, "direct that any evidence
that is to be given, has been given or may be given or, indeed,
is being given but the reason it has the appearance of the past about it is that, as a matter of
structure, it has to be anterior to the matter that
is sought to be prohibited, that is to say, the
publication and that gives it its past flavour. But it does not follow from that that the section can only
be invoked after as it were the offending material
has actually become evidence or a document has actually
been tendered. So that, in our submission, as a matter
of construction, the argument being supported by
considerations of policy, the power may be exercisedin advance of the matter for publication arising and
the basic premise upon which His Honour Mr Justice Crockett
proceeded, in our submission, was incorrect.
I have already outlined the argument as to why
we say as a matter of fact His Honour's analysis of
what happened was incorrect. Now, if that is right - and we say it is an important question, not just
to Mr Brott but how one administers royal coIIm1issions
in the future - the question is, "Well, even so,
would that prevent the publication of what Mr Brott
said on his prosecution for contempt based upon what
he did say?" And we would say, "Yes, either you
prohibit publication or you do not. If you wish to have an exclusion or an exemption from the non-publication
order, the Act empowers.you to do so." And the argument
for which we contend is no haven for contemnors because
one could simply make a non-publication order with, asit were, an escape clause that will not prevent publication of the offending material if deemed necessary by the appropriate law enforcement authorities.
| MASON CJ: But it is a surprising construction of an order, is |
it not, even an order that was more clearly under
section 6D(3) than this one to say of it that it was
intended to exclude prosecution for contempt orprosecution for conduct in relation to the giving of
evidence?
| MR. BLACK: | Your Honour, probably nobody ever - yes, it is surprising, |
but it is - - -
MASON CJ: And it would. be right to say what you were about to
say, that nobody would have thought of it.
| MR. BLACK: | I did not stop because I had second thoughts because |
I did not want to interrupt Your Honour. Probably
nobody did think about it.
| MlT3/5/PLC | 5 | 17/3/89 |
| Brott |
| 11"1.ASON CJ: | Yes, I under-estimated your courtesy, Mr Black. |
| MR BLACK: | Your Honour, it may be nobody did think about it |
but that is what was said, but that operates
according to its terms, in our submission. If that
means that Mr Brott is fortunate, it does not mean
that the point of principle does not arise, because
it does, in our submission, and that was what the
corrnnissioner said.
| MASON CJ: | But there are difficulties in giving an appropriate |
character to what the corrnnissioner said. For example,
subsection (3) seems to contemplate not merely a
general order that evidence shall not be publishedbut a more particular order.
| MR BLACK: | Yes. |
| MASON CJ: | Maybe an order that certain persons will not publish |
the evidence. And likewise, subsection (5) clearly contemplates that the commissioner has general
powers other than the specific powers that are given
to him by section 6D(2) and (3).
| MR BLACK: | Yes. |
MASON CJ: It is therefore possible that what the commissioner
did was to be explained by reference to the exercise
of general powers other than powers that are set forth
in subsections (3) and (4).
MR BLACK: Well, Your Honour, yes, in relation to .powers to order ~hat proceedings be held in private because
they would be just the powers to conduct what happens
in the hearing room. But absent that, and we would say that did not happen here, the commissioner would
need statutory power, in our submission, to prohibit
the publication of something outside his hearing
room. I am talking now of the physical confines
in which he is sitting. And therefore, we say, whilst accepting that he has power to regulate his
own proceedings within the ambit of his letters patent and the Act and so forth, he would not have power
to direct non-publication such as he purported to or
did, in fact, direct Mr Brott not to do. So, therefore
it must have been - and there was a plain assumption of
power. So, the source of the power, we say, must
have been 6D(3). It is wrong to say that that power can only be exercised retrospectively. That is the
foundation of Mr Justice Crockett's rejection of the
matter as well as the factual matters. There is
error and the matter is important, that is the firstpoint.
The second point is of more general application
and that is that if section 30 of the Victorian Act
applies, then just as when section 6D of the Commonwealth
A~t applied in GIANNARELLI's case, then there can be no
| MlT3/6/PLC | 6 | 17/3/89 |
| Brott |
evidence led against Mr Brott and the prosecution
must fail.
| MASON CJ: | Why does section 30 of the Victorian Act apply? | ||
| MR BLACK: |
|
because it is a joint commission and you cannot, as
the Court explained in GIANNARELLI, sever them. You cannot split the character of what is going on. There
is a duality about it. Section 30 applies
either because section 79 of the JUDICIARY ACT picks
it up and, as it were, federalizes it, in which case
the question is that raised by Mr Justice Crockett:
does the Commonwealth law otherwise provide - and we
say on the authority of GIANNARELLI, "No, it does not" -to operate side by side. Curious bedfellows but not inconsistent bedfellows as GIANNARELLI says.
Or else, section 30 simply applies because it
attaches itself to the exercise of State power. The exercise of State power in relation to the giving of
evidence cannot be practically distinguished from
the exercise of the Commonwealth power. And just as in the GIANNARELLI case the Commonwealth protective
mechanism was held to apply according to its terms to all courts in the country, so too the Victorian protected mechanism would apply according to its
terms for any use of the evidence - certainly in
Victoria - except in a prosecution for perjury. The result is a collision but - the result is an uncomfortable situation whereby there cannot be, where there is a joint commission, a prosecution for contempt if the joint commission is-with Victoria
but that does not amount to an inconsistency.Might I take the Court to GIANNARELLI's case. I hand the Court copies of it. There are just two or three passages to which I would desire to refer.
MASON CJ: Yes.
| MR BLACK: | On the inconsistency point, that was considered by |
Mr Justice Brennan at page 229 at point 6 of the page. In the course of His Honour's judgment he set out the
section and said:
There is no relevant inconsistency between -
the two sections.
Section 6DD binds all Australian courts to
reject evidence of a statement or disclosure
to which it applies; s. 30 binds Victorian
courts to reject statements to which it applies.
Where both provisions apply to the same
statement and that statement is inadmissible by
virtue of s. 6DD, it is immaterial whether
it is inadmissible by virtue of s. 30. The exception contained ins. 30 simply leaves the
| MlT3/7/PLC | 7 | 17/3/89 |
| Brott |
evidence to which it applies unaffected by the general rule prescribed by the section;
it is immaterial that evidence which is made
inadmissible bys. 6DD falls within the
s. 30 exception.
And we say, well so too, vice versa. I shoutd, of course, mention to. the Court that there is a passage
in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice at
page 220 at about point 3 of the page which, taken
out of context, might be urged against us but we say
it is not. His Honour says at point 3 of the page:
However, s. 6DD leaves no room for the operation of any State law regulating the admissibility of evidence given before a
Commonwealth commission.
What His Honour was saying there, in our submission,
however, was that section 6DD operates according to
its terms and the State law does not touch the
situation. Now, what we have here, in our submission,
is two sets of protective provisions. They each operate - they do not annul one e.nother either under 109 if the Victorian provision operates by virtue of its own
force on a Victorian letters patent_nor do we say that
they annihilate· each other if the Victorian provision is
federalized under section 79 of the JUDICIARY ACT.
They exist - - -
| MASON CJ: | But it is not a question of annihilation then, is it, |
nor is it a question of inconsistency?· The question
under section 79 is whether:
except as otherwise provided by the
CONSTITUTION or the laws of the Commonwealth -
so if you get a different provision, albeit a provision
that is not inconsistent, none the less the application
of the State provision is displaced.
| MR BLACK: Yes, Your Honour~ but the reason why the Commonwealth |
provision does not otherwise provide is this:. the
Commonwealth provirlon creates an immunity which it
then removes in a particular instance. By removing the immunity in that particular instance all it does -and
this is the only extent to which it provides - is to
leave the general laws of admissibility and so forth
including, we would say, statutory provisions, tooperate. So, it does not make the evidence admissible,
it simply removes the evidence from the protective
mechanism that the Commonwealth has created. But its
admissibility is then to be dealt with, according to
common law principles - it might be irrelevant or
objectionable on other grounds - or according to relevant statutory principles. So that is why we say the Commonwealth law does not otherwise provide. It
| MlT3/8/PLC | 17/3/89 |
| Brott |
does not to~ch the subject-matter, it just leaves it
open, in. using the terminology of section 6DD, and
that is why we say the Commonwealth law does not
otherwise provide and certainly there is no
inconsistency in a 109 sense if the true source of
the State protective mechanism is the direct
application of State law on the State letters patent.
Now, if it is said as it might be that this is
an odd result, the answer is that the legislature
did not pay heed to what this Court said in GIANNARELLI's
case about those sort of problems. Mr Justice Wilson at page 227 at point 1 of GIANNARELLI said:
It may readily be conceded that such a
result is unfortunate and in no way consistent
with the general intention of the Parliament .....
It occurs because of a lack of correspondence
between the Commonwealth and State laws which
respectively prescribe the extent of the
immunity which is to be accorded to statements -
et cetera. Justice Deane, at page 232 expressed himself in somewhat similar terms at the bottom of the
page, concluding at about point 9 of the page, having
referred to "Anomalous and undesirable consequences":
If that be so, it highlights the undesirability
of conferring powers of compulsory interrogation,
with the negation of ordinary common law rights
and privileges which such powers involve,
without at the least taking steps to ensure
that applicable legislative provisions are,
according to their terms, appropriate -
now, what one has here is two legislative policies
directed to different ends, lacking in correspondence
but not inconsistent and providing a protection, in our
submission, which results in Mr Brott having no
evidence that can be led against him as a result of
the policy of the State of Victoria and it is the
reverse of GIANNARELLI. The point is important. The
GIANNARELLI point was regarded as important. Of course,
the consequences in that case for the applicants had
accrued and were severe but the point was there
regarded as important by all the Judges. The application was granted even though it was out of time. The point
had not been raised before, and we say this is a point
of general public importance - both points are. May it please the Court.
McHUGH J: Just before you sit down, could I ask you one - - -
| MR BLACK: | Yes, Your Honour. |
McHUGH J: In section 30, Mr Black, when the section says:
No statement made . .- .... before any board or
commission empowered under the provisions of
this Act -
| MlT3/9/PLC | 9 | 17/3/89 |
| Brott |
is section 30 saying anything about statements made
pursuant to an inquiry made under the ROYAL COMMISSIONS
ACT?
| MR BLACK: | No, Your Honour, but if that is against us, the |
answer to it is, in our submission, to be found in
GIANNARELLI where, in p~rticular Mr Justice Wilson
at page 226 said that you simply cannot divide the
character of what is happening. So that that attaches to the statement in, as it were, its Victorian
aspect but the "ilictorian aspect is indivisible
from its other aspect. It is impossible to deny
whatever happened the character of being a statement, in this case, a: statement made by any person in answer
to any question before any board or
corrnnission - - -
McHUGH J: Except that in GIANNARELLI the defendant was
prosecuted for an offence under Victorian legislation.
| MR BLACK: | Yes, but here the irmnunity is given by applicable |
Victorian law which operates, we would say,
according to its terms because of the dual character
of the corrnnission and the indivisible character of
what actually happens.
McHUGH J: Yes, I see. Can I just ask you one question about
your earlier point? First of all, does section 6D(3)
bind the Crown so as to prevent it tendering evidence
in a prosecution?
| MR BLACK: | Yes, Your Honour. There is no reason - yes, |
otherwise the section could be ineffective because
the Crown can publish and dis.seminate information.
It does not customarily do so - well, it does. In one sense it does not but - - -
| McHUGH J: And what about section 6DD? Is that not an exception |
to 6D(3)?
| MR BLACK: | No, Your Honour, they would operate, in our submission, |
side by side. If you did not want them to operate side by side then you would have to specify. If ene had reason to suppose that the witness was going to
be difficult and might need dealing with, one should
make it clear to the witness, and that is fair enough
anyway, if I can use the. expression, particularly
in regard to use of the coersive powers to which it
would appear it is alleged Mr Brott strenuously objected.If the Court pleases.
| MASON CJ: | Mr Sunberg, we need not trouble you about the first |
of the points that Mr Black has raised but what do you
sa:y about the second point?
| M1T3/10/PLC | 10 | 17/3/89 |
| Brott |
| MR SUNBERG: | Very little, Your Honour, but this is what it is. |
If one puts to one side the pretended inconsistency argument which is elaborated in the affidavit in
support but which now seems to have gone, we would
say that this is a clear case for the application of
section 79 and if one understands the way in which
the GIANNARELLI case arose, one can see that.
Justice McHugh has mentioned it already.
GIANNARELLI was a prosecution for perjury under the Victorian CRIMES ACT.
Section 6DD of the ROYAL
COMMISSIONS ACT applies in accordance with its terms.
It expressly applies to proceedings in State courts
in the criminal jurisdiction, so its words were
applicable. Here the position, in our submission,
is different. The question for the magistrate - the only question for the magistrate and for
Mr Justice Crockett was whether the evidence that
was to be relied on was admissible. Now, the magistrate was exercising federal jurisdiction and section 79
provides that State law as to evidence is to apply
in a court exercising that sort of jurisdiction:
except as otherwise provided by ...... the laws
of the Commonwealth.
So, in our submission, what section 79 requires one
to do is to look around to see if there is any
applicable Commonwealth law. One finds section 6DD; A statement ..... by any::witness -
is admissible -
in proceedings for an offence against this
Act.
So, that provision, Commonwealth law provides the answer to the only question that arises and having
discovered that answer, in our submission, the magistrate or any other judicial functionary simply goes no further.
| McHUGH J: | Under section 79 the laws only apply: |
in all cases to which they are applicable.
That is the last word, isit not?
| l1R SUNBERG: | Yes, Your Honour, but they are applicable to this |
type of case.
| McHUGH J: | But is section 30 applicable? |
| MR SUNBERG: | No, Your Honour, section 30 is not applicable. |
It would be an extraordinary result, in our
submission, to take section 79, obey the first part of
it so as to attract Commonwealth section 6DD
an-d then say, "Now, having done that, I'm going to
fossick around to see if I can find some State law
| MlT3/ll/PLC | 11 | l1R SUNBERG, QC | 17/3/89 |
| Brott |
that will prqduce a different result." That, in our
submission, is the opposite of what section 79 is
there for. Section 79 is intended, in our submission, to pick up State law where there is otherwise a vacuum and there is not a-vacuum here because section 6DD
expressly applies.
So, in our submission, once one identifies what
the issue was before the magistrate and before
Mr Justice Crockett and sees that section 79
provides the answer, it is a very simple case, in
our submission.
| MASON CJ: | We need not trouble you any further, Mr Sunberg. |
MR SUNBERG: If the Court pleases.
MASON· ~J :. Yes, Mr Black?
MR BLACK: If the Court pleases. Really, by way of reply, what
we say is that simply because the Commonwealth
law enters the field, it does not mean that it
otherwise provides. And the circumstances here are very special: people are being subjected to
coercive powers with two sources of power
and each source of power has indicated, as a matter
of legislative policy, that they shall have protection N~,
they do not collide and more than that, in our
submission, the Commonwealth law does not otherwise
provide in those special but by no means unique
circumstances.
| MASON CJ: | But it may not come to the point of a Commonwealth |
law making other provision. It may be that the Victorian section on which you rely is not applicable
at all to begin with so that you are not driven to
look for a displacement by Commonwealth law.
| MR BLACK: | Indeed, and if the Victorian section operates of |
its own force, as we would now - as we did put
and we would put again as a permissible view, leading to the same result, then the Victorian section protection in respect of the Victorian character of the statement in the same way as the Commonwealth
section provided protection in the GIANNARELLI case.So, it is the reverse of GIANNARELLI and we say it is a point of importance to see if both sides of the coin
produce the same result. If the Court pleases.operates of its own force. It provides the
| MASON CJ: | Thank you, Mr Black. |
The Court is not persuaded that the actual
decision of Mr Justice Crockett was attended with
sufficient doubt to justify the grant of special leave
to appeal. The application is therefore refused.
MR SUNBERG:- I would ask for costs, Your Honours?
| MlT3/12/PLC | 12 | 17/3/89 |
| Brott |
| MASON CJ: | You do not resist that, Mr Black? |
| :MR BLACK: | No, Your Honour. |
| MASON CJ: | The application is refused with costs. |
AT 11.14 AM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED SINE DIE
| MlT3/13/PLC· | 13 | 17/3/89 |
| Brott |
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
-
Administrative Law
-
Statutory Interpretation
-
Evidence
Legal Concepts
-
Appeal
-
Judicial Review
-
Jurisdiction
-
Statutory Construction
-
Procedural Fairness
0
0
0