Bropho v The State of Western Australia

Link copied
Case Copied 44 min read

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Perth No P30 of 1989

B e t w e e n -

ROBERT BROPHO

Applicant

and

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

First Respondent

and

WESTERN AUSTRALIAN DEVELOPMENT

COMMISSION

Second Respondent

Application for special leave

to appeal

DEANE J
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
GAUDRON J

Bropho(2)

McHUGH J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT PERTH ON THURSDAY, 26 OCTOBER 1989, AT 9.55 AM

(Continued from 25/10/89)

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

PlT2/l/HS 21 26/10/89
DEANE J :  Mr McIntyre and Mr So 1 i cit or , the Court has had an

opportunity of considering this matter overnight.

Mr Solicitor, we would now wish to hear the

respondent on the general question of whether leave

should be granted in an unrestricted form.

MR PARKER:  If it please the Court, my learned friend,

Ms Wheeler, will present our submissions.

DEANE J:  Thank you, Mr Solicitor. Yes, Ms Wheeler.
MS WHEELER:  If it please the Court. Might I hand up to

Your Honour an outline of submissions.

DEANE J:  Thank you. We will just take a moment to read them.
• MS WHEELER: Your Honours, the respondents' principal submission

is that by whatever interesting path the position,

may have been reached, whether by inadvertence or

whether by a course of decisions reflecting a changing

constitutional principle, the principle of construction

is now not only clear but the established principle

has been expressed in the strongest possible terms by

this Court on a number of occasions. I do not wish to

take Your Honours to all the references in the first
paragraph of the outline of submissions but could I

very briefly read to Your Honours two passages from

BRADKEN's case, firstly that of Mr Justice Gibbs, then

Acting Chief Justice, at page 122, towards the middle of that page, having referred to Professor Hogg's

book on the subject, he goes on to say that:

It seems to me, with all respect,
tnat the rule of construction, which
without doubt is firmly established
in the law, rests on reasons which are
understandable enough.

Justice Stephen in the same case at page 127, again towards the centre of that page, says of the rule of

construction:

However dubious the antecedents ..... only statute can now alter it.
DEANE J:  If that were all we were concerned with there would

obviously be great force in what you say in the

early passages, but are there not other questions

involved in that wide compass? I mean, one is the

Full Court here appears to have applied the BOMBAY

test of the beneficial purpose being wholly frustrated.

Now, there must be, I would have thought, room for

something to be said about that and the second question

is even if one accepts or were to accept that the

statute did not bind the sovereign there would remain

the question of how this rule applies in the case of

a statutory corporation carrying on business

activities and the…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Bropho v The State of Western Australia and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[1989] HCATrans 260
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an application for special leave to appeal concerning the extent to which a statute binds the Crown. The parties involved were The State of Western Australia and Western Australian Development, with the applicant seeking to challenge a decision of the Full Court. The core of the dispute revolved around the interpretation of a statute and its application to the Crown.

The legal issues before the Court included whether the established principle that a statute does not bind the Crown unless an intention to do so is expressly stated or necessarily implied had been correctly applied. Specifically, the Court was asked to consider the test for necessary implication, which requires the intention for the Crown to be bound to be manifest from the very terms of the statute. Furthermore, the Court had to determine if the Full Court had correctly applied the "beneficial purpose being wholly frustrated" test derived from the case of *Province of Bombay*, and how this rule applied to statutory corporations engaged in business activities.

The Court's reasoning, as presented by Ms. Wheeler for the respondent, emphasised the strong and established principle that a statute does not bind the Crown unless an intention to do so is clear, either expressly or by necessary implication. This principle, supported by numerous High Court decisions, including *Bradken's* case, requires a high threshold for necessary implication. The Court also referred to *Brisbane City Council*, where it was held that the test for necessary implication is not easily satisfied and must be manifest from the statute's terms. The *Province of Bombay* case was cited as authority for the proposition that the purposes of an Act would not be wholly frustrated unless the Crown were bound, indicating a stringent test for binding the Crown.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established