IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P30 of 1989 B e t w e e n -
ROBERT BROPHO
Applicant
and
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
First Respondent
and
WESTERN AUSTRALIAN DEVELOPMENT
COMMISSION
Second Respondent
Application for special leave
to appeal
DEANE J
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
GAUDRON J
Bropho(2) McHUGH J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT PERTH ON THURSDAY, 26 OCTOBER 1989, AT 9.55 AM
(Continued from 25/10/89)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
PlT2/l/HS 21 26/10/89
DEANE J : Mr McIntyre and Mr So 1 i cit or , the Court has had an opportunity of considering this matter overnight.
Mr Solicitor, we would now wish to hear the
respondent on the general question of whether leave
should be granted in an unrestricted form.
MR PARKER: If it please the Court, my learned friend,
Ms Wheeler, will present our submissions.
DEANE J: Thank you, Mr Solicitor. Yes, Ms Wheeler.
MS WHEELER: If it please the Court. Might I hand up to Your Honour an outline of submissions.
DEANE J: Thank you. We will just take a moment to read them.
| • | MS WHEELER: | Your Honours, the respondents' principal submission |
is that by whatever interesting path the position,
may have been reached, whether by inadvertence or
whether by a course of decisions reflecting a changing
constitutional principle, the principle of construction
is now not only clear but the established principle
has been expressed in the strongest possible terms by
this Court on a number of occasions. I do not wish to take Your Honours to all the references in the first
paragraph of the outline of submissions but could Ivery briefly read to Your Honours two passages from
BRADKEN's case, firstly that of Mr Justice Gibbs, then
Acting Chief Justice, at page 122, towards the middle of that page, having referred to Professor Hogg's
book on the subject, he goes on to say that:
It seems to me, with all respect,
tnat the rule of construction, which
without doubt is firmly established
in the law, rests on reasons which are
understandable enough.
Justice Stephen in the same case at page 127, again towards the centre of that page, says of the rule of
construction:
However dubious the antecedents ..... only statute can now alter it.
DEANE J: If that were all we were concerned with there would obviously be great force in what you say in the
early passages, but are there not other questions
involved in that wide compass? I mean, one is the
Full Court here appears to have applied the BOMBAY
test of the beneficial purpose being wholly frustrated.
Now, there must be, I would have thought, room for
something to be said about that and the second question
is even if one accepts or were to accept that the
statute did not bind the sovereign there would remain
the question of how this rule applies in the case of
a statutory corporation carrying on business
activities and the…
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- Case
- [1989] HCATrans 260
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court included whether the established principle that a statute does not bind the Crown unless an intention to do so is expressly stated or necessarily implied had been correctly applied. Specifically, the Court was asked to consider the test for necessary implication, which requires the intention for the Crown to be bound to be manifest from the very terms of the statute. Furthermore, the Court had to determine if the Full Court had correctly applied the "beneficial purpose being wholly frustrated" test derived from the case of *Province of Bombay*, and how this rule applied to statutory corporations engaged in business activities.
The Court's reasoning, as presented by Ms. Wheeler for the respondent, emphasised the strong and established principle that a statute does not bind the Crown unless an intention to do so is clear, either expressly or by necessary implication. This principle, supported by numerous High Court decisions, including *Bradken's* case, requires a high threshold for necessary implication. The Court also referred to *Brisbane City Council*, where it was held that the test for necessary implication is not easily satisfied and must be manifest from the statute's terms. The *Province of Bombay* case was cited as authority for the proposition that the purposes of an Act would not be wholly frustrated unless the Crown were bound, indicating a stringent test for binding the Crown.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi