FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Bropho v State of Western Australia [2005] FCA 560
PROCEDURE – racial discrimination – legislation and directives prohibiting Aboriginal persons exercising functions of care, control and management of reserve, requiring them to leave and not enter the reserve - motion to strike out aspects of defence – offers of compensation and alternative accommodation not arguably irrelevant to defence – public interest and justification not arguably irrelevant to defence – defences to allegation of discrimination in respect of enactment not arguably irrelevant – particulars to be addressed specifically if required
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) ss 8(1), 9(1), 9(1A)(a), 10, 10(1)
Land Administration Act 1997 (WA) ss 50, 204
Reserves (Reserve 43131) Act 2003 (WA)Federal Court Rules O 11 r 16
Commonwealth Constitution s 109
Macquarie Dictionary, 2nd rev edn
R Dubler, ‘Direct discrimination and a defence of reasonable justification’ (2003) 77 ALJ 514
Bropho v State of Western Australia [2004] FCA 1209 cited
Butler v Countrywide Finance Ltd [1993] 3 NZLR 623 cited
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 cited
Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 cited
Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 cited
Hodges v State of New South Wales (1988) 77 ALR 1 cited
Mabo v Queensland (1988) 166 CLR 186 cited
Macabenta v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 90 FCR 202 cited
Melkman v Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 20 FCR 331 cited
Metroplaza Pty Ltd v Girvan NSW Pty Ltd (in liq) (1993) ATPR 41-241 cited
Murex Diagnostics Australia Pty Ltd v Chiron Corporation (1995) 55 FCR 194 cited
Nguyen v Refugee Review Tribunal (1997) 74 FCR 311 cited
Orchard v Comrie (1998) 80 IR 76 cited
Orison Pty Ltd v Strategic Minerals Corporation NL (1987) 77 ALR 141 cited
Purvis v State of New South Wales (2003) 202 ALR 133 cited
Reed International Books Australia Pty Ltd (t/a Butterworths) v King & Prior Pty Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 587 cited
Sahak v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 123 FCR 514 cited
Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) v Greater Investments Pty Ltd (1992) 30 NSWLR 185 cited
Turner v Kinian Pty Ltd (unreported, French J, 19 August 1992) cited
Turner v Leda Commercial Properties Pty Ltd (2000) 97 FCR 313 cited
Warne v Genex Corporation Pty Ltd (1996) 35 IPR 284 cited
Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598 cited
Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373 cited
Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 citedBELLA BROPHO ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SWAN VALLEY NYUNGAH COMMUNITY ABORIGINAL CORPORATION AND ABORIGINAL INHABITANTS OF RESERVE 43131 v STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA, ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS PLANNING AUTHORITY and BARRY CHARLES JAMESON
WAD 157 of 2003NICHOLSON J
6 MAY 2005
PERTH
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
WAD 157 OF 2003
BETWEEN:
BELLA BROPHO ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SWAN VALLEY NYUNGAH COMMUNITY ABORIGINAL CORPORATION AND ABORIGINAL INHABITANTS…
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- Case
- [2005] FCA 560
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issues before the court were whether the compensation provisions under the Land Administration Act were relevant to the applicant’s claim for compensation for the arbitrary deprivation of property rights and whether the defence was sufficiently tenable to warrant proceeding to trial. The applicant argued that the compensation mentioned in the amended defence did not address the arbitrary deprivation of the right to manage and exercise ownership rights in relation to the Reserve, thus failing to disclose any reasonable defence. Conversely, the respondents contended that the compensation provisions, along with other matters in the amended defence, were relevant and could potentially form a complete defence if certain characterisations of the applicant's property rights were accepted at trial.
In its reasoning, the court held that on a strike-out application, it was not necessary to assume that the applicant would make out the entirety of her claim or that she was entitled to 'first choice' of remedy. The relevant question was whether the defence could possibly succeed, or in other words, whether it was untenable. The court found that the availability of compensation for money spent on improvements was not entirely irrelevant to the question of whether there was an arbitrary deprivation of property, even if it might not be a complete defence. Therefore, the court dismissed the applicant's re-amended notice of motion to strike out parts of the amended defence, finding them to be potentially relevant and not untenable.
The court further ordered that the applicant be given leave to file and serve amended submissions in relation to specific paragraphs of the re-amended notice of motion by a specified date.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the applicant’s re-amended notice of motion dated 23 February 2005 be dismissed.
2. The applicant to pay the respondents’ costs on those paragraphs of the re-amended notice of motion.
AND THE COURT FURTHER DIRECTS THAT:
A. The applicant have leave to file and serve amended submissions in relation to paragraphs 3 to 13 of the applicant’s re-amended notice of motion on or before 4.00 pm on 13 May 2005.
B.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: NICHOLSON J
The submissions for the applicant accept that Federal Court Rules O 11 r 16 authorises the Court to strike out such portions of the amended defence for failing to disclose any reasonable defence. The applicant does not contest that where a portion of a defence is demonstrated by argument to be clearly untenable the appropriate course is to strike it out.COMPENSATION UNDER THE LAND ADMINISTRATION ACT The applicant submits as follows. Section 50 of the Land Administration Act 1997 (WA) relevantly provides that on the revocation of a management order the former management body may claim compensation under Pt 10 for any improvement made on the relevant reserve in accordance with the management order. The relevant provision in Pt 10 of the Land Administration Act is s 204, which provides that where a management body loses the use of structures erected or improvements made by the management body on the land, the management body is entitled to compensation for the depreciated value of those structures and improvements. The compensation mentioned in par 23(db)(ii)(A) of the amended defence is therefore compensation for the value of structures erected or improvements made to the land. Therefore, the compensation mentioned in par 23(db)(ii)(A) is not compensation for the deprivation of the right to manage and exercise ownership rights in relation to the Reserve as particularised in par 28 of the substituted statement of claim. Paragraph 23(db)(ii)(A) does not therefore disclose any defence to the claim that the deprivation of the right to manage and exercise ownership rights in relation to the Reserve was without compensation or otherwise arbitrary. The respondents contend as follows. It may be accepted that the right to compensation under s 50 of the Land Administration Act and the offer to provide alternative accommodation may not be a complete answer to a claim for compensation for loss of the rights claimed by the applicant. But it does not follow that those matters are not relevant, along with the other matters in the amended defence at par 23, as part of a defence that there was no arbitrary deprivation of property. For example, the respondents submit that it is relevant that the same compensation criteria apply to the applicant as would apply to anyone else whose management order in respect of a reserve was revoked. Further, it is submitted for the respondents, if at trial the Court accepts the respondents’ characterisation of the applicant’s property right (assuming, which is denied, she had a property right) as being in essence a right of public housing, then those matters may well be a complete defence. Contrary to the applicant’s amended submissions (at pars 15 – 19) in support of striking out parts of the amended defence, on a strike out application it is not to be assumed that the applicant will make out the whole of her claim or that the applicant is entitled to ‘first choice’ of remedy. The question is whether the defence could possibly succeed or, put another way, is not untenable. A defence that may succeed in the (very real) possibility that the applicant does not make out the whole of her case is not untenable. Whether or not, on the applicant’s case, they are sufficient, it cannot be said that the availability of compensation for money spent on improvements are entirely irrelevant to the question of whether there was an arbitrary deprivation of any property.