DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Broomhall v Elghalemi [2019] QDC 96
PARTIES:
STEPHEN BROOMHALL
(plaintiff/respondent)v
NABILLA ELGHALEMI
(defendant/applicant)FILE NO:
4720 of 2017
DIVISION:
Civil
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court
DELIVERED ON:
12 June 2019
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
10 June 2019
JUDGE:
Porter QC DCJ
ORDER:
Application dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – where summary judgment was previously entered against the defendant – where the defendant alleges that a newly discovered fact – whether the newly discovered fact is a “fact’ or a legal conclusion – whether the newly discovered matter entitles the application to a different order – whether summary judgment should be stayed pending investigation
COUNSEL:
CJ Ryall for the plaintiff/respondent
R Clutterbuck for the defendant/applicantSOLICITORS:
Robert Palethorpe Solicitors for the plaintiff/respondent
Milburns Law for the defendant/applicant
The defendant applies to stay a summary judgment for possession of her house given by Judge McGill SC on 13 June 2018 in favour of the plaintiff under r. 668(2) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) pending directions for the trial of the issues raised in relation to the judgment.
For the reasons which follow I dismiss the application.
Background
The defendant is the registered proprietor of the dwelling at 104 Todd Street, Torbanlea, (the property) over which an order has been made by the Court granting possession to the plaintiff. She lives there with her husband, Mr Birnie. They are both pensioners of modest means. In about late 2016, they were carrying out renovations to their house as owner builders. They needed $60,000 to complete the work. They sought bridging finance for two months so the work could be completed. They intended to refinance with a major lender once the work was done. It appears there was some urgency to getting the work completed.
There must have been some reason to do with timing or other factors which led them to seek finance from a non-bank lender. On 23 January 2017, they were interviewed by officers of Lightspeed Finance Pty Ltd. They completed an application form. Mr Birnie, the defendant’s husband, was to be the principal debtor. The defendant was to be guarantor. They provided financial information which the defendant submits showed that they did not have the capacity to service the loan. The Loan Application sought no servicing information, only the asset position of the applicants. It sought finance of $60,000 for three months.
Lightspeed requested that Mr Birnie obtain an ABN and complete a “Business Purpose Declaration”. The Finance Application in evidence shows the Business Purpose Declaration to be executed and seems to be part of the Finance Application as initially signed. However the Finance Application was followed up with a request from Lightspeed by email dated 31 January 2017 that the Business Purpose Declaration be signed. I am willing to infer for this application that it was signed subsequently in response to that request. The email also asked…
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- Case
- [2019] QDC 96
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions regarding summary judgment and the introduction of new evidence. The court examined whether the new information could be classified as a fact or if it constituted a legal conclusion, which would not qualify for reconsideration under the rules governing summary judgment. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the new matter was substantial enough to warrant a different outcome or, at the very least, to justify a stay of the existing judgment to allow for further investigation.
The court found that the newly discovered matter was more akin to a legal conclusion rather than a factual discovery. Consequently, the application to set aside the summary judgment was dismissed. The reasoning hinged on the court's interpretation that the new evidence did not meet the threshold for reconsideration under the applicable legal framework. Given this finding, the court did not deem it necessary to stay the judgment, and thus, the application was rejected.
As a result of the court's decision, the summary judgment previously entered against Elghalemi remained in effect, and the application to have it set aside was dismissed. The court did not make any further orders beyond the dismissal of the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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