Brooks v Lane - [2014] TASSC 2

[2014] TASSC 2

COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA

CITATION: Brooks v Lane [2014] TASSC 2

PARTIES:  BROOKS, Karen Maree
  MEDHURST, Felicity Kate
  NASH, Benjamin John

McMAHON, Stuart Peter
v
LANE, Richard

FILE NO:  385/2013, 386/2013, 387/2013 and 388/2013
DELIVERED ON:  30 January 2014
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  31 October 2013
JUDGMENT OF:  Tennent J

CATCHWORDS:

Magistrates – Appeal and review – Tasmania – Motion to review – Other matters – Whether sentence of imprisonment imposed excessive in all the circumstances.

House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499; Dinsdale v R (2000) 202 CLR 32; Bell v Lowe [1988] Tas R (NC 2), followed.
Justices Act 1959 (Tas), s110.
Aust Dig Magistrates [1349]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Applicants:                 G Stevens
             Respondent:              S Nicholson
Solicitors:
             Applicants:                 E. R. Henry Wherrett & Benjamin
             Respondent:              Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment Number: [2014] TASSC 2
Number of paragraphs: 39

Serial No: 2/2014
File Nos: 385/2013, 386/2013, 387/2013, 388/2013

KAREN MAREE BROOKS, FELICITY KATE MEDHURST, BENJAMIN JOHN NASH, STUART PETER McMAHON v RICHARD LANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT TENNENT J

30 January 2014

On 27 March 2013, each of the applicants was convicted and sentenced by Chief Magistrate Hill in respect of offences arising out of an incident at the Mustard Pot Hotel on 1 September 2012. Each applicant has appealed against the sentence imposed. The wording of the grounds of review in each notice to review is identical. Ground 1 was that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. Ground 2 was that the learned magistrate erred in law in sentencing each of the applicants in respect of acts of others with whom an applicant had not been jointly charged. In the alternative, it was asserted the learned magistrate erred in law by imposing a sentence in respect of each applicant which was not disparate from that imposed on the other applicants. That alternative ground was abandoned at the hearing.

It is necessary to look at what each of the applicants pleaded guilty to.

Name

Offence

Particulars

Relevant prior matters

Benjamin John Nash (age 32)

Common assault

By pushing, punching, throwing two punches, taking hold of the complainant and pushing him back several metres

Assault – s7(f) undertaking without conviction

"

Destroy property

By breaking one glass window

"

Failing to comply with the direction of a police officer

Stuart Peter McMahon (age 30)

Common assault

By pushing the complainant to the chest and punching him to the face

Nil

"

Assault a police officer

By punching him to the face

"

Resist police

By struggling, pulling arms away and "wresting"

Karen Maree Brooks (age 36)

Common assault

By pushing the complainant a number of times to the chest, striking to the face using a forearm, striking his arm, shoulder and face, pushing him back several metres, putting her left arm round his neck, pushing him into a wall and biting his arm

2005 – abuse police – s7(h) no conviction

2007 disorderly conduct -s7(h) no conviction

"

Fail to comply with the direction of a…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Brooks v Lane

Details

AGLC: Brooks v Lane [2014] TASSC 2
Case: [2014] TASSC 2
Decision Date: 30 January 2014

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Brooks v Lane, the matter before the Court was an appeal by the respondent against a decision to review a sentence imposed by a Magistrate. The respondent, Lane, had been sentenced to imprisonment for a duration deemed excessive by the reviewing Magistrate. The appellant, Brooks, sought to challenge this decision, arguing that the review was not warranted under the applicable legal principles.

The primary legal issue that the Court was required to decide was whether the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the Magistrate was excessive in all the circumstances. This involved an analysis of the sentencing principles and the discretion afforded to the Magistrate in determining the appropriate penalty. The Court also needed to consider the scope and limits of the reviewing Magistrate's power to alter the original sentence.

The Court examined the nature and severity of the offence, the personal circumstances of the offender, and the principles of sentencing, including deterrence, rehabilitation, and punishment. It was noted that the original sentencing Magistrate had considered these factors and determined that the sentence was appropriate. The reviewing Magistrate, however, had concluded that the sentence was excessive and reduced the term of imprisonment. In assessing the legality of this decision, the Court held that the reviewing Magistrate had not exercised their power appropriately, as the original sentence was within the range of reasonable outcomes. The Court found that the decision to review the sentence was not supported by the evidence and principles of law, leading to the conclusion that the appeal should be upheld.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decision to review the sentence, and reinstated the original sentence imposed by the Magistrate. The Court's decision underscored the importance of adhering to established sentencing principles and the limited scope of review powers in such matters.

Orders