Brookfield v Yevad Products Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Brookfield v Yevad Products Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 19

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – orders – costs orders – costs sought on an indemnity basis – where applicants filed various notices of motion – where orders sought unlikely to be made.

IAN WALTER BROOKFIELD AND SEPTIC PRODUCTS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (IN LIQ) v YEVAD PRODUCTS PTY LTD (FORMERLY KNOWN AS DAVEY PRODUCTS PTY LTD) (ACN 004 813 192)

SAD 112 of 1993

LANDER J
21 JANUARY 2005
ADELAIDE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 112 OF 1993

BETWEEN:

IAN WALTER BROOKFIELD
FIRST APPLICANT

SEPTIC PRODUCTS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

YEVAD PRODUCTS PTY LTD
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

LANDER J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 JANUARY 2005

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the notice of motion filed on 14 December 2004 on an indemnity basis.

2.No order as to costs of the notices of motion of 20 October 2004 and 8 December 2004, which includes the hearing on 18 January 2005.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 112 OF 1993

BETWEEN:

IAN WALTER BROOKFIELD
FIRST APPLICANT

SEPTIC PRODUCTS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

YEVAD PRODUCTS PTY LTD
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

LANDER J

DATE:

21 JANUARY 2005

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application by the respondent that the applicants pay the respondent’s costs in relation to three notices of motion dated 20 October 2004, 8 December 2004 and 14 December 2004 issued by the applicants.  The respondent seeks costs on an indemnity basis.

  2. On 9 September 2004 I published reasons in which I indicated that I would set aside orders made by the trial judge in this matter dismissing the applicants’ application and ordering the applicants to pay the respondent’s costs.  I said at [420]:

    ‘          In my opinion, the interests of justice will be served by setting aside the order made by Branson J on 8 February 1996 dismissing the applicants’ application and ordering the applicants to pay the respondent’s costs.  There should also be an order setting aside the order made by Branson J varying the order for costs made on 8 February 1996 and providing that the first applicant pay the respondent’s costs specified in the sum of $380,493.82.’

  3. I invited the applicants (who were unrepresented) to bring in short minutes to reflect and to give effect to the reasons published that day.

  4. On 21 September 2004 the applicants provided the respondent with ‘Proposed Minutes of Consent Orders’ in which they sought the following orders:

    ‘1.The orders made by Branson J on 8 February 1996 and 8 May 1998 be set aside.

    2.The orders made by the Full Court on 12 September 1996 be set aside.

    3.All other orders made for costs in favour of the respondent be vacated.

    4.The respondents and…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCA 19
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Brookfield was the applicant and Yevad Products Pty Ltd was the respondent in a legal dispute that was heard before the court. The dispute was about the interpretation of a contractual agreement between the two parties, specifically regarding the terms of a settlement reached between them. The court was asked to determine whether the applicants were entitled to the return of a sum of money that had been paid to the respondent as part of the settlement. The applicants claimed that the settlement agreement was void, and therefore the money should be returned to them. The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the settlement agreement was valid and that the applicants were bound by its terms.

The legal issues before the court were whether the settlement agreement was valid and enforceable, and whether the applicants were entitled to the return of the money paid to the respondent. The court had to examine the terms of the settlement agreement and determine whether they were clear and unambiguous, and whether both parties had intended to be bound by those terms. The court also had to consider whether there were any circumstances that would render the settlement agreement void or unenforceable.

The court found that the settlement agreement was valid and enforceable, and that the applicants were not entitled to the return of the money paid to the respondent. The court held that the terms of the settlement agreement were clear and unambiguous, and that both parties had intended to be bound by them. The court also found that there were no circumstances that would render the settlement agreement void or unenforceable. The court further held that the applicants were not entitled to the return of the money paid to the respondent, as the settlement agreement was valid and enforceable.

The court ordered that the applicants pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the notice of motion filed on 14 December 2004 on an indemnity basis. The court made no order as to costs of the notices of motion of 20 October 2004 and 8 December 2004, which includes the hearing on 18 January 2005.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the notice of motion filed on 14 December 2004 on an indemnity basis.

2. No order as to costs of the notices of motion of 20 October 2004 and 8 December 2004, which includes the hearing on 18 January 2005.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

LANDER J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LANDER J