BRJ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BRJ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 588

Appeal from: BRJ15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 3274
File number: NSD 5 of 2017
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 26 May 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court – whether Tribunal’s refusal to delay its decision until the date requested by the appellant was legally unreasonable – application of Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2), 414, 424A, 427

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954)

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967)

Cases cited:

BBS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 61

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332

SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 71; 212 FCR 235

Date of hearing: 18 May 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 43
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr A Markus of Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submits to any order the Court may make save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 5 of 2017
BETWEEN:

BRJ15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MORTIMER J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 MAY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, fixed at $2,557.32, by way of a lump sum.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MORTIMER J

  1. This is an appeal from the orders of the Federal Circuit Court made on 15 December 2016: BRJ15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 3274. The appellant has three grounds of appeal, although it is her third ground of appeal on which she has focused most of her submissions.

  2. For the reasons set out below, the appeal must be dismissed.

    BACKGROUND

  3. The appellant, a national of Malaysia, has been in Australia since April 2010. She entered Australia on a visitor visa but lodged an application for a protection visa approximately three months after she arrived. That visa application was refused, and the appellant was unsuccessful in both merits and judicial review in relation to that refusal. She also sought ministerial intervention, which was also unsuccessful. It is unnecessary to set out…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 588
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of BRJ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a Malaysian national, appealed against the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and the subsequent ruling of the Federal Circuit Court. The appellant had been in Australia since 2010, initially on a visitor visa, and subsequently applied for a protection visa, which was refused. Following a series of unsuccessful appeals and reviews, the appellant applied for another protection visa in January 2014, which was also refused. The AAT found that the appellant did not meet the criteria for complementary protection and did not face a real risk of significant harm upon return to Malaysia. The appellant then sought judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court, arguing that the AAT acted unreasonably by not deferring its decision until a translated copy of a Malaysian police report was provided. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the AAT's decision was not legally unreasonable.

The primary legal issue in this appeal was whether the AAT's refusal to delay its decision until the requested date was legally unreasonable. The appellant argued that the principles of legal unreasonableness as articulated in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh required the AAT to wait for the translated document. The court considered whether the AAT's decision to proceed without the translated report was justified and whether it lacked an evident and intelligible justification. The Federal Circuit Court found that the Tribunal's decision was not unreasonable because the substance of the report was already disclosed, and the Tribunal had accepted the ongoing investigation concerning the appellant's missing mother.

The court's reasoning was that the untranslated copy of the Malay document had already been identified by a Malaysian lawyer and contained facts accepted by the Tribunal, including the ongoing investigation about the appellant's missing mother. The court held that there was no requirement for the Tribunal to wait for the translation of a two-page document when its substance was already known and accepted by the Tribunal. The Federal Circuit Court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was justified and did not lack an evident and intelligible justification. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. The Federal Circuit Court's decision was upheld, affirming that the AAT's refusal to further adjourn the proceedings was not legally unreasonable. The court found that the Tribunal had acted within its discretion and that the principles of legal unreasonableness were not contravened.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, fixed at $2,557.32, by way of a lump sum.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the appeal must be dismissed.BACKGROUND The appellant, a national of Malaysia, has been in Australia since April 2010. She entered Australia on a visitor visa but lodged an application for a protection visa approximately three months after she arrived. That visa application was refused, and the appellant was unsuccessful in both merits and judicial review in relation to that refusal. She also sought ministerial intervention, which was also unsuccessful. It is unnecessary to set out in more detail her attempts to secure a visa prior to January 2014. Those attempts are described in greater detail in both the reasons of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and in the reasons of the Federal Circuit Court. Relevantly for present purposes, the appellant made a further application for a protection visa in January 2014, as a result of the decision of the Full Court of this Court in SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 71; 212 FCR 235. As a result of the Full Court’s decision in SZGIZ, her further application was considered as a valid application in relation to the complementary protection criterion set out in s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). This visa application was also refused and the appellant sought review of that decision in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. As the Tribunal noted in its reasons at [5], it was confined to considering whether the appellant satisfied the requirements of s 36(2)(aa) and (c), there having been in 2010 consideration of whether the appellant satisfied the criteria in s 36(2)(a) in relation to the Refugees Convention (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done at New York on 31 January 1967). Before the Tribunal, the appellant claimed there was a real risk she would suffer significant harm on her return to Malaysia for a number of reasons. They included a debt the appellant claimed she owed to money lenders in Malaysia and harm she feared from them, including a claim (relevant to her grounds of appeal) that these money lenders were involved in the kidnapping of her mother in December 2010. She also made claims that she fears harm from her former boyfriend and his criminal associates, as well as making claims to fear harm because of her Indian Tamil ethnicity and her religion as a Hindu, on the basis that Indian Tamil Hindus in Malaysia experienced discrimination and were treated less favourably than Malays, including by police. The appellant presented material to the Tribunal concerning psychological problems she said she suffered and which she claimed affected her memory and her capacity to give detailed evidence to the Tribunal about some of the events on which her claims were based. At several points in the Tribunal’s reasons, it seems the Tribunal did not find the appellant to be entirely credible. For example, at [33] of its reasons, the Tribunal stated:The Tribunal is not satisfied, having considered all of the evidence, that the applicant has given a truthful account of her experiences in Malaysia or that there is a real risk she will suffer significant harm upon her return to Malaysia.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal published its decision on 22 July 2015. The circumstances in which it did so form a key aspect of the appellant’s grounds of appeal and I will return to those in more detail below. The Federal Circuit Court decision The appellant sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in the Federal Circuit Court and raised two grounds of judicial review. When the matter came on for hearing before the Federal Circuit Court, the appellant was represented by a solicitor and the solicitor informed the Court that only one of the two grounds would be pressed. That ground was:The Tribunal acted unreasonably by failing to defer its decision until the applicant had provided a relevant document as requested by the Tribunal.ParticularsOn 17 July 2015 via email, the Tribunal requested a clear copy of the status of the Police report which is in Malay language. The Tribunal’s email indicates that it would consider the report. The Applicant’s representative in an email dated 20 July 2015 requested further time to provide a translated copy of the Police report because that particular report is in Malay. The Tribunal failed to wait till 27 July 2015 to assess the translated copy of the document and decided to affirm the decision of the delegate on 23 July 2015. It is apparent that this ground of review depended on the principles of legal unreasonableness as they were articulated by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332. The course of events on which the appellant relied is set out in the particulars that I have quoted above. There was no dispute about the factual course of events, and there remains no dispute in this appeal about that course of events. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit Court found it was not legally unreasonable for the Tribunal to proceed to determine the review on 22 July 2015 despite the appellant’s request in an email of 20 July 2015 that the Tribunal wait until she was able to provide a translated copy of the Malaysian police report. The Federal Circuit Court’s reasoning was as follows (at [21]-[22]):… The untranslated copy of the Malay document was squarely identified by the Malayan lawyer as identifying the fact that there was an ongoing investigation in respect of the applicant’s mother who is deemed to be missing. That was a fact that the Tribunal accepted. There was no requirement in the circumstances in the present case for the Tribunal to await a translation in respect of the document, the contents of which had been substantially identified in the covering report by the Malay lawyer, and in respect of which the Tribunal accepted that there was an ongoing investigation.The refusal of the Tribunal to further adjourn the proceedings cannot be said to lack an evident and intelligible justification. It was not unreasonable for the Tribunal in the circumstances of the present case to proceed to determine the application for review without awaiting the translation of the two-page document, the substance of which had already been disclosed to the Tribunal and the content of which in relation to the applicant’s missing mother had been accepted by the Tribunal. Ground 2 fails to make out any jurisdictional error.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established